court not required to accept as true “legal conclusions or threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.”
How later courts described this case
- court not required to accept as true “legal conclusions or threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.”
- there is no protected liberty interest implicated in demotion to C-grade status or loss of certain privilege
- “neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983”
- stating that prison officials “can certainly deny prisoners pay for doing nothing.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
DAVID ROBERT BENTZ,
#S03210,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 19-cv-00770-NJR
KRISTA ALLSUP,
WARDEN LASHBROOK,
DAVID EVELSIZER,
FRANK EOVALDI,
WILLIAM QUALLS,
BRAD BRAMELT,
MR. CLARK,
TIMOTHY BRUMLEY,
TYLER JONES,
MR. CLEAVLAND,
DONALD LINDENBERG,
SCANDLAND,
SCOTT WHITE,
SANDY WALKER,
GARRETT GRIFFIN,
JUSTIN HECHT,
LOYD,
MASON YANKEY,
BILLY CONWAY,
DUSTIN CHITTY,
MICHEALES,
RYNE ELLET,
JOHN HOOD,
JORDEN SPARLING,
BRIAN GUETERSLOH,
ANDREW MARTIN,
NURSE MARSHAL,
THOMAS LAFOND,
JOHN DOE, personal property officer,
KENT BROOKMAN,
JASON HART,
ANDREW SPILLER,
PATRICIA STEWART,
COCKRUM,
JOHN DOE #1,
JOHN DOE #2,
JOHN DOE #3,
JOHN DOE #5,
JOHN DOE #6,
JOHN DOE #7,
JOHN/JANE DOE #8,
JOHN/JANE DOE #9,
JOHN/JANE DOE #10,
JOHN/JANE DOE #11,
JOHN/JANE DOE #12,
JOHN/JANE DOE #13,
JOHN DOE #14,
JOHN DOE #15,
JOHN/JANE DOE #16,
JOHN/JANE DOE #17,
JOHN/JANE DOE #18,
JOHN DOE #19,
JOHN DOE #20,
JOHN DOE #21,
JOHN DOE #22,
JOHN DOE #23,
JOHN/JANE DOE #24,
JOHN/JANE DOE #25,
JOHN/JANE DOE #26,
JOHN/JANE DOE #27,
JOHN/JANE DOE #28,
JOHN/JANE DOE #29,
JOHN DOE #30,
JOHN DOE #31,
JOHN DOE #32,
JANE DOE #33,
JOHN DOE #34,
JOHN DOE #35,
JOHN DOE #36,
JOHN DOE #37,
JOHN DOE #38,
JOHND DOE #39,
MENARD CORRECTIONAL CENTER,
ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS,
JOHN/JANE DOES et al., unidentified,
and
ANTHONY WILLS,1
Defendants.
1 The Court substitutes Anthony Wills, the current warden of Menard Correctional Center, in his official
ROSENSTENGEL, Chief Judge:
Plaintiff David Bentz, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections
(“IDOC”) who is currently incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center, brings this civil
rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivations of his constitutional rights.
Bentz claims that he was issued a false disciplinary ticket and placed in segregation for
filing lawsuits against certain defendants.
Following an initial screening of the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A,
Bentz was allowed to proceed on nine counts against thirty-eight defendants. Before the
Court is Bentz’s Motion for Leave to Amend as a Matter of Law. (Doc. 22). He asks for
leave to amend the Complaint in order to correct deficiencies, such as adding factual
allegations to claims that were previously dismissed and adding additional defendants.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 allows a plaintiff to amend his complaint as a matter
of course before a responsive pleading is served. Bentz filed his motion prior to
Defendants filing an answer to the Complaint, and therefore, the motion is granted. The
Court, however, must conduct a preliminary review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A2 of the
proposed amended complaint, now designated as the “First Amended Complaint.”
