noting that Eleventh Amendment bars suits against states in federal court for money damages
How later courts described this case
- noting that Eleventh Amendment bars suits against states in federal court for money damages
- indicating that individual capacity claims are not available; the proper defendant is the agency or its director (in his official capacity)
- noting that state Department of Corrections is immune from suit by virtue of Eleventh Amendment
- noting that excessive force claim must involve force that was used “‘maliciously and sadistically’ rather than as part of ‘a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline’”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
DERRICK ECHOLS, JR., #R15847, )
)
Plaintiff, )
vs. ) Case No. 3:20-cv-00583-GCS
)
ILLINOIS DEPT. of CORRECTIONS, )
MEDICAL STAFF (Nurse/Medical )
Technicians, Menard CC), )
MAJOR BRADLEY, )
MAJOR RATHKE, )
MAJOR LASHBROOK, )
and WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
SISON, Magistrate Judge:
Plaintiff Derrick Echols, Jr., is a state prisoner currently incarcerated at Pontiac
Correctional Center (“Pontiac”) in the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”). He
filed the instant lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged deprivations of his
constitutional rights while he was confined at Menard Correctional Center (“Menard”).
He asserts violations of the First, Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. and the Rehabilitation
Act (“RA”), 29 U.S.C. § 701, et seq.1 (Doc. 1, p. 23, 34). He seeks monetary damages.
This case is now before the Court for preliminary merits review of the Complaint
1 Although Plaintiff mentions only the ADA, “the [RA] is available to him, and courts are supposed
to analyze a litigant’s claims and not just the legal theories that he propounds, especially when he is
litigating pro se.” Norfleet v. Walker, 684 F.3d 688, 690 (7th Cir. 2012) (internal citations omitted).
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, 2 which requires the Court to screen prisoner Complaints to filter
out non-meritorious claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Any portion of the Complaint that
is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or requests money damages
from an immune defendant must be dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). At this
juncture, the factual allegations of the pro se Complaint are to be liberally construed. See
Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).
THE COMPLAINT
Plaintiff makes the following allegations in his Complaint (Doc. 1): When he
arrived at Menard on June 12, 2018, unnamed correctional staff forcefully held Plaintiff
down while he was handcuffed and cut off his dreadlocks against his will, pursuant to
Menard’s grooming policy. (Doc. 1, p. 6, 23-26). This violated Plaintiff’s religious beliefs
and constituted excessive force. The removal of Plaintiff’s hair caused him to develop
psoriasis, seborrhea of the scalp, itching, rashes, and hair loss. (Doc. 1, p. 23).
Officers Bradley, Rathke, and Lashbrook, as well as unknown medical and/or
mental health staff, authorized a “security hold” against Plaintiff and placed him on
suicide watch. (Doc. 1, p. 2, 23, 26-28). During the suicide watch, Plaintiff was housed in
a cell where he was stripped of his clothes and his prosthetic leg was confiscated against
his will. (Doc. 1, p. 23, 28). During his time on suicide watch, he was forced to crawl or
hop along the cold, dirty cell floor while naked in order to retrieve his food and
2 The Court has jurisdiction to screen the Complaint in light of Plaintiff’s consent to the full
jurisdiction of a magistrate judge and the Illinois Department of Corrections’ limited consent to the exercise
of magistrate judge jurisdiction, as set forth in the Memorandum of Understanding between the Illinois
Department of Corrections and this Court.
medication. (Doc. 1, p. 23). His prosthesis was not returned until June 20, 2018. (Doc. 1,
p. 28). These actions amounted to excessive force and violated the ADA.
On November 9, 2018, Plaintiff was moved from an ADA cell into a cell that was
not ADA accessible. (Doc. 1, p. 16, 19, 23). His contract to have a wheelchair was ignored,
and the grievance officer did not address his complaint over the confiscation of his
prosthetic leg. (Doc. 1, p. 10-11, 13, 16-17, 19, 23). His grievances over the lack of ADA
accommodations were denied or deemed moot. (Doc. 1, p. 23).
Plaintiff seeks financial compensation and court review of the IDOC grooming
policy to remove dreadlocks, which he contends violates the First and Eighth
Amendments. (Doc. 1, p. 23, 34).
