noting that the “complaint includes not a whiff of a conspiratorial agreement or any improper complicity between” defendants
How later courts described this case
- noting that the “complaint includes not a whiff of a conspiratorial agreement or any improper complicity between” defendants
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
REMY SUANE,
#B52215,
Plaintiff, Case No. 21-cv-00213-SPM
v.
DR. SHAH,
WEXFORD HEALTH,
DR. BROOKHART,
LAURIE CUNNINGHAM,
MRS. BROOKS,
ROB JEFFREYS,
ANDREA HOLSCHER,
DR. DEANA BROOKHART,1 and
JOHN M. FROEHLICH,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
MCGLYNN, District Judge:
Plaintiff Remy Suane, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections who is currently
incarcerated at Lawrence Correctional Center (“Lawrence”), brings this civil action pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his constitutional rights. Suane claims that he is not receiving
adequate medical care, specifically treatment for chronic pain. He requests monetary and
injunctive relief. On June 24, 2021, Suane filed a Motion for Emergency Injunctive Relief. (Doc.
17). Before addressing the request for preliminary injunctive relief, the Court must conduct a
preliminary review of the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
1 The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to terminate “Dr. Deana Brookhart” as a defendant in the docket, as she is
mistakenly listed twice by Suane as a defendant in the Complaint. A review of the Complaint reveals that Dr.
Brookhart is listed once in the case caption and then twice in the “Additional Defendant(s)” section of the civil
complaint form, once as “Dr. Brookhart” and then again as “Dr. Deanna Brookhart.” (Doc. 1, p. 1-4). It is clear from
the Complaint that this is the same individual, and she was listed twice in error.
Under Section 1915A, any portion of a complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or requests money damages from a defendant
who by law is immune from such relief must be dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). At this
juncture, the factual allegations of the pro se Complaint are to be liberally construed. Rodriguez v.
Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).
THE COMPLAINT
Suane alleges the following in the Complaint:2 Prior to incarceration, he was in a car
accident in 2017, and as a result, he experiences chronic pain. (Doc. 1-1, p. 5). Suane entered IDOC
custody in 2019 and was prescribed Norco 10/325 for his pain by Dr. Lynn Pittman. (Id. at p. 1).
Suane took two tablets three times a day, and the medicine worked to effectively manage his pain.
Dr. Lynn Pittman was eventually fired from Lawrence. (Id.). Wexford Health, the company
contracted by IDOC to provide medical services, did not hire a fulltime doctor to replace Dr.
Pittman. (Id. at p. 53). Rather, Dr. Shah, the fulltime doctor at Roberson Correctional Center, began
treating inmates at Lawrence a few times a week, after normal working hours. (Id. at p. 41, 52).
Once Dr. Shah began treating inmates at Lawrence, in an effort to save costs, he replaced
most of the name brand pain medications prescribed to inmates at Lawrence with cheap, less
effective pain medication. (Doc. 1-1, p. 3-4, 8). Suane had his first appointment with Dr. Shah on
August 12, 2020. (Id. at p. 1). During the visit, despite the fact that Suane’s medication was
working, Dr. Shah reduced his pain prescription by taking away the afternoon dose. (Id.). At some
point, Dr. Shah stopped prescribing Norco 10/325 altogether and prescribed other ineffective and
2 The Complaint is over 500 pages long, which includes allegations and exhibits. Suane has submitted this District’s
civil complaint form, which includes a “Statement of Claim” section. (Doc. 1, p. 11-13). Suane has also filed another
document titled “Statement of Facts.” (Doc. 1-1). The Statement of Facts is written as a 55 page journal accounting
for daily events from August 2020 until February 2021 regarding his medical care. Construing the Complaint liberally,
the Court will consider the factual allegations in the Statement of Facts to the extent they correspond to and are offered
in support of the claims alleged in the Statement of Claim.
even dangerous medicines to treat Suane’s pain. (Doc. 1, p. 11). Dr. Shah prescribed the medicine
Pamelor and told Suane that it was to treat his pain. (Doc. 1, p. 12; Doc. 1-1, p. 33). Dr. Shah did
not disclose to Suane that Pamelor is primarily used to treat depression and has dangerous side
effects. (Doc. 1-1, p. 33-34, 45). Because Suane is bipolar, he began having dangerous side effects.