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
Bentz makes the following allegations: On June 14, 2018, Allsup issued Bentz a
false disciplinary ticket for forgery and giving false information to an employee in
retaliation against Bentz for filing a lawsuit against her. As a result, he was “deadlocked”
2 Pursuant to Section 1915A, any portion of the First Amended Complaint that is legally frivolous or
malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or requests money damages from an immune defendant must be
exercise, chow line movements, use of the commissary, hygiene indigent kits, law library
access, legal exchange, and other general population activities. On June 27, 2018, he went
before the Adjustment Committee. Bentz asked for (1) the recusal of Adjustment
Committee Members Brookman and Hart on the basis of bias because he is suing them
in another civil lawsuit; (2) the identification of the internal affairs officer mentioned in
the disciplinary ticket and that such officer be called as a witness; (3) a continuance so
that the internal affairs officer could be called; and (4) the incident report and other
documents regarding the disciplinary ticket. All of his requests were denied. He was
found guilty, and the Adjustment Committee recommended that he be sanctioned with
(1) 1 month C-grade status; (2) 1 month segregation; and (3) 1 month commissary
restrictions. The recommendations were approved by Warden Lashbrook. Lashbrook
also imposed sanctions that were not recommended by the Adjustment Committee.
Between June 27, 2018, and July 11, 2018, Bentz was placed in punitive segregation
in unconstitutional conditions. He was housed in dirty cells without running water,
cleaning supplies, writing supplies, hygiene items, ice or ice water, linens, including
towels, change of clothes, or access to laundry services, showers, or exercise time. Bentz’s
mattress and pillow were soiled, and he had no light switch, and so, the lights were off
at all times. He was also exposed to excessive heat with no ventilation and denied medical
care.
From June 14, 2018, until July 11, 2018, he was denied access to legal storage to
access court documents and the law library. On July 14, 2018, Bentz was again denied
access to his legal storage. On January 31, 2019, the Administrative Review Board
PRELIMINARY DISMISSALS
In the First Amended Complaint, Bentz again brings allegations against
“unidentified John/Jane Does, et al.” For the reasons stated in the original Merit Review
Order, these defendants are dismissed. (Doc. 16, p. 4-5).
Bentz also names Menard Correctional Center and/or the Illinois Department of
Corrections as defendants. Both entities, however, are not subject to suit under Section
1983 and are dismissed. Owens v. Godinez, 860 F.3d 434, 438 (7th Cir. 2017); Will v. Mich.
Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (“neither a State nor its officials acting in their
official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983”).
Bentz further claims that John Doe #14 and John Doe #15 are liable under
supervisory responsibility for condoning the retaliatory acts against him. Because
respondeat superior or supervisory liability is not recognized under Section 1983, John Doe
#14 and John Doe #15 are dismissed.
Finally, Bentz names John Doe #37 in the case caption, but he does not assert any
allegations against this defendant. John Doe #37 is also dismissed. See Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
DISCUSSION
Based on the allegations in the Complaint, the Court finds it convenient to
designate the following nineteen Counts:
Count 1: First Amendment claim against Allsup for issuing Bentz a
false disciplinary ticket and causing him to be deadlocked in
his cell and placed in segregation in retaliation for naming her
in a lawsuit.
for finding Bentz guilty at the adjustment committee hearing
in retaliation for filing lawsuits.
Count 3: First Amendment claim against Brumley for denying Bentz
hygiene kits in July 2018 in retaliation for filing grievances
and lawsuits.
Count 4: First Amendment claim against Brumley and Eovaldi for
denying Bentz access to his legal documents on July 14, 2018,
in retaliation for filing grievances.
Count 5: Eighth Amendment claim of cruel and unusual punishment
against Qualls, Brumley, Evelsizer, Bramlet, Yankey, Clark,
Martin, John Doe #4, John Doe #5, John Doe #22, and John
Doe #23 for subjecting Bentz to unconstitutional conditions of
confinement while he was on deadlock in his cell from June
14, 2018, until June 27, 2018.
Count 6: Eighth Amendment claim of cruel and unusual punishment
against Jones, White, Griffin, Hecht, Spiller, Loyd, Conway,
Chitty, Micheales, Ellet, Hood, Sparling, Guetersloh, Eovaldi,
Lindenberg, Scandland, Cleavland, Clark, John Doe #7, John
Doe #19, John Doe #20, John Doe #21, John/Jane Doe #29,
John Doe #30, John Doe #31, John Doe #32, John Doe #33,
John Doe #34, John Doe #35, John Doe #36, John Doe #38, and
John Doe #39 for housing Bentz in unconstitutional
conditions of confinement from June 14, 2018,3 until July 11,
2018, while he was in segregation.
Count 7: Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim
against Allsup for filing a false disciplinary report.
Count 8: Fourteenth Amendment claim against John/Jane Doe #16,
John/Jane Doe #17, and John/Jane Doe #18 for falsifying
reports and the investigation.
