Mrdjenovich v. Menard Correctional Center

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

ANTHONY MRDJENOVICH, #Y37366, )

)

Plaintiff, )

vs. ) Cause No. 3:20-cv-00324-RJD

)

MENARD CORRECTIONAL CENTER, )

N. BEBOUT, )

SGT. DOEDING, )

C/O JAMES, )

JOHN DOE 1, )

JOHN DOE 2, )

JANE DOE 1, and )

MENARD HEALTH CARE UNIT, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Daly , Magistrate Judge:

Plaintiff Anthony Mrdjenovich, an inmate in the Illinois Department of

Corrections, filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged deprivations of his

constitutional rights that occurred while he was incarcerated at Menard Correctional

Center. He asserts violations of the Eighth Amendment and seeks monetary damages.

(Doc. 1).

This case is now before the Court for preliminary review of the Complaint under

28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires the Court to screen prisoner Complaints to filter out

non-meritorious claims. 1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Any portion of the Complaint that is

1 The Court has jurisdiction to screen Plaintiff’s Complaint in light of his consent to the full jurisdiction of

a Magistrate Judge and the Defendants’ limited consent to the exercise of Magistrate Judge jurisdiction, as

set forth in the Memorandum of Understanding between the Illinois Department of Corrections, Wexford

Health Sources, and this Court.

legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or requests money damages

from an immune defendant must be dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

The Complaint

Plaintiff makes the following allegations in his Complaint (Doc. 1): On December

3, 2019, Plaintiff was called out of his cell for a mental health appointment. C/O Campbell

was working the east cell house sick and mental health care. C/O Campbell called him a

“bitch” and Plaintiff struck C/O Campbell knocking him to the ground. C/O Wilson

tackled Plaintiff and then, once he was on the ground, punched him in the back of the

head. Plaintiff put his hands behind his back to show he was not resisting. He did not

assault any other officers and did not receive any punches to his face or body at that time.

Plaintiff laid on the ground with his hands behind his back for approximately 15

seconds with four or five officers on him. He was not resisting. Sgt. Doeding then sprayed

mace on Plaintiff’s head and face. Handcuffs were placed on him so tight that his right

hand went numb. As he was being escorted out of east house, C/O James and 2 John

Does punched him in the torso and kneed him in the face, torso, and legs. Sgt. Doeding

and Lt. Bebout watched the officers assault him and did not step in to stop it.

Plaintiff was escorted to the health care unit. His head was hanging toward the

ground and C/O James kneed him in his right eye seven or eight times while other

officers pulled up on his hands violently. C/O James and the 2 John Does hit Plaintiff’s

head on the health care unit gate to open it. They took him into the hallway and threw

him to the ground. A few minutes later they took him in a room and slammed him face

down on a medical table. They continued to assault him for two to three minutes. He felt

like he was going to die. They stopped when a nurse came by but then resumed assaulting

him when she left. One of the officers tried to break his ankle.

Jane Doe Nurse checked his injuries but did nothing for him. His right eye was

bruised and swollen shut, his left knee was cut open, mace was on his face and body, his

right ankle was severely sprained, and his right hand was numb. He was escorted out of

the health care unit and violently dragged to segregation. C/O James and the 2 John Does

continued to assault him and then threw him in a cell handcuffed without any water. He

was in excruciating pain and could barely stand. He put his face on the damp floor in the

cell to help with the mace burning his face. Approximately twenty minutes later an officer

moved him to a different cell where he was able to rinse his face and body with water

from the sink.

Plaintiff was questioned about the assault on C/O Campbell but never asked how

he sustained his injuries. He was transferred to Pontiac Correctional Center where his

injuries were documented and he was provided medical treatment. He continues to have

numbness and pain in his right hand, blurred vision in his right eye, PTSD, panic attacks,

and nightmares.

Preliminary Dismissals

Menard Correctional Center and Menard Health Care Unit are not persons subject

to suit for money damages under section 1983 and will, therefore, be dismissed. See

Thomas v. Illinois, 697 F.3d 612, 613 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding the state and state agencies are

not subject to suit under Section 1983 for money damages).