He experienced suicidal and homicidal thoughts and became aggressive, angry, and irritable. (Id.
at p. 35, 40). Suane told Dr. Shah of his side effects at an appointment on October 19, 2020. (Id.
at p.41). He asked to be prescribed his previous pain medication, and Dr. Shah said that “they” are
not allowing it anymore. (Id. at p. 42). Dr. Shah told Suane he would check with the psychiatrist
at Lawrence to see what he could prescribe to Suane, but Suane never heard back and was not
given a replacement pain medication. (Id.). After two months, Suane stopped taking the Pamelor,
and his side effects slowly stopped. (Id. at p. 40).
In November 2020, Dr. Shah prescribed Robaxin, meloxicam, and acetaminophen to be
taken twice daily, and in January 2021, Dr. Shah prescribed Tylenol and ibuprofen. (Doc. 1-1, p.
46, 49). These medicines also did not provide relief. Suane again asked for medicine to treat his
pain at an appointment on February 5, 2021. (Id. at p. 51). He told Dr. Shah that the pain medicine
prescribed did not work. Dr. Shah said there was nothing he could do because the FDA was not
allowing them to prescribe the requested medication. Dr. Shah also informed Suane that another
doctor was hired to work at Lawrence and would be starting in a couple of weeks. Dr. Shah stated
that maybe she would prescribe Suane the pain medication he wants. (Id.).
Since being treated by Dr. Shah, Suane has not received proper treatment for his chronic
pain and other related health issues, including swelling and discoloration in the lower left side of
his abdomen, difficulties urinating, and pain in his lungs. (Doc. 1-1, p. 48, 50-51). Suane’s
conditions remain untreated, and he experiences constant pain, unable to perform daily tasks. (Doc.
1-1, p. 4).
PRELIMINARY DISMISSALS
Suane claims that for over six months Lawrence did not have a fulltime doctor on staff who
was at the facility forty hours a week, which resulted in inadequate healthcare. (Doc. 1, p. 12; Doc.
1-1, p. 41). Because Dr. Shah only spent a few hours each week at Lawrence, it was impossible
for him to attend to or even address all the inmates’ issues. Suane asserts that Wexford Health is
liable for not ensuring that Lawrence had an adequate number of medical staff. (Doc. 1-1, p. 53).
He also attempts to hold John Froehlich, the vice president of Wexford Health, liable because there
is no way Froehlich “did not know there [was not a] full time doctor here at Lawrence.” (Doc. 1,
p. 13).
This allegation is insufficient to assert liability under Section 1983. Under the Eighth
Amendment, inmates are entitled to constitutional medical care. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
104 (1976). Medical and prison staff cannot act with deliberate indifference to the serious medical
needs of inmates. Conduct meets the deliberate indifference standard when a defendants acts “in
an intentional or criminally reckless manner.” Board v. Farnham, 394 F.3d 469, 478 (7th Cir.
2005). Based on this standard, intentionally staffing a correctional facility with only a part-time
medical doctor, alone, does not violate the constitution, even if such act is contrary to state law or
IDOC policy. See Scott v. Edinburg,346 F.3d 752, 760 (7th Cir.2003). Suane does not allege, nor
can it be inferred, that he received inadequate care because there was not a fulltime doctor at
Lawrence. Rather, he asserts his harm has resulted from Dr. Shah’s continuous denial of effective
pain medication. From August 2020 until filing the Complaint in February 2021, Suane was seen
by Dr. Shah approximately once a month3 and by other medical staff, including nurses and nurse
3 Suane saw Dr. Shah on August 12, 2020, September 7, 2020, October 19 , 2020, November 8, 2020, sometime in
December 2020, and February 5, 2021. (Doc. 1-1, p. 41, 46, 48-50). He states, “Because [I] see nurses, nurse
practitioners, and the [doctor] what good is that if they cannot give me the medications [I] need to stop the [pain].”