Count 9: Fourteenth Amendment claim against Brookman, Hart, and
Walker for denying Bentz due process by not recusing
themselves and improper procedure during the disciplinary
hearing.
3 The Court notes discrepancies in the dates provided. At one point in the First Amended Complaint, Bentz
claims he was held in deadlock in his cell, W-216, from June 14, 2018, through June 27, 2018. But in another
section he states he was held in punitive segregation in North Two Cell House from June 14, 2018, through
Lafond, Cockrum, Qualls, Brumley, Evelsizer, Bramlet,
Yankey, Clark, Lindenberg, Jones, Griffin, Ellet, Hood,
Martin, Eovaldi, Stewart, John Doe, John Doe #1, John Doe
#2, John Doe #3, John Doe #4, John Doe #5, John Doe #6, John
Doe #7, John/Jane Doe #8, John/Jane Doe #9, John/Jane Doe
#10, John/Jane Doe #11, John/Jane Doe #12, John/Jane Doe
#13, John Doe #19, John Doe #21, John Doe #22, John Doe #23,
John/Jane Doe #24, John/Jane Doe #25, John/Jane Doe #26,
John/Jane Doe #27, John/Jane Doe #28, John Doe #31, John
Doe #32, John Doe #33, and John Doe #34 for denying Bentz
access to his legal storage, legal documents, or the law library.
Count 11: Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference to a
serious medical need against Nurse Marshal for refusing to
address Bentz’s medical issues on June 27, 2018.
Count 12: First Amendment claim against Jones, White, Griffin, Hecht,
Spiller, Loyd, Conway, Chitty, Micheales, Ellet, Hood,
Sparling, Guetersloh, Eovaldi, Lindenberg, Scandland,
Cleavland, Clark, John Doe #7, John Doe #19, John Doe #20,
John Doe #21, John Doe #30, John Doe #31, John Doe #32,
John Doe #33, John Doe #34, John Doe #35, John Doe #36,
John Doe #38, and John Doe #39 for keeping Bentz in
unconstitutional conditions of confinement from June 14,
2018, until July 1, 2018, in retaliation for filing lawsuits and
grievances.
Count 13: First Amendment claim against Lindenberg, Jones, Griffin,
Ellet, Hood, John Doe #6, John Doe #7, John/Jane Doe #8,
John/Jane Doe #9, John/Jane Doe #10, John/Jane Doe #11,
John/Jane Doe #12, John Doe #19, John Doe #21, John Doe
#31, John Doe #32, John Doe #33, and John Doe #34 for
denying Bentz access to his legal documents in retaliation for
filing lawsuits and grievances.
Count 14: Negligence claim in violation of Illinois state law against
Qualls, Brumley, Evelsizer, Bramlet, Yankey, Clark, Martin,
Jones, White, Griffin, Hecht, Spiller, Loyd, Conway, Chitty,
Micheales, Ellet, Hood, Sparling, Guetersloh, Eovaldi,
Lindenberg, Scandland, Cleavland, Clark, John Doe #4, John
Doe #5, John Doe #7, John Doe #19, John Doe #20, John Doe
#21, John Doe #22, John Doe #23, John Doe #30, John Doe #31,
John Doe #32, Jane Doe #33, John Doe #34, John Doe #35, John
Doe #36, John Doe #38, and John Doe #39.
of Illinois state law against Defendants for intentionally and
maliciously placing Bentz in unconstitutional conditions of
confinement and denying him medical care.
Count 16: Malicious prosecution claim in violation of Illinois state law
against Brookman, Hart, and Walker.
Count 17: False imprisonment claim in violation of Illinois state law
against Allsup, Brookman, Hart, and Walker.
Count 18: Fourteenth Amendment claim against Warden Lashbrook for
denying Bentz due process by implementing excessive
discipline and punishment that were not recommended by
the Adjustment Committee.
Count 19: Eighth Amendment claim of inadequate medical care against
Jones, White, Griffin, Hecht, Spiller, Loyd, Conway, Chitty,
Micheales, Ellet, Hood, Sparling, Guetersloh, Eovaldi,
Lindenberg, Scandland, Cleavland, Clark, John Doe #7, John
Doe #19, John Doe #20, John Doe #21, John Doe #30, John Doe
#31, John Doe #32, John Doe #33, John Doe #34, John Doe #35,
John Doe #36, John Doe #38, and John Doe #39 for refusing to
obtain medical treatment for Bentz from June 27, 2018, until
July 11, 2018.
