The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
TYRONE SMITH, N01634, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 19-cv-637-RJD
)
JOHN BALDWIN, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
DALY, Magistrate Judge:
Plaintiff, an inmate within the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC), filed this suit
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging Defendants violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights of the U.S. Constitution. Plaintiff received three disciplinary tickets for the same incident
that occurred at Stateville Correctional Center in January 2018. Plaintiff then transferred to
Menard Correctional Center (“Menard”) and following three disciplinary hearings he was found
guilty of the third ticket and punished with six months of segregation. While in segregation,
Plaintiff alleges that he endured filthy living conditions and was denied cleaning supplies, hygiene
items, and clothing. He only had access to dirty water, which made him ill and made his skin
itch.
After the Court conducted a threshold review pursuant to 42 USC §1915A and ruled on the
issue of administrative remedy exhaustion, Plaintiff’s case proceeded on the following claims:
Count 1: Fourteenth Amendment claim against Mitchell, Hart, Brookman and
Lashbrook for depriving Plaintiff of a protected liberty interest
without due process of law by punishing him for his third re-issued
ticket with six months of segregation in unusually harsh conditions
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after expunging his first and second tickets for the same offense.
Count 3: Eighth Amendment claim against Mitchell, Hart, Brookman,
Lashbrook, and Baldwin for subjecting Plaintiff to unconstitutional
conditions of confinement in segregation at Menard as punishment
for the third ticket.
Count 4: Eighth Amendment claim against Lashbrook and Baldwin for their
deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s complaints about unsanitary
drinking water and his related illness.
This matter now comes before the Court on Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
(Docs. 63 and 64). Plaintiff filed a Response (Doc. 65).
Factual Background
Plaintiff resided at Stateville Correctional Center (“Stateville”) in January 2018.
According to a Disciplinary Report authored by Defendant Mitchell, two females visited Plaintiff
and another inmate on January 14, 2018 (Doc. 64-16, p. 1). Defendant Mitchell testified at his
deposition that he observed the visit from the Investigations Office (Doc. 64-10, p. 10). During
the visit, the females changed seats several times and bought several food items from the vending
machines (Doc. 64-16, p. 1). One of the females retrieved a small package from her boot and
placed it inside a potato chip bag (Id.). Correctional staff escorted Plaintiff and the other inmate
from the visitor room, and other intel/internal affairs staff observed Plaintiff dropping a small
package on the floor (Id. p. 2). Testing performed by the Illinois State Police revealed the
substance contained opiates (Id.). Plaintiff contends in his Response that the “facts” related to
the January 14, 2018 visit are disputed but cites no portion of the record to explain the dispute.
The following facts, however, are not disputed. Plaintiff was placed on “Investigative
Status” on January 14, 2018 (Doc. 64-10, p. 26). An intel officer at Stateville wrote Plaintiff a
disciplinary ticket for violation of Department Rule 203 (“Drugs and Drug Paraphernalia”) related
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to “drug test” (Doc. 64-17, p. 1). Another officer wrote Plaintiff a second ticket for violating Rule
203 by failing to provide a urine sample (Id., p. 2). Plaintiff transferred to Menard, and the
Menard Adjustment Committee (consisting of Defendants Hart and Brookman) dismissed both
tickets (Doc. 64-17).
Defendant Thompson testified that IDOC Rule 504.30 requires that an investigation last
no more than 30 days (Doc. 64-10, p. 31-32). On May 8, 2018, Defendant Thompson completed
a disciplinary report for the January 13, 2018 incident (Doc. 64-16). Defendant Thompson
testified that he could not complete the report sooner because he did not have verification from the
ISP regarding composition of the confiscated substance (Doc. 64-10, p. 15). Plaintiff received
the disciplinary report on May 10, 2018 (Doc. 64-16, p. 1; Doc. 64-3, p. 2). Prison staff
immediately transferred him to segregation (Doc. 64-2, p. 5). In segregation, Plaintiff’s mattress
was not covered in plastic (as mattresses elsewhere in the prison were) and it smelled of “someone
else’s urine.” There was feces and black and yellow “stuff” on the walls. There was trash on the
floor.