(Id. at p. 47).
practitioners, in between those doctor visits. (Id. at p. 47). While the adequacy of care provided
during these medical visits is in question, Suane was regularly seen by a medical professional. To
the extent other inmates were harmed because of inadequate staffing of medical professionals at
Lawrence, Suane cannot assert the rights of other inmates, and those claims are not properly in
this suit. See 28 U.S.C. § 1654. Because Suane was not harmed by the alleged understaffing of
medical personnel at Lawrence, these claims are dismissed without prejudice. Because there are
no other claims brought against John Froehlich, he shall be dismissed without prejudice.
Suane also makes general allegations regarding the inadequacy of the medical staff and the
untimeliness of “medline” and receipt of prescription refills. (Doc. 1-1, p. 7, 41, 53). These claims,
however, are not asserted against a specific Defendant and are also dismissed.
DISCUSSION
Based on the allegations of the Complaint, the Court finds it convenient to designate the
following Counts:
Count 1: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Dr. Shah,
Dr. Brookhart, Laurie Cunningham, Mrs. Brooks, and Rob Jeffreys
for denying Suane adequate treatment for his chronic pain and
related medical issues.
Count 2: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Wexford
Health for denying Suane adequate treatment for his chronic pain
and mental health conditions.
Count 3: State law medical negligence/malpractice claim against Dr. Shah,
Dr. Brookhart, Lauri Cunningham, Mrs. Brooks, Rob Jeffreys, and
Wexford for denying Suane adequate treatment for his chronic pain
and related medical issues.
Count 4: Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) claim
against Dr. Shah for the disclosure of Suane’s private medical
information.
Count 5: Claim against Andrea Holsher for refusing to release Suane’s
medical records.
The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future pleadings and orders,
unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. Any other claim that is mentioned
in the Complaint but not addressed in this Order should be considered dismissed without
prejudice as inadequately pled under the Twombly4 pleading standard.
Count 1
To state an Eighth Amendment claim based on the denial of medical care, a plaintiff must
plead facts sufficient to show that (1) his medical condition was sufficiently serious, and (2) the
defendants acted with deliberate indifference to his medical needs. Rasho v. Elyea, 856 F.3d 469,
475-76 (7th Cir. 2017); see also Cooper v. Casey, 97 F.3d 914 (7th Cir. 1996).
Suane alleges that Dr. Shah ceased prescribing medication that was effectively treating his
pain for nonmedical reasons and began treating his pain with ineffective and even dangerous
medications. Despite continuous complaints, Dr. Shah is now not prescribing Suane any
medication for his pain. (Doc. 1, p. 11). He also claims that he has been suffering from related
health issues, such as swelling and discoloration in his lower abdomen, difficulties urinating, and
lung pain, that have gone untreated. These claims are sufficient for Count 1 to proceed against Dr.
Shah.
Furthermore, Suane claims that he notified the warden, Dr. Brookhart, the medical
administrator, Laurie Cunningham, the director of nursing, Mrs. Brooks, and the IDOC director,
Rob Jeffreys, that he was receiving inadequate treatment for his chronic pain and that they have
not acted to ensure he receive proper care. (Doc. 1, p. 11). Count 1 will also proceed against these
Defendants. See Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 781 (7th Cir. 2015).
4 See Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (a claim must state “enough facts” to be “plausible on its
face”).
