McDonald v. Williams

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

TODD MCDONALD, )

)

)

Petitioner, )

) Civil No. 21-cv-1708-DWD

vs. )

)

WILLIAMS, )

Respondent. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DUGAN, District Judge:

Petitioner Todd McDonald, a federal inmate incarcerated at FCI Greenville, brings

this habeas action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. He presents several challenges to the

conviction he received after a jury trial in the Western District of Arkansas.

This matter is now before the Court for preliminary review. Rule 4 of the Federal

Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in United States District Courts provides that upon

preliminary consideration by the district judge, “[i]f it plainly appears from the petition

and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court,

the judge must dismiss the petition and direct the clerk to notify the petitioner.” Rule 1(b)

gives this Court the authority to apply the rules to other habeas corpus cases.

BACKGROUND

On April 5, 2017, McDonald was charged in a five-count Indictment issued by a

Federal Grand Jury for the Western District of Arkansas. USA v. McDonald, 17-cr-60014,

(“criminal case”). Counts One and Two charged McDonald with online enticement of a

minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) (Criminal Case, Doc. 9). Count Three charged

McDonald with knowingly receiving child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§

2252A(a)(2) and (b). Id. Count Four charged McDonald with knowingly possessing a

computer containing images of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§

2552A(a)(5)(B) and (b)(2). Id. Count Five charged McDonald with possession of

ammunition as a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). Id.

On October 10, 2017, McDonald pled guilty to Counts One and Five of the

Indictment (Criminal Case, Doc. 24). On November 7, 2018, McDonald was sentenced to

210 months imprisonment based upon a guideline range of 168 to 210 months

imprisonment (Criminal Case, doc. 42). Thereafter, McDonald filed an appeal and two

2255 petitions, all of which were denied (Criminal Case Docs. 55, 64, 78).

THE PETITION

McDonald raises four grounds for relief in his § 2241 petition (Doc. 1): (1) he was

not conversing with a minor; (2) he lacked the requisite intent and did not take a

“substantial step” toward commission of the predicate offense; (3) he did not know it was

illegal for a felon to possess ammunition under federal law; and (4) he was not served

with a copy of the warrant. As to the claim that his conviction should be overturned

because he was not conversing with a minor, McDonald indicates that he has newly

discovered evidence (Facebook messages) demonstrating that he was conversing with

the minor victim’s mother, and that this newly discovered evidence warrants

consideration under § 2241. McDonald also states as follows regarding why the remedy

under § 2255 is inadequate or ineffective to challenge his conviction:

U.S. Attorney for Western Arkansas District believes speech is a substantial

step, will not acknowledge the legal definition of a minor under Part G

Promoting a commercial sex act or prohibited sexual conduct, will not

acknowledge new evidence, and will not acknowledge Rehaif Supreme

Court decision.

(Doc. 1, p. 5).

SECTION 2241

Generally, petitions for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 may not be

employed to raise claims of legal error in conviction or sentencing; they may only

challenge the execution of a sentence. See Valona v. United States, 138 F.3d 693, 694 (7th

Cir. 1998). Thus, aside from the direct appeal process, a prisoner who has been convicted

in federal court is ordinarily limited to challenging his conviction and sentence by

bringing a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See Kramer v. Olson, 347 F.3d 214, 217 (7th

Cir. 2003). Additionally, in some instances, he may file a “second or successive” § 2255

motion.

In limited circumstances, however, a petitioner may employ § 2241 to challenge

his federal conviction or sentence. Webster v. Daniels, 784 F.3d 1123, 1124 (7th Cir. 2015)

(en banc). Specifically, under § 2255(e) (the “savings clause”), a federal prisoner may seek

relief under § 2241 if it “appears that the remedy by motion [under § 2255] is inadequate

or ineffective to test the legality of [the] detention.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e); Roundtree v.

Krueger, 910 F.3d 312, 313 (7th Cir. 2018). The Seventh Circuit has held that § 2255 is

“ ‘inadequate or ineffective’ when it cannot be used to address novel developments in

either statutory or constitutional law, whether those developments concern the

conviction or the sentence.” Roundtree, 910 F.3d at 313 (citing e.g., In re Davenport, 147 F.3d

605 (7th Cir. 1998). Whether § 2255 is inadequate or ineffective “focus[es] on procedures

rather than outcomes.” Taylor v. Gilkey, 314 F.3d 832, 835 (7th Cir. 2002). In In re Davenport,

the Seventh Circuit stated as follows as to the savings clause:

A procedure for postconviction relief can be fairly termed inadequate when

it is so configured as to deny a convicted defendant any opportunity for

judicial rectification of so fundamental a defect in his conviction as having

been imprisoned for a nonexistent offense.

In re Davenport, 147 F.3d at 611.

“[S]omething more than a lack of success with a section 2255 motion must exist

before the savings clause is satisfied.” Webster, 784 F.3d at 1136. Specifically, to fit within

the savings clause following Davenport, a petitioner must meet three conditions: "(1) the

petitioner must rely on a case of statutory interpretation (because invoking such a case

cannot secure authorization for a second § 2255 motion); (2) the new rule must be

previously unavailable and apply retroactively; and (3) the error asserted must be grave

enough to be deemed a miscarriage of justice, such as the conviction of an innocent

defendant." Davis v. Cross, 863 F.3d 962, 964 (7th Cir. 2017); Brown v. Caraway, 719 F.3d

583, 586 (7th Cir. 2013).