Defendants Brookman and Hart held an Adjustment Committee hearing on May 15, 2018
(Doc. 64-15, p. 1) Plaintiff pleaded not guilty “because it is out of time allowance” (Id.).
Plaintiff received notice of the disciplinary report more than 24 hours before the hearing. He did
not call any witnesses. Plaintiff was found guilty of a “drugs and drug paraphernalia” offense
related to opiates and received six months in segregation, as well as restrictions in commissary and
contact visits (Id.). He received a copy of the final report that described the evidence relied upon
by the committee and the reason for the disciplinary action. At the hearing, Plaintiff told
Defendant Brookman about the conditions of his cell in segregation (Doc. 64-2, p. 4-5). He did
not, however, discuss the conditions of his cell with Defendant Hart (Doc. 64-2, p. 4).
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On multiple occasions in May and June 2018, Plaintiff wrote letters to Defendants
Lashbrook (Warden at Menard) and Baldwin (Director of the IDOC) regarding the conditions in
segregation. Warden Lashbrook made rounds in segregation, and Plaintiff spoke with her on five
or six occasions regarding the conditions of his cell in segregation; Warden Lashbrook does not
recall these conversations. Plaintiff never met Defendant Mitchell (an officer in the Investigations
Unit at Stateville), so he never told him about the conditions of his cell in segregation.
The water in Plaintiff’s segregation cell made him sick. It tasted like there were sand
grains in it. His hands itched constantly and his skin peeled. Plaintiff wrote letters regarding the
water to Defendants Lashbrook and Baldwin. In his verified Complaint, Plaintiff stated that he
“let Defendants Lashbrook, Baldwin…[sic] with his letters and grievances that he wrote and sent
to them which is the proper procedure for putting the prison and the officials on notice of a
problem…Defendants never responded back to Plaintiff’s complaints so they turned a blind eye to
the problem.” There is no record that Defendants Lashbrook or Baldwin ever saw a grievance
from Plaintiff that mentioned the water in his cell made him sick and irritated his skin. Plaintiff
attached two grievances to his Complaint regarding the conditions in segregation (Doc. 6, p.39-
41). One of those grievances (dated May 17, 2018) mentioned that “the hot water doesn’t work
so I’m unable to wash up in my cell” (Id. p. 41). The other grievance (dated August 4, 2018)
mentions that he had “started to itch and I’ve got some bumps all over my body.” (Id. p. 40).
Plaintiff did not sign those grievances and there is no record that any prison official received and/or
reviewed them.
Plaintiff submitted multiple grievances regarding the disciplinary tickets that were
expunged, the report authored by Defendant Mitchell, and the hearing with Defendant Brookman
and Hart (Doc. 64-12; Doc. 64-14); Plaintiff signed those grievances and Defendant Lashbrook
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reviewed and issued a decision on at least one of them, concurring with a grievance officer at
Menard that Plaintiff’s disciplinary action related to the May 8, 2018 disciplinary report “shall
remain as imposed” (Doc. 64-12, p. 1). However, the IDOC Administrative Review Board
ultimately recommended, after a “compliance check of the procedural due process safeguards
outlined in DR504,” that the disciplinary report “be expunged due to non-compliance with
DR504.3” (Doc. 64-11). On November 29, 2018, Defendant Baldwin instructed the Adjustment
Committee and Records office at Menard to expunge the disciplinary report (Id.).
Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate only if the moving party can demonstrate “that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322(1986); see also Ruffin-
Thompkins v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc., 422 F.3d 603, 607 (7th Cir. 2005). The
moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the lack of any genuine issue of material
fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Once a properly supported motion for summary judgment is
made, the adverse party “must set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact exists
when “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
Estate of Simpson v. Gorbett, 863 F.3d 740, 745 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at
248). In considering a summary judgment motion, the district court views the facts in the light
most favorable to, and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of, the nonmoving party. Apex
Digital, Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 735 F.3d 962, 965 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
Count I: Deprivation of Due Process (14th Amendment)
The 14th Amendment prohibits the state from depriving persons (including prisoners) of
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“life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” Scruggs v. Jordan, 485 F.3d 934, 938 (7th
Cir. 2007) (citing U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV §1). Of course, “prison officials must necessarily
restrict the liberty of those they house.” Id. (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56
(1974)). To prevail, a prisoner must establish that 1) “he has a liberty or property interest that the
state has interfered with”; and 2) “the procedures he was afforded upon that deprivation were
constitutionally deficient.” Defendants urge the Court to go no farther in its analysis than
determining whether Plaintiff had a liberty or property interest with which Defendants interfered.
