Anderson v. Puckett

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

PHILIP ANDERSON, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 21-cv-1166-NJR

)

)

ADAM M. PUCKETT, DARREN N. )

WILLIAMS, SHANAE B. )

GILLENWATER, DEANNA M. )

BROOKHART, and J. GARRETT, )

)

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ROSENSTENGEL, Chief Judge:

Plaintiff Philip Anderson, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections

(“IDOC”) who is currently incarcerated at Hill Correctional Center, brings this action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivations of his constitutional rights while at

Lawrence Correctional Center (“Lawrence”). In his Complaint (Doc. 1), Anderson alleges

Defendants violated his procedural due process rights in violation of the Fourteenth

Amendment.

This case is now before the Court for preliminary review of the Complaint

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under Section 1915A, the Court is required to screen

prisoner complaints to filter out non-meritorious claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Any

portion of a complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted, or asks for money damages from a defendant who by law is

immune from such relief must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

The Complaint

Anderson makes the following allegations in the Complaint (Doc. 1): On April 27,

2021, Anderson received an investigative status report written by Correctional Officer

Vaughn which placed Anderson in investigative status (Id. at p. 6). On May 7, 2021, Adam

M. Puckett wrote a disciplinary report charging him with several violations (Id.). The

report alleged that he had introduced a synthetic drug into the prison on paper and that

six confidential informants had exposed Anderson’s actions. Puckett and another officer

later informed Anderson that no drugs were actually found (Id.). Anderson had no

knowledge of the drugs and he did not impede the investigation, yet he was charged with

“Impeding or Interfering with an Investigation,” in addition to the charges related to the

contraband (Id. at pp. 6 and 23). The disciplinary report failed to explain the personal

information that was obtained, which was a violation of the Illinois Administrative Code.

Puckett failed to sign the report, also a violation of the Code (Id. at p. 8).

The adjustment committee members, including Darren Williams and Shanae

Gillenwater, heard his disciplinary report and failed to take any corrective measures

based on the unsubstantiated report (Id. at p. 9). On May 13, 2021, they found him guilty

of the charges, despite lacking the necessary information to substantiate the claim.

Anderson alleges that they failed to safeguard his procedural due process rights (Id. at

pp. 9-10). Brookhart signed off on the disciplinary report and failed to safeguard

Anderson’s due process rights. J. Garrett was the grievance officer at the time Anderson

filed his grievance and he failed to use his position as the grievance officer to take

corrective measures in response to the grievance (Id. at p. 9). He also failed to safeguard

Anderson’s due process rights. He spent 80 days in the restrictive housing unit and then

was sentenced to three months C grade, six months segregation, disciplinary transfer,

and six months contact visit restrictions. Anderson filed a grievance on the disciplinary

proceedings. On June 26, 2021, the Administrative Review Board expunged the finding

of guilt because the Final Summary failed to provide that the substance was observed,

tested, and documented and failed to add specific information in the Basis of Decision to

substantiate the finding of guilt (Id. at p. 21). The disciplinary report was dismissed and

expunged, and Anderson was released from his disciplinary sentence (Id.).

Discussion

Based on the allegations in the Complaint, the Court finds it convenient to

designate the following single count:

Count 1: Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim

against Adam M. Puckett, Darren N. Williams, Shanae

Gillenwater, Deanna Brookhart, and J. Garrett.

The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future pleadings and orders,

unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. Any other claim that is

mentioned in the Complaint but not addressed in this Order should be considered

dismissed without prejudice as inadequately pled under the Twombly pleading

standard.1

1 See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (an action fails to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is

Simply put, Anderson fails to state a due process claim. An inmate’s liberty

interests are protected by the Due Process Clause only insofar as a deprivation of the

interest at issue would impose an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in

relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995).

Neither the C grade, visit restrictions, nor transfer constitute the deprivation of a liberty

interest. Thomas v. Ramos, 130 F.3d 754, 762 n. 8 (7th Cir. 1997) (collecting cases).

Although Anderson alleges that he was sentenced to six months of segregation

and spent 80 days in the restrictive housing unit, that alone is not enough to state a

deprivation of a liberty interest. Thomas, 130 F.3d at 761 (70 days not enough on its own).