DISCUSSION

A. Newly Discovered Evidence

McDonald claims he is actually innocent of the enticement conviction because he

was not conversing with a minor. He contends he can proceed on this claim because it

involves newly discovered evidence. Section 2255 allows a second or successive motion

in such circumstances. Specifically, § 2255(h)(1) permits a second or successive motion

“when it contains ‘newly discovered evidence that, if proven and viewed in light of the

evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence

that no reasonable factfinder would have found the movant guilty of the offense.’ ”

Mandacina v. Entzel, 991 F.3d 758, 762 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(1)).

Because § 2255(h)(1) provides an avenue for McDonald to seek relief, there is no structural

flaw in § 2255 that would permit him to proceed under § 2241.1 See id. (holding that

petitioner could not use § 2241 to present Brady claim because petitioner's argument fell

within § 2255(h)(1) and his inability to meet the threshold of § 2255(h)(1) showed only

“that he [could not] obtain relief, not that there's a structural flaw” in § 2255).

Accordingly, McDonald cannot present this claim in a § 2241 petition.

B. Knowledge Regarding Ammunition

McDonald claims that because he did not know it was illegal for a felon to possess

ammunition, he is actually innocent of this charge. In support of this claim, McDonald

cites to Rehaif v. United States, 139 S.Ct. 2191 (2019). Rehaif, involved a challenge to a

conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), which makes it unlawful for certain individuals to

possess firearms or ammunition. The Supreme Court held that "in a prosecution under

18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and § 924(a)(2), the Government must prove both that the defendant

knew he possessed a firearm and that he knew he belonged to the relevant category of

persons barred from possessing a firearm." 139 S. Ct. at 2200. Thus, to be convicted of

1 In Webster v. Daniels, 784 F.3d 1123 (7th Cir. 2015), the Seventh Circuit held that § 2255(e) would permit

consideration of “new evidence that would demonstrate categorical ineligibility for the death penalty.” 784

F.3d at 1125. However, “the Webster court took great care to assure that its holding was narrow in scope.”

Poe v. LaRiva, 834 F.3d 770, 774 (7th Cir. 2016). There is no indication that Webster extends to the

circumstances present in the instant case.

unlawful possession of a firearm in violation of § 922(g)(1), a defendant must (a)

knowingly possess a firearm and (b) know that he “has been convicted in any court of, a

crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1);

see also Greer, 141 S. Ct. at 2095 (“In felon-in-possession cases after Rehaif, the Government

must prove not only that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm, but also that he knew

he was a felon when he possessed the firearm.” (emphasis in original)).

In the instant case, even assuming McDonald’s Rehaif claim is properly brought in

this § 2241 petition, his argument is without merit. By its terms, the statute does not

require the defendant to know that his status prohibited him from possessing a firearm

or ammunition; it simply requires the defendant to knowingly possess a firearm or

ammunition and to know that he had previously been convicted of a felony at the time

he did so. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); United States v. Boyd, 999 F.3d 171, 182 (3d Cir. 2021)

(noting that Rehaif does not require proof that the defendant knew he “could not legally

possess a firearm,” it only requires proof that the defendant knew he was in the relevant

category); United States v. Bryant, 976 F.3d 165, 172–73 (2d Cir. 2020) (“although a felon

need not specifically know that it is illegal for him to possess a firearm under federal law,

Rehaif requires him to know, at the time he possessed the firearm, that he had been

convicted in any court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one

year.”).

McDonald does not contend he did not know that he had been convicted of a crime

punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year at the time he possessed

ammunition, and the fact that he did not know it was illegal for him to possess

ammunition is irrelevant. Accordingly, McDonald’s argument fails.

C. Remaining Arguments

As to his remaining arguments, other than lodging complaints about the

prosecutor on his case and stating that he never received a copy of the warrant, McDonald

fails to address why a motion pursuant to § 2255 was “inadequate or ineffective.”

McDonald’s dissatisfaction or disagreement with the prosecutor’s position on legal issues

and the fact that he allegedly did not receive a copy of the warrant do not entitle him to

raise these claims in a § 2241 petition. Because McDonald has failed to satisfy §2255(e),

these claims are not properly before this Court.

DISPOSITION

For the foregoing reasons, the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241

(Doc. 1) is DISMISSED with prejudice and all pending motions are TERMINATED as MOOT.

If Petitioner wishes to appeal this Order, he must file a notice of appeal with this Court

within the time allotted in FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1). If Petitioner chooses to appeal, he will be liable

for the $505.00 appellate filing fee irrespective of the outcome of the appeal. See FED. R. APP. P.

3(e); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Ammons v. Gerlinger, 547 F.3d 724, 725-26 (7th Cir. 2008); Sloan

v. Lesza, 181 F.3d 857, 858-59 (7th Cir. 1999); Lucien, 133 F.3d at 467. He must list each of the

issues he intends to appeal in the notice of appeal and his motion for leave to appeal in forma

pauperis. See FED. R. APP. P. 24(a)(1)(C). A proper and timely motion filed pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) may toll the 30-day appeal deadline. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(4). A Rule

59(e) motion must be filed no more than twenty-eight (28) days after the entry of judgment, and

this 28-day deadline cannot be extended.

The Clerk’s Office is DIRECTED to close this case and enter judgment accordingly.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 19, 2022 Lb J

Dent ty J

David W. Dugan

United States District Judge