The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future pleadings and orders,
unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. Any claim that is mentioned
in the First Amended Complaint but not addressed in this Order is considered
dismissed without prejudice as inadequately pled under the Twombly4 pleading
standard.
Counts 1-4
For the reasons stated in the original Merit Review Order, Counts 1, 2, 3, and 4 will
proceed. (Doc. 16).
4 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). This includes Bentz’s claims of violations of equal
protection and the Fifth Amendment. Because he offers no additional facts to support these claims, they
Count 5 will also survived screening, as provided in the original Merit Review
Order, but will also proceed against newly added Defendant Clark.
Count 6
Count 6 shall proceed, as provided in the original Merit Review Order, but will
also proceed against newly added Defendants Scandland, Cleavland, Clark, John Doe
#30, John Doe #31, John Doe #32, John Doe #33, John Doe #34, John Doe #35, John Doe
#36, John Doe #38, and John Doe #39.
Counts 7, 8, 9
As provided in the original Merit Review Order, Counts 7, 8, and 9 will proceed.
Count 10
As discussed in the original Merit Review Order, to state a claim for denial of
access to the courts, a plaintiff must demonstrate that his denial of access to the library or
other legal assistance “hindered his efforts to pursue a legal claim.” Id. Mere delay or
inconvenience is not an unconstitutional detriment. A plaintiff must connect the
defendants’ conduct with his “inability to pursue a legitimate challenge to a conviction,
sentence, or prison conditions.” Ortiz v. Downey, 561 F.3d 664, 671 (7th Cir. 2009) (internal
quotation and citation omitted); accord Guajardo Palma v. Martinson, 622 F.3d 801, 805–06
(7th Cir. 2010). This requires a plaintiff to identify the underlying claim that was lost. See
Christopher, 536 U.S. at 416; Steidl v. Fermon, 494 F.3d 623, 633 (7th Cir. 2007).
Bentz claims that forty-three Defendants violated his First Amendment Right to
access the courts between June 14, 2018 and July 11, 2018, by limiting his access to the law
library and his legal documents, which caused him injuries in three of his other civil
v. Gregson, No. 17-00015-SMY-RJD, was dismissed June 22, 2018, when the Court granted
Defendants’ motion for summary judgement, after Bentz filed a response on May 17,
2018.5 Additionally, a review of the docket reveals he was filing documents in this
district during the period of time he alleges to have been denied access to his legal
documents and the law library. In the First Amended Complaint, he states that on June
29, 2018, he filed a motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction in
two of his other cases regarding the retaliatory conduct of Allsup.6 As Bentz still has not
explained “the connection between the alleged denial of access to legal materials [and the
law library] and an inability to pursue a legitimate challenge [,]” Ortiz, 561 F.3d at 671,
Count 10 is dismissed.
Count 11
In the original Merit Review Order, the Court dismissed Count 11 against Nurse
Marshal because Bentz’s claims were vague and conclusory. (Doc. 16, p. 11). While the
5 Bentz states that he incurred injuries in cases Bentz v. Gregson, No. 17-cv-00015; Bentz v. Gregson, No. 18-
1273; and Bentz v. Godinez, No. 18-1684. There are no cases entitled and numbered Bentz v. Gregson, No. 18-
1273, or Bentz v. Godinez, No. 18-1684. One of Bentz’s previous cases against Defendant Godinez closed
before the alleged actions in this case (Bentz v. Godinez, No. 12-cv-00201-GPM (S.D. Ill. Mar. 9, 2012)
(transferred to the Northern District of Illinois; Bentz v. Godinez, No. 17-cv-00315-MJR (S.D. Ill. Feb. 6, 2018)
(case dismissed; denied leave to proceed on appeal by the appellate court on September 10, 2018). Likewise,
case Bentz v. Gregson, No. 16-cv-01349-SMY was dismissed on January 9, 2017.
6 Specifically, he filed a “Notice to the Court Per Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Temporary Restraining
Order, Mandamus, and Administrative Procedures Act” in several cases on June 29, 2018. See Bentz v.
Gregson, No. 17-cv-00015-SMY-RJD (S.D. Ill.) (notice to the court file June 29, 2018); Bentz v. Bledsol, No. 13-
cv-00573-MAB (S.D. Ill.) (motion for objections and for sanctions filed June 14, 2018; notice to the court filed
June 29, 2018); Bentz v. Threadgille, No. 17-cv-01384 (S.D. Ill.) (identity of defendant/response and
notice/objection and motion to reinstate motion for preliminary injunction filed June 29, 2018); Bentz v.
