LaChance v. Community Consolidated School District 93

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

Peter F. LaChance,

No. 1:22-cv-01266

Plaintiff,

Honorable Nancy L. Maldonado

v.

Community Consolidated School District 93,

David Hill,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Peter LaChance brings this lawsuit against Defendants Community Consolidated

School District 93 (the “Board”)1 and David Hill (collectively, “Defendants”) for alleged violations

of LaChance’s First and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the U.S. Constitution. LaChance

alleges the Board and Hill violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by demoting him

from his position as a school principal and then terminating him for requesting a hearing before

the Board regarding his demotion. LaChance brings these civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. §

1983 against the Board pursuant to Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

Defendants have moved to dismiss LaChance’s Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. (Dkt. 24.)2 For the reasons stated in this

Memorandum Opinion and Order, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is granted. In short, while

LaChance pleaded sufficient facts to allege § 1983 liability under Monell, LaChance has failed to

1 Defendants note in their briefing that the Community Consolidated School District 93 is not an entity that

is capable of being sued. Rather, the Board of Education of Community Consolidated School District 93 (“Board”)

is the only entity capable of being sued. As Defendants treated the Complaint as being filed solely against the Board,

so too will the Court.

2 In citations to the docket, page numbers are taken from the CM/ECF headers.

state a claim for a First or Fourteenth Amendment violation. The Complaint is dismissed without

prejudice, and LaChance may amend his Complaint by 4/12/24.

Background

The Court takes the following factual background from the well-pled allegations in the

Complaint (Dkt. 1) and assumes the allegations to be true for the purposes of the instant motion.

See Lewert v. P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Inc., 819 F.3d 963, 966 (7th Cir. 2016).

LaChance is a former public school principal who worked for Defendant Community

Consolidated School District 93 for nearly twenty years. (Dkt. 1 ¶ 7.) The Board is a body politic

and corporation organized and chartered under the laws of the State of Illinois. (Id. ¶ 4.) The elected

School Board conducts the business of administering the public school district. (Id.) Hill has been

the superintendent of the district since July 1, 2019. (Id. ¶ 6.)

LaChance started as an Assistant Principal in 2002 and was later promoted to Principal of

Carol Stream Elementary School. (Id. ¶ 7.) In 2008, LaChance became the Principal of Jay Stream

Middle School, where he worked for nearly twelve years. (Id.) LaChance alleges that after years

of successful service in this role, in 2020 the Board “reclassified” (i.e., demoted) him from the

position of Principal to the position of teacher. (Id. ¶ 30.) LaChance alleges that this decision came

after his relationship with Hill soured over the preceding years. (Id. ¶¶ 18-20.)

Illinois law provides reclassified principals and assistant principals with an opportunity to

request both a private and a public hearing before the Board to discuss the reasons for the Board’s

reclassification decision. See 105 ILCS 5/10-23.8b. Here, LaChance claims that upon his request

for a hearing with the Board regarding its decision to reclassify LaChance’s role, LaChance was

informed that he was to be terminated from his position at the school. (Dkt. 1 ¶ 33.) LaChance’s

termination decision was pursuant to the Illinois School Code, specifically the “Reduction in

Force” program, which groups educators for discharge by seniority and performance evaluation

ratings. (Id. ¶ 38.) The Complaint alleges that while LaChance for many years received high ratings

on his performance evaluations, Hill gave LaChance poor performance evaluation ratings because

of his alleged personal animus against LaChance. (Id. ¶¶ 23–25.) Because of LaChance’s low

ratings, upon his reclassification as a teacher, LaChance was placed in an educator group that

resulted in his termination. (Id. ¶¶ 38, 41.) LaChance argues that this was pretext for his

termination, as he claims no administrator level position had been terminated previously pursuant

to the reduction in force program. (Id. ¶¶ 40–41.)

LaChance now seeks to recover from both the Board and Hill for alleged violations of his

First Amendment right to petition and Fourteenth Amendment right to due process under the U.S.

