Opinion

Boclair v. Wills

Court
District Court, S.D. Illinois
Filed
Apr 15, 2022
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 21.3%

holding warden is proper defendant for injunctive relief claim as he would be responsible for ensuring that any injunctive relief would be carried out

How later courts described this case

  • holding warden is proper defendant for injunctive relief claim as he would be responsible for ensuring that any injunctive relief would be carried out

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

STANLEY BOCLAIR, #A60451, )

)

Plaintiff, )

vs. ) Case No. 21-0289-SPM

)

ANTHONY WILLS, )

MOHAMMAD SIDDIQUI, )

ANGELA CRAIN, KIM MARTIN, )

HEATHER PRICE, and )

ROB JEFFREYS, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

McGLYNN, District Judge:

Plaintiff Stanley Boclair, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”)

who is currently incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center (“Menard”), brings this civil action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of his constitutional rights. (Doc. 1). He asserts

violations of the First and Eighth Amendments in relation to the denial of medical care. As relief,

Plaintiff seeks monetary damages and an order requiring Defendants to stop their retaliation. (Doc.

1, p. 17).

The Complaint is now before the Court for preliminary review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A,

which requires the Court to screen prisoner Complaints to filter out nonmeritorious claims. 28

U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Any portion of the Complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state

a claim for relief, or requests money damages from an immune defendant must be dismissed.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). At this juncture, the factual allegations of the pro se Complaint are to be

liberally construed. Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).

THE COMPLAINT

Plaintiff makes the following allegations in his Complaint (Doc. 1): He filed a lawsuit in

this district on November 16, 2018, asserting claims against Defendant Crain (Health Care Unit

Administrator) and other medical personnel who report to Defendant Dr. Siddiqui.1 (Doc. 1, pp.

7, 10-11). He ties his retaliation claims to that case.

On October 6, 2020, Plaintiff consulted Dr. Siddiqui for treatment of a painful and itchy

rash and blisters on his genitals, which Plaintiff attributes to a urinary tract fungus. Siddiqui

dismissed the problem and gave Plaintiff no treatment, allegedly in retaliation for the above lawsuit

against his subordinates. (Doc. 1, pp. 10-11).

The condition became worse and spread to include painful blisters and scars over most of

Plaintiff’s body. A medical technician who had been attempting to treat Plaintiff submitted a

medical referral for him on December 23, 2020, but Plaintiff got no treatment as a result. (Doc. 1,

pp. 11, 22).

After Plaintiff’s January 14, 2021, session with a psychiatrist, that professional emailed

Defendant Crain about his need for medical care, but Crain took no action. (Doc. 1, p. 11). Another

mental health professional informed Crain on or about February 3, 2021, of Plaintiff’s medical

issues, and again Crain did not respond. (Doc. 1, p. 12). Soon after, Plaintiff informed the attorney

who is representing him in another case about the denial of medical care; Plaintiff believes his

lawyer informed the Assistant Attorney General of the problem so she could warn Crain that she

should not deny Plaintiff medical care as retaliation for his lawsuit. (Doc. 1, pp. 12-13).

On January 19, 2021, Plaintiff submitted an emergency grievance to Defendant Warden

Wills reporting the lack of medical treatment as retaliation for his lawsuit and requesting medical

1 It appears that Plaintiff is referencing Boclair v. Baldwin, et al., Case No. 18-cv-2084-NJR-GCS, which

is still pending.

care. (Doc. 1, pp. 12, 22-23). Wills took no action. On January 24, 2021, Plaintiff submitted the

same grievance to Counselor Price, again seeking treatment, but Price either withheld or destroyed

the grievance in retaliation for Plaintiff’s earlier lawsuit. (Doc. 1, pp. 12, 24).

On February 9, 2021, Wills toured Plaintiff’s cell block. Plaintiff held up his arms to show

Wills they were covered with blisters and sores, and asked Wills for medical treatment. Wills

looked at him but made no response and walked away. (Doc. 1, p. 13). On the same day, Plaintiff

showed his blisters and sores to Kim Martin (Director of Nursing) and asked for treatment. Martin

responded that Plaintiff should write to her, but Plaintiff explained he had been denied treatment

since the December 2020 medical referral. Nonetheless, he wrote to Martin that night. Martin

failed to respond. (Doc. 1, pp. 13, 27).

On February 14, 2021, Plaintiff submitted a grievance directly to IDOC Director Jeffreys

complaining about the lack of medical treatment, retaliation, and destruction/withholding of his

grievances by Wills and Price. (Doc. 1, pp. 14, 19-21). Jeffreys did nothing to address the medical

concerns.

Plaintiff submitted six more medical requests between February 12 and 19, 2021, and was

finally called to see a nurse practitioner on March 12, 2021. (Doc. 1, pp. 13-14).