Count 2
For Wexford Health to be liable, Suane must plead that a Wexford Health policy caused
the deprivation of his Eighth Amendment right. Shields v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 746 F.3d 782, 789
(7th Cir. 2014); see also Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
That is exactly what he alleges here. Suane claims that Wexford Health is in control of the
medication inmates can be prescribed by medical providers at IDOC facilities and considers costs
when approving medicines, regardless of efficacy. (Doc. 1-1, p. 10, 15, 35). Because of this policy,
Norco 10/325, prescribed to treat Suane’s chronic pain, and Klonopin, prescribed to treat his
mental health illnesses, were replaced with cheaper, less effective medicines. (Id.). Count 2 will
proceed against Wexford Health.
Count 35
In order to bring a negligence claim under Illinois state law, a plaintiff must allege facts
suggesting that the defendant owed him a duty of care, breached the duty, and that the breach was
the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. Thompson v. Gordon, 948 N.E.2d 39, 45 (Ill. 2011)
(citing Iseberg v. Gross, 879 N.E.2d 278 (2007)). The allegations are sufficient to support a
negligence claim against Dr. Shah, Dr. Brookhart, Lauri Cunningham, Mrs. Brooks, Rob Jeffreys,
and Wexford Health, as Dr. Shah’s employer.6
However, Suane has not provided the affidavit and medical report, as required under
Illinois state law. See 735 ILCS § 5/2-622. To survive summary judgment, Suane is warned that
he must file an affidavit stating that “there is a reasonable and meritorious cause” for litigation of
the medical malpractice claim, along with a physician’s report in support of the affidavit. See
5 Because Suane’s allegations of medical negligence derive from the same facts as his Eighth Amendment deliberate
indifference claims, this Court will exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a); Wisc.
v. Ho-Chunk Nation, 512 F.3d 921, 936 (7th Cir. 2008).
6 Respondeat superior liability is recognized under Illinois state law.
Young v. United States, 942 F.3d 349 (7th Cir. 2019). His failure to do so is not dispositive of his
claim at this point, so Count 3 shall proceed against Defendants.
Count 4
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”) prohibits the
disclosure of a patient’s medical information without his consent. See Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110
Stat. 1936 (1996). However, the statute does not create a private right of action to enforce this
substantive prohibition, and the Seventh Circuit has held that HIPAA does not confer individual
enforcement rights, either express or implied. See Stewart v. Parkview Hosp., 940 F.3d 1013, 1015
(7th Cir. 2019). See also Dodd v. Jones, 623 F.3d 563, 569 (8th Cir. 2010); Wilkerson v. Shinseki,
606 F.3d 1256, 1267 n.4 (10th Cir. 2010). Therefore, Count 4, Suane’s claim for the unlawful
disclosure of private medical information shall be dismissed with prejudice. (See Doc. 1-1, p. 1,
12, 13).
Count 5
Suane claims that he sent several requests to the medical records office, and the medical
records director, Andrea Holscher, has refused to release his medical records because the
documents will show that Dr. Shah prescribed Suane a dangerous drug, Pamelor. (Doc. 1, p. 11;
Doc. 1-1, p. 44-45).
To the extent Suane is claiming an independent constitutional violation, Holscher’s refusal
to produce medical records does not violate a constitutionally established right. See Allen v.
Asselmeier, No. 15-cv-334-NJR-DGW, 2016 WL 5341189, at *5 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 23, 2016) (noting
that the Court is not aware of any constitutional right to view medical records); Kimmel v. Jackson
Cty., Il. No. 11-cv-01146-MJR, 2012 WL 3262903, at *6 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 9, 2012) (finding that a
claim based on the prison’s denial to release medical records did not implicate any constitutional
right held by the plaintiff).
If Suane is alleging civil conspiracy, this claim also fails. Conspiracy is not an independent
basis of liability in Section 1983 actions. See Smith v. Gomez, 550 F.3d 613, 617 (7th Cir. 2008)
(citing Cefalu v. Vill. of Elk Grove, 211 F.3d 416, 423 (7th Cir. 2000)). Allegations of a conspiracy
are held to a higher pleading standard than other allegations. Geinosky v. City of Chic., 675 F.3d
743, 749 (7th Cir. 2012). Thus, mere conclusions and allegations suggesting there is only a
suspicion of a conspiracy do not suffice.
