Hollins v. Monti

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

Dwayne Hollins,

#K78282,

Plaintiff, Case No. 21-cv-1143-SPM

v.

Daniel Monti,

Ms. Johnston, and

Dr. David,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MCGLYNN, District Judge:

Plaintiff Dwayne Hollins, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections

who is currently incarcerated at Shawnee Correctional Center (“Shawnee”), brings

this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his constitutional rights.

Hollins claims that while housed at Shawnee he has been denied adequate medical

treatment, specifically for persistent pain in his lower back. Hollins seeks monetary

damages.

The Complaint is now before the Court for preliminary review pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915A. Under Section 1915A, any portion of a complaint that is legally

frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or

requests money damages from a defendant who by law is immune from such relief

must be dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). At this juncture, the factual allegations

of a pro se complaint are to be liberally construed. Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance

Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).

THE COMPLAINT

Hollins alleges the following: In January of 2021, he began having muscle

spasms in his lower back. (Doc 1, p. 6). The treatment for this issue was delayed. He

submitted several requests to Shawnee’s healthcare facility but did not receive

treatment for an unspecified amount of time.

When Hollins did see a doctor, Dr. David, an appointment for an x-ray was set

for about a week later. A week following his x-ray, he received his results, which

“indicated nothing.” During this time, his condition worsened, causing him great

pain. Dr. David prescribed medication which did not alleviate his symptoms. After

several days of taking his prescribed medication, Hollins notified Shawnee’s

healthcare facility care that his symptoms were persisting. He was scheduled for a

second x-ray and was prescribed by Dr. David the same medication as had been

prescribed previously. Hollins suffered greatly during this time, even requiring

assistance to move.

In 2019, Hollins suffered a similar muscle spasm issue, which was immediately

treated to his satisfaction. Hollins repeatedly asked Dr. David to review his medical

records and to “give [him] the same thing the doctor gave [him] before,” but Dr. David

refused. Hollins wrote several emergency grievances about this issue, but “no one has

responded.”

DISCUSSION

Based on the allegations of the Complaint, the Court finds it convenient to

designate the following counts:

Count 1: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against

Dr. David for delaying and denying Hollins adequate

treatment for his chronic back pain and related medical

issues.

Count 2: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against

Daniel Monti and Ms. Johnston for their role in delaying

and denying Hollins adequate treatment for his chronic

back pain and related medical issues.

The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future pleadings

and orders, unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. Any other

claim that is mentioned in the Complaint but not addressed in this Order

should be considered dismissed without prejudice as inadequately pled

under the Twombly1 pleading standard.

Count 1

To state an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim based on the

denial of medical care, a plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to show that (1) his

medical condition was sufficiently serious, and (2) the defendant acted with deliberate

indifference to his medical needs. Rasho v. Elyea, 856 F.3d 469, 475-76 (7th Cir. 2017);

see also Cooper v. Casey, 97 F.3d 914 (7th Cir. 1996).

Hollins alleges that he suffered great pain as a result of his chronic back

spasms. (Doc 1, p. 6). This condition was so serious that, at times, he needed

assistance walking. As a result, he sought treatment from Shawnee’s healthcare

facility. Dr. David administered x-rays on two separate occasions and prescribed

medication based on his findings. While the “receipt of some medical care does not

• 1 See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).

automatically defeat a claim of deliberate indifference,” Edwards v. Snyder, 478 F.3d

827, 831 (7th Cir. 2007), the facts alleged by Hollins do not plausibly indicate that Dr.

David acted “in an intentional or criminally reckless manner,” despite Hollins’

displeasure with Dr. David’s method of treatment. Board v. Farnham, 294 F.3d 469,

478 (7th Cir. 2005).

Hollins has failed to provide in his complaint any substantive information

about his medical condition or Dr. David’s treatment and knowledge, such as his x-

ray results, the names of the medications prescribed in 2019 or 2021, or diagnosis.

Absent such information, it cannot be plausibly presumed that Dr. David acted with

deliberate indifference to Hollins’ medical needs. Without more supporting factual

detail inferring a departure by Dr. David from medical standards in his treatment of

Hollins’ muscle spasms, Hollins has failed to plead a claim for deliberate indifference.

See Thomas v. Martija, 991 F. 3d 763, 772 (7th Cir. 2021) (it “is not enough that the

plaintiff simply believes the treatment was ineffective or disagrees with the doctor’s

chosen course of treatment.”). Accordingly, Count 1 is dismissed without prejudice.