Discussion

Based on the allegations in the Complaint, the Court designates the following

claims in this pro se action:

Count 1: Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against James, John

Doe 1, John Doe 2 for assaulting Plaintiff on December 3, 2019,

against Doeding for spraying Plaintiff with mace, and against

Bebout and Doeding for failing to intervene to stop the

assault.

Count 2: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to serious medical

needs claim against Jane Doe 1 for failing to provide medical

care for the injuries Plaintiff sustained in the assault on

December 3, 2019.

Count 3: Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim against

James, John Doe 1, and John Doe 2 for placing Plaintiff in a

cell that lacked any means for him to clean the mace from his

face and body.

Count 4: Failure to train claim against the Menard Warden and Bebout.

Any other claim that is mentioned in the Complaint, but not addressed in this Order,

should be considered dismissed without prejudice as inadequately pled under the

Twombly pleading standard. See, e.g., Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)

(noting that an action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not

plead “enough facts to state a claim that is plausible on its face.”).

Count 1

The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from being subjected to cruel and

unusual punishment. See Brown v. Budz, 398 F.3d 904, 909 (7th Cir. 2005). “Correctional

officers violate the Eighth Amendment when they use force not in a good faith effort to

maintain or restore discipline, but maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of

causing harm.” Wilborn v. Ealey, 881 F.3d 998, 1006 (7th Cir. 2018) (internal citations and

quotation marks omitted). Under certain circumstances, “a state actor's failure to

intervene renders him or her culpable under § 1983.” Yang v. Hardin, 37 F.3d 282, 285 (7th

Cir. 1994). A failure to intervene claim may be asserted against officers who were present

when the inmate's constitutional rights were violated by a different officer if the officers

had reason to know that excessive force was being used, and the officers had a “realistic

opportunity to intervene to prevent the harm from occurring.” Abdullahi v. City of

Madison, 423 F.3d 763, 774 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Yang, 37 F.3d at 284 (7th Cir. 1994)).

Plaintiff’s Complaint includes sufficient allegations to proceed on an excessive force

claim against Doeding, James, John Doe 1, and John Doe 2 and a failure to intervene claim

against Doeding and Bebout.

Count 2

Prison officials and medical staff violate the Eight Amendment’s prohibition on

cruel and unusual punishment when they act with deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s

serious medical needs. Rasho v. Elyea, 856 F.3d 469, 475 (7th Cir. 2017). To state a claim, a

prisoner must show that (1) he suffered from an objectively serious medical condition,

and (2) the defendant acted with deliberate indifference to his medical needs. Id.

Plaintiff’s Complaint includes sufficient allegations to proceed on deliberate indifference

claim against Jane Doe 1.

Count 3

Prison conditions that deprive inmates of basic human needs—food, medical care,

sanitation, or physical safety—may violate the Eighth Amendment. James v. Milwaukee

Cnty., 956 F.2d 696, 699 (7th Cir. 1992). Two elements are required to establish a

constitutional violation. First, an objective element requires a showing that the conditions

deny the inmate “the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities,” creating an

excessive risk to the inmate's health or safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).

The second requirement is a subjective element—establishing a defendant's culpable state

of mind, which is deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to the

inmate from those conditions. Id. at 842. Plaintiff claims he was placed in a cell with no

means to clean the mace from his face and body. Ordinarily, a short-term deprivation of

access to facilities or sanitary supplies would not rise to the level of a constitutional

violation. See Harris v. Fleming, 839 F.2d 1232, 1235 (7th Cir. 1988); Caldwell v. Miller, 790

F.2d 589, 600-01 (7th Cir. 1986). However, Plaintiff had allegedly just been sprayed with

a significant quantity of mace, violently assaulted, and was in physical distress. Under

these circumstances, placing him in a cell that lacked any means for him to clean the

chemical residue from his face and body could constitute cruel and unusual punishment.

Therefore, Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to proceed on the unconstitutional

conditions of confinement claim in Count 3 against James, John Doe 1, and John Doe 2.

Count 4

Plaintiff alleges the Menard Warden and Lt. Bebout failed to train their officers on

the way to conduct themselves during the incident. Plaintiff cannot state a claim against

the Menard Warden because he is not named as a defendant. See Fed.R.Civ.P 10(a) (the

names of all parties must be included in the case caption); Myles v. United States, 416 F.3d

551, 551–52 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding pro se Complaint failed to state a claim against

individual mentioned in body of Complaint but not specified in the caption).

