Earley v. City of Chicago

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

Dakotah Earley,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 23 C 801

City of Chicago, Lori Lightfoot, David Hon. LaShonda A. Hunt

Brown, John Doe 1, and John Doe 2,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Currently pending before the Court is the motion of Defendants City of Chicago, Lori

Lightfoot, and David Brown, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), to dismiss the civil rights complaint

filed by Plaintiff Dakotah Earley. For the following reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss [14]

is granted and Plaintiff’s complaint [1] is dismissed without prejudice.

BACKGROUND1

Earley lived in the Lincoln Park neighborhood of Chicago at the time of the unfortunate

events giving rise to this case. When the complaint was filed, Lightfoot was the Mayor of Chicago

and Brown was the Superintendent of the Chicago Police Department (CPD). Defendants John

Doe 1 and John Doe 2 are unidentified CPD officers.

On May 6, 2022, around 3:00 a.m., Earley was walking near his home when he was robbed

and shot three times, twice in the back and once in the head. Miraculously, Earley survived. During

1 Unless otherwise noted, this section sets forth the non-conclusory factual allegations of the complaint, which

must be taken as true for purposes of analyzing this motion. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Information

from Chicago Police Department General Order G03-03-01, entitled “Emergency Vehicle Operations - Eluding and

Pursuing” is also discussed. (Defs.’ Mot., Ex. 1, Dkt. No. 14-1). Although Rule 12(d) generally requires the Court to

convert a Rule 12(b)(6) motion into a Rule 56 summary judgment motion if matters outside the pleadings are presented

and not excluded, the policy is considered part of the complaint, as it is referred to repeatedly in the pleading and

central to Earley’s claims. Venture Assocs. v. Zenith Data Sys., 987 F.2d 429, 431 (7th Cir. 1993).

his months-long hospitalization and recovery, Earley required jaw, abdominal, and partial leg

amputation surgeries and was unable to talk. Earley’s lasting injuries include the partial loss of his

leg, partial permanent brain injuries, speech impediments, mobility problems, post-traumatic

stress, and overwhelming emotional distress.

Starting two days before Earley’s attack, on May 4, 2022, Tyshon Brownlee and a group

of other men were involved in a string of armed robberies on Chicago’s North Side. The crime

spree included the following incidents: the night before Earley was robbed and shot, a man was

robbed at gunpoint and his BMW vehicle was stolen in the 2900 block of North Clark;2 minutes

later, another victim was robbed in Lincoln Park—shots were fired but fortunately the victim was

not injured; on May 5, 2022, around 9:00 p.m., a woman was robbed at gunpoint in the 3000 block

of North Racine—she reported that another woman across the street was also robbed and provided

police with a license plate number for the getaway car that matched the stolen BMW; within

minutes, another man was robbed at gunpoint a few blocks away. All the robberies involved armed

men wearing ski masks who left a vehicle and confronted victims walking down the street.

The vehicle stolen by Brownlee and his crew was equipped with a GPS system that allowed

police to monitor and track the real-time location of the vehicle.3 Although the complaint alleges

that “the police were at all times aware that they could have apprehended the vehicle on the basis

of the GPS tracking system[,]” (Compl. ¶ 36), and that “Defendants at all times were aware of the

2 The complaint alleges that the BMW was taken in Lakeview “the previous night” (Compl. ¶ 22) and on the

2900 block of North Clark “the night before.” (Compl. ¶ 29a). Because Earley was attacked on the morning of May

6, 2022, it is not clear if Earley means the vehicle was stolen on May 4, 2022, or May 5, 2022.

3 Earley also alleges that the vehicle’s GPS system was being monitored, “on belief, by the dealership”

(Compl. ¶ 36) and argues in his response brief that “police could have obtained the exact GPS coordinates of the

vehicle from the dealership and did not.” (Pl.’s Resp. at 5). These are the only instances where he mentions “the

dealership” in the filings, and those statements are somewhat inconsistent with his allegations about CPD’s

independent awareness of the vehicle’s location.

vehicle’s location due to reports and the GPS tracking system,” (Compl. ¶ 53), Earley does not

specify exactly how or when CPD began monitoring and tracking the vehicle’s location with the

GPS system.

