Njie v. Jones

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

ADAMA NJIE, )

R11748, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

ALEX JONES, ) Case No. 22-cv-50-DWD

ANTHONY WILLS, )

C/O LAUER, )

JOHN DOE 2 CHAPLAIN, )

SAMUEL STERRETT, )

SLOAN. )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DUGAN, District Judge:

Plaintiff Adama Njie, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC)

currently detained at Menard Correctional Center (Menard), brings this civil rights action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons

Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-2000cc-5, (RLUIPA) for alleged refusals by defendants to allow

him to practice his Rastafarian beliefs. (Doc. 1). Plaintiff seeks monetary compensation

and other relief that this Court deems as proper.

Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 1) is now before the Court for preliminary review

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under Section 1915A, the Court is required to screen

prisoner complaints to filter out non-meritorious claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a)-(b).

Any portion of a complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted, or asks for money damages from a defendant who by law

is immune from such relief must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). At this juncture,

the factual allegations of the pro se complaint are to be liberally construed. Rodriguez v.

Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).

The Complaint

Plaintiff alleges that on February 11, 2020, he was transferred to Menard. Upon

arrival he wrote a request slip to the chaplaincy department seeking accommodation of

his Rastafarian ITAL diet. (Doc. 1 at 4). The chaplaincy department sent him a religious

diet request form and a religious affiliation sincerity assessment form. On February 23,

2020, Plaintiff completed and returned the forms. He alleges that on February 25, 2020,

Defendant Senior Chaplain denied his request for the diet because “IDOC does not offer

an ITAL diet. This is no ‘substantial burden.’ A vegan religious diet would offer the least

restrictive means of meeting the inmate’s religious needs.” (Doc. 1 at 5). Plaintiff attached

a copy of the request form with the Senior Chaplain’s response. (Doc. 1 at 13).

Plaintiff alleges that on March 2, 2020, he wrote a letter to then-warden, Defendant

Alex Jones, asking for intervention because he was being harassed over his dreadlocks

and because he was denied the ITAL diet. Plaintiff alleges that Jones retaliated for the

letter by sending Defendant Lauer to his cell to photograph his dreadlocks. (Doc. 1 at 5).

He alleges that both before and after the letter to Jones, officials were denying him yard

and shower privileges because of the dreadlocks. Plaintiff claims the dreadlocks are a

tenet of Rastafarian beliefs.

Plaintiff grieved his issues on March 5, 2020, and he alleges both the counselor and

Defendant Jones denied his grievance as unsubstantiated by March 10, 2020. He

appealed the outcome of the grievance, but the grievance counsel found it to be moot.

He alleges that Defendant Wills signed the grievance without properly investigating it.

(Id. at 6). He alleges he appealed to the Administrative Review Board (ARB) but got no

response.

Plaintiff claims that the IDOC recognizes the Rastafarian ITAL diet, it is discussed

in the chaplaincy handbook, and religious diets are also provided for in the Illinois

Administrative Code (20 Ill. Admin. Code Ch. 1 § 425(d), § 435.70). (Doc. 1 at 7). On June

9, 2021, Plaintiff renewed his request for his religious ITAL diet, but Defendant Sterrett

denied his request. Defendant Wills signed the form denying the diet.

On November 4, 2021, Plaintiff again requested paperwork from the chaplain to

request a religious diet. He was again told such a diet was not offered in IDOC.

Defendants Sterrett and Wills signed the denial of his diet.

Plaintiff alleges that IDOC does recognize the ITAL diet, but that defendants have

just refused to accommodate his requests for it or to sell compatible items at the

commissary. He claims that these actions violate Equal Protection because diets and

commissary items are served for other groups, like kosher diet for Jewish inmates, a lacto-

ovo diet for Muslim inmates, and a vegan diet for Hebrew Israelite inmates. (Doc. 1 at 8-

9). Plaintiff argues that the Illinois Administrative Code provides for reasonable

accommodations for religious beliefs and practices.

Plaintiff further alleges that the defendants have denied items that he ordered

from outside vendors to use in observation of his religion. Specifically, he has been

allowed a tam and a mediation rug, but they have denied two other tams, multi-colored

meditation beads, and 2 kufi’s.

