Williams v. Jeffreys

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

WILLIE WILLIAMS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 3:20-cv-00469-MAB

)

RYAN SUTTERER, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

BEATTY, Magistrate Judge:

This matter is before the Court on the motions for summary judgment brought by

Defendant Ryan Sutterer (Doc. 75) and Defendants Latika Burns, Jennifer Cowan, Jessi

Cox, Patrick Harris, Rob Jeffreys, Alex Jones, Frank Lawrence, Andrew Martinez, and

William Qualls (“IDOC Defendants”) (Doc. 81). Defendants request summary judgment

based on Plaintiff Willie William’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies before

filing suit. For the reasons set forth herein, the Court finds that Plaintiff failed to exhaust

his available administrative remedies before bringing this action, and the motions for

summary judgment are granted.

INTRODUCTION

On May 19, 2020, Plaintiff Willie Williams, an inmate with the Illinois Department

of Corrections (“IDOC”), filed this lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for purported

deprivations of his constitutional rights at Lawrence Correctional Center and Menard

Correctional Center (Doc. 1). Following a threshold review of the complaint pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the “Lawrence claims” were severed into a separate action and only

the “Menard claims” remained in this case (Doc. 9). However, the Menard claims were

dismissed for violations of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, and Plaintiff was granted

leave to amend his complaint (Doc. 9).

Plaintiff subsequently filed his First Amended Complaint on July 21, 2020 (Doc.

11), and another document titled First Amended Complaint on July 27, 2020, which has

been construed as the Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 12; see Docs. 27, 29). In short,

Plaintiff alleged that he was denied medical care for his infected eye and his complaints

about the matter were ignored. Although Plaintiff has accumulated at least four “strikes”

for filing frivolous lawsuits and is prohibited from proceeding in forma pauperis under 28

U.S.C. § 1915(g), the Court permitted him to proceed on the following claims after finding

the imminent danger exception applied:

Count 1: Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to serious

medical needs against Defendants Burns, Cowan, Cox, Harris, Jeffreys,

Jones, Lawrence, Martinez, Qualls, and Sutterer for the denial of medical

treatment for Plaintiff’s eye.

Count 3: First Amendment claim for retaliation against Defendants Burns,

Cowan, Cox, Harris, Jeffreys, Jones, Lawrence, Martinez, Qualls, and

Sutterer.

Count 8: State law medical negligence claim against Dr. Sutterer for the

denial of medical treatment for Plaintiff’s eye and denying him eyeglasses.

(Doc. 27).

Defendant Sutterer filed his motion for summary judgment on the issue of

exhaustion on March 29, 2021 (Docs. 75, 76). And the IDOC Defendants filed their motion

on April 12, 2021 (Docs. 81, 82). Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to fully exhaust any

of the relevant grievances, and some Defendants also argue that none of the relevant

grievances name, describe, or identify them in any way (Docs. 76, 82). Plaintiff filed a

“response” in opposition to the motions for summary judgment on April 30, 2021 (Doc.

86),1 however, his brief does not actually contain any facts or arguments relevant to the

issue of exhaustion, nor does he dispute the facts asserted by Defendants in their motions.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he has glaucoma and is

blind in his right eye (Doc. 29, pp. 7, 15-16). In April 2020, his right eye became bloody,

cloudy, and infected (Id. at pp. 19-20). He made repeated requests to see Defendant

Sutterer for medical treatment for the infection, but to no avail (Id. at pp. 8-20). Plaintiff

further alleges that in May 2020 he submitted his eyeglasses to the health care unit for

repair and, despite repeated requests for the return of his eyeglasses, his property has not

been returned to him (Id. at pp. 6-7, 15-16, 20).