In any event, on May 6, 2022, around 2:00 a.m., CPD dispatchers notified patrol officers

that the stolen BMW vehicle was located near Northerly Island according to the GPS system.

Officers Doe 1 and 2 “initially approached the vehicle, but then let it go.” (Compl. ¶ 29g). Over

the police radio, one of the officers stated, “We’re not following. We’re not chasing. Show us

heading into [the station] to do an eluding report.” (Id. (quoting unknown source)). According to

Earley, the officers made this decision “despite being [in] possession of facts regarding [Brownlee]

and his crew’s extremely violent behavior and his direct whereabouts.” (Compl. ¶ 45).

Approximately one hour later, the vehicle appeared at the intersection of Webster and Wayne in

Lincoln Park. Brownlee got out of the vehicle, ambushed, robbed, and shot Earley. He then

returned to the vehicle and fled the scene.

Approximately two years earlier, on August 15, 2020, CPD instituted General Order G03-

03-01, entitled “Emergency Vehicle Operations - Eluding and Pursuing”. (Defs.’ Mot. at Ex. 1).

Essentially, the policy allows officers to engage in a motor vehicle pursuit only if “[t]he necessity

to immediately apprehend the fleeing suspect outweighs the level of inherent danger created by a

motor vehicle pursuit.” (Gen. Order G03-03-01 § 4A). Based on this policy, CPD justified the

officers’ decision not to pursue Brownlee in the stolen vehicle on May 6, 2022. According to

Earley, the officers “follow[ed] the . . . policy, by misjudging the application of the balancing

test . . . , but engag[ed] in a course of action showing . . . disregard for the safety of others,

including . . . Earley.” (Compl. ¶ 35).

Earley alleges that Lightfoot and Brown both knew there was a high probability that the

policy would chill and hamper officers from engaging in pursuits to stop criminals and that the

policy has had that effect in practice. Earley further asserts that the “policy has specifically caused

a widespread chilling of police activity by officers for fear of civil and criminal liability among

officers for engaging in pursuit activities.” (Compl. ¶ 42). As a result, Earley maintains that there

is an increased danger to victims of violent crimes like himself, and but for the policy, he would

not have been victimized and suffered injuries.

Earley filed this section 1983 action for deprivation of his due process rights under the 14th

Amendment. Count I asserts a Monell claim against the City, Lightfoot, and Brown based on the

enactment and maintenance of the policy. Count II asserts a state-created danger against Brown

and the officers. Count III seeks indemnification by the City to the extent the individual defendants

are found liable under Counts I and II. Defendants have moved to dismiss Earley’s complaint for

a plethora of reasons, the primary being that the complaint fails to state an underlying constitutional

violation. The motion is fully briefed.

LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 12(b)(6) permits a party to move for dismissal based on the opposing party’s “failure

to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In determining whether

a complaint states a claim, courts must accept all non-conclusory factual allegations as true.

Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678. In addition, the Court must construe the complaint in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Levy v. W.

Coast Life Ins. Co., 44 F.4th 621, 626 (7th Cir. 2022). Applying these principals, a complaint will

survive a motion to dismiss if it “states a plausible claim for relief.” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 679

(2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). To state a plausible claim

for relief, a complaint must “permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of

misconduct[.]” Id. at 679. The movant has the ultimate burden to show entitlement to dismissal.

Marcure v. Lynn, 992 F.3d 625, 631 (7th Cir. 2021).

DISCUSSION

The Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment provides that “No State shall . . . deprive

any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]” U.S. Const. amend. XIV.

For those whose 14th Amendment due process rights are violated, section 1983 creates a remedy.

In pertinent part, the statute provides as follows:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,

custom, or usage, of any State or the District of Columbia, subjects,

or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action

at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .

