Duplessis v. United States

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

ANDREW M. DUPLESSIS, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 21-cv-00095-JPG

)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

)

Respondent. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on petitioner Andrew M. Duplessis’ (“Petitioner” or

“Duplessis”) Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. On

August 21, 2019. Petitioner pled guilty to one count of possession with intent to distribute

methamphetamine. On January 30, 2020, the Court sentenced him to serve 216 months in prison

on Count 1 for possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. He did not appeal his

conviction. Duplessis’ criminal Case No. is 19-cr-40047-JPG.1

I. Background

In June 2019, a grand jury issued an indictment for Duplessis for Possession with intent

to distribute methamphetamine (Crim. Doc. 1). Attorney Robert Elovitz (“Mr. Elovitz”) was

appointed to represent Duplessis. Duplessis notified the Court that his final pre-trial would be

converted into a change of plea hearing on August 21, 2019. Duplessis pled guilty, in an open

plea, on that date and sentencing was scheduled for November 26, 2019 (Crim. Doc. 20). During

that hearing, Duplessis, under oath, stated he was fully satisfied with counsel and representation

by Mr. Elovitz. (Crim. Doc. 60, p. 4). Additionally, in the colloquy regarding the sentencing

1 Any document referencing the docket in Duplessis’ criminal case shall hereby be referred to as “(Crim.

Doc.).” Documents from Duplessis’ civil Section 2255 case shall be referred to as “(Doc.).

guidelines, Duplessis stated him, and his attorney spoke about the Federal Sentencing Guidelines

and the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors. Id. at 7. Additionally, when asked about the “rough” guideline

calculation, Mr. Elovitz stated “Defendant’s criminal history comes into play greatly in this

instance.” Id. at 8. Additionally, Mr. Elovitz stated:

The Government has provided two sets of incidents that may affect his relevant

conduct, so that the actual potential base offense levels can vary by, in his case, I

think -- the Government and I have talked on the methamphetamine issue -- can

vary as much as six levels and potentially with other relevant conduct they have

disclosed in another report, but we could be at a difference of four levels

additional, so we could have a ten-level swing either way at sentencing. It's quite

an open range, Judge.

Id. The Court asked if Duplessis understood that he will be able to review the presentence report

and make objections to the report. Id. Duplessis stated he understood. Id. at 8-9.

A pre-sentence investigation report (“PSR”) was issued on October 21, 2019 (“Initial

PSR”). (Crim. Doc. 21). Duplessis had fourteen days to object, which counsel for Duplessis filed

on November 4, 2019 (Crim. Doc. 22). The Initial PSR determined Duplessis’ relevant conduct

involved 2.7 kilograms methamphetamine in the form of “ice,” recommended two-level firearm

enhancement, three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, Offense Level 35, and

Criminal History Category II. Id. The guideline range was 188-235 months, the statutory

maximum term was 20 years. Id.

The Government moved to strike Duplessis’ objections. Duplessis objected, stated his

relevant conduct was “far below” 2.7 kilograms and objected to the firearm enhancement, stating

he never was in possession of handguns “during the time frame in question.” (Crim. Doc. 22).

Duplessis also objected to each paragraph with the exception of two paragraphs that amounted to

actually involved amounts of ice seized from Duplessis upon his arrest. Id. The Government

moved to strike the objections, which this Court denied (Crim. Doc. 23, 35).

On December 13, 2019, the Addendum to the Initial PSR was issued (Crim. Doc. 32).

The Addendum, issued by U.S. Probation, asserted information and calculations in the Initial

PSR were accurate. Id.

Mr. Elovitz sought continuation of the sentencing hearing. The Government conducted

additional interviews in response to Duplessis’ relevant conduct and firearm objections. (Doc.

17, p. 8). As a result of these interviews, on January 27, 2020, Probation issued a revised

presentence report (“Revised PSR”), whereby the relevant conduct increased from 2.7 kilograms

to 3.28 kilograms. (Crim. Doc. 46). The Revised PSR continued to apply the two-level firearm

enhancement. Id.