In support of their motions for summary judgment, Defendants submitted a

number of documents, including the Menard Correctional Center Offender Orientation

Manual (Docs. 76-3, 82-2), which explains the grievance process and procedures;

Plaintiff’s grievance records from the Administrative Review Board (Docs. 76-4, 76-5, 76-

6, 82-3); his grievance records on file at Menard (Doc. 76-8, 76-9, 76-10, 82-4); a grievance

log maintained at the facility (Doc. 76-7; Doc. 82-5); and Plaintiff’s cumulative counseling

summary (Doc. 76-2; Doc. 82-1). According to these records, Plaintiff submitted the

1 A duplicate response was filed that same day at Doc. 90.

following relevant grievances prior to submitting his Second Amended Complaint on

July 27, 2020:

• Grievance #250-4-20: The grievance log and cumulative counseling

summary show Plaintiff submitted an emergency grievance in April 2020

regarding “bloody, cloudy eye denied sick call” (Doc. 76-2, p. 5; Doc. 76-7,

p. 167). No copies of this grievance were contained in Plaintiff’s grievance

records from the ARB or Menard, nor was a copy of the grievance attached

to Plaintiff’s complaint (see Doc. 29). The grievance was received by the

warden on April 20, 2020 and deemed a non-emergency. It was returned to

Plaintiff two days later. There is no indication that Plaintiff ever

resubmitted this grievance through the standard grievance procedure (see

Doc. 76-7, p. 167).

• Grievance #224-5-20: Plaintiff filed an emergency grievance dated May 28,

2020 in which he complained, in short, that Officer Cox was threatening

him, had denied him medical care for his eye infection, and was working

with other correctional officers and medical staff to have him assaulted.

Plaintiff also said that his complaints to Warden Jones and Warden

Lawrence about Officer Cox have been ignored (Doc. 76-10, pp. 70–72; see

also Doc. 76-2, p. 5; Doc. 76-7, p. 171). This grievance was received by the

warden on May 29th and deemed a non-emergency. It was returned to

Plaintiff on June 2nd. Plaintiff then submitted the grievance to his counselor

and received a response on June 4, 2020. There is no indication that Plaintiff

ever sent this grievance on to the grievance officer (see Doc. 76-2, p. 5; Doc.

76-7, p. 171).

Months later, Plaintiff sent a different version of a grievance dated May 28,

2020 regarding Officer Cox to the ARB, where it was received, along with

corresponding letters and unnotarized affidavits, on September 2, 2020

(Doc. 76-4, pp. 70–76). The ARB responded on September 10, 2020,

indicating that the grievance was being returned without review because of

Plaintiff’s “overall failure” to meet the requirements of the grievance

procedure (Id.).

• Grievance #64-7-20: Plaintiff submitted an emergency grievance dated July

1, 2020 in which he complained that his eyeglasses were not returned to him

after he had left them with the health care unit for repair a month prior

(Doc. 76-10, pp. 68–69; see also Doc. 76-2, p. 4; Doc. 76-7, p. 175). The warden

received the grievance on July 6th, determined it was not an emergency,

and instructed Plaintiff that the grievance should be submitted according

to the standard grievance procedure. The grievance with the warden’s

response was returned to Plaintiff on July 9th. Plaintiff then submitted the

grievance to his counselor, who sent him a response on July 20th that

included a memorandum from Dr. Sutterer. There is no indication that

Plaintiff ever sent this grievance to the grievance officer (see Doc. 76-7, p.

175; Doc. 76-2, p. 4).

• Grievance #202-8-20: The grievance log and cumulative counseling

summary indicate that Plaintiff filed an emergency grievance dated August

13, 2020 regarding “eyeglasses” (Doc. 76-7, p. 182; Doc. 76-2, p. 4). No copies

of this grievance were contained in Plaintiff’s grievance records from

Menard or the ARB, nor was a copy of the grievance included with

Plaintiff’s complaint (see Doc. 29). The warden determined the grievance

was not an emergency and it was returned to Plaintiff on August 19th with

instructions that the grievance should be resubmitted according to the

standard grievance procedure. There is no indication that Plaintiff

resubmitted this grievance to his counselor (see Doc. 76-7, p. 182; Doc. 76-2,

p. 4).

LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact

and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). The

moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the lack of any genuine issue of

material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once a properly supported

motion for summary judgment is made, the adverse party must set forth specific facts

showing there is a genuine issue. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986).

A genuine issue of material fact exists when “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury

could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Estate of Simpson v. Gorbett, 863 F.3d 740,

745 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). In determining a summary

judgment motion, the Court views the facts in the light most favorable to, and draws all

reasonable inferences in favor of, the nonmoving party. Apex Digital, Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck

& Co., 735 F.3d 962, 965 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).