As a result of the events, Plaintiff claims he has suffered from pain, mental

anguish, and financial loss. He alleges that the conduct constitutes harassment, official

misconduct, cruel and unusual punishment, retaliation, religious infringement, and a

violation of RLUIPA. He also alleges violations of his First, Eighth, and Fourteenth

Amendment rights.

The court designates the following Claims, based on the Complaint:

Claim 1: RLUIPA claims concerning dreadlocks, religious items

(beads, etc.) and the ITAL diet;

Claim 2: First Amendment claim against Defendants for refusal of

the ITAL diet;

Claim 3: Equal Protection claim against Defendants for refusal of the

ITAL diet despite other religions getting dietary

accommodations;

Claim 4: First Amendment claim against Defendant Sterrett

concerning denial of religious items (beads and kufi);

Claim 5: First Amendment retaliation claim against Defendants

Jones and Lauer concerning request for diet and dreadlocks.

The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future pleadings and orders,

unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. Any claim that is mentioned

in the Complaint but not addressed in this Order is considered dismissed without

prejudice as inadequately pled under Twombly. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 570 (2007) (an action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does

not plead “enough facts to state a claim that is plausible on its face”).

Preliminary Dismissal

Plaintiff mentions the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments in his factual narrative,

but he does not have any factual allegations that align with these theories for relief. A

bare legal assertion without any factual support is not sufficient to plead a claim. See

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

Analysis

1. RLUIPA claims

Claim 1 may not proceed against any defendant because Plaintiff seeks only

monetary relief. Under controlling precedent money damages are not available in suits

against states or state employees under RLUIPA. See, Vinning-El v. Evans, 657 F.3d 591,

593 (7th Cir. 2011) (money damages are not available against state employees in their

official or individual capacities under RLUIPA); Sossaman v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277 (2011).

Accordingly, Claim 1 shall be dismissed.

2. First Amendment ITAL diet claim

Claim 2 may proceed against Defendants Jones, John Doe Senior Chaplain, and

Sterrett because Plaintiff alleged that these individuals personally participated in

refusing to serve him an ITAL diet after multiple proper requests. See e.g. Njie v. Dorethy,

766 Fed. Appx. 387, 392 (7th Cir. 2019) (fact issue precluded summary judgment on

question of whether denial of ITAL diet substantially burdened plaintiff’s religion). The

claim will also be allowed to proceed against Wills at this early juncture because Plaintiff

alleges that Wills signed off on a grievance about his religious dietary needs without

investigating the matter.

By contrast, Plaintiff will not be allowed to proceed with Claim 2 against

Defendant Lauer because he does not allege that Lauer had anything to do with the

rejection of his requests for an ITAL diet. Plaintiff’s only allegation against Lauer is that

he came to his cell and took pictures of his dreadlocks.

3. Equal protection ITAL diet claim

Claim 3 will proceed against Defendants Jones, Wills, John Doe Senior Chaplain

and Sterrett for the same reasons as Claim 2.

4. First Amendment religious materials claim

Claim 4 will proceed against Defendant Sterrett because Plaintiff alleges that the

chaplain denied him access to certain religious materials (beads and kufis), and he

attached documentation showing that Sterrett was the chaplain who apparently denied

these requests. By contrast, Claim 4 will not proceed against any of the other defendants

because in his allegations concerning religious items Plaintiff either speaks of the

chaplain department or he speaks of “defendants” generically. A generic assertion of

“one or more defendants” is not sufficient to state a claim. Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574,

580 (7th Cir. 2009). Claim 4 will only proceed against Sterrett.

5. First Amendment retaliation claim

Claim 5 for retaliation against Defendants Jones and Lauer will be dismissed

because the allegations are insufficient to state a claim. “First Amendment retaliation

cases require the petitioner to show that the speech or activity was constitutionally

protected, a deprivation occurred to deter the protected speech or activity, and the speech

or activity was at least a motivating factor in the decision to take retaliatory action.”

Manuel v. Nalley, 966 F.3d 678, 680 (7th Cir. 2020). The ‘motivating factor’ amounts to a

causal link between the activity and the unlawful retaliation.” Id. A plaintiff must

plausibly allege a causal link between the protected act and the alleged retaliation. See

Roger Whitmore's Auto. Servs., Inc. v. Lake Cnty., 424 F.3d 659, 669 (7th Cir. 2005). “Both

circumstantial evidence, like suspicious timing, ambiguous oral or written statements, or

behavior or comments, and direct evidence, like near-admissions of retaliatory acts, may

serve as proof of causation.” Pro's Sports Bar & Grill, Inc. v. City of Country Club Hills, 2021

WL 4263475, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 20, 2021) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

At the pleading stage, a plaintiff must present a retaliation story that “holds together.”