During sentencing on January 30, 2020, the Court asked Duplessis if he received the

Revised PSR, which he stated he had. (Crim. Doc. 61, p. 3). When asked about the objections to

the PSR, Mr. Elovitz stated “Defendant would announce…he’s going to withdraw the objections

as to the weight of the sentence in question for relevant conduct purposes.” Id. at 4. When the

Court asked Duplessis if that was correct and Duplessis stated “Yes, your Honor.” Duplessis was

still objecting to the firearm enhancement. Id. at 5. On January 30, 2020, the second revised PSR

(“Second Revised PSR”) was issued, which corrected the date/year on the fact page and changed

“581.175 ounces” to “581.175 grams” in paragraph 15. (Crim. Doc. 47).

The Government called three witnesses and introduced letters that Duplessis sent to two

of the witnesses while incarcerated. In one letter attached to the Government’s response,

Duplessis threatened witness John Reed regarding his cooperation with the Government. (Doc.

17, Exh. C p. 8). Upon consideration of the witnesses and evidence provided, the Court found the

firearm enhancement applicable not only “by a preponderance of the evidence, but the evidence

is overwhelming that this Defendant was known to possess firearms during drug transactions

even though he didn’t show it every time, but it was there.” (Crim. Doc. 61, p. 48-49).

Additionally, the Court noted that the letters and threats were “inconsistent with acceptance of

responsibility.” Id. at 61. The Court stated it was not going to be taking two points back for

acceptance of responsibility but noted it for the record. The Court, in consideration of all the

3553(a) factors, sentenced Duplessis to 216 months in prison. Id. at 63.

II. § 2255 Motion

In his timely motion, Petitioner raises the following claims of constitutionally ineffective

assistance of counsel Robert Elovitz in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights:

1) Attorney Robert Elovitz provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to advise

petitioner that his sentence could be based on additional “ghost dope” and a firearm

enhancement;

2) Attorney Elovitz provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to object to the

alleged due process violation, specifically, the fact that Duplessis was denied due process

because the Revised PSR was not “timely” disclosed.

Additionally, Petitioner also makes a due process claim. Petitioner states he was denied

due process because the Revised PSR was not “timely” disclosed.

Pursuant to Rule 4(b) of the Rules Governing § 2255 Proceedings for the United States

District Courts, the Court has determined that it is plain from the motion and the record of the

prior proceedings that Petitioner is not entitled to relief.

III. Analysis

a. Sixth Amendment

The Court must grant a § 2255 motion when a petitioner’s “sentence was imposed in

violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). However,

“[r]elief under § 2255 is available ‘only in extraordinary situations, such as an error of

constitutional or jurisdictional magnitude or where a fundamental defect has occurred which

results in a complete miscarriage of justice.’” United States v. Coleman, 763 F.3d 706, 708 (7th

Cir. 2014) (quoting Blake v. United States, 723 F.3d 870, 878-79 (7th Cir. 2013)). It is proper to

deny a § 2255 motion without an evidentiary hearing if “the motion and the files and records of

the case conclusively demonstrate that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b);

see Shipman v. United States, 925 F.3d 938, 943 (7th Cir. 2019).

Duplessis asserts violations of his Sixth Amendment rights. The Sixth Amendment to the

Constitution provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to

have the Assistance of Counsel for [his] defence.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. This right to

assistance of counsel encompasses the right to effective assistance of counsel. McMann v.

Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771, n. 14 (1970); Watson v. Anglin, 560 F.3d 687, 690 (7th Cir.

2009). A party claiming ineffective assistance of counsel bears the burden of showing (1) that his

trial counsel’s performance fell below objective standards for reasonably effective representation

and (2) that this deficiency prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688-

94 (1984); Groves v. United States, 755 F.3d 588, 591 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Jones,

635 F.3d 909, 915 (7th Cir. 2011); Wyatt v. United States, 574 F.3d 455, 457 (7th Cir. 2009).

In a case where a petitioner pled guilty as a result of alleged ineffective assistance of

counsel, to satisfy the first prong of the Strickland test, the petitioner must show that his

counsel’s advice leading to the plea was outside the range of professionally competent

assistance. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56-57 (1985) (citing McMann, 397 U.S. at 771; Tollett

v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973)). To satisfy the second Strickland prong, he must show

that there is a reasonable probability that, but for his counsel’s deficient performance, he would

not have entered a guilty plea and instead would have gone to trial. Lee v. United States, 137 S.