Here, the Complaint contains only conclusory statements that Holscher refused to produce
Suane’s medical records “because they show Dr. Shah[’]s neglect.” (Doc. 1, p. 11). Without more
supporting factual detail inferring Holscher’s involvement in the denial of adequate care, Suane
has failed to plead a claim for conspiracy. Redd v. Nolan, 663 F. 3d 287, 292 (7th Cir. 2011) (noting
that the “complaint includes not a whiff of a conspiratorial agreement or any improper complicity
between” defendants). Accordingly, Count 5 is dismissed without prejudice.
MOTIONS TO SUPPLEMENT
Prior to screening the Complaint, on March 19, 2021, Suane filed two motions seeking to
supplement the Complaint with additional exhibits. (See Doc. 10). Although the Court typically
does not allow piecemeal additions to complaints, the Court granted the motions but advised Suane
that the additional allegations contained in the new filings do not amend or supplement the claims
in the Complaint. Suane has since filed three additional motions seeking to add exhibits to the
Complaint, along with factual allegations regarding those exhibits. (Docs. 14, 15, 16). The motions
are denied. The Court will not continue to allow Suane to add to the Complaint in an incremental
fashion. Defendants have not yet been served, and Suane has already provided hundreds of pages
of exhibits. “It is not necessary that a plaintiff provide evidentiary support to satisfy the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure requirement of ‘a shot and plaint statement of the claim.’” Jones v.
Experian Info. Sols., Inc., No. 14-10218-GAO, 2015 WL 13688629, at *1 (D. Mass. June 2, 2015).
The additional exhibits are unnecessary at this early stage in the case, and the motions are denied.
The Court will, however, allow Suane to supplement his Complaint with a new signature
page. (Doc. 11). Suane seeks to add a new signature page that is dated February 11, 2021, as the
Complaint was not dated when it was originally signed and filed. The Motion to Amend is granted.
MOTION TO RECONSIDER
Suane asks the Court to reconsider its previous Order denying his request to subpoena
medical records from a private surgical center, Dr. Stams Carle Plastic Surgery. (Doc. 13). He
argues he is legally entitled to these medical records, and they are required for demonstrating the
severity of his injury. Suane has not presented any errors of law of fact on the part of the Court or
presented newly discovered evidence warranting reconsideration. See Rothwell Cotton Co. v.
Rosenthal & Co., 827 F.2d 246, 251 (7th Cir. 1987). He only restates arguments previously
rejected or that could have been presented in his initial motion for subpoena. See Caisse Nationale
de Credit Agricole v. CBI Indus., Inc., 90 F.3d 1264, 1270 (7th Cir. 1996); Ahmed v. Ashcroft, 388
F. 3d 247, 249 (7th Cir. 2004). As the Court previously explained, the motion is premature.
Defendants have not been served and discovery has not yet commenced. Once Defendants have
entered their appearance and filed responsive pleadings to the Complaint, the Court will enter an
order providing instructions and deadlines for discovery. Then Suane may seek relevant discovery
through the issuance of a subpoena on a nonparty.
MOTION FOR EMERGENCY INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
Suane has also filed a Motion for Emergency Injunctive Relief. (Doc. 17). He states that
Lawrence is doing mass transfers due to a security level change of the facility. Due to the severity
of his pain, there is no possible way he can handle the pain of a long bus ride. The transfer could
cause further injuries to his back and to the lump in his lower abdomen. He asks the Court to order
an adjustment in his pain medication and to order Defendants to transfer him in an IDOC van, to
ensure he experiences the least amount of pain possible when being transported to a new facility.
The request for a preliminary injunction will remain pending until Defendants have been
served. Defendants are ordered to respond to the request for a preliminary injunction within
14 days of service of the pleadings in this case, at which point the Court will determine the need
for a hearing on the motions requesting a preliminary injunction.