Constitution. Specifically, LaChance alleges that the Board and Hill retaliated against LaChance

for exercising his First Amendment right to seek redress with the government by requesting a

hearing in front of the Board regarding his reclassification. (Id. ¶¶ 45–57.) LaChance alleges that

Hill and the Board terminated LaChance from his reclassified role as an educator in retaliation for

LaChance requesting a hearing on his reclassification decision. Id. LaChance also alleges that the

District violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural due process by failing to provide

a meaningful hearing before the Board on its decision to reclassify LaChance prior to his

termination. (Id. ¶¶ 58–66.)

LaChance initiated this suit on March 9, 2022. (Dkt. 1.) Defendants responded to the

Complaint with a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. (Dkt.

24.) Briefing on the motion is now complete, and the Court will address the motion below.

Legal Standard

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the complaint, not

its merits. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Gibson v. City of Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510, 1520 (7th Cir. 1990).

In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court accepts as true all well-pleaded facts in the

plaintiff’s complaint and draws all reasonable inferences from those facts in the plaintiff’s favor.

Kubiak v. City of Chicago, 810 F.3d 476, 480–81 (7th Cir. 2016). The Court need not, however,

accept conclusory allegations, or allegations that contain only legal conclusions. See, e.g., Dix v.

Edelman Fin. Servs., LLC, 978 F.3d 507, 513 (7th Cir. 2020) (citations omitted). To survive a Rule

12(b)(6) motion, the complaint must assert a facially plausible claim and provide fair notice to the

defendant of the claim’s basis. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); Adams v. City of Indianapolis, 742 F.3d 720, 728–29 (7th Cir.

2014). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court

to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 678.

Discussion

Defendants argue that LaChance’s claims under the First and Fourteenth Amendment,

against both Defendants, should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim for

relief. Because Monell liability is predicated on the existence of an underlying constitutional

violation, the Court will first turn to LaChance’s constitutional claims. Sallenger v. City of

Springfield, Ill., 630 F.3d 499, 505 (7th Cir. 2010).

A. LaChance’s First Amendment Claim

LaChance’s First Amendment claims against the Board and Hill rely on the same

underlying facts, specifically LaChance’s allegation that the Board and Hill retaliated against him

for pursuing his First Amendment right to seek redress with the government by requesting a

hearing pursuant to 105 ILCS 5/10-23.8b. (Dkt. 1 ¶ 46.)

To establish a claim for retaliation in violation of the First Amendment, a public employee

first must prove that his speech was constitutionally protected. Kubiak v. City of Chicago, 810 F.3d

476, 481 (7th Cir. 2016). A public employee must show that (1) he made the speech as a private

citizen, (2) the speech addressed a matter of public concern, and (3) his interest in expressing that

speech was not outweighed by the state’s interests as an employer in “promoting effective and

efficient public service.” Swetlik v. Crawford, 738 F.3d 818, 825 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Houskins

v. Sheahan, 549 F.3d 480, 490 (7th Cir. 2008)).

Defendants argue that LaChance failed to allege that he engaged in constitutionally

protected speech, and his claims should therefore be dismissed. (Dkt. 25 at 8.) Defendants argue

that, in requesting the hearing pursuant to 105 ILCS 5/10-23.8b, LaChance did not speak as a

private citizen on a matter of public concern. (Id. at 9–10.)

In response, LaChance argues that the Speech Clause of the First Amendment is not the

gravamen of LaChance’s claims and therefore the test for a private citizen speaking on a public

matter is inapplicable here. (Dkt. 27 at 11.) LaChance argues that because his First Amendment

claim is alleged pursuant to the Petition Clause, the only issues before the Court are whether his

request for a hearing was a matter of public concern and if the interests of the public outweighed

the interests of the District. (Id.)