Ct. 1958, 1965 (2017); Hill, 474 U.S. at 59; United States v. Parker, 609 F.3d 891, 894 (7th Cir.

2010); Wyatt, 574 F.3d at 458; Richardson v. United States, 379 F.3d 485, 487 (7th Cir. 2004).

Counsel’s deficient performance must have been a decisive factor in the defendant’s decision to

enter a guilty plea. Wyatt, 574 F.3d at 458; see Julian v. Bartley, 495 F.3d 487, 498 (7th Cir.

2007). To make such a showing, the petitioner must present objective evidence that he would not

have entered a guilty plea; his own self-serving testimony that he would have insisted on going

to trial is not enough. Koons v. United States, 639 F.3d 348, 351 (7th Cir. 2011); McCleese v.

United States, 75 F.3d 1174, 1179 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing Toro v. Fairman, 940 F.2d 1065, 1068

(7th Cir. 1991)); see Wyatt, 574 F.3d at 458 (stating “a defendant’s mere allegation that he would

have chosen a path other than the conditional plea is insufficient by itself to establish

prejudice.”). “Courts should not upset a plea solely because of post hoc assertions from a

defendant about how he would have pleaded but for his attorney’s deficiencies. Judges should

instead look to contemporaneous evidence to substantiate a defendant's expressed preferences.”

Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1967.

In some instances, counsel’s deficient performance is so stark that prejudice can be

presumed such as where counsel abandoned a defendant or utterly failed to represent her. This

presumption can occur:

in the face of a “complete denial of counsel” or denial at a “critical stage” of the

litigation. The presumption would also be triggered if counsel “entirely fails to

subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing,” or if, due to the

timing of the trial or other factors, “the likelihood that any lawyer, even a fully

competent one, could provide effective assistance is [] small.”

Smith v. Brown, 764 F.3d 790, 796 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S.

648, 659-60 (1984); internal citations omitted). A critical stage in a criminal case is “every stage

of the criminal process between arraignment and appeal that either addresses a substantive issue

or risks loss of a procedural right.” See Schmidt v. Foster, 911 F.3d 469, 491-92 (7th Cir. 2018).

The Court addresses each of Duplessis’ arguments in turn.

a. Counsel’s failure to advise petitioner that his sentence could be based on additional

“ghost dope” and a firearm enhancement.

Duplessis argues that Mr. Elovitz failed to advise him that his sentence could be based on

“hearsay statements concerning ghost drugs or constructive possession of a gun.” (Doc. 1, p. 5).

Additionally, Duplessis asserts that Mr. Elovitz failed to file a motion to withdraw the guilty plea

so facts relating to the gun could be presented to a jury. Id. In response, the Government states

that Duplessis fails to attach an affidavit in support of its claim, Duplessis’ arguments are

contradicted by Mr. Elovitz’ affidavit attached to the Government’s response, and the record

clearly shows Duplessis’ assertions are incorrect. (Doc. 17, p. 21-22).

Upon review of the record and filings, Court agrees with the Government. First,

petitioner did not attach an affidavit, therefore providing no sworn support to contradict the other

sworn statements provided in these filings. See, e.g., Kafo, 467 F.3d at 1067 (“the affidavit” is

the “threshold requirement” and that “the petition must be accompanied by a detailed and

specific affidavit which shows that the petitioner had actual proof of the allegations going

beyond mere unsupported assertions”).