MOTION FOR RECRUITMENT OF COUNSEL
Suane has filed a Motion for Recruitment of Counsel (Doc. 18), which is denied. 7 Pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), the Court “may request an attorney to represent any person unable to
afford counsel.” Suane has paid his full filing fee and did not provide with his motion for counsel
any recent financial documentation. Thus, the Court has no way to determine that Suane is unable
to afford counsel as is required by Section 1915(e). Because Suane has not demonstrated
indigency, the Court will not consider recruiting counsel on his behalf at this time.
DISPOSITION
For the reasons provided, the Complaint survives preliminary review pursuant to Section
1915A. COUNT 1 shall proceed against Dr. Shah, Dr. Brookhart, Laurie Cunningham, Mrs.
Brooks, and Rob Jeffreys, COUNT 2 shall proceed against Wexford Health, and COUNT 3 shall
proceed against Dr. Shah, Dr. Brookhart, Laurie Cunningham, Mrs. Brooks, Rob Jeffreys, and
Wexford. Count 4 is DISMISSED with prejudice and COUNT 5 is DISMISSED without
prejudice. Because there are no surviving claims against Andrea Holscher and John M. Froehlich,
they are DISMISSED without prejudice, and the Clerk of Court is directed to TERMINATE
them as Defendants. The Clerk is further directed to REMOVE “Dr. Deana Brookhart” as a
Defendant in the docket, as this name was listed twice by Suane in the Complaint in error.
7 In evaluating the Motion for Recruitment of Counsel, the Court applies the factors discussed in Pruitt v. Mote, 503
F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 2007) and related authority.
The Motion for Recruitment of Counsel (Doc. 18), the Motion for Reconsideration (Doc.
13), and the Motions to Enter New Evidence (Docs. 14, 15, 16) are DENIED. The Motion to
Amend Original Complaint (Doc. 11) is GRANTED. The Motion for Emergency Injunctive Relief
(Doc. 17) shall remain pending. Defendants are ORDERED to respond to the request for a
preliminary injunction within 14 days of service of the pleadings in this case
The Clerk of Court shall prepare for Dr. Shah, Wexford Health, Dr. Brookhart, Laurie
Cunningham, Mrs. Brooks, and Rob Jeffreys: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to
Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is
DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the Complaint, and this Memorandum and Order to
each defendant’s place of employment as identified by Suane. If a defendant fails to sign and return
the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the forms
were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service on that defendant, and the
Court will require that defendant pay the full costs of formal service, to the extent authorized by
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
With respect to a defendant who no longer can be found at the work address provided by
Suane, the employer shall furnish the Clerk with that defendant’s current work address, or, if not
known, his or her last known address. This information shall be used only for sending the forms
as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the address shall be
retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be maintained in the court file or
disclosed by the Clerk.
Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the
Complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g). Pursuant to
Administrative Order No. 244, Defendants need only respond to the issues stated in this
Merit Review Order.
Finally, Suane is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk of
Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not
independently investigate hus whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than 7 days
after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will cause a
delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action for want of
prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: June 28, 2021
s/Stephen P. McGlynn
STEPHEN P. MCGLYNN
United States District Judge
NOTICE TO PLAINTIFF
The Court will take the necessary steps to notify the appropriate defendants of your lawsuit and
serve them with a copy of your complaint. After service has been achieved, the defendants will
enter their appearance and file an Answer to the Complaint. It will likely take at least 60 days from
the date of this Order to receive the defendants’ Answers, but it is entirely possible that it will take
90 days or more. When all of the defendants have filed Answers, the Court will enter a Scheduling
Order containing important information on deadlines, discovery, and procedures. Suane is advised
to wait until counsel has appeared for the defendants before filing any motions, to give the
defendants notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before defendants’
counsel has filed an appearance will generally be denied as premature. Suane need not submit any
evidence to the Court at this time, unless otherwise directed by the Court.