“Medical decisions that may be characterized as ‘classic examples of matters for medical judgment,’ such as whether one course of treatment is preferable to another, are beyond the [Eighth] Amendment's purview. Such matters are questions of tort, not constitutional law.”
How later courts described this case
- “Medical decisions that may be characterized as ‘classic examples of matters for medical judgment,’ such as whether one course of treatment is preferable to another, are beyond the [Eighth] Amendment's purview. Such matters are questions of tort, not constitutional law.”
- Generally, a prisoner's dissatisfaction with a doctor’s prescribed course of treatment does not give rise to a constitutional claim
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
JAMES MUNSON, )
Plaintiff,
vs. Case No. 18-cv-2216-DWD
FAIYAZ AHMED,
WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INC.,)
and WARDEN OF LAWRENCE )
CORRECTIONAL CENTER, )
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
DUGAN, District Judge:
In this matter, Plaintiff James Munson proceeds on two Eighth Amendment claims
against Defendants Dr. Faiyaz Ahmed and Wexford Health Sources, Inc. related to his
medical treatment for testicular nodules, osteoarthritis pain, a herniated disc, bone
degeneration, and a cold (Doc. 1; Doc. 8). Now before the Court are three motions filed
by Plaintiff: Motion for Physical and Mental Examinations (Doc. 57), Motion to Compel
Discovery (Doc. 59), and Second Motion to Reconsider (Doc. 60). For the reasons below,
Plaintiff's Motions will be denied.
Motion for Physical and Mental Examinations
By his Motion for Physical and Mental Examinations (Doc. 57), Plaintiff seeks to
compel a “full body” MRI pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 35. Plaintiff wants
to determine “whether or not his arthritis, bone degeneration and herniated disk has
advance[d] and what course of treatment will eliminate or treat [his] constant chronic
pain.” Plaintiff further asks to be examined by a provider with no connections to
Defendant Wexford. Fed. R. Civ. P. 35 provides:
(a) ORDER FOR AN EXAMINATION.
(1) In General. The court where the action is pending may order a
party whose mental or physical condition—including blood group—is in
controversy to submit to a physical or mental examination by a suitably
licensed or certified examiner. The court has the same authority to order a
party to produce for examination a person who is in its custody or under
its legal control.
(2) Motion and Notice; Contents of the Order. The order: (A) may be
made only on motion for good cause and on notice to all parties and the
person to be examined; and (B) must specify the time, place, manner,
conditions, and scope of the examination, as well as the person or persons
who will perform it.
However, Rule 35 does not authorize this Court to appoint an expert to examine a
party wishing an examination of himself. Brown v. United States, 74 Fed. Appx. 611, 614-
15 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Rule 35 of the FRCP does not vest the court with authority to appoint
an expert to examine a party wishing an examination of himself. Rather, under
appropriate circumstances, it would allow the court to order a party to submit to a
physical examination at the request of an opposing party.”). Accordingly, Rule 35 cannot
provide Plaintiff with the relief he requests.
Moreover, in denying Plaintiff's Motion for Expert Witness (See Order at Doc. 70),
the Court reasoned:
The central issue presented by the Complaint is whether Dr. Ahmed
exhibited deliberate indifference toward Mr. Munson and his conditions
related to his pain. Given that the issues presented are narrowly tailored to
a “deliberate indifference” claim, and do not involve more complex
questions concerning medical diagnosis and judgment, expert testimony
regarding the “proper standard of medical care” and whether a defendant
negligently failed to meet the standard of care, is not relevant and,
therefore, will not provide assistance to the trier of fact. Further, even
without such expert testimony, a lay fact finder should be able to discern
whether Mr. Munson’s alleged pain, bleeding and weakness were
“objectively serious” and whether a defendant had subjective knowledge
of, and then disregarded, a substantial risk of serious harm.
(Doc. 70, at p. 5). As Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claims do not concern questions of
the proper standard of medical care or Plaintiff's specific medical diagnosis, an additional
medical examination of Plaintiff is unnecessary here, even if Rule 35 provided for such
examination. See Snipes v. DeTella, 95 F.3d 586, 591 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Medical decisions
that may be characterized as ‘classic examples of matters for medical judgment,’ such as
whether one course of treatment is preferable to another, are beyond the [Eighth]
Amendment's purview. Such matters are questions of tort, not constitutional law.”)
(internal citations omitted). Plaintiff's Motion (Doc. 57) is therefore DENIED.
Motion to Compel Discovery
On August 19, 2020, Plaintiff filed his third Motion to Compel (Doc. 59) whereby
he seeks to compel answers or documents related to: (1) Defendant Dr. Anmed’s personal
medical records, and (2) Defendant Wexford’s contract with the Illinois Department of
Corrections and related documents. Plaintiff's request related to Defendant Ahmed’s
personal medical history will be denied. Plaintiff argues that Dr. Ahmed shared
statements concerning his personal experience with arthritis pain with Plaintiff.
Therefore, Plaintiff wants to review Dr. Ahmed’s medical records to verify the accuracy
of these statements, and presumably determine whether Dr. Ahmed used his personal
medical history in diagnosing and treating Plaintiff's arthritis. However, Plaintiff's
request to examine Defendant's personal medical records - when Defendant's health is
not at issue in this dispute - is not relevant to Plaintiff’s claims for deliberate indifference
and will not reasonably lead to discoverable information.
To succeed on his deliberate indifference claims, Plaintiff must establish that he
has an “objectively serious medical condition” and that a prison official was subjectively
aware of the condition and either “knowingly or recklessly disregarded it.” Hayes v.