However, understanding Duplessis is moving pro se, the Court finds that his argument

further fails because it is contradicted by Mr. Elovitz’ affidavit. (Crim. Doc. 17, Exh. A). In his

sworn affidavit, Mr. Elovitz stated he advised Duplessis regarding the relevant conduct and

firearm issues. “Well prior to Andrew Duplessis change of plea, I advised him of the possibility

of a gun enhancement, at length and on multiple occasions. I also discussed the concept of

relevant conduct and ‘ghost dope’…” Id. Additionally, Mr. Elovitz stated that “[a]t no time prior

to sentencing did Andrew Duplessis request I withdraw his guilty plea so the facts of any gun

enhancement or ‘ghost drugs for relevant conduct purposes’ could be presented to a jury.” Id.

Petitioner contends his claim does not fail for a failure to submit an affidavit because the

due process violations “are a direct result of the ‘lack of’ support of the relevant conduct

submitted to the PSR to enhance petitioner’s sentence.” (Doc. 20, p. 2). Petitioner states that

because the drug quantity and firearm enhancement was not supported by reliable information,

his claim should not fail. The Court disagrees and will address this point below.

Additionally, while the Court is mindful of competing testimonies, the Court is persuaded

by the Court’s record in Duplessis’ criminal case. During the plea colloquy, this Court asked

Duplessis if he discussed the guidelines with his attorney and Duplessis stated he had.

Additionally, Mr. Elovitz stated there were multiple discussions with his client and the

Government regarding the disparity in the relevant conduct, stating that “we could have a ten-

level swing either way at sentencing.” (Crim. Doc. 60, p. 8). “[T]he representations of the

defendant. . . at [a plea hearing], as well as any findings made by the judge accepting the plea,

constitute a formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral proceedings. Solemn declarations in

open court carry a strong presumption of verity.” Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74

(1977); see Bridgeman v. United States, 229 F.3d 589, 592 (7th Cir. 2000). The petitioner bears a

heavy burden of overcoming the presumption that her sworn plea colloquy statements were true.

See United States v. Hardimon, 700 F.3d 940, 944 (7th Cir. 2012). Here, Duplessis

acknowledged he was fully satisfied with Mr. Elovitz’ representation, was guilty of the charged

offense, and discussed the guidelines with his attorney.

Defense counsel also filed multiple objections of the relevant conduct issues, including

objections to the “ghost dope” paragraphs. (Crim. Doc. 22, p. 2). Further, during sentencing, Mr.

Elovitz stated that they would be “withdraw[ing] the objections as to the weight of the sentence

in question for relevant conduct purposes.” (Crim. Doc. 61, p. 4). The Court asked Duplessis if

that was correct, and he stated that it was. Id. Duplessis did so knowingly, and voluntarily. Id.

Again, the Court finds that such a declaration in open court carries a strong presumption of

verity. Blackledge, 431 U.S. at 73-74.

Duplessis states that he requested that counsel failed to “investigate” the cases the

government was using against him “as conspiracies and non-convictions to support a drug total

of more than 3.28 kilograms, therefore enhancing his guideline range.” (Doc. 20, p. 4). First, the

case that Duplessis uses as support that failure to investigate a claim can constitute ineffective

assistance refers to an attorney’s failure to investigate during trial. Adams v. Bertrand, 453 F.3d

428, 436 (7th Cir. 2006) (finding trial counsel’s failure to investigate a crucial witness during

trial amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel). Here, Duplessis argues that counsel did not

investigate witnesses supporting a sentence enhancement, which the Court must find under a

preponderance of evidence standard, as opposed to a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Further, a failure to investigate here was not fatal – defense counsel had an opportunity, which it

utilized, to cross-examine the witnesses.

The Court finds that Duplessis does not meet the first prong of the Strickland test.

Specifically, the Court does not find that Mr. Elovitz’s representation was outside the range of

professionally competent assistance.

Duplessis additionally also cannot show prejudice – the second prong under Strickland.

First, facts “relating to guns and ghost drugs” for sentence enhancement purposes is not

presented to a jury but found by the Court, under a preponderance of the evidence, as the Court

did so here. The Government notes that the Government could have sought a superseding

indictment to include an additional consecutive 18 U.S.C. 924(c) offense instead of the firearm

enhancement. (Crim. Doc. 17, p. 24).