Count 2

Hollins claims that Shawnee’s warden, Daniel Monti, and its medical director,

Ms. Johnston, knew about Hollins’ delayed and inadequate treatment because of

their positions and titles. He also claims that Monti is subject to liability because, as

warden, Hollins is in his custody.

Here, Hollins has not sufficiently pled a deliberate indifference claim against

Warden Monti and Ms. Johnston. Hollins’ assertions that the two are liable because

their positions and titles placed them in a position where they learned of Hollins’

plight, and that Monti is liable because Hollins was in his custody, are conclusory and

not supported by any factual allegations. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 680

(2009) (courts are not required to assume that conclusory allegations are true, even

early in litigation). It is possible that they could have obtained this knowledge

through their positions, but the facts, as alleged, are insufficient to establish as such.

Furthermore, individual liability under Section 1983 requires “personal

involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Palmer v. Marion County, 327

F.3d 588, 594 (7th Cir. 2003). Hollins has failed to allege actual personal involvement

by Monti or Johnston in his treatment. Accordingly, Count 2 is dismissed without

prejudice as to Daniel Monti and Ms. Johnston.

DISPOSITION

For the reasons stated above, the Complaint, including Counts 1 and 2, does

not survive preliminary review pursuant to Section 1915A and is DISMISSED

without prejudice for failure to state a claim.

Hollins is GRANTED leave to file a “First Amended Complaint” on or before

August 5, 2022. It is strongly recommended that Hollins use the civil rights

complaint form designed for use in this District. He should label the form, “First

Amended Complaint,” and he should use the case number for this action (No. 21-cv-

01143-SPM). Further, Hollins should identify each defendant in the case caption and

include sufficient allegations against each defendant to describe what the defendant

did or failed to do to violate his constitutional rights, see DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901

F.2d 624, 627 (7th Cir. 1990) (a successful complaint generally alleges “the who, what,

when, where, and how....”), and as much as possible, include the relevant facts in

chronological order, inserting each defendant's name where necessary to identify the

actors and each defendant’s actions. To enable him to comply with this Order, the

CLERK is DIRECTED to mail Hollins a blank civil rights complaint form.

An amended complaint generally supersedes and replaces the original

complaint, rendering the original complaint void. See Flannery v. Recording Indus.

Ass’n of Am., 354 F.3d 632, 638 n. 1 (7th Cir. 2004). The First Amended Complaint

must stand on its own without reference to any previous pleading. The First Amended

Complaint is also subject to review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

If Hollins fails to file a First Amended Complaint within the allotted time or

consistent with the instructions in this Order, the entire case shall be dismissed with

prejudice for failure to comply with a court order and/or for failure to prosecute his

claims. FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b); Ladien v. Astrachan, 128 F.3d 1051 (7th Cir. 1997);

Johnson v. Kamminga, 34 F.3d 466 (7th Cir. 1994); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The

dismissal shall also count as one of his three allotted “strikes” under 28 U.S.C. §

1915(g).

Hollins is ADVISED that his obligation to pay the filing fee for this action was

incurred at the time the action was filed, thus the filing fee remains due and payable,

regardless of whether he files a First Amended Complaint. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1);

Lucien v. Jockisch, 133 F.3d 464, 467 (7th Cir. 1998).

Finally, Hollins is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep

the Clerk of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address;

the Court will not independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in

writing and not later than 7 days after a transfer or other change in address occurs.

Failure to comply with this Order will cause a delay in the transmission of court

documents and may result in dismissal of this action for want of prosecution. See

FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 8, 2022

s/Stephen P. McGlynn

STEPHEN P. MCGLYNN

United States District Judge

NOTICE TO PLAINTIFF

The Court will take the necessary steps to notify the appropriate defendants of your

lawsuit and serve them with a copy of your complaint. After service has been

achieved, the defendants will enter their appearance and file an Answer to the

complaint. It will likely take at least 60 days from the date of this Order to receive

the defendants’ Answers, but it is entirely possible that it will take 90 days or more.

When all of the defendants have filed Answers, the Court will enter a Scheduling

Order containing important information on deadlines, discovery, and procedures.

Plaintiff is advised to wait until counsel has appeared for the defendants before filing

any motions, to give the defendants notice and an opportunity to respond to those

motions. Motions filed before defendants’ counsel has filed an appearance will

generally be denied as premature. Plaintiff need not submit any evidence to the Court

at his time, unless otherwise directed by the Court.