DISCUSSION
Based on the allegations in the Complaint, the Court designates the following
claims in this pro se action:
Count 1: On June 12, 2018, unidentified Menard/IDOC staff cut
Plaintiff’s dreadlocks pursuant to a Menard/IDOC policy and
used excessive force against him, in violation of Plaintiff’s
First, Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
Count 2: On June 12, 2018, Bradley, Rathke, Lashbrook, and unknown
medical/mental health staff placed Plaintiff under a “security
hold,” put him on suicide watch, and used excessive force to
take his prosthetic leg, forcing him to crawl or hop on the
dirty cell floor in order to move about, in violation of the
Eighth Amendment.
Count 3: On June 12, 2018, Bradley, Rathke, Lashbrook, and unknown
medical/mental health staff placed Plaintiff under a “security
hold,” put him on suicide watch, and confiscated his
prosthetic leg, forcing him to crawl or hop on the dirty cell
floor in order to move about, in violation of the ADA and/or
the RA.
Count 4: Starting November 9, 2018, unidentified Menard/IDOC
officials housed Plaintiff in a non-ADA-accessible cell where
he was without his prosthetic leg at times and his wheelchair
access to facilities was impaired.
Count 5: Unidentified grievance officials wrongly denied Plaintiff’s
grievances over the denial of ADA accommodations.
Any other claim that is mentioned in the Complaint but not addressed in this Order
should be considered dismissed without prejudice as inadequately pled under the
Twombly pleading standard.3
Count 1
Plaintiff indicates that he wore his hair in dreadlocks for religious reasons.
Prisoners are entitled to practice their religion so long as such practice “does not unduly
burden the administration of the prison.” Hunafa v. Murphy, 907 F.2d 46, 47 (7th Cir.
1990). However, a prison regulation that impinges on an inmate’s First Amendment
rights may still be valid “if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests[,]”
such as prison security. O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987)(quoting Turner
v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)).
Plaintiff may be able to pursue a First Amendment and/or an Eighth Amendment
claim for excessive force based on the forcible removal of his dreadlocks. However, he
has failed to associate any individual Defendant with these claims. He merely states that
3 See, e.g., Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)(noting that an action fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim that is plausible
on its face.”).
“staff” forcefully held him down while an inmate recruited by “staff” cut his hair. (Doc.
1, p. 23-26). This is not sufficient. While Plaintiff does include unnamed “medical staff”
(nurse and/or med techs) among the Defendants (Doc. 1, p. 1), he does not allege that the
medical staff were involved in the removal of his dreadlocks. Instead, Plaintiff indicates
that correctional staff ordered the haircut while he was in the holding cell/bullpen. (Doc.
1, p. 23-26).
While Plaintiff seeks to pursue this claim against the IDOC, he cannot sue a state
governmental agency for money damages. See, e.g., Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491
U.S. 58, 71 (1989)(stating that “[n]either a State nor its officials acting in their official
capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.”). See also Wynn v. Southward, 251 F.3d 588, 592 (7th
Cir. 2001)(noting that Eleventh Amendment bars suits against states in federal court for
money damages); Billman v. Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 56 F.3d 785, 788 (7th Cir. 1995)(noting that
state Department of Corrections is immune from suit by virtue of Eleventh Amendment).
For these reasons, Count 1 shall be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted. The dismissal is without prejudice as to any individual
Defendants that Plaintiff may identify in an amended Complaint.4 However, the claims
in Count 1 against the IDOC will be dismissed with prejudice.
Count 2
Plaintiff seeks to pursue a claim of “excessive force” for “withholding/taking [his]
4 A Plaintiff must associate particular defendants with specific claims so these defendants are put on
notice of the claims brought against them and so they can properly answer the complaint. See Hoskins v.
Poelstra, 320 F.3d 761, 764 (7th Cir. 2003). A Defendant whose name is unknown may be identified as a
“John/Jane Doe,” but the Plaintiff must supply as much descriptive information as possible (such as job
title, shift worked, or location) to assist in the person’s eventual identification.
prosthetic leg” while placing him on suicide watch on June 12, 2018, after which he had
to crawl on the floor or hop to move about his cell. (Doc. 1, p. 23). His attached grievance
supplies some additional facts, stating that after his placement in the suicide watch cell,
Plaintiff “reluctantly” complied with a staff request to check his prosthesis for contraband
by removing the prosthesis himself and handing it to a staff member for inspection. (Doc.