The Court is not persuaded that Duplessis satisfies either prong under Strickland. As the

Government noted, the Court found it “inconsistent” that Duplessis was receiving two points off

for acceptance of responsibility, even though he was threatening witnesses in letters.

b. Due process violation, and whether counsel failed to object to the due process

violation.

The Court will address Duplessis’ second and third arguments – his alleged due process

violation and his counsel’s failure to object. Duplessis states he did not receive enough time,

pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. Proc. 32, to review the Revised PSR. Specifically, Duplessis states that

on the morning of sentencing on January 30, 2020, Mr. Elovitz gave him a copy of the Revised

PSR, which was filed on January 27, 2020, thirty minutes before the hearing.

Rule 32 of the Rules of Civil Procedure states that the “probation officer must give the

presentence report to the defendant, the defendant’s attorney, and an attorney for the government

at least 35 days before sentencing unless defendant waives this minimum period.” Fed. R. Crim.

Proc. 32(e)(2). Rule 32 also states that a probation officer must submit a report “[a]t least 7 days

before sentencing” “the presentence report and an addendum containing unresolved objections,

the grounds for those objections, and the probation officer’s comments on them.” Fed. R. Crim.

Proc. 32(g).

The initial PSR was issued on October 31, 2019. Thus, the initial PSR was issued more

than 30 days prior to the sentencing. The Addendum was filed on December 13, 2019. However,

the Revised PSR was issued on January 27, 2020, three days prior to the sentencing hearing. The

Revised PSR contained additional statements made by witnesses and added over 800 grams of

ghost drugs. (Doc. 1, p. 6).

“A claim cannot be raised for the first time in a § 2255 motion if it could have been

raised at trial or on direct appeal[.]” McCoy v. United States, 815 F.3d 292, 295 (7th Cir. 2016).

“A federal prisoner cannot bring defaulted claims on collateral attack unless he shows both cause

and prejudice for the default.” Id. (internal citations omitted). “Absent a showing of both cause

and prejudice, procedural default will only be excused if the prisoner can demonstrate that he is

“actually innocent” of the crimes of which he was convicted.” Id. Duplessis failed to raise this

issue on direct appeal and has made no argument that he is “actually innocent” of the offenses to

which he pled guilty. Thus, his failure to raise this claim will only be excused if he can

demonstrate cause and prejudice for the default. Here, the Duplessis does not make any

arguments establishing cause and the Court can find none. The Court finds Duplessis’ claims

insufficient to support good cause for procedural default.

In fact, the Court finds more support that Duplessis waived his due process claim. Mr.

Elovitz’s affidavit states that he reviewed the contents of the Revised PSR and reviewed the

Revised PSR with Duplessis. (Doc. 17, Exh. A). During the sentencing, Mr. Elovitz stated that

he wishes to withdraw his relevant conduct objections and proceed with sentencing. (Crim. Doc.

61, p. 4). As stated in Rule 32, while 32 requires notice, it also provides that a defendant can

waive those notice requirements. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(e)(2). Additionally, the Court asked

Duplessis if he received the January 27, 2020 report. (Doc. 61, p. 3). Defendant stated “[y]es,

Your Honor.” Additionally, the Court asked if Duplessis reviewed the addendum dated

December 13. Id. at 4. Duplessis stated “[y]es, Your Honor.” In fact, the only objections

Duplessis and his attorney maintained were the firearm enhancement objections. The Court does

not find it persuasive that Duplessis did not object to the lack of time to review the Revised PSR

during sentencing and, instead, stated the exact opposite. United States v. Knorr, 942 F.2d 1217,

1221 (7th Cir. 1991) (“we have held that by participating in a sentencing without an objection

based on the ten-day requirement, the defendant waives the minimum period requirement of Fed.

R. Crim. P. 32”). Again, the Court finds that such a declaration in open court carries a strong

presumption of verity. Blackledge, 431 U.S. at 73-74.