Defendants point to case law finding that six months in segregation, by itself, does not trigger a
liberty interest. Hardaway v. Meyerhoff, 734 F.3d 740, 743-44 (7th Cir. 2013). However,
Plaintiff contends that he was subjected to unconstitutional conditions of confinement during his
stay in segregation, namely, that his cell was filthy and unsanitary. A prisoner’s time in
segregation may invoke the 14th Amendment’s procedural protections if it is constitutes “an
atypical and significant hardship when compared to the ordinary incidents of prison life.”
Townsend v. Cooper, 759 F.3d 678, 685-86 (7th Cir. 2014). For example, the plaintiff in
Townsend “easily met this standard” by describing how he was denied clothing, bedding, or a
mattress for weeks and months at a time. Id. at 683.
Regardless of whether the filth in Plaintiff’s segregation cell was so significant that it
invokes the 14th Amendment, the record reflects that Plaintiff was afforded the appropriate
procedural protections. Prisoners in disciplinary proceedings are entitled to: “1) advance (at least
24 hours before hearing) written notice of the claimed violation; 2) the opportunity to
be heard before an impartial decision maker; 3) the opportunity to call witnesses and present
documentary evidence (when consistent with institutional safety); or 4) a written statement by the
fact-finder of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action.” Scruggs, 485
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F.3d at 938 (quoting Rasheed-Bey v. Duckworth, 969 F.2d 357, 361 (7th Cir. 1992). Plaintiff
received the disciplinary report more than 24 hours before the hearing and, after the hearing, he
received a written statement from the Adjustment Committee that contained the evidence they
relied upon and the reason for the disciplinary action. The record contains no evidence that
Plaintiff was denied the opportunity to call witnesses or present documentary evidence, or that he
was not heard before an impartial decision maker. Accordingly, the undisputed evidence in the
record reflects that the disciplinary report and May 15, 2018 hearing comported with the
procedural protections required by the 14th Amendment.
Plaintiff, however, contends that he “was not given even minimal due process” at the May
15, 2018 hearing because Defendants Brookman and Hart proceeded with the hearing on the
disciplinary report despite Plaintiff’s objection that it was “out of time.” At his deposition,
Defendant Thompson (who wrote the report) seemed to concede that it was “out of time” pursuant
to Department Rule 504.3 because the investigation lasted longer than 30 days (Doc. 64-10, p. 31-
32). Rule 504.3 is the rule relied upon by the ARB when recommending the report be expunged
(a recommendation that Defendant Baldwin enforced), but the ARB did not state which provision
of Rule 504.3 was violated. The parties do not cite or quote Rule 504.3 in their briefings-they
simply adopt Defendant Thompson’s deposition testimony as accurate. In the interests of
accuracy and completeness, the Court provides Rule 504.3 in its entirety:
a) Every employee has the duty to observe the conduct of offenders.
b) If an employee observes an offender committing an offense, discovers evidence of its
commission or receives information from a reliable witness of the conduct, the employee
shall promptly prepare a disciplinary report. However, if the infraction is listed in the 400
series in Table A and the employee determines a disciplinary report is not necessary to
resolve the situation, the employee may orally reprimand the offender.
c) The disciplinary report must be fully completed. The reporting employee shall provide
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the following information to the extent known or available:
1) The name and identification number of the offender.
2) The place, time and date of the offense.
3) The offense that the offender is alleged to have committed.
4) A written statement detailing the conduct observed.
5) The names of offenders, employees and visitors who were witnesses. The
identity of witnesses may be withheld for reasons of security provided a statement
to that effect and the information the confidential source provided are included on
the disciplinary report to the extent the information can be included without
jeopardizing security.