In assessing whether disciplinary segregation amounts to a constitutional violation, a

court must examine the length of a prisoner’s confinement in segregation in combination

with the conditions he endured there. Kervin v. Barnes, 787 F.3d 833, 836-37 (7th Cir. 2015);

Hardaway v. Meyerhoff, 734 F.3d 740, 743 (7th Cir. 2013). Simply pleading that imposition

of disciplinary segregation, “without additional facts about the conditions of

confinement, would not implicate a liberty interest.” Miller v. Maue, 759 F. App’x 515, 516

(7th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted). Anderson does not indicate whether he served any

time in disciplinary segregation prior to the sentence being expunged or, if he did, what

conditions he experienced while in segregation.

plausible on its face”). This includes Anderson’s conspiracy claim and Fourth Amendment

unlawful restraint claim.

Thus, Anderson fails to state a viable procedural due process claim at this time.2 If

Anderson wishes to proceed with his claim, he would need to file a First Amended

Complaint. His Amended Complaint should set forth facts indicating whether he was

deprived of a liberty interest, by offering facts to describe the conditions he faced while

in segregation.

Pending Motions

As to Anderson’s motion for counsel (Doc. 3), he states that he has his G.E.D. but

does not understand the law. Further, he has not identified any attorneys whom he has

contacted to represent him, although he does indicate that his movement and phone

privileges are limited due to a quarantine at Lawrence. But Anderson is no longer housed

at Lawrence, and he does not indicate whether he has the same restrictions at his current

location. Thus, the Court DENIES his motion for counsel. Should he choose to move for

recruitment of counsel at a later date, the Court directs Anderson to (1) contact at least

three attorneys regarding representation in this case prior to filing another motion,

(2) include in the motion the name and addresses of at least three attorneys he has

2 Anderson must sufficiently allege that he was deprived of a constitutionally protected interest

in “life, liberty, or property” without due process of law. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125

(1990). A court analyzing such a claim in the context of inmate disciplinary actions must consider

(1) whether there was a protected interest at stake that necessitated due process protections and

(2) whether the disciplinary proceedings were conducted in accordance with procedural due

process requirements. Id. at 125-26. His Complaint does allege that he was denied due process

rights in that the disciplinary report and findings of the committee were not supported by the

evidence. See Scruggs v. Jordan, 485 F.3d 934, 941 (7th Cir. 2007) (The decision of the adjustment

committee must be supported by “some evidence.”).

contacted, and (3) if available, attach the letters from the attorneys who declined

representation.

Disposition

For the reasons stated, Anderson’s Complaint (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED without

prejudice for failure to state a claim.

Anderson is GRANTED leave to file a “First Amended Complaint” on or before

February 25, 2022. Should Anderson fail to file his First Amended Complaint within the

allotted time or consistent with the instructions set forth in this Order, the entire case shall

be dismissed with prejudice for failure to comply with a court order and/or for failure to

prosecute his claims. Fed. R. App. P. 41(b). See generally Ladien v. Astrachan, 128 F.3d 1051

(7th Cir. 1997); Johnson v. Kamminga, 34 F.3d 466 (7th Cir. 1994); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The

dismissal shall count as one of Anderson’s three allotted “strikes” under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(g).

An amended complaint supersedes and replaces the original complaint, rendering

the original complaint void. See Flannery v. Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., 354 F.3d 632, 638

n. 1 (7th Cir. 2004). The Court will not accept piecemeal amendments to the original

Complaint. Thus, the First Amended Complaint must stand on its own, without reference

to any previous pleading, and Anderson must re-file any exhibits he wishes the Court to

consider along with the First Amended Complaint. The First Amended Complaint is

subject to review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

Anderson is further ADVISED that his obligation to pay the filing fee for this

action was incurred at the time the action was filed, thus the filing fee remains due and

payable, regardless of whether he elects to file a First Amended Complaint. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(1); Lucien v. Jockisch, 133 F.3d 464, 467 (7th Cir. 1998).

Finally, Anderson is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep

the Clerk of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the

Court will not independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing

and not later than 7 days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to

comply with this Order will cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and

may result in dismissal of this action for want of prosecution. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 25, 2022 7 g ()

NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL

Chief U.S. District Judge