Newbold, No. 18-cv-00017-JPG-RJD (S.D. Ill.)(motion for default judgment by clerk file June 14, 2018; notice to
the court filed June 29, 2018); Bentz v. Mulholland, No. 18-cv-01064-NJR (S.D. Ill.) (motion for preliminary
injunction/TROfiled June 29, 2018); Bentz v. Wexford Health Sources, No. 18-cv-01213(S.D. Ill.) (case filed June
7, 2018; notice to the court filed June 29, 2018); Bentz v. Gregson, No. 16-cv-01349-SMY (S.D. Ill.) (notice to the
court filed June 29, 2018).
pain and swelling and Nurse Marshal refused to provide him care on June 27, 2018, this
claim is not properly joined in this suit. The Seventh Circuit instructs that unrelated
claims against different defendants should be severed in to separate lawsuits. George v.
Smith, 507 F. 3d 605 (7th Cir. 2007). Bentz’s claim against Nurse Marshal is not related to
the retaliation claims alleged against the other defendants, and therefore, Nurse Marshal
is an improperly joined party. See FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(2). Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure grants district courts broad discretion when deciding whether to sever
claims or to dismiss improperly joined defendants. Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 952
(7th Cir. 2011). The Court will exercise its discretion and dismiss Count 11 against Nurse
Marshal as improperly joined.
Counts 12 and 13
Bentz alleges that Jones, White, Griffin, Hecht, Spiller, Loyd, Conway, Chitty,
Micheales, Ellet, Hood, Sparling, Guetersloh, Eovaldi, Lindenberg, Scandland,
Cleavland, Clark, John Doe #7, John Doe #19, John Doe #20, John Doe #21, John Doe #30,
John Doe #31, John Doe #32, John Doe #33, John Doe #34, John Doe #35, John Doe #36,
John Doe #38, and John Doe #39 kept him in unconstitutional conditions of confinement
from June 14, 2018, until July 1, 2018, in retaliation for filing lawsuits and grievances. He
also states that Lindenberg, Jones, Griffin, Ellet, Hood, John Doe #6, John Doe #7,
John/Jane Doe #8, John/Jane Doe #9, John/Jane Doe #10, John/Jane Doe #11, John/Jane
Doe #12, John Doe #19, John Doe #21, John Doe #31, John Doe #32, John Doe #33, John
Doe #34 denied him access to his legal documents and martials in retaliation for filing
lawsuits and grievances. This is enough to state a First Amendment claim of retaliation,
866 (7th Cir. 2012).
Count 14
In Illinois, in order to state a claim for negligence, a complaint must allege facts to
establish that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care, breached that duty, and
that the breach was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury. Thompson v. Gordon, 948
N.E.2d 39, 45 (Ill. 2011) (citing Iseberg v. Gross, 879 N.E.2d 278 (2007)).
Other than stating that Defendants were negligent to his unconstitutional
conditions of confinement, Bentz provides no further explanation of this claim.
Conclusory statements, such as those pertaining to negligence, do not meet the pleading
standards set forth in Twombly and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. See Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555; Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009) (court not required to accept as
true “legal conclusions or threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements.”). Accordingly, Count 14 shall be dismissed
without prejudice.
Count 157
In Illinois, the tort of intentional infliction has three components: (1) the conduct
involved must be truly extreme and outrageous; (2) the actor must either intend that his
conduct inflict severe emotional distress, or know that there is at least a high probability
that his conduct will cause severe emotional distress; and (3) the conduct must in fact
cause severe emotional distress. McGrath v. Fahey, 533 N.E.2d 806, 809 (Ill. 1988); see also
7 Bentz’s state law claims in Counts 15, 16, and 17 concerns the same facts as his Section 1983 claims, so
supplemental jurisdiction is appropriate. See 28 U.S.C. 1367(a); Wisconsin v. Ho-Chunk Nation, 512 F.3d 921,
defendant’s conduct “must go beyond all bounds of decency and be considered
intolerable in a civilized community.” Honaker, 256 F.3d at 490 (citations omitted).
Bentz alleges that he suffered from sleep deprivation, chronic depression, anxiety,
high stress, and chronic pain due to his conditions of confinement and denial of medical
care, which were knowingly, intentionally, and maliciously inflicted by all Defendants.