42 U.S.C. § 1983.

I. Monell Policy-Based Claim

To state a section 1983 claim against a municipality, the plaintiff must be able to satisfy

three “requirements—policy or custom, municipal fault, and ‘moving force’ causation—[which]

must be scrupulously applied in every case alleging municipal liability.” First Midwest Bank

Guardian of Est. of LaPorta v. City of Chicago, 988 F.3d 978, 987 (7th Cir. 2021). Regarding the

first requirement, the constitutional violation must have been caused by a “policy or custom,

whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent

official policy.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). The

Seventh Circuit has interpreted Monell “to include three types of actions that can support municipal

liability under § 1983: ‘(1) an express policy that causes a constitutional deprivation when

enforced; (2) a widespread practice that is so permanent and well-settled that it constitutes a

custom or practice; or (3) an allegation that the constitutional injury was caused by a person with

final policymaking authority.’” First Midwest, 988 F.3d at 986 (quoting Spiegel v. McClintic, 916

F.3d 611, 617 (7th Cir. 2019)). For a Monell claim based on an express policy, one constitutional

violation resulting from application of the policy is sufficient. Calhoun v. Ramsey, 408 F.3d

375, 380 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 822 (1985)).

However, if the claim is based on a widespread practice or a policy omission, there must have been

more than a single incident to establish liability. Calhoun, 408 F.3d at 380 (citing Tuttle, 471 U.S.

at 822-23).

Earley’s complaint does not identify any explicit language from CPD’s eluding and

pursuing policy as the basis for his Monell claim. At most, the only specific allegation is that police

officers “acted in willful and wanton fashion by following the . . . policy, by misjudging the

application of the balancing test . . . .” (Compl. ¶ 35). Pointing to this passing reference to the

balancing test provision, Defendants contend that the Monell claim here must be based on a policy

omission instead of an express provision and thus seek dismissal of Count I because only a single

incident has been alleged. Earley attempts to rectify this in his response brief by noting that several

members of the public called his attorneys to report similar incidents and arguing the issue should

be sorted out in discovery. He also clarified that that the policy itself has not caused a constitutional

deprivation; rather, it has resulted in a chilling and hampering effect on police activity that

constitutes an unconstitutional widespread custom and practice.

Earley’s theory of municipal liability under Monell is muddled, to say the least. However,

the Court need not attempt to decipher whether he alleges a constitutional violation caused by an

omission from the policy or a widespread custom and practice. Either way, the complaint fails to

state a claim because only one incident is alleged. Accordingly, Count I of the complaint is

dismissed without prejudice. Any amended Monell claim must allege more than a single incident

and as discussed infra, satisfy the narrow criteria required to maintain a claim under the state-

created danger exception.

II. State-Created Danger

Turning to Earley’s state-created danger due process claim, the first step is to determine

whether there has been an underlying constitutional violation. First Midwest, 988 F.3d at 987. As

a general matter, “a State’s failure to protect an individual against private violence simply does

not constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause.” DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc.

Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 197 (1989). That is because “nothing in the language of the Due Process

Clause itself requires the State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against

invasion by private actors.” Id. at 196. Instead, the Clause “is phrased as a limitation on the State’s

power to act, not as a guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and security.” Id. Based on this

interpretation of the Due Process Clause, the Supreme Court has stated that its purpose is “to

protect the people from the State, not to ensure that the State protect[s] them from each other.” Id.

That said, there are certain limited circumstances under which the State may be held liable

for failure to protect and individuals against private violence.4 First Midwest, 988 F.3d at 988.

Under the “state-created danger” exception, liability for a 14th Amendment Due Process Clause

violation may exist “where the state creates a dangerous situation or renders citizens more

vulnerable to danger.” Reed v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1122, 1125 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510

4 Under the “special relationship” exception, “the state has an affirmative duty to provide for the safety of a

person it has taken into its custody involuntarily.” First Midwest, 988 F.3d at 988 (citing DeShaney. 489 U.S. at 199-

200; Buchanan-Moore v. Cnty. of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009)). Neither side argues that it applies

to this case.