Before addressing the substance of LaChance’s argument, the Court rejects LaChance’s

attempt to distinguish the test for a Speech Clause violation from a Petition Clause violation. The

Supreme Court has specifically declined to set forth a separate test for public employees’ First

Amendment claims under the Petition Clause. While the Supreme Court instructed that “[c]ourts

should not presume there is always an essential equivalence in the two Clauses or that Speech

Clause precedents necessarily and in every case resolve Petition Clause claims,” at the same time,

the Guarnieri court concluded that “[t]he considerations that shape the application of the Speech

Clause to public employees apply with equal force to claims by those employees under the Petition

Clause.” Borough of Duryea, Pa. v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 379, 388-89 (2011). This is because

“[p]etitions, no less than speech, can interfere with the efficient and effective operation of

government.” Id. The Guarnieri court specifically declined to adopt a separate standard for claims

under the Petition Clause, explaining that

[t]he framework used to govern Speech Clause claims by public employees, when

applied to the Petition Clause, will protect both the interests of the government and

the First Amendment right. If a public employee petitions as an employee on a

matter of purely private concern, the employee’s First Amendment interest must

give way, as it does in speech cases.

Id. At 398 (internal citation omitted). Moreover, “[a]s under the Speech Clause, whether an

employee’s petition relates to a matter of public concern will depend on ‘the content, form, and

context of [the petition], as revealed by the whole record.’” Id. (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S.

138, 147–48, n.7 (1983)). The inquiry into whether LaChance was speaking or petitioning on a

matter of public concern, therefore, is still necessary to determine if LaChance has stated a First

Amendment violation.

The Court is unable to discern from the facts pled whether, in requesting the hearing,

LaChance was acting as a private citizen petitioning the government on a matter of public concern.

See Brooks v. Univ. of Wisconsin Bd. Of Regents, 406 F.3d 476 (7th Cir. 2005). Under Guarnieri,

the Court must look at the content, form, and context of the petition for redress. LaChance argues

that his petition for a hearing touched on a matter of public concern because his demotion from his

position as principal generally raises concerns related to the welfare of children and the ability of

the school to deliver effective education. (Dkt. 27 at 12.) At the same time, LaChance concedes

that he did not plead facts explaining what he would have addressed during his request hearing

with the Board. (Id.)

The Court is not persuaded by LaChance’s conclusory statements. Because LaChance has

not pled that his petition would have involved matters of public interest, he has not stated a First

Amendment claim. The “public concern” element “must relate to a community concern and is not

satisfied by ‘merely a personal grievance of interest only to the employee.’” Houskins v. Sheahan,

549 F.3d 480, 490 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Sullivan v. Ramirez, 360 F.3d 692, 699 (7th Cir. 2004)).

At this stage, it is not enough for LaChance to argue that simply because he was a public employee,

his termination and/or reclassification necessarily would have involved public matters – if this

were the standard then any government employee’s speech or petition regarding termination or

demotion would garner First Amendment protection. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. at 399 (“in one sense the

public may always be interested in how government officers are performing their duties. … [but]

that will not always suffice to show a matter of public concern.”).

The Court recognizes that “a public employee’s speech may still be protected If the

speaker’s motives were mixed and also included a desire to help the public” because “motive alone

does not conclusively determine whether a public employee’s speech involves a matter of public

concern.” Kristofek v. Village of Orland Hills, 712 F.3d 979, 984–85 (7th Cir. 2013). At this stage,

however, the facts pled in the Complaint are insufficient to infer that LaChance’s request for a

reclassification hearing was anything other than an attempt to “simply [] further a purely

personalized grievance,” which would not be a matter of public concern. Id. at 986.

In making this determination, this Court is not concluding that LaChance cannot make out

a First Amendment claim. Rather, the facts pled in the Complaint are insufficient to allow the Court

to analyze whether, in requesting the hearing, LaChance was petitioning the Board as a citizen on

a matter of public concern. For these reasons, Counts I and II of LaChance’s Complaint are

dismissed without prejudice.

