Patterson v. Buckles

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

RICKY PATTERSON, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 3:17-CV-1067-MAB

)

COLE BUCKLES and MARK )

SUMMERS, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

BEATTY, Magistrate Judge:

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Ricky Patterson’s Motion to Relieve

Counsel of Duties (Doc. 72) and Motion to Withdraw Settlement Agreement (Doc. 73).

For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff’s Motion to Relieve Counsel (Doc. 72) is granted and

his Motion to Withdraw Settlement Agreement (Doc. 73) is denied and the settlement

agreement is enforced.

BACKGROUND

In October 2019, the undersigned conducted a settlement conference with the

parties but the case did not settle (Doc. 55). Plaintiff, through his recruited counsel,

continued negotiating with Defendants, and in mid-November 2019, the parties informed

the Court that they had settled this case, along with Patterson’s other pending case: 17-

cv-1311-SMY (Doc. 58). A 90-day order was entered on November 19, 2019 (Doc. 59).

While the parties were finalizing the settlement agreement, they consented to a United

States Magistrate Judge conducting all further proceedings in this case, and District Judge

Staci Yandle referred the case to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) (Docs. 8,

44, 45). The entry of judgment was then postponed for another 90 days at Defendants’

request (Doc. 69).

A short time later, Plaintiff filed a pro se motion to withdraw from the settlement

agreement (Doc. 70). In his motion, Plaintiff claimed that he was unable to properly

defend his claims in both of his cases because his “records/discovery” were destroyed

when mice made a nest in his property box (Doc. 70). He claims defense counsel knew

this and used it to “bully” him into settling both cases by “threatening plaintiff with

sanctions/fines/financial penalties” in case 17-cv-1311-SMY if he did not accept the

settlement offered to him in the instant case (Doc. 70). He further claims that he felt

“extremely bullied by the magistrate judge” in case 17-cv-1311-SMY because she would

not grant him extensions of time or order Defendants to resend him the discovery

documents that had been destroyed by the mice (Doc. 70). Plaintiff claims that he was

consequently “forced to settle [sic] these claims at the defendants convience [sic]” (Doc.

70). Plaintiff claims that after he agreed to the settlement, defense counsel continued to

“bully” him by delaying his settlement payment for six months (Doc. 70).

Plaintiff’s motion was stricken and he was told that, because he was represented

by counsel, the Court would not accept any pro se filings from him other than a motion

asking to fire his attorney (Doc. 71). A month later, he filed a motion to fire his attorney

(Doc. 72) and resubmitted his motion to withdraw from the settlement (Doc. 73). In the

motion to fire his attorney, Plaintiff indicates that during the time that defense counsel

was purportedly “stalling” the settlement, a grievance that he filed about the destruction

of his legal materials was granted and prison officials “must secure [his] case files, which

will restore key information [he] needs to surpass summary judgment in both cases”

(Doc. 72). Plaintiff further indicates that he “has written counsel several times and even

has his family call his office [but] the letters were returned and the calls have gone

unreplied to” (Doc. 72).

Defendants filed a response to Plaintiff’s motion to withdraw the settlement

agreement, stating that the settlement agreement was fully executed, a payment voucher

was created, and the parties are simply waiting for Plaintiff to be paid (Doc. 74).

DISCUSSION

A plaintiff generally has the right to fire their attorney if they so choose. In this

instance, Plaintiff indicates that he wants to fire his attorney because he has stopped

communicating with Plaintiff (Doc. 72). However, the Court questions whether this is

true given the timing of Plaintiff’s motion and the complete lack of details regarding

Plaintiff’s purported efforts to contact his attorney. It seems that perhaps Plaintiff wants

to fire his attorney so that he can challenge the settlement, which presumably his attorney

would not agree to do. At any rate, this matter is on the verge of completion, at which

time the Court would have terminated counsel’s representation of Plaintiff anyway.

Consequently, the Court will grant Plaintiff’s motion to fire his attorney and consider

Plaintiff’s pro se motion to withdraw from the settlement.

“Whether the parties to a federal lawsuit have reached an enforceable settlement

is a question governed by contract principles in the state where the court sits.” Brown v.