Snyder, 546 F.3d 516, 524 (7th Cir. 2008); Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 652-653 (7th Cir.
2005). A prisoner may also “establish deliberate indifference by demonstrating that the
treatment he received was ‘blatantly’ inappropriate.” Pyles v. Fahim, 771 F.3d 403, 409
(7th Cir. 2014) (internal citations omitted). “Making that showing is not easy: ‘A medical
professional is entitled to deference in treatment decisions unless ‘no minimally
competent professional would have so responded under those circumstances.” Id.
“Disagreement between a prisoner and his doctor, or even between two medical
professionals, about the proper course of treatment generally is insufficient, by itself, to
establish an Eighth Amendment violation.” Id.; in accord Snipes, 95 F.3d at 592 (Generally,
a prisoner's dissatisfaction with a doctor’s prescribed course of treatment does not give
rise to a constitutional claim).
As the Court previously determined in denying Plaintiff's Motion for Expert
Witness (See Order at Doc. 70), Plaintiff's deliberate indifference claims “do not involve
more complex questions concerning medical diagnosis and judgment.” (Doc. 70, at p. 5).
As such, the question of whether Defendant Ahmed drew from his own medical history
in exercising his medical judgment to diagnose and treat Plaintiff is irrelevant to
Plaintiff's deliberate indifference claims which focus on whether Defendant Ahmed
knowing or recklessly disregarded Plaintiff's “objectively serious” injuries. Moreover,
even if such information was relevant to Plaintiff's claims, unrestrained access into
Defendant’s medical history would not be reasonably calculated to lead to discoverable
information.
Plaintiff also seeks to compel documents from Defendant Wexford related to its
policies and procedures in treating inmates with the Illinois Department of Corrections.
The documents at issue here appear to be the same documents at subject in Plaintiff's
prior Motion to Compel at Doc. 52, which was denied by the Order at Doc. 69. Plaintiff
argues that he has not received or viewed the documents Defendant disclosed in its
discovery responses. In turn, Defendant states that it produced 336 pages of documents
subject to the protective order at Doc. 49 (which prohibits Plaintiff from retaining any of
the documents produced), but that Plaintiff refused to view the documents (Doc. 51; Doc.
62). In his Motion, Plaintiff does not proffer that he attempted to contact Defendant or
Mr. Schoon (the litigation coordinator at Lawrence Correctional Center) to request an
opportunity to again review these documents. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not complied
with the mandates of Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(1) in resolving this issue.
Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Discovery (Doc. 59) is therefore DENIED. However,
considering that the discovery deadline in this matter has now passed, the Court will
permit Plaintiff one last opportunity to resolve this issue with Defendant Wexford and
arrange for the review of the documents requested, if desired. Accordingly, the Court
will extend the discovery deadline by 30-days, as further detailed below. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 6(b)(1)(A) (The court may, for good cause, extend the time for when an act must be
done).
Second Motion to Reconsider
By his Second Motion to Reconsider, Plaintiff asks the Court to reconsider
appointing counsel for Plaintiff. Plaintiff's prior requests for counsel were denied on
March 25, 2019 (Doc. 8), March 30, 2020 (Doc. 32), and June 15, 2020 (Doc. 46). Plaintiff
asks the Court to reconsider its prior denials, arguing that the case is no longer in its
infancy and that Plaintiff is no longer getting assistance from the prison staff librarian.
The Court construes Plaintiff’s Motion as another request for counsel.
When presented with a request to appoint counsel, the Court must make the
following inquiries: (1) has the indigent plaintiff made a reasonable attempt to obtain
counsel or effectively been precluded from doing so, and (2) given the difficulty of the
case, does the plaintiff appear competent to litigate it himself. Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647,
654-55 (7th Cir. 2007). The Court previously found that Plaintiff made a reasonable
attempt to procure counsel on his own. Nevertheless, the appointment of counsel is not
watranted at this time. Plaintiff's pleadings to date demonstrate an ability to articulate
clearly and effectively, and they also reflect an understanding of the law. See Romanelli v.
Suliene, 615 F.3d 847, 852 (7th Cir. 2010). This case involves straightforward claims that
are not overly complex, and no exceptional circumstances appear to exist that would
merit appointment of counsel at this time. Id. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Second Motion to
Reconsider/Motion to Appoint Counsel (Doc. 60) is DENIED without prejudice.
Plaintiff may move for recruited counsel again in the future, if necessary.
Other Matters
Also pending before the Court is a Motion to Withdraw filed by Attorney Jeanine
Armstrong (Doc. 56). Attorney Jeanine Armstrong seeks to withdraw as attorney for
Defendant Dee Dee Brookhart, the Warden of Lawrence Correctional Center, stating that
Assistant Attorney General Kyrstin B. Beasley will continue to represent Defendant
Brookhart in this matter. Attorney Armstrong’s Motion (Doc. 56) is GRANTED.
Attorney Jeanine Armstrong is TERMINATED as counsel of record for Defendant
Warden of Lawrence Correctional Center. The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to
terminate Attorney Armstrong from the docket.
Finally, On August 18, 2020, Defendants filed their Joint Motion for Extension of
Time (Doc. 58) to file dispositive motions. Defendants request a 30-day extension on their
deadlines following resolution of Plaintiff’s pending discovery motions at Docs. 31, 52,
54, and 57. As all discovery motions have now been resolved, the Court GRANTS
Defendant’s Motion (Doc. 58). The Court hereby resets the following deadlines:
Discovery must be completed by April 16, 2021. Any dispositive motions must be filed
on or before May 17, 2021.
SO ORDERED. U L. “J
Dated: March 16, 2021 dun « W J a
DAVID W. DUGAN
United States District Judge