Count 15 will proceed against Allsup, who Bentz specifically states intentionally inflicted
emotional distress when she wrote the false disciplinary ticket causing him to be held in
unconstitutional conditions of confinement. The general assertion, however, that all
seventy-five Defendants intentionally inflicted emotional distress is not sufficient to
proceed. See Walton v. Walker, 364 F. App’x 256, 258 (7th Cir. 2010); Brooks, 578 F.3d at 580
(7th Cir. 2009) (finding the phrase “one or more of the Defendants” did not adequately
connect specific defendants to illegal acts, and thus failed to adequately plead personal
involvement). Therefore, Count 15 is dismissed without prejudice as to all other
Defendants.
Count 16
Bentz claims that Brookman, Hart, and Walker maliciously prosecuted him when
he was found guilty of the charges on his disciplinary ticket and sanctioned without
evidence. Under Illinois law a claim for malicious prosecution must allege facts showing:
“(1) the defendants commenced judicial proceedings, (2) for which there was no probable
cause, (3) the proceeding were instituted or continued maliciously, (4) the proceedings
were terminated in the plaintiff’s favor, and (5) the plaintiff sustained an injury.”
Saunders-El v. Rohde, 778 F.3d 556, 561 (7th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted). Although other
adversarial hearing which can give rise to a claim for malicious prosecution,” the Court
will exercise supplemental jurisdiction and allow Count 16 to proceed at this stage. See
Lee v. Gowdy, No. 12 C 9503, 2012 WL 6605400 at *2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 18, 2012) (citing Greer
v. DeRobertis, 568 F. Supp. 1370 (N.D. Ill. 1983); Joseph v. Ortiz, 15 CV 66, 2016 WL 4366591
at *6 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 16, 2016).
Count 17
Bentz claims that he was falsely imprisoned by Allsup, Brookman, Hart, and
Walker, as a result of a false disciplinary ticket and unconstitutional disciplinary
proceedings which caused him to be deadlocked in his cell and then placed in
segregation, unreasonably restraining his liberty. 8 Under Illinois state law, false
imprisonment is the unreasonable restraint of an individual’s liberty, against his will,
caused or procured by the defendant. Poris v. Lake Holiday Prop. Owners Ass’n, 983 N.E.
2d 993, 1007 (Ill. 2013). “There is doubt whether a prisoner sentenced to segregation can
assert a false imprisonment claim under Illinois law.” Lear v. Pfister, 17-cv-1173-JBM, 2018
WL 10096601 at *2 (C.D. Ill. Feb. 1, 2018) (citing Suarez v. Harrington, No. 15-cv-00637-
NJR, 2015 WL 4127181 at *2 (S.D. Ill. July 8, 2015) (discussing the possibility of a false
imprisonment claim under the Eighth Amendment)). See also Leslie v. Doyle, 125 F.3d 1132,
1135 (7th Cir. 1997). But see Goings v. Jones, 16-CV-00833-NJR-DGW, 2018 WL 2099877 at
*5 (S.D. Ill. May 7, 2018) (dismissing plaintiff’s false imprisonment claim because his
“period in segregation was not unlawful, at least not in the sense that he was imprisoned
8 Although Bentz does not specifically state he brings this claim under Illinois tort law, he recites the
however, the Court will allow Bentz to proceed with his claim.
Count 18
Bentz claims that Warden Lashbrook implements policies that imposed excessive
disciplinary sanctions beyond her authority. Following the implementation of the
sanctions recommended by the Adjustment Committee, Bentz remained C-grade status
for an additional fifteen days beyond the Committee’s recommendation and then
changed to a B-grade status on September 27, 2018. He also received an additional three
months loss of state idle pay that was not imposed or recommended by the Committee.
He claims that these actions amounted to excessive punishment and violate IDOC
policies, which provide that the chief administrative officer shall not increase the
sanctions recommended by the Adjustment Committee. See 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20,
§ 504.80(q)(2).
Bentz’s claims that the modifications to his grade status and denial of idle pay
amounted to excessive discipline in violation of his due process rights do not state a
constitutional claim. A prisoner does not have a liberty interest in receiving idle pay or
being demoted and left at C-grade or B-grade status and so, procedural due process is
not required prior to the implementation of those punishments. Beatty v. DeBruyn, No.