See id.

Plaintiff alleges that he wrote Jones a letter about issues with the ITAL diet and

harassment for his dreadlocks. The Court will assume that writing this letter was

protected speech. However, Plaintiff has not alleged a retaliatory action. At most

Plaintiff alleges that one or two days after his letter Defendant Lauer was sent to his cell

to photograph his dreads. Taking a photograph of Plaintiff is not a deprivation of a right,.

Plaintiff further alleges that “prison officials” continued to deny him yard and showers

and they talked about forcing him to take his dreadlocks out. Before Plaintiff wrote Jones,

he alleged that he was being denied yard and showers, so any continued denial of the

same has no clear motivating link to his letter to Jones. He also does not allege that he

was ultimately forced to take his dreadlocks out. Ultimately, Plaintiff has not adequately

pled the components of a retaliation claim, because he has not alleged that as a result of

protected speech he was made to suffer a deprivation sufficient to deter speech. He does

not link his letter to Jones to any new deprivation, nor does he explain how the letter

caused the deprivation to continue. Claim 5 will be dismissed.

Disposition

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Claims 1 and 5 shall be DISMISSED. Claims 2

and 3 shall proceed against Defendants Jones, Wills, John Doe Senior Chaplain and

Sterrett. Claim 4 shall proceed against Sterrett. There are no remaining claims against

Defendant Lauer, so the Clerk is DIRECTED to TERMINATE Lauer. The Clerk is

DIRECTED to ADD the current Warden of Menard for the sole purpose of identifying

the John Doe Senior Chaplain.

The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to prepare for Defendants Jones, Wills, Sterrett

and Warden of Menard (official capacity only): (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and

Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons).

The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the Complaint (Doc. 1), and this

Memorandum and Order to Defendants’ place of employment as identified by Plaintiff.

If a Defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the

Clerk within 30 days from the date the forms were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate

steps to effect formal service on Defendant, and the Court will require Defendant to pay

the full costs of formal service, to the extent authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure.

If a Defendant cannot be found at the work address provided by Plaintiff, the

employer shall furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if not

known, the Defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for

sending the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation

of the address shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be

maintained in the court file or disclosed by the Clerk.

Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to

the Complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).

Pursuant to Administrative Order No. 244, Defendants need only respond to the issues

stated in this Merits Review Order.

If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the payment

of costs under Section 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of the costs,

regardless of whether his application to proceed in forma pauperis was granted. See 28

U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2)(A).

Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to inform the Clerk

of Court and each opposing party of any address changes; the Court will not

independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later

than 7 days after a transfer or other change of address occurs. Failure to comply with this

order will cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in

dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute. FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 1, 2022

/s David W. Dugan

______________________________

DAVID W. DUGAN

United States District Judge

Notice to Plaintiff

The Court will take the necessary steps to notify the appropriate defendants of your

lawsuit and serve them with a copy of your complaint. After service has been achieved,

the defendants will enter their appearance and file an Answer to the complaint. It will

likely take at least 60 days from the date of this Order to receive the defendants’ Answers,

but it is entirely possible that it will take 90 days or more. When all of the defendants

have filed Answers, the Court will enter a Scheduling Order containing important

information on deadlines, discovery, and procedures. Plaintiff is advised to wait until

counsel has appeared for the defendants before filing any motions, to give the defendants

notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before defendants’

counsel has filed an appearance will generally be denied as premature. Plaintiff need not

submit any evidence to the Court at his time, unless otherwise directed by the Court.

The Court wishes to remind the Plaintiff that litigation is often viewed a series of hurdles

that the Plaintiff must clear to get to another hurdle. Initial screening is such a hurdle, but

it is a very low one for the Plaintiff to clear. As noted above, surviving initial screening

only requires the bare statement of a claim that, if proven, could entitle Plaintiff to some

relief. At trial, he will need to prove by a preponderance of evidence that the facts alleged

actually occurred and that those facts satisfy the legal requirements for recovery. Trial is

the highest and most difficult of hurdles for any Plaintiff to clear.