Generally, the courts cannot resolve factual disputes on a motion for summary

judgment. See, e.g., Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 656, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1866, 188 L. Ed. 2d

895 (2014) (“[A] judge's function at summary judgment is not to weigh the evidence and

determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for

trial.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). However, when the motion for

summary judgment pertains to a prisoner’s failure to exhaust, the Seventh Circuit has

instructed courts to conduct an evidentiary hearing and resolve contested issues of fact

regarding a prisoner’s efforts to exhaust. Wagoner v. Lemmon, 778 F.3d 586, 590 (7th Cir.

2015) (citing Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739, 742 (7th Cir. 2008)). Accord Roberts v. Neal, 745

F.3d 232, 234 (7th Cir. 2014). On the issue of exhaustion, the defendants have the burden

of proof. Pavey v. Conley, 663 F.3d 899, 903 (7th Cir. 2011); Westerfer v. Snyder, 422 F.3d 570,

577 (7th Cir. 2005). Where there are no material factual disputes, an evidentiary hearing

is not necessary. See Doss v. Gilkey, 649 F. Supp. 2d 905, 912 (S.D. Ill. 2009) (no hearing

required where there are “no disputed facts regarding exhaustion, only a legal

question”). Here, there is no material facts in dispute and no hearing is required because,

in his response, Plaintiff did not assert any of his own facts or disagree with any of the

facts asserted by Defendants (see Doc. 86).

B. Administrative Exhaustion

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) provides that a prisoner may not bring

a lawsuit about prison conditions unless and until he has exhausted all available

administrative remedies. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Pavey, 663 F.3d at 903. The PLRA provides

that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under Section 1983 of

this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison or other

correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.”

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).

Proper exhaustion is mandatory. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006); McNeil v.

United States, 508 U.S. 106, 111, 113 (1993) (Courts are “not free to rewrite the statutory

text” when Congress has strictly “bar[red] claimants from bringing suit in federal court

until they have exhausted their administrative remedies.”). This circuit requires strict

compliance with the exhaustion rules. Doe v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 809 (7th Cir. 2006).

In order to properly exhaust his administrative remedies, a prisoner must “file

complaints and appeals in the place, and at the time, the prison’s administrative rules

require.” Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2002). Moreover, to properly

exhaust administrative remedies, an inmate must take all steps through all levels

required by the prison's grievance system, including the appeal of denied grievances, that

are available to him prior to filing suit in federal court. Chambers v. Sood, 956 F.3d 979, 981

(7th Cir. 2020); see also Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90. Unless a prisoner completes the

administrative process by following the rules the state has established for that process,

exhaustion has not occurred. Pozo, 286 F.3d at 1023.

As an IDOC inmate at Menard, Plaintiff is subject to the PLRA’s exhaustion

requirement. In order to exhaust his administrative remedies, he was required to use the

IDOC’s grievance procedures described in 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.800, et seq. (2017),

along with institution-specific supplemental procedures. In its normal course at Menard,

the grievance process involves three steps. First, an inmate must submit a written

grievance within 60 days after the discovery of the incident, occurrence or problem, to

their institutional counselor. Id. at § 504.810(a).2 If the inmate is unable to resolve the

grievance through their counselor, the inmate may submit the written grievance to the

grievance officer who must render a written recommendation to the warden “within two

months of receipt . . . when reasonably feasible under the circumstances.” Id. at §

504.830(e). The warden then reviews the findings and then advises the inmate of their

decision on the resolution of the matter. Id. An inmate may appeal the warden’s decision

in writing to the Administrative Review Board within thirty days after the date of the

warden’s decision, and the Director renders a final decision, in consideration of the ARB’s

findings and recommendations on the appealed grievance, “within six months . . . when

reasonably feasible under the circumstances.” Id. at § 504.850(a) and (e).

Alternatively, an inmate may request that a grievance be handled as an emergency

by submitting the request directly to the warden. Id. at § 504.840. If the warden

determines that “there is a substantial risk of imminent personal injury or other serious

or irreparable harm to the [inmate],” then the grievance is processed on an expedited

basis. Id. On the other hand, if the warden determines that the grievance does not involve

an emergency, the inmate is notified in writing that he or she “may resubmit the

grievance as non-emergent, in accordance with the standard grievance process.” Id.

2 There are exceptions to this rule, none of which apply here. 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.810(a), 504.870

(2017).

