noting that “every order short of a final decree is subject to reopening at the discretion of the district judge.”
How later courts described this case
- noting that “every order short of a final decree is subject to reopening at the discretion of the district judge.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
CALEB CHARLESTON, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) Case No. 19-cv-764-DWD
)
ALEX JONES, )
JOSHUA SCHOENBECK, )
PAMELA WESTERMAN, )
SARAH WOOLEY, )
JOHN MCCALEB, )
CHASE CARON, )
JEFFREY GARDNER, )
SHAUN GEE, )
HEATHER MCGHEE, and )
TANGELA OLIVER, )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
DUGAN, District Judge:
Now before the Court are three motions filed by Plaintiff Caleb Charleston: Motion
for Reconsideration (Doc. 81), Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 83), and Motion to Alter
or Amend Judgment (Doc. 84). Defendants Caron, Gardner, Gee, Jones, McCaleb,
McGhee, Schoenbeck, Trokey, Westerman, Wooley, and Young filed Responses in
Opposition to the Motions (Doc. 89; Doc. 90).
By his Motions, Plaintiff asks the Court to reconsider the Order at Doc. 80 granting,
in part, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the issue of Plaintiff's exhaustion
of administrative remedies and dismissing Counts 1 and 2 of Plaintiff's Complaint.
Plaintiff maintains that he properly exhausted his administrative remedies, or that such
remedies were unavailable to him because of Defendants’ or other third-persons’ actions.
Plaintiff repeats the arguments he presented in opposition to the motion for summary
judgment and at the Pavey hearing on the motion. Plaintiff specifically points to his
affidavit, wherein he described multiple persons who allegedly thwarted his ability to
submit his October 8, 2017 Grievance for mailing. Plaintiff also relies heavily on his legal
mail card, which showed certain documents were mailed to the Administrative Review
Board in October and November 2017. Plaintiff presented these arguments to the Court
both in his briefing in opposition to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and at
the evidentiary hearing the Court held on April 15, 2021.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not expressly recognize motions to
reconsider. Rule 54(b) allows district courts to revisit “any order or other decision . . .
that adjudicates fewer than all the claims” in an action and to revise it at any point before
the entry of judgment as justice requires. FED. R. Civ. PROC. 54(b); see also Moses H. Cone
Mem’! Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 12 (1983) (noting that “every order short
of a final decree is subject to reopening at the discretion of the district judge.”). The
granting of Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and dismissal of Counts 1 and 2
of Plaintiff's complaint fall within the reach of Rule 54(b).
Motions to reconsider under this rule “serve a limited function: to correct manifest
errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence.” Caisse Nationale de Credit
Agricole v. CBI Indus., Inc., 90 F.3d 1264, 1269 (7th Cir. 1996) (internal quotations and
citations omitted). “A manifest error is not demonstrated by the disappointment of the
losing party. It is the wholesale disregard, misapplication, or failure to recognize
controlling precedent.” Oto v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 224 F.3d 601, 606 (7th Cir. 2000) (internal
quotations and citation omitted); see also Burritt v. Ditlefsen, 807 F.3d 239, 253 (7th Cir.
2015). Because the standards for reconsideration are exacting, the Seventh Circuit has
stressed that appropriate issues for reconsideration “rarely arise.” Bank of Waunakee v.
Rochester Cheese Sales, Inc., 906 F.2d 1185, 1191 (7th Cir. 1990) (internal quotations and
citation omitted).
Plaintiff does not offer any new arguments or present any newly discovered
evidence in support of his request for reconsideration. Instead, Plaintiff relies on the same
arguments and evidence he presented in the briefing on Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment and at the Pavey hearing held on Defendants’ motion. However, as the Court
already determined in its Order at Doc. 80, the Court considered all of Plaintiff's
arguments, in addition to Plaintiff's testimony at the April 15, 2021 hearing. Specifically,
the Court found Plaintiff's testimony at the Pavey hearing credible, although too
speculative to support the conclusion that Plaintiff properly mailed or submitted his
October 8, 2017 Grievance in accordance with the Illinois Department of Corrections’
administrative procedures (Doc. 80, p. 11). As Plaintiff has not presented any newly
discovered evidence or alleged any manifest error of law or fact, the Court DENIES his
Motions for Reconsideration (Doc. 81; Doc. 83).
Likewise, Plaintiff's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment (Doc. 84) will be denied.
Rule 59(e) permits the Court to alter or amend judgments upon a motion filed no later
than 28 days after the date of entry. The purpose of Rule 59(e) is to provide the district
court with a means for correcting errors that may have “crept into the proceeding” while
the district court still holds jurisdiction over the case. Sosebee v. Astrue, 494 F.3d 583, 589
(7th Cir. 2007). This Court retains jurisdiction over the action, as the Order dismissing
Counts 1 and 2 of Plaintiff’s complaint only dismissed the action as to certain defendants.
Therefore, the concern that Rule 59(e) protects against is mitigated in this instance.
A Rule 59(e) motion “is only proper when the movant presents newly discovered
evidence that was not available at the time of trial or if the movant points to evidence in
the record that clearly establishes a manifest error of law or fact.” Burritt, 807 at 252-253
(internal quotations and citation omitted). The motion is not an invitation to rehash
previously considered and rejected arguments. See Bordelon v. Chicago School Reform Bd. of
Trustees, 233 F.3d 524, 529 (7th Cir. 2000). Again, as Plaintiff has not presented any newly
discovered evidence or alleged any manifest errors of law or fact, the Court DENIES his
Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment (Doc. 84).
Motion to Appoint Counsel
Also pending before this Court is Plaintiff's Motion to Appoint Counsel and
Memorandum in Support (Doc. 82). When presented with a request to appoint counsel,
the Court must make the following inquiries: (1) has the indigent plaintiff made a
reasonable attempt to obtain counsel or effectively been precluded from doing so, and (2)
given the difficulty of the case, does the plaintiff appear competent to litigate it himself.
See Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 654-55 (7th Cir. 2007). Plaintiff demonstrates that he has
made a reasonable attempt to recruit counsel on his own, satisfying the first inquiry.
However, the Court is not inclined to appoint counsel on Plaintiff's behalf at this time.
Plaintiff's pleadings and arguments demonstrate that he can articulate clearly and
effectively on his own behalf. This case involves a straightforward claim with no complex
matters pending before this Court. Additionally, the undersigned recently observed
Plaintiff during a motion hearing and notes that Plaintiff appeared to be of clear mind
and highly capable of representing himself considering the current posture of this case.
For all these reasons, Plaintiff's Motion to Appoint Counsel (Doc. 82) is DENIED, without
prejudice. Plaintiff may renew his request by filing another motion if circumstances
change and it becomes necessary to do so as the case proceeds.
Disposition
For all of the above stated reasons, Plaintiff's Motions for Reconsideration (Doc.
81; Doc. 83), Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment (Doc. 84), and Renewed Motion to
Appoint Counsel (Doc. 82) are DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
L Vio a
Dated: May 13, 2021
DAVID W. DUGAN
United States District Judge