1, p. 28). The staff member did not return the prosthesis and left it outside Plaintiff’s cell.
Despite Plaintiff’s entreaties and distress, his leg was not returned to him until 8 days
later. Id.
These facts do not support a claim for excessive force, because by Plaintiff’s own
description, no physical force or touching at all was used against him to remove his
prosthetic leg. See, e.g., Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 40 (2010)(noting that excessive force
claim must involve force that was used “‘maliciously and sadistically’ rather than as part
of ‘a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline’”).
However, keeping Plaintiff in the suicide watch cell for several days without his
prosthetic leg or any other mobility aid may have violated the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment if it denied him “the minimal civilized
measure of life’s necessities,” creating an excessive risk to his health or safety, and if
Defendants were deliberately indifferent to that risk. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834
(1994). Prison conditions that deprive inmates of basic human needs – food, medical care,
sanitation, or physical safety – may violate the Eighth Amendment. See Rhodes v.
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981). On that basis, the Eighth Amendment claim in Count
2 for unconstitutional conditions of confinement may proceed against Bradley, Rathke,
Lashbrook, and the unknown medical staff (nurses/medical technicians) who were
responsible for placing/keeping Plaintiff in the cell without his prosthetic leg. However,
the unknown medical staff cannot be given notice of the claim until Plaintiff identifies the
person(s) by name.
The portion of Count 2 alleging excessive force is dismissed without prejudice for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Plaintiff also seeks to bring this claim against the IDOC, Wexford Health Sources
(“Wexford”), and unnamed “mental health personnel.”5 (Doc. 1, p. 23). As explained
with Count 1, Plaintiff cannot maintain a claim for damages against the IDOC.
Furthermore, he can only sustain a claim against Wexford if he can show that an
individual employed by Wexford acted or failed to act as a result of an official policy
espoused by Wexford. See, e.g., Woodward v. Corr. Med. Serv. of Ill., Inc., 368 F.3d 917, 927
(7th Cir. 2004)(noting that corporation can be held liable for deliberate indifference only
if it had a policy or practice that caused the violation). Plaintiff has made no such
allegation. For these reasons, Count 2 fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted against the IDOC or Wexford.
Count 3
Plaintiff's allegations that he was confined in the suicide watch cell without his
prosthetic leg are sufficient to state an ADA and/or RA claim. However, this claim
5 It is not clear whether the “mental health personnel” included in Plaintiff’s statement of this claim
fall within his description of the unknown “medical staff” (nurses and med techs) that he lists as a
Defendant. (Doc. 1, p. 1-2, 23). In any case, Count 2 cannot proceed against any unknown party until
Plaintiff identifies him/her by name.
cannot proceed against any individual Defendants because individual employees of the
IDOC cannot be sued under the ADA or the RA. See Jaros v. Illinois Dep't of Corr., 684 F.3d
667, 670 (7th Cir. 2012). Instead, the proper defendant is the relevant state department or
agency. See 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(b). See also Jaros, 684 F.3d at 670, n.2 (indicating that
individual capacity claims are not available; the proper defendant is the agency or its
director (in his official capacity)). Therefore, the claim in Count 3 will proceed only
against the IDOC and is dismissed as to Defendants Bradley, Rathke, Lashbrook, the
unknown medical/mental health staff, and Wexford.
Count 4
As with Count 3, the claim that prison officials kept Plaintiff in a non-ADA-
accessible cell in November 2018, where he was unable to safely move about or access the
sink and toilet, states a claim under the ADA and/or RA that merits further review.
Plaintiff indicates that during the time he was in the non-accessible cell, he was without
his prosthetic leg for some period, and that his wheelchair could not maneuver properly
in the area. (Doc. 1, p. 16-17, 19). Count 4 shall therefore proceed, but only against the
IDOC.
Count 5
The assertion that the Menard “Administration/Grievance Office” wrongly
denied Plaintiff’s grievances over the denial of ADA accommodations fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted. (Doc. 1, p. 23). Even if Plaintiff had associated one of
the named Defendants with this claim, it is subject to dismissal. The alleged mishandling
of grievances “by persons who otherwise did not cause or participate in the underlying
conduct states no claim.” Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 953 (7th Cir. 2011). Count 5
shall therefore be dismissed with prejudice.
