Opinion

Howe v. Godinez

Court
District Court, S.D. Illinois
Filed
Jun 7, 2022
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 21.3%

"If the movant can make these threshold showings, the court then moves on to balance the relative harms considering all four factors using a 'sliding scale' approach."

How later courts described this case

  • "If the movant can make these threshold showings, the court then moves on to balance the relative harms considering all four factors using a 'sliding scale' approach."

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

JAMES G. HOWE, )

TIMOTHY CHARLES, )

JACOB KALLAL, and )

GEORGE NEEDS, )

) Case No. 14-cv-844-SMY

Plaintiffs, )

)

vs. )

)

SALVADORE GODINEZ, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

YANDLE, District Judge:

Plaintiffs, civil detainees classified as "sexually dangerous persons" under the Sexually

Dangerous Persons Act ("SDPA"), 725 ILCS 205/0.1, et seq, filed the instant action pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants are violating their constitutional rights. Following a

bench trial, the Court ordered the following permanent injunctive relief on September 6, 2021:

1. Beginning no later than 30 days from the entry of this Order, Plaintiffs shall

receive a minimum of 7.5 hours of core group therapy per week – each core group

therapy session shall last no less than 90 minutes;

2. All offense specific and didactic groups that are currently suspended shall be

reinstated and permanently maintained beginning no later than 30 days from the

entry of this Order;

3. Within 6 months from the entry of this Order, recovery/release evaluations shall

be conducted of the plaintiffs herein by independent psychologists or psychiatrists

(not employed by IDOC or Wexford). No later than 30 days from the entry of this

Order, Defendants shall provide Plaintiffs and the Court with a list of proposed

independent psychologists/psychiatrists to conduct said evaluations. Plaintiffs

shall file any objections to the proposed providers within 30 days thereafter.

(Doc. 286).

In October 2021, Defendants filed a motion to amend the judgment (Doc. 289) and a

motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62(c) requesting to stay enforcement of the Order

(Doc. 291); both motions were denied (Docs. 296, 300). Defendants filed a Notice of Appeal on

March 7, 2022 (Doc. 302).

Defendants’ Motion to Stay Compliance with the Court’s September 6, 2021, Order and

Permanent Injunction Order (Doc. 310) is now before the Court. Plaintiffs filed a Response in

opposition to the motion (Doc. 311).1 For the following reasons, the motion is DENIED.

Discussion

Rule 62(c) authorizes a court to suspend modify, restore, or grant an injunction during the

pendency of an appeal over an injunction (or the denial of one). Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(c); 11 Fed.

Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2904 (3d ed. 2015). A stay under such circumstances is “extraordinary

relief” for which the moving party bears a “heavy burden.” Winston–Salem/Forsyth County

Board of Education v. Scott, 404 U.S. 1221, 1231 (1971) (Burger, C.J., in chambers) (denying

stay of school desegregation order). In deciding whether to grant a motion to stay pending appeal,

the Court considers: (1) "whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely

to succeed on the merits" on appeal; (2) "whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent

a stay"; (3) "whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in

the proceeding"; and (4) "where the public interest lies." Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776

(1987). Here, Defendants raise the same arguments made and rejected in their post-trial motions

and previous motion to stay – that this Court should stay compliance with the Injunctive Order

1 As there are no material factual disputes to be resolved, and given the parties detailed written submissions and

exhibits, a hearing on the instant motion is unnecessary. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Hearing (Doc. 314) is

DENIED.

due to the likelihood of success on the merits at the appellate level regarding injunctive relief

under the PLRA, the irreparable harm to Defendants, and ongoing staffing issues.

In the Rule 62(c) context, whether the movant can demonstrate a likelihood of success on

the merits and irreparable harm is a threshold issue. In re Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 115 F.3d

1294, 1300 (7th Cir. 1997) ("If the movant can make these threshold showings, the court then

moves on to balance the relative harms considering all four factors using a 'sliding scale'

approach."). To satisfy the first factor, a movant must "demonstrate a substantial showing of

likelihood of success, not merely the possibility of success." Id. At 1301. Moreover, because a

movant's arguments have likely been previously evaluated by the court, the movant "must make

a stronger threshold showing of likelihood of success to meet its burden" Id.

Defendants have not met their threshold burden. Their main argument is that the Court

exceeded its authority by crafting an injunction that runs afoul of the Prison Litigation Reform

Act (“PLRA”). The Court disagrees. Recognizing that injunctive measures ordered against a

state agency or official must be no broader than necessary to remedy a constitutional violation,

the Court limited application of its Order to the named individual Plaintiffs and tailored the

injunctive relief to remedy the specific constitutional deprivations established by the evidence:

requiring Defendants to provide Plaintiffs with hours of treatment consistent with the generally

accepted standards for sex offender treatment; and to provide Plaintiffs’ release evaluations to be

conducted by independent psychologists or psychiatrists. Thus, the Permanent Injunction issued

does not run afoul of the PLRA.

Defendants also maintain that, to the extent the Injunctive Order prohibits recovery

evaluations from being conducted by Wexford contractors, compliance would cause irreparable

harm to Defendants and the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”) because IDOC

contracts with Wexford to provide healthcare to individuals housed in IDOC facilities, and it

would be burdensome for IDOC to pay for new evaluators while also paying Wexford for their

services. But this is speculative harm, unsupported by evidence.

Finally, Defendants argue that a stay would not substantially harm Plaintiffs as “treatment

is ongoing”. However, according to the affidavits submitted by Defendants, no SDP groups were

held from March 2020 to sometime in Fall 2021 or from December 2021 to March 2022. And

while SDP groups resumed in March 2022, numerous groups have been cancelled and not

rescheduled. Defendants blame staffing issues for the lack of consistent treatment and contend

that they are doing their best to ensure that staffing levels increase. These excuses simply don’t

cut it. Defendants cannot fulfill the requirement to treat Plaintiffs for the disorders that led to

their confinement with the cessation of essential programs and subpar hours of group therapy.

Conclusion

Defendants have failed to meet their threshold burden of showing a likelihood of success

nor that it will suffer irreparable harm. Accordingly, the motion to stay compliance is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 7, 2022

Mood Gee

STACI M. YANDLE

United States District Judge

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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