DISCUSSION

Based on the allegations in the Complaint, the Court designates the following claims in

this pro se action:

Count 1: First Amendment retaliation claim against Dr. Siddiqui for denying

Plaintiff medical care for a painful skin condition on October 6,

2020, in retaliation for Plaintiff having filed a lawsuit against

Defendant Crain and other medical staff.

Count 2: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to serious medical needs

claim against Dr. Siddiqui for denying Plaintiff medical care for a

painful skin condition on October 6, 2020.

Count 3: First Amendment retaliation claim against Wills, Crain, Martin,

Price, and Jeffreys for denying Plaintiff medical care for a painful

skin condition between December 23, 2020, and March 2021, in

retaliation for Plaintiff having filed a lawsuit against Defendant

Crain and other medical staff.

Count 4: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to serious medical needs

claim against Wills, Crain, Martin, Price, and Jeffreys for denying

Plaintiff medical care for a painful skin condition between

December 23, 2020, and March 2021.

The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future pleadings and orders, unless

otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. Any other claim that is mentioned in the

Complaint but not addressed in this Order should be considered dismissed without prejudice

as inadequately pled under the Twombly pleading standard.2

Counts 1 and 3 - Retaliation

Prison officials may not retaliate against inmates for filing grievances, lawsuits, or

otherwise complaining about their conditions of confinement. See, e.g., Gomez v. Randle, 680 F.3d

859, 866 (7th Cir. 2012); Walker v. Thompson, 288 F.3d 1005 (7th Cir. 2002); DeWalt v. Carter,

224 F.3d 607 (7th Cir. 2000); Babcock v. White, 102 F.3d 267 (7th Cir. 1996); Cain v. Lane, 857

F.2d 1139 (7th Cir. 1988). The issue in a retaliation claim is whether the plaintiff experienced an

adverse action that would likely deter First Amendment activity in the future, and if the First

Amendment activity was “at least a motivating factor” in the defendants’ decision to take the

retaliatory action. See McKinley v. Schoenbeck, 731 F. App’x 511, 515 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting

Surita v. Hyde, 665 F.3d 860, 878-79 (7th Cir. 2011)); Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 551 (7th

Cir. 2009). “A complaint states a claim for retaliation when it sets forth ‘a chronology of events

from which retaliation may plausibly be inferred.’” Zimmerman v. Tribble, 226 F.3d 568, 573 (7th

2 See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (an action fails to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim that is plausible on its face.”).

Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).

Here, Plaintiff alleges that he filed a lawsuit in 2018 against Crain and other Menard

medical staff which is still pending in this Court. He asserts that Siddiqui’s refusal to treat his rash

on October 6, 2020 (the only time Plaintiff says he raised his concerns with Siddiqui) was in

retaliation for Plaintiff filing that suit. This sequence of events is sufficient at this stage to state a

viable retaliation claim against Siddiqui in Count 1.

Plaintiff lumps together all the Defendants in his retaliation claim, stating that they “joined

in lockstep unison…to refuse to allow any treatment of [his] serious medical needs.” (Doc. 1, p.

15). This allegation is plausible as to Crain, a defendant in the 2018 case, and Martin, her colleague

in the Menard health care unit. Plaintiff may also be able to demonstrate retaliatory motive on the

part of Counselor Price, who he claims deliberately destroyed his grievances in retaliation for the

lawsuit, and Warden Wills, who may have been aware of Plaintiff’s earlier case. But the Complaint

contains no factual support for the claim that IDOC Director Jeffreys acted with a retaliatory

motive, based on a 2018 lawsuit that did not involve him, in failing to take action in response to

Plaintiff’s grievance of February 2021. Jeffreys, in his individual capacity, will therefore be

dismissed without prejudice from Count 3.

Count 1 will proceed for further consideration against Siddiqui, and Count 3 will proceed

against Wills, Crain, Martin, and Price.

Counts 2 and 4 – Deliberate Indifference

Prison officials and medical staff violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel

and unusual punishment when they act with deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical

needs. Rasho v. Elyea, 856 F.3d 469, 475 (7th Cir. 2017). To state such a claim, a prisoner must

plead facts and allegations suggesting that (1) he suffered from an objectively serious medical

condition, and (2) the defendant acted with deliberate indifference to his medical needs. Id.

“[D]eliberate indifference may be found where an official knows about unconstitutional conduct

and facilitates, approves, condones, or turns a blind eye to it.” Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768,

781 (7th Cir. 2015).

Plaintiff’s claim that Siddiqui refused him medical care on October 6, 2020, for his painful

rash is sufficient for Count 2 to proceed at this early stage.

Likewise, Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim against medical providers Crain and

Martin in Count 4 survives § 1915A review. Defendants Wills, Price, and Jeffreys are not medical

providers, but Plaintiff informed each of them of his condition and the ongoing failure of medical

staff to give him any treatment despite many requests, and they allegedly turned a blind eye to his

plight. Accordingly, Count 4 will receive further consideration against Wills, Crain, Martin, Price,

and Jeffreys.

