The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
FRANK MARTIN, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 18-1159-RJD
)
REO STINSON and MELISSA PAPPAS )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
DALY, Magistrate Judge:
The matter is before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 53) filed by
Defendant Pappas and the Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 56) filed by Defendant Stinson.
Plaintiff timely filed responses (Docs. 63, 64). For the following reasons, Defendant Pappas’
motion is GRANTED and Defendant Stinson’s motion is DENIED.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Frank Martin, an inmate in the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections
(“IDOC”), filed this lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that his constitutional rights
were violated while he was incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center (“Menard”). Following
threshold review, Plaintiff proceeds on the following claims:
Count 1: Defendants Stinson and Pappas failed to protect Plaintiff from violence at
the hands of inmate Gaines, in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
Defendants filed motions for summary judgment arguing there is no evidence they had
actual knowledge of an impending harm. Plaintiff contends he informed both Defendants of the
harm posed by his cellmate.
FINDINGS OF FACT
During all times relevant, Plaintiff was housed at Menard (Plaintiff’s Deposition, Doc. 54-
1 at 5). Plaintiff was transferred to Menard on January 6, 2016 (Doc. 56-2 at 1). On February 5,
2016, Plaintiff was placed in West 509 with a cellmate, Calvin Gaines (Id., Doc. 54-1 at 5).
According to Plaintiff, when he moved into the cell, Gaines told him there were rules for the cell
(Doc. 54-1 at 5). Gaines would become angry with Plaintiff if he did not clean the cell the right
way (Id.). The two were celled together for approximately two and a half months (Doc. 56-2 at
1).
Plaintiff testified during the time the two were housed together, Gaines’ attitude worsened,
and he grew angry (Doc. 54-1 at 6). Plaintiff sent a kite to the mental health department
expressing confusion with his cell placement (Doc. 54-3 at 99). Melissa Pappas, a mental health
professional, responded to Plaintiff’s kite and set up a face-to-face meeting on February 18, 2006
(Id.). Plaintiff inquired about how he was placed with his cellmate and expressed frustration and
unhappiness with his living situation (Id.). Pappas explained the placement protocol (Id.). She
noted Plaintiff suffered from depression and scheduled a follow up within 30 days (Id.). The
interaction lasted approximately five minutes (Id.).
On March 14, 2016, Pappas met with Plaintiff a second time to discuss a treatment plan
(Doc. 54-3 at 102). Plaintiff reported, “I am coping with my cellie. Well, I am trying to.” (Id.).
Pappas discussed with Plaintiff coping skills to deal with frustration (Id., 54-4 at 2, 54-1 at 17).
The interaction lasted approximately twelve minutes (Doc. 54-3 at 102). Pappas attested that at
no time during the February 18, 2016 or March 14, 2016 interactions did Plaintiff indicate he was
being threatened or feared for his safety (Doc. 54-4 at 2). Pappas further stated that if an offender
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came to her fearing for his safety from his cellmate, it is her regular practice to note specific threats
in his records, contact internal affairs, and note that internal affairs has been contacted (Id.).
Plaintiff’s mental health records from February 18, 2016 and March 14, 2016 contain no
documentation regarding threats from his cellmate (Doc. 54-3 at 99-102). Defendant Pappas had
no other interaction with Plaintiff prior to the May 25, 2016 assault (Id.).
Plaintiff testified during the two-month period they were housed together, Gaines
increasingly threatened him approximately 40-50 times (Doc. 54-1 at 8). Gaines would threaten
to “beat my ass,” “take me out,” and “make my life miserable” (Id. at 7). Plaintiff testified he
complained to a number of correctional staff, including Internal Affairs Officer Bridges and
Lieutenant Samuel (Id. at 7-8). Plaintiff also testified during one exchange, Gaines punched him
in the face (Id. at 8). Plaintiff did not report the incident of being punched to anyone (Id. at 9).
Plaintiff testified he spoke to Defendant Officer Stinson on one occasion in May 2016
about the issues he was having with Gaines (Doc. 54-1 at 11-12). He could not recall exactly
when he spoke to Stinson (Id. at 11-13). Plaintiff told Stinson he felt threatened by Gaines and
needed to be moved (Id. at 11-12, 14). The conversation took place when Plaintiff was in line
coming back from chow and lasted approximately 30-45 seconds (Id.). Plaintiff testified
regarding his conversation with Stinson, “I think I generalized what was going on in the cell. I
didn’t give any specific examples” (Id. at 14). Reo Stinson attested he does not recall every
speaking with Plaintiff (Doc. 59).