U.S. 947 (1993). The Seventh Circuit has recently described the state-created danger exception as

well-established5 and articulated a three-part test for such claims:

First, the state, by its affirmative acts, must create or increase a

danger faced by an individual. Second, the failure on the part of the

state to protect an individual from such a danger must be the

proximate cause of the injury to the individual. Third, the state’s

failure to protect the individual must shock the conscience.

Johnson v. Rimmer, 936 F.3d 695, 708 (7th Cir. 2019) (citations and punctuation omitted) (quoting

King ex. rel King v. E. St. Louis Sch. Dist. 189, 496 F.3d 812, 817-18 (7th Cir. 2007)); see also

First Midwest, 988 F.3d at 988-89; Est. of Her v. Hoeppner, 939 F.3d 872, 876 (7th Cir. 2019);

Flint v. City of Belvidere, 791 F.3d 764, 770 (7th Cir. 2015). Because the third prong of the analysis

is dispositive, the Court will begin its analysis there.

A. Conduct that Shocks the Conscience

The inquiry into whether the State’s conduct shocks the conscience is stringent, necessarily

fact-bound, and satisfied by “only the most egregious official conduct[.]” Cnty. of Sacramento v.

Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998); First Midwest, 988 F.3d at 989; Jackson v. Indian Prairie Sch.

Dist. 204, 653 F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 2011); King, 496 F.3d at 818. Indeed, “[m]aking a bad

decision, or even acting negligently, does not suffice to establish the type of conscience shocking

behavior that results in a constitutional violation.” Jackson, 653 F.3d at 654-55. Because the

standard lacks precise measurement, courts evaluate whether conduct is conscience shocking on a

spectrum. King, 496 F.3d at 818-19. “[W]hen the circumstances permit public officials the

opportunity for reasoned deliberation in their decisions, [a court] shall find the official’s conduct

conscience shocking when it evinces a deliberate indifference to the rights of the individual.”

5 Although the Seventh Circuit has also recently expressed doubt as to whether the state-created danger

exception is well-founded, Weiland v. Loomis, 938 F.3d 917, 921 (7th Cir. 2019), the Court need not engage in that

analysis because the issue is not outcome determinative here.

Id. at 819 (citing Lewis, 523 U.S. at 851; Armstrong v. Squadrito, 152 F.3d 564, 576-77

(7th Cir. 1998)). However, “where circumstances call for hurried judgments in order to protect the

public safety or maintain the public order, and thereby render reasoned deliberation impractical,

conduct must reach a higher standard of culpability approaching malicious or intentional infliction

of injury before we shall deem official conduct conscience shocking.” King, 496 F.3d at 819.

In Lewis, the Supreme Court considered which level of culpability would make conduct

conscience shocking in the context of high-speed police chases. 523 U.S. at 836. There, police

decided to chase a motorcycle being operated at high speeds. Id. at 837. During the chase, the

motorcycle tipped over while taking a sharp turn, causing both the driver and the passenger to fall

off. Id. One of the police cars was unable to stop in time and struck and killed the passenger. Id.

Based on those facts, the Court observed that “[a] police officer deciding whether to give chase

must balance on one hand the need to stop a suspect and show that flight from the law is no way

to freedom, and, on the other, the high-speed threat to all those within stopping range, be they

suspects, their passengers, other drivers, or bystanders.” Id. at 853. When making such a decision

there is rarely an opportunity to engage in reasoned deliberation and therefore deliberate

indifference is not enough to impose liability, there must be some intent to cause harm. Id. at 854.

Accordingly, Lewis held that “high-speed chases with no intent to harm suspects physically or to

worsen their legal plight do not give rise to liability under the Fourteenth Amendment, redressable

by an action under § 1983.” Id.