Thus, because the Court finds there was no due process violation, Duplessis cannot show

ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object. The Court finds Duplessis has failed to

meet the ineffective assistance under the first and second prongs of Strickland. The Court does

not feel this is a case that amounts to a “complete miscarriage of justice.”

c. Violation of constitutional rights on the basis of accurate and reliable information

In Duplessis’ reply, he expounds on his argument from his petition that his due process

rights were violated because relevant conduct and firearm enhancement was based off inaccurate

and unreliable information. Specifically, Duplessis states that the witnesses the Court heard, John

Reed, Alan Elder, Timothy Walkters, and Amy Brozowski, were unreliable and violate his due

process rights of being sentenced on the basis of accurate information. (Doc. 20, p. 7-8).

Duplessis bases his arguments on the holding of United States v. Helding, 948 F.3d 864,

872 (7th Cir. 2020). Helding held the sentencing record did not contain enough to find that the

CI-provided information was sufficiently reliable to find Helding responsible for a substantial

amount of marijuana seized. Id. Specifically, the Helding court found that a finding of marijuana

(over 32 times the amount marijuana seized) based only on statements made by confidential

informants to law enforcement and memorialized in a PSR was insufficient and fell short of

protecting a defendant’s due process rights to be sentenced on the basis of accurate information.

Id. The court was concerned about a sentence imposition where a Court is unable to determine

credibility. Duplessis states that, pursuant to Helding, the PSR in his case did not contain any

determination of the informant’s reliability and did not state how the evidence corroborated what

the CI’s told law enforcement. (Doc. 20, p. 9-12).

The Court finds Duplessis’ arguments unpersuasive. First, the Court did investigate the

credibility of the witnesses. The witnesses testified during Duplessis’ hearing regarding the

relevant conduct. The Helding court found the trial court violated the defendant’s due process

because it solely relied on the PSR to apply the defendant’s sentence. In fact, the Helding court

advised trial courts that “[w]hile it's not required that a judge hear personally from witnesses

under oath at a sentencing hearing about drug quantities, we think it's not a terribly bad idea to

do so when the witness is going to provide the basis for ... a defendant's relevant conduct.”

Helding, 948 F.3d at 871, quoting United States v. Robinson, 164 F.3d 1068, 1070 (7th Cir.

1999). The Court did so here. Further, defense counsel had an opportunity to cross-examine or

present conflicting evidence. United States v. Rollerson, 7 F.4th 565, 572 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,

142 S. Ct. 631 (2021) (“At least in the absence of conflicting evidence, the PSR's assertions

concerning the controlled-buy amounts were sufficiently reliable to support a finding that they

were proven by a preponderance of the evidence. In due process terms, the defense had the

opportunity to present conflicting evidence about the controlled buys”).

“How to proceed with the reliability inquiry and on what to base the reliability finding

are committed to the district court’s sound judgment.” Helding, 948 F.3d 864, 872. Here, the

Court did what the Seventh Circuit advised is the best course of action – bring witnesses to

testify and determine the reliability of witnesses under oath. The Court did so and determined

“[i]n finding the firearm evidence overwhelming and overruling petitioner’s objections, the

Court stated that it “has heard the evidence and finds actually refreshing consistency between all

of the witnesses.” (Doc. 14, p 48). The Court found the firearm enhancement appliable “it's not

only by a preponderance of the evidence, but the evidence is overwhelming that this Defendant

was known to possess firearms during drug transactions even though he didn't show it every

time, but it was there.” Id. at 49.

Thus, finding during Duplessis’ sentencing hearing that the Court evaluated and

determined the witnesses reliable regarding the relevant conduct and firearm enhancement, the

Court does not find that Duplessis’ due process rights were violated.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, pursuant to Rule 4(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2255

Proceedings, the Court finds that it is plain from the motion and the record of the prior

proceedings that Duplessis is not entitled to relief under § 2255. Thus, there is no need for an

evidentiary hearing. The Court DENIES Duplessis’ § 2255 Motion (Doc. 1) and DIRECTS the

Clerk of the Court to enter judgment accordingly.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 28, 2022

/s/ J. Phil Gilbert

J. PHIL GILBERT

DISTRICT JUDGE