94-3241, 1996 WL 80168 at *1 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that prison officials “can certainly
deny prisoners pay for doing nothing.”); Thomas v. Ramos, 130 F. 3d 754, 762 n. 8 (7th Cir.
1997) (there is no protected liberty interest implicated in demotion to C-grade status or
loss of certain privilege). Furthermore, violations of IDOC policies are not cognizable
under Section 1983. See James v. Pfister, 708 F. App’x 876, 879 (7th Cir. 2017). Accordingly,
Count 19
Bentz states that during his time in segregation, from June 27, 2018, until July 11,
2018, he requested medical care for his skin rash, chronic back and neck pain, and neck
issues, as well as requested muscle relaxers, but that Jones, White, Griffin, Hecht, Spiller,
Loyd, Conway, Chitty, Micheales, Ellet, Hood, Sparling, Guetersloh, Eovaldi,
Lindenberg, Scandland, Cleavland, Clark, John Doe #7, John Doe #19, John Doe #20, John
Doe #21, John Doe #30, John Doe #31, John Doe #32, John Doe #33, John Doe #34, John
Doe #35, John Doe #36, John Doe #38, and John Doe #39 refused to do anything. He
asserts that he asked for care in person from each of the defendants associated with this
claim. These allegations are sufficient to survive screening and Count 19 shall proceed.
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Within the request for relief, Bentz asks the Court to issue a preliminary injunction
ordering Warden Lashbrook to stop using policies that impose excessive disciplinary
sanctions, allow offenders access to personal property and documents prior to
disciplinary hearings, and expunge his conviction from institutional records. Not only
has Bentz not filed a separate motion for his preliminary injunction pursuant to Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 7 and 65, but he has failed to demonstrate any of the elements
required for obtaining a preliminary injunction. See Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) (citations omitted).
DISPOSITION
For the reasons stated above and pursuant to Rule 15, the Court GRANTS the
Motion for Leave to Amend as a Matter of Law (Doc. 22). The First Amended Complaint
DIRECTED to file the proposed amended complaint submitted to the Court on January
14, 2020, as “First Amended Complaint.”
Bentz may proceed with the following Counts:
Count 1: First Amendment claim against Allsup for issuing Bentz a
false disciplinary ticket and causing him to be deadlocked in
his cell and placed in segregation in retaliation for naming her
in a lawsuit.
Count 2: First Amendment claim against Brookman, Hart, and Walker
for finding Bentz guilty at the adjustment committee hearing
in retaliation for filing lawsuits.
Count 3: First Amendment claim against Brumley for denying Bentz
hygiene kits in July 2018 in retaliation for filing grievances
and lawsuits.
Count 4: First Amendment claim against Brumley and Eovaldi for
denying Bentz access to his legal documents on July 14, 2018,
in retaliation for filing grievances.
Count 5: Eighth Amendment claim of cruel and unusual punishment
against Qualls, Brumley, Evelsizer, Bramlet, Yankey, Clark,
Martin, John Doe #4, John Doe #5, John Doe #22, and John
Doe #23 for subjecting Bentz to unconstitutional conditions of
confinement while he was on deadlock in his cell from June
14, 2018, until June 27, 2018.
Count 6: Eighth Amendment claim of cruel and unusual punishment
against Jones, White, Griffin, Hecht, Spiller, Loyd, Conway,
Chitty, Micheales, Ellet, Hood, Sparling, Guetersloh, Eovaldi,
Lindenberg, Scandland, Cleavland, Clark, John Doe #7, John
Doe #19, John Doe #20, John Doe #21, John/Jane Doe #29,
John Doe #30, John Doe #31, John Doe #32, John Doe #33,
John Doe #34, John Doe #35, John Doe #36, John Doe #38, and
John Doe #39 for housing Bentz in unconstitutional
conditions of confinement from June 14, 2018, until July 11,
2018, while he was in segregation.
Count 7: Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim
against Allsup for filing a false disciplinary report.
John/Jane Doe #17, and John/Jane Doe #18 for falsifying
reports and the investigation.
Count 9: Fourteenth Amendment claim against Brookman, Hart, and
Walker for denying Bentz due process by not recusing
themselves and improper procedure during the disciplinary
hearing.