B. LaChance’s Fourteenth Amendment Claim

In addition to LaChance’s retaliation claim under the First Amendment, LaChance also

alleges that the Board violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural due process by

failing to provide LaChance with a meaningful reclassification hearing pursuant to 105 ILCS 5/10-

23.8b prior to terminating him.

The Fourteenth Amendment forbids a state from depriving a person of “life, liberty, or

property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. Amend. XIV § 1. “The fundamental requirement

of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”

Mathews v. Edlride, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (citing Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552

(1965)). “To prevail on a procedural due process claim, ‘a plaintiff must establish that a state actor

deprived him of a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest without due process of

law.’” Hinkle v. White, 793 F.3d 764, 767 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Dupuy v. Samuels, 397 F.3d 493,

503 (7th Cir. 2005)). A procedural due process claim thus requires the Court to analyze two

questions: first, “whether there exists a liberty or property interest which has been interfered with

by the State;” and second, “whether the procedures attendant upon that deprivation were

constitutionally sufficient.” DuPuy, 397 F.3d at 503 (quoting Kentucky Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson,

490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989)).

LaChance’s Fourteenth Amendment claim arises from the reclassification procedure for

principals and assistant principals as set forth by Illinois law. 105 ILCS 5/10-23.8b. Pursuant to

this section of the Illinois School Code, a school board must give written notice of a proposed

reclassification if the reclassification results in a demotion or reduction in rank to a position with

a lower salary. Id. After receipt of such notice, the school board “shall provide the principal or

assistant principal with a written statement of the facts regarding reclassification[.]” Id. The

principal or assistant principal may then “request and receive” a private hearing with the school

board “to discuss the reasons for the reclassification.” Id. The principal or assistant principal may

then also “request and receive” a public hearing on the reclassification. Id. The principal or

assistant principal may be represented by counsel at either hearing. Id. After conclusion of one or

both hearings, the school board must give the principal or assistant principal written notice of its

decision within fifteen days of whichever hearing is held later, at which point the decision becomes

final. Id.

LaChance alleges that his right to due process was violated when the Board terminated him

from his teaching position prior to affording him a reclassification hearing pursuant to ILCS 5/10-

23.8b. (Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 59–62.) LaChance further alleges that this resulted in depriving LaChance of his

occupational liberty interest. (Id. ¶ 66.)

1. Whether LaChance has Alleged a Property Interest

Defendants argue that LaChance’s Fourteenth Amendment claim fails because LaChance

cannot assert a property interest in his continued employment as a Principal. (Dkt. 25 at 12–13.)

In response, LaChance explains that “the fundamental liberty and property interest implicated is

Pete’s fundamental right to pursue his chosen occupation[.]” (Dkt. 27 at 8); see also Peterson v.

Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 986 F.3d 746, 752 n.2 (7th Cir. 2021) (noting that plaintiff, in

opposing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, was “free to ‘elaborate on his factual allegations so long as the

new elaborations are consistent with the pleadings.’”) (citing Geinosky v. City of Chicago, 675

F.3d 743, 745 n.1 (7th Cir. 2012)). At the outset, the Court finds that LaChance has not pled that

he had a property interest in his employment as a principal. See Lyznicki v. Bd. of Educ., Sch. Dist.

167, Cook County, Ill., 707 F.2d 949, 952 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding reclassification statute “makes

employment as a principal employment at will, which Roth held created no Fourteenth Amendment

property right”) (citing Roth, 408 U.S. at 578).

LaChance cannot allege that the procedure set forth in 105 ILCS 5/10-23.8b creates such a

property right. See Manley v. Law, 889 F.3d 885, 893 (7th Cir. 2018) (“a rule that ‘merely provides

procedures to be followed does not include a substantive right’ if the procedures protect nothing

more than employment that can be terminated at will.”) (citing Miyler v. Vill. of East Galesburg,

512 F.3d 896, 898 (7th Cir. 2008)). Because LaChance was employed at will, the procedures set

forth by 105 ILCS 5/10-23.8b do not implicate any substantive due process rights. See id.