6) The signature of the reporting employee and the date and time the report is
completed.
d) If an offender is suspected of committing a disciplinary offense, an investigative
disciplinary report, hereinafter referred to as an investigative report, shall be issued that
reasonably informs the offender of the subject of the investigation to the extent that safety
and security allow. In no event shall an investigative report be served upon an offender
more than eight calendar days after the suspected commission of an offense or the
discovery of an offense, whichever is later, unless the offender is unavailable or unable to
participate in the proceeding.
e) Service of a disciplinary report upon the offender shall commence the disciplinary
proceeding. In no event shall a disciplinary report be served upon an offender more than
eight calendar days after the commission of an offense or the discovery of an offense
unless the offender is unavailable or unable to participate in the proceeding.
20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.3. (Amended at 41 Ill. Reg. 3869, effective 4/1/2017).
It appears to the Court that Plaintiff should have received the disciplinary report eight days
after the offense-not 30-but he received it more than 90 days after the incident. Regardless, the
Seventh Circuit has “repeatedly rejected the notion that any and all state prison rules and
regulations [involving mandatory language]” trigger the due process clause. Colon v. Schneider,
899 F.2d 660, 669 (7th Cir. 1990). To determine whether a state prison rule/regulation creates a
“federally protected liberty interest”, the Court looks at the language of the rule/regulation.
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Regulations that “guide the prison staff rather than the inmates” do not “create a protectable liberty
interest.” Id. Department Rule 504.3 directs prison staff in their investigations and report-
writing. It does not direct the actions of the inmates. As the Supreme Court and Seventh Circuit
have frequently stated, “federal courts should be reluctant to restrict unnecessarily (for example,
by recognizing federal liberty interests) the judgment of experienced prison administrators,
especially those involving internal prison security and discipline.” Id. Because the parties do not
dispute that Plaintiff was afforded the required due process protections for the disciplinary
proceeding that resulted in six months segregation, summary judgment is granted in favor of
Defendants on Count I.
Count III: Unconstitutional conditions of confinement (8th Amendment)
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Mitchell, Hart, Brookman, Lashbrook, and Baldwin
subjected him to filthy conditions in his segregation cell. Subjecting a prisoner to inhumane
conditions violates “the essence of the Eighth Amendment.” Thomas v. Blackard, 2 F. 4th 716,
720 (7th Cir. 2021) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). To prevail on this
claim, Plaintiff must establish that: 1) he was denied “the minimal civilized measure of life’s
necessities” (an objective inquiry) that created “an excessive risk to the inmate’s health and safety”
and 2) Defendants “knew of and disregarded this excessive risk of harm” to Plaintiff (a subjective
inquiry). Id. (internal citations omitted).
Plaintiff’s description of his cell-feces and “black and yellow stuff” on the walls, trash on
the floor, a urine-soaked mattress (not his own) creates a genuine issue of material fact regarding
whether he was subjected to an excessive risk to his health, as does his testimony that he was
denied cleaning supplies. See Vinning-El v. Long, 482 F.3d 923, 924 (7th Cir. 2007) (internal
citations and quotations omitted). Prison officials must “provide ‘reasonably
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adequate..sanitation, bedding, hygienic materials.” Id. (quoting Gills v. Litscher, 468 F.3d 493
(7th Cir. 2006)).
For the subjective inquiry, Plaintiff must provide evidence that Defendants were aware of
the conditions in his cell. He has satisfied this inquiry for Defendants Lashbrook and Brookman,
despite their testimony that they do not remember communicating with him and their argument
that the “record is simply void of any evidence” that they knew about the conditions in his cell.
Plaintiff testified that he spoke with Defendant Lashbrook about the conditions in his cell on five
or six occasions when she conducted rounds in segregation. He only spoke with Defendant
Brookman on one occasion (at the May 15, 2018 hearing) about the conditions in his cell, but
because Plaintiff has testified that such a conversation occurred, the Court cannot find that the
record is void of evidence that Defendant Brookman (or Defendant Lashbrook) were unaware of
the conditions in Plaintiff’s cell. Consequently, whether Defendants Lashbrook and/or Brookman
knew of and disregarded an excessive risk of harm to Plaintiff are questions for the jury.