Count 12: First Amendment claim against Jones, White, Griffin, Hecht,
Spiller, Loyd, Conway, Chitty, Micheales, Ellet, Hood,
Sparling, Guetersloh, Eovaldi, Lindenberg, Scandland,
Cleavland, Clark, John Doe #7, John Doe #19, John Doe #20,
John Doe #21, John Doe #30, John Doe #31, John Doe #32,
John Doe #33, John Doe #34, John Doe #35, John Doe #36,
John Doe #38, and John Doe #39 for keeping Bentz in
unconstitutional conditions of confinement from June 14,
2018, until July 1, 2018, in retaliation for filing lawsuits and
grievances.
Count 13: First Amendment claim against Lindenberg, Jones, Griffin,
Ellet, Hood, John Doe #6, John Doe #7, John/Jane Doe #8,
John/Jane Doe #9, John/Jane Doe #10, John/Jane Doe #11,
John/Jane Doe #12, John Doe #19, John Doe #21, John Doe
#31, John Doe #32, John Doe #33, and John Doe #34 for
denying Bentz access to his legal documents in retaliation for
filing lawsuits and grievances.
Count 15: Intentional infliction of emotional distress claim in violation
of Illinois state law against Allsup for intentionally and
maliciously writing a false disciplinary ticket resulting in the
placement of Bentz in unconstitutional conditions of
confinement.
Count 16: Malicious prosecution claim in violation of Illinois state law
against Brookman, Hart, and Walker.
Count 17: False imprisonment claim in violation of Illinois state law
against Allsup, Brookman, Hart, and Walker.
Count 19: Eighth Amendment claim of inadequate medical care against
Jones, White, Griffin, Hecht, Spiller, Loyd, Conway, Chitty,
Micheales, Ellet, Hood, Sparling, Guetersloh, Eovaldi,
Lindenberg, Scandland, Cleavland, Clark, John Doe #7, John
Doe #19, John Doe #20, John Doe #21, John Doe #30, John Doe
obtain medical treatment for Bentz from June 27, 2018, until
July 11, 2018.
Counts 10, 11, 14, and 18 are DISMISSED. Because there are no other claims against
them, Lashbrook, Marshal, Lafond, John Doe personal property officer, Patricia Stewart,
Cockrum, John Doe #1, John Doe #2, John Doe #3, John/Jane Doe #13, John Doe #14,
John Doe #15, John/Jane Doe #24, John/Jane Doe #25, John/Jane Doe #26, John/Jane
Doe #27, John/Jane Doe #28, John Doe #37, Menard Correctional Center, Illinois
Department of Corrections, and unidentified John/Janes Does, et al., are DISMISSED
from this action. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to terminate them from the Case
Management/Electronic Case Filing (“CM/ECF”) system.
The warden of Menard Correctional Center, Anthony Wills, in his official capacity
only, is a defendant in this case for the purpose of responding to discovery aimed at
identifying the unknown defendants and implementing any injunctive relief that may be
ordered.
The Clerk of Court shall prepare for Clark, Cleavland, Scandland, and John Doe
#6, John/Jane Does #8-12, John Does #30-36, and John Does #38-39 (once identified):
(1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2)
Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a
copy of the First Amended Complaint, the original Merit Review Order of the Complaint
(Doc. 16), and this Memorandum and Order to the defendants’ place of employment as
identified by Bentz. If a defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver of Service of
Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk of Court within 30 days from the date the forms were
sent, the Clerk of Court shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service on that
defendant, and the court will require that defendant to pay the full costs of formal service,
to the extent authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
If a defendant cannot be found at the work address provided by Bentz, the
employer shall furnish the Clerk of Court with that defendant's current work address, or,
if not known, his or her last-known address. This information shall be used only for
sending the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation
of the address shall be retained only by the Clerk of Court. Address information shall not
be maintained in the court file or disclosed by the Clerk of Court.
Service shall not be made on the newly added unknown defendants, until such
time as Bentz has identified each by name in a properly filed motion for substitution by
August 18, 2020, and as provided in the Initial Scheduling Order. (Doc. 37). Bentz is
ADVISED that it is his responsibility to provide the Court with the names and service
addresses for these individuals. Failure to file a motion to substitute by August 18, 2020,
will result in the dismissal of the John Does added in the First Amended Complaint
without prejudice.
Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to
the complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g). Pursuant
to Administrative Order No. 244, defendants need only respond to the issues stated in
this merit review order and the original Merit Review Order of the Complaint (Doc.
16). Defendants are ADVISED that the Court does not accept piecemeal answers.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: June 18, 2020 Tew) (ocuitingD
NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL |
Chief U.S. District Judge
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