(explaining that rules that “merely provide[] procedures to be followed do[] not include a

substantive right if the procedures protect nothing more than employment that can be terminated

at will.”).

Nor has LaChance pled that he had a property interest in his role as a teacher because he

does not allege that he had tenure. See Lyznicki, 707 F.2d at 951 (holding that tenured teacher, “if

he had been discharged from his teaching position he would have been able to complain that he

had been deprived of a property right within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). This

leaves the Court with only LaChance’s claim that he was deprived of an occupational liberty

interest.

2. Whether LaChance has Stated an Occupational Liberty Interest

LaChance correctly notes that a plaintiff may state an occupational liberty interest claim

even if the plaintiff does not have a property interest in the specific job. See Bryant v. Gardner,

545 F. Supp. 2d 791, 799 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (citing Klug v. Chi. Sch. Reform Bd. of Trs., 197 F.3d

853, 859 (7th Cir. 1999)). LaChance alleges that he was deprived of his occupational liberty

interest because he can no longer find employment in his chosen occupation. (Dkt. 1 ¶ 43.)

The government may violate an employee’s occupational liberty interest “when, in the

course of a discharge, failure to rehire, or other adverse employment action, the employer

stigmatizes the employee by making public comments that impugn ‘the individual’s good name,

reputation, honor, or integrity’ or impose a ‘stigma or other disability on the individual which

forecloses other opportunities.” Bryant, 545 F. Supp. 2d at 798. “The Fourteenth Amendment

protects only the individual’s liberty to pursue a particular occupation, however, and not the

individual’s right to any one job.” Id. To state a claim for deprivation of an occupational liberty

interest, a plaintiff must allege: “(1) the employer made stigmatizing comments; (2) the comments

were publicly disclosed; and (3) the plaintiff suffered a tangible loss of other employment

opportunities as a result.” Id. “If all the elements necessary to make out an occupational liberty

claim are met, the remedy is an opportunity to refute the charge, which allows the person an

opportunity to ‘clear his name.’” Id. (citing Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,

573 & n.12 (1972)).

At the same time, “[l]iberty is not infringed when the individual is only ‘somewhat less

attractive to some other employers,’ as through a label of incompetence or poor management skills

… there must be permanent exclusion from or protracted interruption of employment.” Wroblewski

v. City of Washburn, 965 F.2d 452, 456 (7th Cir. 1992) (citing Munson v. Friske, 754 F.2d 683, 693

(7th Cir. 1985)) (internal citation omitted.) For instance, “[t]he denial of tenure or employment is

not, by itself, stigmatizing conduct in the legal sense of the term.” Hedrich v. Bd. of Regents of

Univ. of Wisconsin Sys., 274 F.3d 1174, 1184 (7th Cir. 2001). Rather, “a termination is only

stigmatizing if it is accompanied by a publicly announced reason that ‘impugns [the employee’s]

moral character,’ or implies ‘dishonesty or other job-related moral turpitude.’” Id. (citing Lawson

v. Sheriff of Tippecanoe Cnty., 725 F.2d 1136, 1138–39 (7th Cir. 1984)) (internal citation omitted.)

Further, “‘not every remark which may arguably affect one’s reputation’ is actionable; the

Fourteenth Amendment protects only against ‘charges that might seriously damage one’s standing

and associations in the community.’” Bryant v. Gardner, 545 F. Supp. 2d at 800 (quoting Ulichny

v. Merton Cmty. Sch. Dist., 249 F.3d 686, 705 (7th Cir. 2001)).

LaChance claims that other school district employers will not hire him because of the

circumstances of his reclassification and termination. (Dkt. 27 at 9.) He argues that the timing of

his reclassification and termination at the same time the COVID-19 pandemic caused school

closures was “problematic” and created a stigma associated with his termination. (Id.) Because

LaChance did not have a reclassification before the Board, he argues, he was never given the

opportunity to “clear his name.” (Id. at 9.)

