The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EDWARD E. ROBERSON, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. )
) Case No. 3:19-cv-01188-GCS
CRAIG AGGLEMEIER, and SHERRY )
JONES, )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
SISON, Magistrate Judge:
On October 30, 2019, Plaintiff Edward Roberson, an inmate at Menard
Correctional Center (“Menard”) brought suit against numerous defendants pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that he was denied access to the courts, denied adequate dental
care, and subjected to cruel and unusual punishment. (Doc. 1). Plaintiff filed his first
amended complaint on May 28, 2020. (Doc. 14). After conducting a merit review
according to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court severed Plaintiff’s First and Fourteenth
Amendment claims, as well as his Eighth Amendment claims against correctional officers
Morrison, Moore, and Ostlundmeiner. (Doc. 20). Remaining before the Court in this case
is Plaintiff’s single count against Defendants Agglemeier and Jones for violating
Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights by demonstrating deliberate indifference to his
serious medical needs. Id. Now, before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion to compel initial
disclosures from Defendants, including a log of Plaintiff’s interactions with Menard staff
during the time relevant to the complaint, and a list of staff names and titles for those
with whom Plaintiff interacted. See (Doc. 5, p. 3-4). For the reasons stated below,
Plaintiff’s motion to compel is DENIED.
LEGAL STANDARDS
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, parties may obtain discovery into any
non-privileged matter relevant to a party’s claim or defense so long as that discovery is
proportional to the needs of the case. See Pegues v. Coe, No. 3:16-CV-00239-SMY-RJD, 2017
WL 4922198, at *1 (S.D. Ill. Oct. 31, 2017)(citing FED. R. CIV. PROC. 26(1)). The purpose of
discovery is to provide a mechanism for making relevant information available to
litigants. See FED. R. CIV. PROC. 26 advisory committee note to 1980 amendment.
Accordingly, the relevancy requirement is to be broadly construed to include matters
“that bear on, or that could reasonably lead to other matters that could bear on, any issue
that is or may be in the case.” Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978)
(internal citation omitted); see also, FED. R. CIV. PROC. advisory committee note to 1946
amendment. Nevertheless, the relevancy requirement should be firmly applied, and a
district court should not neglect its power to restrict discovery when necessary. See
Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 177 (1979); Balderston v. Fairbanks Morse Engine Div. of Coltec
Industries, 328 F.3d 309, 320 (7th Cir. 2003); Stephenson v. Florilli Transportation, LLC, No.
3:18-cv-0103-NJR-DGW, 2018 WL 4699863 at *1 (S.D. Ill. Oct. 1, 2018).
ANALYSIS
In his motion to compel, Plaintiff states that, as of February 16, 2021, he had not
received Defendants initial disclosures. (Doc. 47). Specifically, Plaintiff claims that
Defendants failed to timely send him incident reports; grievance reports, including
grievance logs and counselors’ notes; disciplinary tickets and documents indicating the
resolution of those tickets; Plaintiff’s cumulative counseling summary, or any other log
of Plaintiff’s interactions with staff during the relevant time; reports or statements of any
person with knowledge of the incident; and the names of any person with knowledge of
the underlying incident and a short description of the subject of their knowledge. (Doc.
54, p. 2). Under the initial scheduling order, Defendants were to provide Plaintiff with
these documents on or before February 15, 2021. (Doc. 44).
Defendants respond that they mailed their initial disclosures to Plaintiff on
February 11, 2021. (Doc. 52, Exh. A). However, February 12th and February 15th were
both state holidays, during which the post office was closed. Id. at p. 2. A winter storm
then hit Illinois shortly thereafter; Defendants posit that this storm may have caused
additional mail delays. Id.
In the event that Plaintiff did not eventually receive Defendants’ initial disclosures,
Defendants assert that it would be prejudicial to require Defendants to resend the
required documents, as the disclosures totaled more than 700 pages. (Doc. 52, p. 2).
Defendants also claim that any prejudice to Plaintiff is minimal. Id. Defendants filed their
motion for summary judgment on the issue of exhaustion of remedies on March 1, 2021;
in their motion, Defendants included as exhibits copies of Plaintiff’s movement records,
his cumulative counseling summary, his Menard orientation record, his grievance
records from the Administrative Review Board, and his Menard grievance log. (Doc. 51,
Exh. A-E). Defendants assert that any other discovery not included in their motion for
summary judgment is discovery on the merits. (Doc. 52, p. 2). As discovery on the merits
is stayed pending resolution of the issue of Plaintiff’s exhaustion of administrative
remedies, Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s motion to compel is premature. Id. at p. 2-3.
Plaintiff replied on March 10, 2021. (Doc. 54). Though Plaintiff noted that he
received most of Defendants’ initial disclosures on March 5, 2021, he also stated that he
still had not received copies of requests slips he sent to staff members regarding this
incident, or the names of staff members with information regarding the incident and their
titles. Id. at p. 4. Plaintiff notes that the initial scheduling order required Defendants to
send both documents as part of their initial disclosures. Id.
As Plaintiff has received the vast majority of Defendants’ required initial
disclosures, the Court notes that Defendants are not required to re-send all 700 pages of
discovery to Plaintiff. The resulting burden on Defendants of providing the remainder of
the requested discovery is therefore significantly less than providing all of the initial
disclosures for a second time. Nevertheless, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s requested
discovery is not proportional to the needs of the case at this time. See Pegues, 2017 WL
4922198, at *1. Plaintiff has not indicated a particular need for copies of his request slips.
Although the scheduling order references a log of Plaintiff’s interactions with staff, and
although Plaintiff’s request slips are evidence of such interactions, the scheduling order
also states that Defendants may provide either a log of such interactions or Plaintiff’s
cumulative counseling summary. (Doc. 44, p. 2)(emphasis added). Defendants are only
required to provide a log of Plaintiff’s interactions with staff during the relevant time as
an alternative to providing Plaintiff's cumulative counseling summary. Similarly,
Defendants are only required to provide Plaintiff with the names of persons with
knowledge of the incident “to the extent this information is not included in the
documents produced to Plaintiff.” Id. The documents produced to Plaintiff include
information regarding those with knowledge of the incident, including Plaintiff's
grievance counselor and those who reviewed his grievances. Accordingly, the Court
finds that Defendants have complied with the requirement to provide Plaintiff with initial
disclosures as required by the Court’s scheduling order, and the motion to compel is
therefore denied.
CONCLUSION
For the above-stated reasons, Plaintiff's motion to compel (Doc. 47) is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED. Digitally signed
□ _ » by Judge Sison 2
Dated: April 9, 2021. Stik 6. Soe. Pyate: 2021.04.09
15:57:12 -05'00'
GILBERT C. SISON
United States Magistrate Judge
Page 5 of 5