The same is not true for Defendants Mitchell, Hart, and Baldwin. The record reflects that
Defendant Mitchell had no knowledge of the conditions in Plaintiff’s cell in segregation at Menard;
Defendant Mitchell worked at Stateville and Plaintiff admitted that he never told Defendant
Mitchell about those conditions (Doc. 64-2, p. 4). Plaintiff likewise testified that he did not tell
Defendant Hart about the conditions in his cell (Id.). Plaintiff stated in his verified Complaint
that he sent Defendant Baldwin letters regarding the conditions of his cell, but no evidence suggests
that Defendant Baldwin actually received and reviewed those letters. Without evidence that
suggests Defendant Baldwin actually read the letters, the Court cannot infer that he was aware of
the conditions in Plaintiff’s segregation cell. Because Plaintiff has failed to produce evidence that
Defendants Baldwin, Hart, and Mitchell were aware of an excessive risk of harm to his health,
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summary judgment is granted in their favor.
Count IV: Deliberate indifference (8th Amendment)
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Lashbrook and Baldwin were deliberately indifferent to
the water provided to Plaintiff in segregation. To prevail on Count IV, Plaintiff must establish
that Defendants Lashbrook and Baldwin knew of and “consciously disregarded a substantial risk
of harm” to Plaintiff because of the water in his segregation cell. See Rasho v. Jeffreys, 22 F.4th
703, 710 (7th Cir. 2022). There is no record in the evidence that either Defendant Lashbrook or
Baldwin were aware that there was sand in the water in Plaintiff’s cell, or that his skin was itching
and peeling after washing in it. Plaintiff stated in his verified Complaint that he sent Defendants
Lashbrook and Baldwin letters regarding the water. However, simply because Plaintiff sent
Defendants grievances and letters does not mean they received them, reviewed them, and therefore
knew about the water. The record is devoid of any evidence that Defendants actually received any
letters or grievances from Plaintiff regarding the water in his cell or otherwise knew about the
water in his cell. Accordingly, summary judgment is appropriate in favor of Defendants on Count
IV.
Qualified Immunity
Finally, Defendants contend that summary judgment should be awarded in their favor
because they are shielded by the doctrine of qualified immunity. To evaluate the defense of
qualified immunity, the Court determines whether Defendants’ conduct violated a constitutional
right and whether that specific constitutional right was “clearly established at the time of the
alleged violation.” The Court has already determined that there is no genuine issue of material
fact regarding whether Defendants violated Plaintiff’s 14th Amendment right in Count I, or Eighth
Amendment right in Count IV, or whether Defendants Mitchell, Hart, or Baldwin violated
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Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment right in Count III. A genuine issue of material fact exists regarding
whether Defendants Lashbrook and/or Brookman violated Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment right in
Count III by subjecting him to unconstitutional conditions of confinement. However, in 2018
case law clearly established that subjecting an inmate to a cell covered in feces and other bodily
excrement constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Vinning-El, 482 F.3d at 924. Defendants
Lashbrook and Brookman are therefore not entitled to summary judgment on their qualified
immunity defense.
CONCLUSION
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 63) is GRANTED IN PART and
DENIED IN PART. Summary judgment is granted in favor of Defendants on Count I, in favor
of Defendants Mitchell, Hart, and Baldwin on Count III, and in favor of Defendants Lashbrook
and Baldwin on Count IV. Count I of Plaintiff’s Complaint against Defendants Mitchell, Hart,
Brookman and Lashbrook is dismissed with prejudice. Count III of Plaintiff’s Complaint against
Defendants Mitchell, Hart, and Baldwin is dismissed with prejudice. Count IV against
Defendants Lashbrook and Brookman is dismissed with prejudice. The Clerk of Court is
directed to enter judgment accordingly at the close of the case.
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment in favor of Defendants Lashbrook and
Brookman on Count III is DENIED. This case proceeds to trial on Count III against Defendant
Lashbook and Brookman only.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: July 1, 2022
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s/ Reona J. Daly
Hon. Reona J. Daly
United States Magistrate Judge
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