At this stage, the Court finds that LaChance has failed to allege facts sufficient to state a

claim for deprivation of an occupational liberty interest. LaChance’s conclusory allegations that

his termination is adversely affecting his ability to find new employment are insufficient to infer

that his standing in the community has been “seriously damaged” or that his moral character has

been “impugned.” LaChance’s claims that the timing of the termination contemporaneous with the

beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic do not allege the type of “morally stigmatizing” statements

or conduct “strong enough to bestow serious dishonor” on him to state a claim for deprivation of

an occupational liberty interest. Wroblewski, 965 F.2d at 456. Again, the Court makes no

determination as to whether LaChance could ever make this claim, just that he has not done so

with the facts alleged here. Because LaChance has failed to allege facts that support a deprivation

of his occupational liberty under the U.S. Constitution, his procedural due process claim fails.

C. § 1983 Monell Liability

The Court recognizes that there can be no Monell liability where there is no underlying

constitutional violation. Sallenger v. City of Springfield, Ill., 630 F.3d 499, 504 (7th Cir. 2010).

However, because this Court will grant leave for LaChance to amend his Complaint, the Court

observes that LaChance has plausibly alleged the Board could be liable for Constitutional

violations under Monell. Accordingly, the Court will analyze LaChance’s Monell allegations as

pled.

In order to state a 1983 claim against a municipality or government entity, as opposed to

an individual, a plaintiff must meet certain requirements set forth by the Supreme Court in Monell

v. Dep’t of Social Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Monell held that

“[m]unicipalities are not vicariously liable for the constitutional torts of their employees or

agents,” but rather are only liable “when they themselves cause the deprivation of rights.” Dean v.

Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 18 F.4th 214, 235 (7th Cir. 2021); J.K.J. v. Polk County, 960 F.3d

367, 376 (7th Cir. 2022). In order to allege a § 1983 claim against a municipality, a plaintiff must

allege “(1) the City had an express policy that, when enforced, causes a constitutional deprivation;

(2) the City had a widespread practice that, although not authorized by written law or express

municipal policy, is so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage within the

force of law; or (3) plaintiff's constitutional injury was caused by a person with final policymaking

authority." McCormick v. City of Chicago, 230 F.3d 319, 324 (7th Cir. 2000).

“One way in which a municipality may be liable for a section 1983 violation is if ‘an

individual with final policymaking authority for the municipality (on the subject in question)

caused the constitutional deprivation.” Kristofek v. Village of Orland Hills, 712 F.3d 979, 987 (7th

Cir. 2013) (quoting Valentino v. Village of South Chicago Heights, 575 F.3d 664, 674 (7th Cir.

2009)). Policymakers are “[o]fficials with final decisionmaking authority” and courts must “look

to state law to determine the scope of such authority.” Valentino, 757 F.3d at 676. The Seventh

Circuit has identified three factors that may inform whether an individual is a policymaker for

Monell purposes: “(1) whether the official is constrained by policies of other officials or legislative

bodies; (2) whether the official’s decision on the issue in question is subject to meaningful review;

and (3) whether the policy decision purportedly made by the official is within the realm of the

official’s grant of authority.” Id. (internal quotations marks and citation omitted). The Seventh

Circuit has also instructed that “[f]inal policymaking authority may be granted directly by statute

or delegated or ratified by an official having policymaking authority.” Kujawski v. Bd. of Comm’rs

of Bartholomew Cnty., Ind., 183 F.3d 734, 737 (7th Cir. 1999). “Customary practices having the

force of law may be considered as proof of delegation[.]” Id.

The Board argues that it cannot be subject to § 1983 liability under Monell because

LaChance failed to plead a municipal policy, custom, or action by a final policymaker. (Dkt. 25 at

1.) Specifically, the Board argues that LaChance does not plead an express policy or widespread

practice that led to the alleged constitutional deprivation. (Id. at 6.) Defendants also argue that

LaChance did not sufficiently allege action by a final policymaker because final policymaking

authority sits solely with the Board. (Id. at 7.) In support of this argument, the Board cites to a

provision of the Illinois School Code which sets forth that school boards have the authority “[t]o

adopt and enforce all necessary rules for the management and government of the public schools of

their district.” 105 ILCS 5/10-20.5. In response, LaChance argues that he sufficiently pled the

Board was a final policymaker for Monell purposes. (Dkt. 27 at 14.)