Further, the mere fact that a defendant was a supervisor is insufficient to establish

liability because the doctrine of respondeat superior (supervisor liability) does not apply to

actions filed under § 1983. Pacelli v. De Vito, 972 F.2d 871, 877 (7th Cir. 1992). Plaintiff

refers to only one event and makes no mention of any policy, custom, or training

procedure. There are no allegations regarding any training program or how it is

inadequate. Simply put, Plaintiff’s conclusory allegation is insufficient to state a claim.

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (an action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted

if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”);

Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009) (“courts should not accept as adequate

abstract recitations of the elements of a cause of action or conclusory legal statements”).

Accordingly, Count 4 will be dismissed.

Identification of Doe Defendants

Plaintiff will have the opportunity to engage in limited discovery to ascertain the

identity of the John and Jane Doe Defendant. See Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv.,

577 F.3d 816, 832 (7th Cir. 2009). The Warden of Menard Correctional Center will be

added in his or her official capacity to respond to discovery aimed at identifying the Doe

Defendants. Guidelines for discovery will be set by the undersigned judge. Once the

names of the Doe Defendants are discovered, Plaintiff shall file a motion to substitute the

newly identified defendant for the Doe Defendants.

Disposition

The following claims will proceed in this action: Count 1 against N. Bebout, Sgt.

Doeding, C/O James, John Doe 1, and John Doe 2; Count 2 against Jane Doe 1; and Count

3 against C/O James, John Doe 1, and John Doe 2. Count 4 is DISMISSED without

prejudice.

The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to ADD the Warden of Menard Correctional

Center in his or her official capacity as a defendant to respond to discovery aimed at

identifying the Doe Defendants.

Menard Correctional Center and Menard Health Care Unit are DISMISSED with

prejudice and the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to TERMINATE them as defendants.

The Clerk shall prepare for N. Bebout, Sgt. Doeding, C/O James, and the Warden

of Menard Correctional Center (official capacity only): (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit

and Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of

Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the Complaint, and

this Memorandum and Order to Defendant’s place of employment as identified by

Plaintiff. If a Defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form

6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the forms were sent, the Clerk shall take

appropriate steps to effect formal service on the Defendant, and the Court will require

the Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service, to the extent authorized by the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

If a Defendant cannot be found at the work address provided by Plaintiff, the

employer shall furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if not

known, the Defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for

sending the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation

of the address shall be retained only by the Clerk and shall not be maintained in the court

file or disclosed by the Clerk.

Defendants are ORDERED to file an appropriate responsive pleading to the

Complaint in a timely manner and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

1997e(g). As the Warden of Menard Correctional Center is in the case solely for discovery

purposes, the Warden need not respond to the Complaint. The Warden only needs to

enter an appearance. Pursuant to Administrative Order No. 244, Defendants only need

to respond to the issues stated in this Merit Review Order.

Plaintiff is ADVISED that if judgment is rendered against him and the judgment

includes the payment of costs under 28 U.S.C. §1915, he will be required to pay the full

amount of the costs, regardless of whether his application to proceed in forma pauperis is

granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2)(A).

Plaintiff is further ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the

Clerk of Court and the opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court

will not independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not

later than 7 days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with

this order will cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in

dismissal of this action for want of prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. PROC. 41(b).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED:

s/ Reona J. Daly

Hon. Reona J. Daly

United States Magistrate Judge

NOTICE TO PLAINTIFF

The Court will take the necessary steps to notify the appropriate Defendants of your

lawsuit and serve them with a copy of your Complaint. After service has been achieved,

Defendants will enter an appearance and file an Answer to your Complaint. It will likely

take at least 60 days from the date of this Order to receive the Defendants’ Answers, but

it is entirely possible that it will take 90 days or more. When Defendants have filed their

Answers, the Court will enter a Scheduling Order containing important information on

deadlines, discovery, and procedures. Plaintiff is advised to wait until counsel has

appeared for Defendants before filing any motions and to give the Defendants notice and

an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before Defendants’ counsel

has filed an appearance will generally be denied as premature. Plaintiff need not submit

any evidence to the Court at this time, unless specifically directed to do so.