In another tragic case involving a high-speed police chase, Bublitz v. Cottey, the Seventh

Circuit applied the holding of Lewis to conclude that the plaintiff could not prevail on a 14th

Amendment Due Process claim absent intent or purpose to cause harm. 327 F.3d 485, 491-92 (7th

Cir. 2003). In Bublitz, police deployed a spike strip to stop a vehicle fleeing at high speeds. Id.

at 487. The vehicle ran over the spikes, lost control, and struck the plaintiff’s vehicle, killing the

plaintiff’s wife and child. Id. Even though the plaintiff argued that the officers had adequate time

(at least three to five minutes) to deliberate whether to deploy the spike strip, the Seventh Circuit

held that the plaintiff could not “show that what the officers did deprived him or his family of their

Fourteenth Amendment rights[,]” because he did not “seek to prove any intention or purpose on

the part of the defendants to cause harm to [his] family during the course of the high-speed chase.”

Id. at 491-92.

Intent or purpose to harm or injure has also been required to satisfy the shocks-the-

conscience requirement in cases involving situations analogous to a high-speed chase. Schaefer v.

Goch, 153 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 1998). In Schaefer, police officers unintentionally shot and

killed a woman during a standoff with her husband. Id. at 794. Because the situation was dangerous

and fluid, officers “were forced to make decisions ‘in haste, under pressure, and . . . without the

luxury of a second chance.’” Id. at 798 (quoting Lewis, 523 U.S. at 852 (quoting Whitley v. Albers,

475 U.S. 312, 320 (1986)). Summarizing the rule in such circumstances, the Seventh Circuit stated

that “[w]hen government officers face the sort of unforeseen and rapidly changing circumstances

that demand unreflective decisions with potentially grave consequences on every side, ‘even

precipitate recklessness fails to inch close enough to harmful purpose to spark the shock that

implicates [the concerns of substantive due process].’” Id. (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320).

Thus, Schaefer held that the officer’s “decision to fire, while certainly regrettable in hindsight, did

not evince the purpose to harm that the Supreme Court has said is necessary for liability.” Id.

at 799.

While there are factual and procedural differences between those cases and the instant one,

none of those distinctions materially affect the analysis here. For example, the person who suffered

the injury varies from case to case. But, as illustrated by Bublitz, the standards discussed apply

equally in situations like this case where the victim is an innocent bystander. In addition, although

all three cases discussed above were on appeal from summary judgment decisions with more

developed factual records, a plaintiff must still at least allege facts plausible to satisfy the shocks-

the-conscience requirement at the pleading stage to survive dismissal. Finally, it is irrelevant that

the cases discussed above did not involve the state-created danger exception, because the shocks-

the-conscience requirement is rooted in the Due Process Clause itself. See King, 496 F.3d at 818

(“because the right to protection against state-created dangers is derived from the substantive

component of the Due Process Clause, the state’s failure to protect the individual must shock the

conscience.”) (citing Lewis, 523 U.S. at 847). Thus, the rule articulated in Lewis remains equally

applicable here. When a police officer faces a decision without an opportunity to engage in

reasoned deliberation, the officer’s conduct cannot be said to shock the conscience and therefore

result in a constitutional deprivation under the 14th Amendment Due Process Clause unless the

decision was made with the intent or purpose to harm or injure.

With respect to the officers’ conduct in this case, Earley alleges that it shocks the

conscience because they decided not to pursue Brownlee “despite being the [sic] possession of

facts regarding his and his crew’s extremely violent behavior and his direct whereabouts.” (Compl.

¶ 45). He further alleges that “Defendants’ actions shock the conscience in that the application of

the [eluding and pursuing] policy in this instance directly caused Earley’s injuries from Brownlee

in that, but for the policy, the police would have stopped and apprehended Brownlee at numerous

points in his rampage.” (Id. ¶ 68). Finally, Earley alleges and argues that the enactment and

maintenance of the policy itself shocks the conscience, but such policy based Monell claims fail

for the reasons already discussed.

