The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
WILLIAM BUCK, #R21689, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) Case No. 18-cv-2125-SMY
)
SGT RIGDON, )
C/O PUXDOM, )
C/O EDWARDS, )
C/O MALLORY, )
C/O HALLE, )
C/O WEAVER, )
JUSTIN HUNZIKER, )
LT. SAMUELS, )
JEFFREY GARDINER, )
LANCE PHELPS, )
MELISSA PAPPAS, )
and CHELSEA REGELSPERGER, )
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
YANDLE, District Judge:
This matter comes before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment for Failure to
Exhaust Administrative Remedies (Doc. 57) filed by Defendants Chelsea Regelsperger and
Melissa Pappas. Plaintiff filed a Response (Doc. 61) and Defendants filed a Reply (Doc. 62).1 For
the following reasons, Defendants’ Motion is DENIED.
Background
Plaintiff William Buck is an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”).
He filed this lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging that on June 16, 2017, he was assaulted
1 Because the pleadings reveal there are no factual disputes between the parties on exhaustion, this Court did not
hold a hearing pursuant to Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739 (7th Cir. 2008).
by guards at Menard Correctional Center (“Menard”) and subsequently denied medical and mental
health treatment. Several claims survived threshold review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A,
including Count 5 against Defendants Chelsea Regelsperger, Melissa Pappas, Phelps and Gardiner,
alleging they failed to provide Plaintiff medical and mental health treatment following the assault
on June 16, 2017 (Doc. 7).2
Regelsperger and Pappas filed the instant Motion claiming Plaintiff never named or
otherwise identified them in grievances and therefore failed to exhaust his administrative remedies
against them. Plaintiff argues that although he did not name them, he adequately conveyed that
he was denied mental health treatment following the alleged assault.
Facts
There are two relevant grievances at issue, both filed after Plaintiff had been transferred to
Pontiac Correctional Center (“Pontiac”). On July 7, 2017, Plaintiff filed an emergency grievance
(Grievance #066201) in which he described the staff assault after a suicide attempt and stated that
he was taken to the Health Care Unit (“HCU”) where a woman told the correctional officers to
take him away. (Doc. 58-2, pp. 4-5). He asserts that as a result, he received “no treatment nor saw
Mental Health.” (Id., p. 5). He details further assaults, his transfer to Pontiac and mistreatment
there. (Id.). This grievance was marked as received on July 13, 2017. The Chief Administrative
Officer determined that it was not an emergency. (Id., p. 4). Despite being deemed non-
emergency, the grievance was reviewed by a grievance officer who recommended the grievance
be denied as moot due to a previously-filed Prison Rape Elimination Act (“PREA”) complaint and
investigation. (Id., p. 2). Pontiac’s Chief Administrative Officer (“CAO”) concurred on July 21,
2 In his Complaint, Plaintiff identified Regelsperger and Pappas (“Ms. R” and “Ms. Pappas”) as mental health
professionals; Regelsperger is a Behavioral Health Technician and Pappas is a Qualified Mental Health Professional.
(Docs. 1, 26 and 48).
2017. (Id.).
On July 9, 2017, Plaintiff submitted another grievance directly to the Administrative
Review Board (“ARB”) because he had transferred from Menard to Pontiac Correctional Center.
(Doc. 58-1, pp. 13-14). It contained essentially the same allegations as Grievance 066201, stating
that following the assault, he was not examined in the healthcare unit “nor was I seen by mental
health.” (Id., p. 14). Plaintiff’s requested relief was “to have this investigated.” (Id., p. 13). The
ARB received the grievance and sent it to Menard for investigation. (Id., p. 12). On September
7, 2017, the ARB sent Plaintiff a response stating the investigation concluded with a determination
that Plaintiff’s allegations in his grievance were unfounded and therefore, Plaintiff’s grievance was
denied. (Doc. 1, p. 27).
Discussion
Summary judgment is appropriate only if the moving party can demonstrate “that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322(1986); see also Ruffin-
Thompkins v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc., 422 F.3d 603, 607 (7th Cir. 2005). The moving
party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the lack of any genuine issue of material fact.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Once a properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, the
adverse party “must set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact exists when “the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Estate of
Simpson v. Gorbett, 863 F.3d 740, 745 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). In
considering a summary judgment motion, the district court views the facts in the light most
favorable to, and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of, the nonmoving party. Apex Digital,
Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 735 F.3d 962, 965 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), prisoners are required to exhaust available administrative
remedies prior to filing lawsuits in federal court. “[A] suit filed by a prisoner before administrative
remedies have been exhausted must be dismissed; the district court lacks discretion to resolve the
claim on the merits, even if the prisoner exhausts intra-prison remedies before judgment.” Perez
v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Corr., 182 F.3d 532, 535 (7th Cir. 1999). “[A]ll dismissals under § 1997e(a)
should be without prejudice.” Ford v. Johnson, 362 F.3d 395, 401 (7th Cir. 2004).
To exhaust his administrative remedies, an inmate in the custody of the Illinois Department
of Corrections must submit a written grievance within 60 days after the discovery of the incident,
occurrence, or problem. 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.810(a). If the issue involves a facility other
than the facility where the inmate is currently housed, the inmate must submit the grievance
directly to the ARB. 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.870(a)(4). The ARB reviews and processes the
grievance and issues its decision. 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.870(b). The grievance must contain:
factual details regarding each aspect of the offender's complaint, including what
happened, when, where and the name of each person who is the subject of or who
is otherwise involved in the complaint. This provision does not preclude an offender
from filing a grievance when the names of individuals are not known, but the
offender must include as much descriptive information about the individual as
possible.
20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.870(b). Inmates who intend to file suit are required to follow all steps
and instructions in the grievance process before filing with the Court in order to “[allow prisons]
to address complaints about the program [they administer] before being subjected to suit, [reduce]
litigation to the extent complaints are satisfactorily resolved, and [improve] litigation that does
occur by leading to the preparation of a useful record.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 219 (2007).
Here, the timing and content of the grievances in question are undisputed. (Docs. 58, 60).
Defendants do not assert that Plaintiff failed to fully exhaust at least one of the grievances. The
sole question is whether the statements in the grievances were sufficient to encompass Defendants
Regelsperger and Pappas, despite not being specifically named. Plaintiff points to a sentence in
the July 9, 2017 grievance where he states he was taken to the healthcare unit following the alleged
rape but was not examined “nor was I seen by mental health.” Defendants acknowledge that they
work in the Mental Health Unit at Menard. They argue, however, that because Plaintiff stated he
did not see anyone in Mental Health on June 16, 2017, he could not have been referring to them
as subjects of his grievance.
Defendants’ argument is unavailing. Plaintiff’s claims Regelsperger and Pappas refused
to provide him with mental health care. Refusing to provide care does not require that a defendant
look a prisoner in the eye and explicitly state that she will not treat him. Moreover, the exhaustion
requirement is not intended to provide individual notice to each prison official who might later be
sued; it is designed to provide the prison with notice of the problem and give them an opportunity
to fix it. Maddox v. Love, 655 F.3d 709, 722 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199,
219 (2007)). Plaintiff’s statement was sufficient to notify prison officials that he was complaining
about not receiving mental health care. While the Grievance Procedures require descriptive
information regarding individuals, it would be illogical read this as requiring a prisoner to describe
who they didn’t see in the context of a medical staff.
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 57) is
DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: September 21, 2020
s/ Staci M. Yandle
STACI M. YANDLE
United States District Judge