As a preliminary matter, the Court notes LaChance’s argument is not responsive to the

appropriate inquiry. The Court looks to whether “a particular course of action is directed by those

who set municipal policy” to determine if the municipality itself may be liable under section 1983.

Valentino, 575 F.3d at 675. LaChance may not allege this by pleading the Board as an entity was

the final policymaker. See id.

Setting aside this argument, the Court finds that LaChance has pled sufficient facts to at

least plausibly state a claim that the Board can be liable under Monell because it delegated final

policymaking authority of personnel decisions to Hill. While Defendants’ argument that Illinois

law grants policymaking authority to the Board is well taken, the Complaint alleges that the Board

gave unfettered deference to Hill in creating and implementing policies for personnel decisions.

(Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 29, 36); Kujawski, 183 F.3d at 739 (holding issue of fact existed as to whether municipal

board delegated final policymaking authority to chief probation officer where plaintiff presented

evidence that the board never reviewed the officer’s personnel decisions, the officer was in charge

of the department, and set policies for the department); Valentino, 575 F.3d at 678 (reversing grant

of summary judgment in favor of defendants where plaintiff presented evidence that mayor was a

de facto policymaker for the municipality). LaChance alleged that that the Board “entrusted” Hill

“to establish and apply rules and procedures … for evaluating the performance of all

administrators” and that the Board “relied entirely” on Hill and gave “unfettered deference” to Hill

for personnel recommendations. (Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 27, 29.) Specifically, LaChance alleges that the Board

approved every personnel recommendation made by Hill. (Id. ¶ 36.) LaChance also claims that the

vote held by the Board to terminate LaChance was merely “perfunctory” because the vote “was in

fact driven and directed solely by Superintendent Hill.” (Id. ¶ 34.) LaChance has stated facts for

the Court to reasonably infer that Defendant Hill was given final policymaking authority on behalf

of the Board. The Seventh Circuit has recognized that an official can be a de facto policymaker for

purposes of Monell liability when that official makes personnel decisions as the official sees fit

without any laws or policies to guide the official’s decision-making. See Valentino, 575 F.3d at

677–78 (finding that mayor was a de facto policymaker and further stating “[g]iven that the Village

has a population of only a few thousand people and is run by a small government, a legislative

framework for personnel decisions may not actually exist”). More specifically, the Seventh Circuit

has held that a police chief had “de facto authority to set policy for hiring and firing”—and thus

that the plaintiff had stated a plausible Monell claim—when the plaintiff’s complaint suggested

that the chief “was fully in charge of the police department and that his firing decisions were not

reviewed.” Kristofek, 712 F.3d at 987.

Here, LaChance alleges that Hill made the final decision to both reclassify and terminate

LaChance, with no oversight from the Board. The Court thus finds it plausible that Hill may have

had de facto authority to set hiring and firing policy, giving rise to Monell liability. See FKFJ, Inc.

v. Village of Worth, No. 18 C 2828, 2019 WL 277723, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 22, 2019) (“[r]esolving

the question at this early stage might be premature, in any case, because it may turn on issues of

fact, such as whether the Board of Trustees delegated policymaking authority or ratified decisions

of Werner or other village officials.”). Whether the evidence ultimately supports that claim is a

factual question to be resolved at a later stage. Even though LaChance cannot allege Monell

liability without an underlying constitutional claim, the Court flags for the parties that LaChance’s

Complaint plausibly alleges the Board would otherwise be subject to Monell liability.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted without prejudice.

LaChance may amend his complaint by 4/12/24.

ENTERED: 3/25/24

Nancy L. Maldonado

United States District Court Judge

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