Cook Cty., Ill., 590 Fed. Appx. 639, 640 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Dillard v. Starcon Int'l Inc., 483

F.3d 502, 506 (7th Cir. 2007); Lynch, Inc. v. SamataMason Inc., 279 F.3d 487, 490 (7th Cir.

2002)). In Illinois, “[p]ublic policy . . . favors settlements and dictates that, absent fraud

or duress, settlements should be final.” Pritchett v. Asbestos Claims Mgmt. Corp. 773 N.E.2d

1277, 1285 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (citations omitted). Accord Carlile v. Snap-on Tools, 648

N.E.2d 317, 321 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (“Public policy favors the settlement of claims, and it

is important that claims, once fairly resolved, not be resurrected.”)

Here, it is undisputed that the parties reached a settlement. Plaintiff now wants to

tear up the agreement, however, because he claims that defense counsel is intentionally

stalling payment and the settlement agreement he reached and signed was essentially

tainted by coercion or duress.

The Court is wholly unconvinced by Plaintiff’s first argument. Payment of the

settlement amount is entrusted to the Illinois Department of Central Management

Services. Defense counsel is not responsible for payment and has no control over when

payment is made. Furthermore, defense counsel sought to postpone the entry of

judgment not to “bully” Plaintiff, but to ensure that he was paid before judgment was

entered and the case was closed.

The Court is also wholly unconvinced by Plaintiff’s argument that he was coerced

into signing the settlement agreement. Plaintiff contends that he felt “bullied” by

Magistrate Judge Reona Daly because after his documents were destroyed by mice, she

would not give him any extensions of time or order Defendants to resend him the

documents he needed. His contentions are belied by the record in that matter. The record

plainly demonstrates that Judge Daly gave Plaintiff multiple extensions (see, e.g., SDIL

case number 17-cv-1311-SMY, Docs. 47, 73, 75). Judge Daly also specifically instructed

Plaintiff that if the documents he needed to respond to Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment were destroyed by the mice, he “should request additional copies of those

documents as soon as possible” (Id. at Doc. 75).

As for Plaintiff’s contention that he was bullied by defense counsel and threatened

with financial penalties if he did not settle, the Court notes that Plaintiff was represented

by counsel during all of the settlement negotiations. Counsel was presumably able to

explain Defendants’ position on settlement to Plaintiff and advise him on the pros and

cons of settling. The fact that Plaintiff was in a difficult bargaining position, under

financial pressure, or later gained access to new information is not enough to set aside

the settlement agreement. Baptist v. City of Kankakee, 481 F.3d 485, 491 n.2 (7th Cir. 2007)

Rather, Plaintiff must show by clear and convincing evidence “imposition, oppression,

undue influence, or the taking of undue advantage of the business or financial stress or

extreme necessities or weakness[es] of another,” such that “the person is deprived of the

exercise of [their] free will.” Id.; Flynn v. Flynn, 597 N.E.2d 709, 713 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).

Plaintiff’s argument here falls well short of that. He describes nothing more than the

typical puffing and posturing that occurs during settlement negotiations. Furthermore,

entering into the settlement agreement was not Plaintiff’s only option; he could have

taken his chances by responding to Defendants’ motion summary judgment. See Baptist,

481 F.3d at 491 n.2 (“[A] party asserting duress cannot prevail if he had an alternative to

entering into the agreement. The plaintiffs . . . had the option of taking their disparate

impact claim to trial, and any claim of duress would necessarily fail.”)

Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to set forth a reason sufficient to set aside the

settlement agreement and his pro se motion to withdraw the settlement agreement is

denied.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s Motion to Relieve Counsel of Duties (Doc. 72) is GRANTED. Attorneys

David Grebel and Patrick Hamacher are TERMINATED as counsel of record for Plaintiff.

On behalf of the entire Southern District of Illinois, the undersigned sincerely thanks Mr.

Grebel and Mr. Hamacher for their time and service on this case.

Plaintiff’s Motion to Withdraw Settlement Agreement (Doc. 73) is DENIED and

the settlement agreement is ENFORCED.

In accordance with the Order entered on February 21, 2020, the Clerk of Court is

DIRECTED to enter judgment and close this case on the Court’s docket.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 28, 2020

s/ Mark A. Beatty

MARK A. BEATTY

United States Magistrate Judge