OFFICIAL CAPACITY CLAIMS

Plaintiff raises claims against each Defendant in his or her individual and official

capacities. (Doc. 1, p. 10). His claim for injunctive relief in the form of an order prohibiting further

retaliation is properly brought against IDOC Director Jeffreys and Warden Wills of Menard

Correctional Center in their official capacities. See Gonzales v. Feinerman, 663 F.3d 311, 315 (7th

Cir. 2011) (holding warden is proper defendant for injunctive relief claim as he would be

responsible for ensuring that any injunctive relief would be carried out). However, Plaintiff’s

claims for monetary damages may only be pursued against state officials in their individual

capacities. Brown v. Budz, 904 F.3d 904, 918 (7th Cir. 2005); Shockley v. Jones, 823 F.2d 1068,

1070 (7th Cir. 1987). Accordingly, the official capacity claims against the remaining Defendants

are dismissed without prejudice.

PENDING MOTIONS

Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed on Original Complaint (Doc. 14) is GRANTED. The motion

responds to the Court’s Order at Doc. 13 and clarifies that Doc. 1 remains the operative pleading

in this action.

Plaintiff's Motion for Recruitment of Counsel (Doc. 15) is DENIED at this time without

prejudice. There is no constitutional or statutory right to counsel in federal civil cases. Romanelli

v. Suliene, 615 F.3d 847, 851 (7th Cir. 2010); see also Johnson v. Doughty, 433 F.3d 1001, 1006

(7th Cir. 2006). In determining whether to recruit counsel, the Court considers two factors. See

Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 2007). Plaintiff’s motion indicates that he may have

satisfied the first element of making a reasonable attempt to obtain counsel by writing to several

attorneys seeking representation. He attaches payment vouchers for postage on those letters and

asserts that prison officials destroyed his copies. (Doc. 15, pp. 1, 3-4, 9-10). Looking at the second

factor, however, it appears that Plaintiff is competent to litigate the case himself at this early stage.

See Navejar v. Iyiola, 718 F.3d 692, 696 (7th Cir. 2013); Santiago v. Walls, 599 F.3d 749, 761 (7th

Cir. 2010). He completed his GED, and his Complaint is well-organized, concise, and competently

articulates his legal claims. (Doc. 15, p. 2). Although the motion is denied at this juncture, Plaintiff

may renew his request for counsel if necessary, as the case progresses.

DISPOSITION

The Complaint states colorable claims in Counts 1 and 2 against Siddiqui; in Count 3

against Wills, Crain, Martin, and Price; and in Count 4 against Wills, Crain, Martin, Price, and

Jeffreys. These claims will proceed for further consideration.

All official capacity claims against Defendants Siddiqui, Crain, Martin, and Price are

DISMISSED without prejudice.

The Clerk shall prepare for Defendants Wills, Siddiqui, Crain, Martin, Price, and Jeffreys:

(1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6

(Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the

Complaint, and this Memorandum and Order to each Defendant’s place of employment as

identified by Plaintiff. If a Defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver of Service of Summons

(Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the forms were sent, the Clerk shall take

appropriate steps to effect formal service on the Defendant, and the Court will require the

Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service, to the extent authorized by the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure.

If a Defendant cannot be found at the work address provided by Plaintiff, the employer

shall furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if not known, the

Defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending the forms as

directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the address shall be

retained only by the Clerk and shall not be maintained in the court file or disclosed by the Clerk.

Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the

Complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g). Pursuant to

Administrative Order No. 244, Defendants need only respond to the issues stated in this

Merit Review Order.

Plaintiff is ADVISED that if judgment is rendered against him and the judgment includes

the payment of costs under 28 U.S.C. §1915, he will be required to pay the full amount of the

costs.

Plaintiff is further ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk of

Court and the opposing parties informed of any change in his address; the Court will not

independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than 7 days

after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will cause a

delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action for want of

prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).

Finally, based on the allegations in the Complaint, the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to

ENTER the standard qualified protective order pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and

Accountability Act.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 15, 2022

s/ _Stephen P. McGlynn_____

STEPHEN P. McGLYNN

United States District Judge

NOTICE TO PLAINTIFF

The Court will take the necessary steps to notify the appropriate defendants of your lawsuit

and serve them with a copy of your Complaint. After service has been achieved, the defendants

will enter an appearance and file an Answer to your Complaint. It will likely take at least 60 days

from the date of this Order to receive the defendants’ Answer, but it is entirely possible that it will

take 90 days or more. When all the defendants have filed Answers, the Court will enter a

Scheduling Order containing important information on deadlines, discovery, and procedures.

Plaintiff is advised to wait until counsel has appeared for the defendants before filing any motions,

to give the defendants notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before

defendants’ counsel has filed an appearance will generally be denied as premature. Plaintiff need

not submit any evidence to the Court at this time, unless specifically directed to do so.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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