On May 25, 2016, Plaintiff was assaulted by Calvin Gaines (Doc. 54-1 at 15). Plaintiff
had just returned from lunch and was getting ready to go down to the showers when Gaines told
him he was not going to take a shower (Id.). Plaintiff replied that he was going to go to the
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showers and Gaines threw him into the wall, causing him to lose consciousness (Id.). The
correctional officers that were unlocking cells three doors down responded and separated Gaines
from Plaintiff (Id.). Plaintiff was taken to the health care unit bleeding and believes he suffered
a concussion (Id. at 16).
Plaintiff testified he never filed a grievance regarding his cell placement with Gaines (Doc.
54-1 at 13). According to Plaintiff’s Cumulative Counseling Summary, he talked to his
correctional counselor on February 22, 2016, March 16, 2016, March 25, 2016, April 6, 2016, and
April 8, 2016, and made no complaints regarding his cell placement with Gaines (Id. at 19).
Plaintiff testified that he did not tell his counselor about complaints with Gaines when he visited
the cell because he did not want to say anything in front of Gaines (Id.). Plaintiff testified he
could place handwritten requests to his counselor into a box (Id.). Plaintiff did not put in a request
for protective custody while at Menard (Id.).
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate only if the moving party can demonstrate “that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322(1986); see also Ruffin-
Thompkins v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc., 422 F.3d 603, 607 (7th Cir. 2005). The
moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the lack of any genuine issue of material
fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Once a properly supported motion for summary judgment is
made, the adverse party “must set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact exists
when “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
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Estate of Simpson v. Gorbett, 863 F.3d 740, 745 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at
248). In determining a summary judgment motion, the Court views the facts in the light most
favorable to, and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of, the nonmoving party. Apex Digital,
Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 735 F.3d 962, 965 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment requires that
prison officials “take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of inmates.” Santiago v. Walls, 599
F.3d 749, 758 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (other citations
omitted)). In order to succeed on a claim for failure to protect against a prison official, a plaintiff must
show: (1) that he was incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm and, (2)
that prison officials acted with deliberate indifference to that risk. Id.
In order to establish the first element, a plaintiff must show not only that he experienced,
or was exposed to, a serious harm, but also that there was a substantial risk beforehand that serious
harm might actually occur. Brown v. Budz, 398 F.3d 904, 910 (7th Cir. 2005). The second
element, the subjective element, is more difficult for a plaintiff to demonstrate, and requires an
inquiry into a defendant prison official’s state of mind. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847. A prison
official may be held liable only if he knows an inmate faces a substantial risk of serious harm and
“disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.” Id. Thus, in order for
Plaintiff to prevail on his failure to protect claim, he must establish that Defendants had actual
knowledge of an impending harm, easily preventable, so that a conscious, culpable refusal to
prevent the harm can be inferred from each Defendant’s failure to prevent it. Santiago, 599 F.3d
at 758. “In cases involving inmate-on-inmate violence, ‘a prisoner normally provides actual
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knowledge of impending harm by showing that he complained to prison officials about a specific
threat to his safety’.” Pope v. Shafer, 86 F.3d 90, 92 (7th Cir. 1996).
ANALYSIS
Defendant Pappas
The evidence here, even when viewed in Plaintiff’s favor, fails to establish that Defendant
Pappas was aware of, and disregarded, a known hazard to Plaintiff’s health and safety. The
evidence establishes that on his first visit with Pappas, Plaintiff had been housed with Gaines for
13 days and reported frustration and unhappiness with his living situation. The two agree they
discussed coping skills he could use to deal with is frustration. There is no evidence Plaintiff
reported threats such that Pappas was aware he was in imminent danger. On the second visit,
Plaintiff again complained about Gaines, but stated, “I’m coping with my cellie.” There is
insufficient evidence such that a jury could find Plaintiff’s complaints about Gaines on March 14,
2016, were such that Pappas had actual knowledge of an impending harm for which she was
required to take steps to prevent. Defendant Pappas is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s
failure to protect claim.
Defendant Stinson
Plaintiff admits he had only one brief conversation with Defendant Stinson regarding
Gaines, however, during the 30-second conversation he stated that he felt threatened by Gaines
and asked to be moved. The one conversation in May 2016, although brief, raises genuine issues
of material fact as to whether Defendant Stinson had “actual knowledge of impending harm” such
that he was required to act to prevent the assault that occurred. Defendant Stinson is not entitled
to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s failure to protect claim.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant Pappas
(Doc. 53) is GRANTED and the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant Stinson (Doc.
56) is DENIED. The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of Defendant Pappas and against
Plaintiff at the close of the case. Plaintiff shall proceed on the following claim:
Count 1: Defendant Stinson failed to protect Plaintiff from violence at the hands of
inmate Gaines in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: January 2, 2020
s/ Reona J. Daly
Hon. Reona J. Daly
United States Magistrate Judge
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