ANALYSIS

As previously noted, Plaintiff failed to respond to the merits of the motion for

summary judgment on the issue of exhaustion. As a self-represented litigant, Plaintiff

received notice of the consequences of failing to respond to the motion for summary

judgment (Doc. 77). The Rule 56(e) Notice advises Plaintiff that “[i]f a party fails . . . to

properly address another party’s assertion of fact” the Court may “consider the fact

undisputed for purposes of the motion” (Id.). As such, the Court deems the facts

presented by Defendant Sutterer on the issue of exhaustion undisputed. See Smith v. Lamz,

321 F.3d 680, 683 (7th Cir. 2003); Flynn v. Sandahl, 58 F.3d 283, 288 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting

that a failure to respond constitutes an admission that there are no undisputed material

facts).

The Court has reviewed the grievance records submitted in connection with the

pending motion for summary judgment and considered the arguments presented. This

review shows that there are four grievances that potentially cover Plaintiff’s claims

against Defendant regarding Plaintiff’s injuries: the April 2020 grievance #250-4-20; the

May 2020 grievance #224-5-20; the July 2020 grievance #64-7-20; and the August 2020

grievance #202-8-20.

As an initial matter, the Court notes that Plaintiff filed his original complaint on

May 19, 2020 but did not state any viable claims. However, he was permitted to pursue

claims stated in his Second Amended Complaint, which was submitted on July 27, 2020

(Doc. 12). Defendants appear to take the position that Plaintiff had to fully exhaust his

administrative remedies as to them by the time he filed his second amended complaint,

not the original complaint (see Docs. 76, 82). For example, Defendants do not distinguish

which allegations were included in the original complaint and which were added

somewhere thereafter (see Docs. 76, 82). And they also discuss grievances that were

submitted after the original complaint was filed, as opposed to summarily arguing these

grievances cannot serve to exhaust Plaintiff’s claims because they were not submitted

until after Plaintiff filed suit (see Docs. 76, 82). Consequently, the Court’s analysis will

focus on whether Plaintiff fully exhausted his administrative remedies prior to

submitting his second amended complaint on July 27, 2020.

One of the four grievances—grievance #202-8-20 dated August 13, 2020—was not

submitted until after Plaintiff filed his Second Amended Complaint. Therefore, this

grievance cannot possibly be used to exhaust as to any of the Defendants. E.g., Chambers

v. Sood, 956 F.3d 979, 981 (7th Cir. 2020) (“The [PLRA] requires pre-suit exhaustion;

pursuing administrative remedies while litigation is underway does not suffice.”).

Furthermore, there is no evidence that Plaintiff took this grievance, or any of the other

three, through every step of the grievance process. All four grievances were submitted

by Plaintiff as emergency grievances to the warden. In each case, the warden reviewed

the grievance and determined it was a non-emergency and Plaintiff was advised that he

should resubmit his grievance through the standard grievance process. Of the four

grievances, only two of the grievances—grievance #224-5-20 dated May 28, 2020 and

grievance #64-7-20, dated July 1, 2020—were subsequently resubmitted by Plaintiff

through the standard process. In those two instances, Defendants argue, without

contradiction, that Plaintiff took no further action after receiving the grievances back

from his counselor. Plaintiff failed to pursue the grievances to the next level of

institutional review with the grievance officer and the warden.

In sum, the undisputed facts reveal that Plaintiff filed this lawsuit before he

exhausted all of his available administrative remedies. Defendants are therefore entitled

to summary judgment on the issue of exhaustion and this case must be dismissed without

prejudice. The dismissal, in turn, renders Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction

(Doc. 98) and his “Motion to Clarify,” which describes a new perceived threat to his safety

(Doc. 106), moot.

CONCLUSION

The motions for summary judgment on the issue of exhaustion filed by Defendant

Ryan Sutterer (Doc. 75) and Defendants Latika Burns, Jennifer Cowan, Jessi Cox, Patrick

Harris, Rob Jeffreys, Alex Jones, Frank Lawrence, Andrew Martinez, and William Qualls

(Doc. 81) are GRANTED. This case is dismissed with prejudice for failure to exhaust.

Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction (Doc. 98) and “Motion to Clarify” (Doc.

106) are MOOT. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment and close this case

on the Court’s docket.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 5, 2021

s/ Mark A. Beatty

MARK A. BEATTY

United States Magistrate Judge