Saterfield v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

LLOYD SATERFIELD,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 18-cv-560-JPG-GCS

JOHN R. BALDWIN, JACQUELINE

LASHBROOK, WEXFORD HEALTH

SOURCES, INC., STEPHEN RITZ, ROBERT

SMITH, and MOHAMMED SIDDIQUI,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on the Report and Recommendation (“Report”) (Doc.

124) of Magistrate Judge Gilbert C. Sison. After holding a hearing on January 25, 2019,

Magistrate Judge Sison recommended that the Court grant the motion for summary judgment

filed by defendant Dr. Stephen Ritz (Doc. 50) and deny the summary judgment motion filed by

defendant Dr. Mohammed Siddiqui (Doc. 96). Both motions are based on the assertion that

plaintiff Lloyd Saterfield failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Dr. Siddiqui has

objected to the Report to the extent it concerns him (Doc. 131), and Saterfield has responded to

that objection (Doc. 135). Saterfield has also objected to the Report to the extent it concerns Dr.

Ritz (Doc. 136), and Dr. Ritz has responded to that objection (Doc. 137).

This case arose because Saterfield suffers from ongoing back problems, and he is not

happy with the medical treatment provided by Dr. Siddiqui, Dr. Ritz, and others.

I. Report Review Standard

The Court may accept, reject or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or

recommendations of the magistrate judge in a report and recommendation. Fed. R. Civ. P.

72(b)(3). The Court must review de novo the portions of the report to which objections are

made. Id. “If no objection or only partial objection is made, the district court judge reviews

those unobjected portions for clear error.” Johnson v. Zema Sys. Corp., 170 F.3d 734, 739 (7th

Cir. 1999).

II. Dr. Ritz’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 50)

Magistrate Judge Sison found in the Report that Saterfield filed a grievance on November

27, 2017, complaining about Dr. Ritz’s September 7, 2017, request for collegial review, Wexford

Health Sources Inc.’s (“Wexford”) process to approve or deny a medical service requested by a

prison doctor. The grievance officer denied the grievance as late because it was filed more than

60 days after September 7, 2017. Saterfield went through all the grievance steps thereafter, and

the Administrative Review Board made the final denial of his grievance on January 19, 2018.

Magistrate Judge Sison found that the continuing violation doctrine does not help Saterfield

because that doctrine only excuses exhaustion for later events of a continuing violation as long as

a timely grievance was filed after the beginning of the violation.

Saterfield objects to the Court’s interpretation of the continuing violation doctrine. He

argues that the doctrine allows reaching back to events before the filing of the grievance. He

notes that his grievance makes clear that Dr. Ritz was one of his medical providers and that he

continued to suffer from his medical problems, which is sufficient to exhaust as to Dr. Ritz.

As a preliminary matter, Magistrate Judge Sison misidentifies Dr. Ritz as a prison doctor

who would have had appointments to examine, diagnose, and/or treat Saterfield. From the

allegations in the grievance and complaint, however, it is clear that Dr. Ritz is not a prison doctor

but a doctor working for Wexford Health Sources, Inc. as part of the collegial review process.

Grievance 2 (Doc. 97-2 at 18); Am. Compl. ¶¶ 23 & 28. Thus, Dr. Ritz’s involvement was not

2

as a treating physician but as a reviewing physician making discrete decisions on medical service

requests from treating physicians. That distinction sheds a different light on the exhaustion

question.

Saterfield’s argument ignores the plain text of the administrative rule on grievances,

which states, “A grievance must be filed with the counselor or Grievance Officer in accordance

with the procedures in this Subpart, within 60 days after the discovery of the incident, occurrence

or problem that gives rise to the grievance.” 20 Ill. Admin. Code § 504.810 (emphasis added).

Thus, by the very terms of the administrative rule, in order to exhaust, Saterfield must have

grieved Dr. Ritz’s conduct within 60 days of when he discovered his health problem and Dr.

Ritz’s participation in it. This point in time is clear where Saterfield complains of a specific

discrete instance by Dr. Ritz—the decision to deny a “medical special service” of an MRI.

Grievance 2 (Doc. 97-2 at 18); Am. Compl. ¶¶ 23 & 28; see Ramirez v. Young, 906 F.3d 530,

539 (7th Cir. 2018) (noting that “many people assert that problems are ongoing, when the issue

really stems from a discrete act that starts the clock running”). Saterfield did not file his

grievance within 60 days of Dr. Ritz’s discrete decision to deny a specifically requested

diagnostic test, so the grievance was not timely.

The continuing violation doctrine does not save Saterfield’s claim. The doctrine means

that after Saterfield files a timely grievance about Dr. Ritz, he does not have to keep filing them

for ongoing problems with Dr. Ritz, that is, ongoing deliberate indifference by Dr. Ritz to

Saterfield’s medical needs. See Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 650 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[O]nce

a prison has received notice of, and an opportunity to correct, a problem, the prisoner has

satisfied the purpose of the exhaustion requirement.”). But it does not excuse Saterfield from

filing a timely grievance to begin with, which he failed to do in this case concerning Dr. Ritz.

3

For this reason, after a de novo review, the Court will adopt the Report to the extent it

recommends granting Dr. Ritz’s motion for summary judgment on exhaustion grounds.

III. Dr. Siddiqui’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 96)

Magistrate Judge Sison found in the Report that Saterfield’s November 27, 2017,

grievance mentioned Dr. Siddiqui’s November 6, 2017, request to the collegial review process

for Saterfield to receive an MRI for his back problems. In the grievance, Saterfield also

complained about his continuing back issues. Magistrate Judge Sison found that Saterfield had

exhausted this grievance as to his claims against Dr. Siddiqui and was therefore able to maintain

this lawsuit against him.

Dr. Siddiqui objects on three grounds. First, he claims Saterfield’s grievance, although

mentioning Dr. Siddiqui, did not complaint of Dr. Siddiqui’s treatment. Second, he claims

Saterfield’s grievance does not specifically complain of Dr. Siddiqui’s failure to provide any

treatment beyond pain medications. The Court disagrees and finds that a liberal reading of

Saterfield’s grievance contains an implicit complaint that his medical provider at the time—Dr.

Siddiqui—was not providing appropriate care for his back treatment, whether it be through

seeking approval for an MRI or providing effective medication. This is sufficient to have raised

his claims against Dr. Siddiqui in the grievance.

Third, Dr. Siddiqui argues that the November 2017 grievance did not—and could not—

have included complaints about Dr. Siddiqui’s conduct in May 2018. However, the Court

agrees with Magistrate Judge Sison that Saterfield’s complaints about Dr. Siddiqui’s treatment in

May 2018 are part and parcel of the same alleged failure to adequately treat that began in 2017.

Thus, Saterfield alleges a continuing Eighth Amendment violation for which it would be

unreasonable for him to file a new grievance. See Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 651 (7th

4

Cir. 2013).

For this reason, after a de novo review, the Court will adopt the Report to the extent it

recommends denying Dr. Siddiqui’s motion for summary judgment on exhaustion grounds.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court:

• ADOPTS the Report as MODIFIED by this order (Doc. 124);

• OVERRULES Dr. Siddiqui’s objections (Doc. 131);

• OVERRULES Saterfield’s objections (Doc. 136);

• GRANTS Dr. Ritz’s motion for summary judgment on exhaustion grounds (Doc. 50);

• DENIES Dr. Siddiqui’s motion for summary judgment on exhaustion grounds (Doc. 96);

and

• DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to enter judgment accordingly at the close of the case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 4, 2019

s/ J. Phil Gilbert

J. PHIL GILBERT

DISTRICT JUDGE

5