JOHN/JANE DOE DEFENDANTS
Plaintiff is responsible for conducting discovery (informal or formal) aimed at
identifying the “John/Jane Doe” Unknown Medical Staff Defendants (Nurse/Medical
Technicians), in accordance with the discovery order that will be entered by the Court.
Once the names of the unknown Defendants are discovered, Plaintiff must file a motion
to substitute the newly identified Defendant(s) in place of the generic designations in the
case caption and throughout the Complaint.
OFFICIAL CAPACITY CLAIMS
Plaintiff raises claims against each Defendant in his or her official capacity. (Doc.
1, p. 1). The ADA and RA claims are properly brought against the IDOC as an official
capacity claim. However, Plaintiff’s claims for monetary damages may only be pursued
against state officials in their individual capacities. See Brown v. Budz, 398 F.3d 904, 918
(7th Cir. 2005); Shockley v. Jones, 823 F.2d 1068, 1070 (7th Cir. 1987). Accordingly, the
official capacity claims against the individual defendants are dismissed without
prejudice. Count 2 will proceed against Bradley, Rathke, Lashbrook, and the Unknown
Medical Staff (Nurse/Medical Technicians) in their individual capacities only.
DISPOSITION
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that portions of the Complaint (Doc. 1) survive
preliminary review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and shall proceed as follows: COUNT
2 for unconstitutional conditions of confinement will receive further review against
Defendants Bradley, Rathke, Lashbrook, and the Unknown Medical Staff
(Nurse/Medical Technicians); COUNTS 3 and 4 will proceed only against the IDOC.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that COUNT 1 is DISMISSED from the action
without prejudice as to any individual Defendant(s). COUNTS 1 and 2 are DISMISSED
with prejudice as against the IDOC. COUNT 5 is DISMISSED with prejudice.
Defendant Wexford Health Sources is DISMISSED from the action without prejudice
and the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to TERMINATE Wexford as a Defendant.
The Clerk shall prepare for the IDOC, Major Bradley, Major Rathke, and Major
Lashbrook: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons),
and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these
forms, a copy of the Complaint, and this Memorandum and Order to each Defendant’s
place of employment as identified by Plaintiff. If a Defendant fails to sign and return the
Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the
forms were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service on the
Defendant, and the Court will require the Defendant to pay the full costs of formal
service, to the extent authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
If a Defendant cannot be found at the work address provided by Plaintiff, the
employer shall furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if not
known, the Defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for
sending the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation
of the address shall be retained only by the Clerk and shall not be maintained in the court
file or disclosed by the Clerk.
Defendants are ORDERED to file an appropriate responsive pleading to the
Complaint in a timely manner and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1997e(g). Pursuant to Administrative Order No. 244, Defendants need only respond to
the issues stated in this Merit Review Order.
Plaintiff is ADVISED that if judgment is rendered against him and the judgment
includes the payment of costs under 28 U.S.C. §1915, he will be required to pay the full
amount of the costs, even though his application to proceed in forma pauperis was granted.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(£)(2)(A).
Plaintiff is further ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the
Clerk of Court and the opposing parties informed of any change in his address; the Court
will not independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not
later than 7 days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with
this order will cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in
dismissal of this action for want of prosecution. See FED. R. CIv. PROC. 41(b).
Finally, based on the allegations in the Complaint, the Clerk of Court is
DIRECTED to ENTER the standard qualified protective order pursuant to the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act.
IT IS SO ORDERED. Digitally signed
DATED: January 4, 2021. Tint Sg het 10104
10:05:46 -06'00'
GILBERTC.SISON
United States Magistrate Judge
Page 11 of 12
NOTICE TO PLAINTIFF
The Court will take the necessary steps to notify the Defendants of your lawsuit
and serve them with a copy of your Complaint. After service has been achieved,
Defendants will enter an appearance and file an Answer to your Complaint. It will likely
take at least 60 days from the date of this Order to receive the Defendants’ Answer, but it
is entirely possible that it will take 90 days or more. When Defendants have filed their
Answers, the Court will enter a Scheduling Order containing important information on
deadlines, discovery, and procedures. Plaintiff is advised to wait until counsel has
appeared for Defendants before filing any motions, to give the Defendants notice and an
opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before Defendants’ counsel has
filed an appearance will generally be denied as premature. Plaintiff need not submit any
evidence to the Court at this time, unless specifically directed to do so.