clarifying that “the former approach-that, no matter what their substance, all post-judgment motions filed within [28] days of judgment would be considered as Rule 59(e) motions – no longer applies”
How later courts described this case
- clarifying that “the former approach-that, no matter what their substance, all post-judgment motions filed within [28] days of judgment would be considered as Rule 59(e) motions – no longer applies”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
REGINALD JONES,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 19-cv-1281-NJR
SANDRA QUICK and
FRANK LAWRENCE,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL, Chief Judge:
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Reginald Jones’s motion for
reconsideration (Doc. 135) of the Court’s Order (Doc. 134) denying both a motion for
sanctions and a previous motion to reconsider the judgment in this case. Defendants
Sandra Quick and Frank Lawrence filed a response (Doc. 138) in opposition to the motion.
Jones also filed two motions to supplement (Docs. 139 and 142) his original motion. The
Court GRANTS those motions (Docs. 139 and 142) and will consider the arguments
presented in those as supplements to Jones’s original motion.
The Court on two previous occasions has set forth the facts and background
leading up to Jones’s newest motion to reconsider (see the Court’s February 26, 2021
Order (Doc. 114) granting Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and the June 17,
2021 Order (Doc. 134) denying Jones’s motion to reconsider and motion for sanctions).
Jones’s current motion to reconsider asks the Court to reconsider its Order denying the
request to sanction Defendants for attaching a “photoshopped” copy of Grievance No.
162-8-19. Additionally, Jones again asks the Court to reconsider and deny Defendants’
motion for summary judgment on the issue of administrative exhaustion.
Although Jones fails to indicate which Federal Rule of Civil Procedure he brings
his motion under, the motion will automatically be considered as having been filed
pursuant to Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures. See, e.g.,
Mares v. Busby, 34 F.3d 533, 535 (7th Cir. 1994). “[W]hether a motion filed within [28] days
of the entry of judgment should be analyzed under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b) depends on
the substance of the motion, not on the timing or label affixed to it.” Obriecht v. Raemisch,
517 F.3d 489, 493 (7th Cir. 2008) (emphasis in the original) (citing Borrero v. City of Chicago,
456 F.3d 698, 701-02 (7th Cir. 2006) (clarifying that “the former approach-that, no matter
what their substance, all post-judgment motions filed within [28] days of judgment
would be considered as Rule 59(e) motions – no longer applies”)). Nevertheless, a motion
to reconsider filed more than 28 days after entry of the challenged order “automatically
becomes a Rule 60(b) motion.” Hope v. United States, 43 F.3d 1140, 1143 (7th Cir. 1994)
(citing United States v. Deutsch, 981 F.2d 299, 301 (7th Cir. 1992)); see also Talano v. N.W.
Med. Faculty Found., Inc., 273 F.3d 757, 762 (7th Cir. 2001).
A motion to alter or amend judgment filed pursuant to Rule 59(e) may only be
granted if a movant shows there was a mistake of law or fact, or presents newly
discovered evidence that could not have been discovered previously. Matter of Prince,
85 F.3d 314, 324 (7th Cir. 1996), reh’g and suggestion for reh’g en blanc denied, cert. denied 519
U.S. 1040; Deutsch v. Burlington N. R. Co., 983 F.2d 741 (7th Cir. 1993). “‘[M]anifest error’
is not demonstrated by the disappointment of the losing party. It is the wholesale
disregard, misapplication, or failure to recognize controlling precedent.” Oto v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 224 F.3d 601, 606 (7th Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted). A
movant may not use a Rule 59(e) motion to present evidence that could have been
submitted before entry of the judgment. Obriecht, 517 F.3d at 494 (citing Sigsworth v. City
of Aurora, Ill., 487 F.3d 506, 512 (7th Cir. 2007)).
Rule 60(b) provides for relief from judgment for “mistake, inadvertence, surprise,
or excusable neglect.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1). Rule 60(b) relief is an extraordinary remedy
and is granted only in exceptional circumstances. McCormick v. City of Chicago, 230 F.3d
319, 327 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing Dickerson v. Board of Educ., 32 F.3d 1114, 1116 (7th Cir. 1994)).
Rule 60(b) allows a court “to address mistakes attributable to special circumstances and
not merely to erroneous applications of law.” Russell v. Delco Remy Div. of Gen. Motors
Corp., 51 F.3d 746, 749 (7th Cir. 1995). It is also not an appropriate vehicle for rehashing
old arguments or for presenting arguments that should have been raised before the court
made its decision. Russell, 51 F.3d at 749; Rutledge v. United States, 230 F.3d 1041, 1052 (7th
Cir. 2000).
To the extent that Jones argues the Court should again reconsider its Order
granting the summary judgment on the basis of exhaustion (see Doc. 142), that motion is
DENIED. Jones again rehashes the same arguments he raised in his original responsive
brief (Doc. 63), his testimony, and his motion to reconsider (Doc. 118). He argues that
Defendants prevented him from filing grievances and denied him access to the grievance
process. The Court has already considered his testimony on this subject both in its
original Order and the Order denying his first motion to reconsider and found his
testimony lacking in credibility. Although Jones argues that his testimony about the
grievance process was found credible in another case, Jones v. Wall, Case No. 19-cv-1386-
SPM, the Court noted in that case that Jones’s testimony was not rebutted because the
defendant failed to present any witnesses. See Jones v. Wall, Case No. 19-cv-1386 (Doc. 62,
pp. 7-9). In this case, however, the Court heard testimony from Kelly Pierce and found
her testimony about the availability of grievance forms to be credible.
Jones next asks this Court to reconsider its ruling denying sanctions. He again
rehashes arguments he has raised on numerous occasions. He argues that the copy of
Grievance 162-8-19 offered by Defendants initially was cropped and that the grievance
presented at the evidentiary hearing had different markings. Although Jones argues that
the Court did not consider these markings, the Court acknowledged that the document
presented at the hearing had certain words circled, but determined that those were later
markings and did not indicate an attempt by the defense to mislead the Court (Doc. 134,
p. 8). Jones offers no newly discovered evidence or mistake of law or fact. The Court has
previously considered Jones’s arguments and found them lacking.
Accordingly, Jones’s motion to reconsider (Doc. 135) is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: November 3, 2021 Tl
tip omg
NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
Chief U.S. District Judge
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