As a threshold matter, the Court must determine whether deliberate indifference is

sufficient to show that the officers’ conduct shocks the conscience, or if it is necessary that the

officers intended to cause harm. Because this case involves police officers’ decision whether to

pursue a fleeing vehicle on a potentially high-speed chase, the Court concludes that the higher

level of culpability applies. Even if the officers knew every fact Earley alleges about the stolen

vehicle, Brownlee, and the crime spree, the decision whether to pursue was the exact type

described in Lewis, Bublitz, and Schaefer that is typical of high-speed chases and analogous

scenarios. In such situations, police officers often encounter those rapidly changing circumstances

that require them to make hasty decisions under pressure. See, e.g., Schaefer, 153 F.3d at 798.

Even viewing the allegations of the complaint in the light most favorable to Earley and drawing

reasonable inferences in his favor, this appears to be the situation the officers faced here in

applying the policy. As such, in order to satisfy the shocks-the-conscience prong of the analysis,

deliberate indifference is not enough—Earley’s complaint must plausibly allege that the officers

made the decision not to pursue Brownlee’s vehicle with intent or purpose to harm or injure.

This is where Earley’s claim falls short. The complaint does not contain any factual

allegations to suggest that the officers’ non-pursuit involved any intent to cause injury. In fact, the

complaint alleges the opposite—that the officers may have declined to pursue because of the

purported chilling and hampering effects of the policy—which involves no purpose to cause harm

whatsoever. Accordingly, Earley has not plausibly alleged that the officers’ decision not to pursue

Brownlee shocks the conscience. Count II therefore fails to state a 14th Amendment Due Process

Clause claim under the state-created danger exception.

Based on Earley’s theory of the case, it is not clear if he will be able to cure this defect in

an amended complaint. Nevertheless, the Court grants leave to attempt to replead if he can do so

in good faith, consistent with this ruling, and his Rule 11 obligations. Because the complaint, as

alleged, also struggles to satisfy the other two prongs of the state-created danger analysis, the Court

will briefly discuss those defects as well.

B. Affirmative Act that Creates or Increases Danger

The issue of whether the officers acted affirmatively to create or increase a danger to Earley

depends largely on the officers’ knowledge when they decided not to pursue, in particular, details

about them approaching the vehicle and deciding to let it go. (Compl. ¶ 29g). The police officers’

knowledge of the potential risk is critical to determining whether there is liability under

section 1983. See Reed, 986 F.2d at 1125 (“It was the police action in removing [the sober driver],

combined with their knowledge of [the passenger’s] intoxication, which creates their liability for

the subsequent accident.”) (emphasis added). The allegation that the officers were in “possession

of facts regarding [Brownlee] and his crew’s extremely violent behavior and his direct

whereabouts” is likely sufficient to satisfy this requirement at the pleading stage. (Compl. ¶ 45).

But regardless of the officers’ knowledge, the allegation that “police initially approached the

vehicle, but then let it go” is so vague that it is unclear what actually happened.

On one hand, it could mean that the officers merely drove towards and near the vehicle but

then decided not to pursue. “Initially approached” could also mean that officers drove towards and

near the vehicle, turned on their sirens and emergency lights, instructed the driver of the vehicle

to pull over on the loudspeaker, and, if the driver complied, even approached the vehicle on foot

and spoke with the occupants before deciding to “let it go.” If the police officers knew all of the

facts alleged about the vehicle, Brownlee, and the crime spree, and “initially approached” means

that they turned on their sirens and lights, ordered the vehicle to pull over, pulled it over, spoke

with the occupants, “but then let it go[,]” then this case is much more analogous to a case like Reed

v. Garner than it would be if the officers were merely provided with basic information about the

vehicle and then drove near it but never attempted to pull it over. To reach that conclusion,

however, the Court would need to draw inferences that are not necessarily reasonable in light of

other allegations in the complaint. If Earley chooses to amend the complaint, this and other key

facts regarding what police knew and did require clarification.

C. Causation

The allegations supporting causation are less troublesome but still in need of development.

To state a claim under the state-created danger exception, “the failure on the part of the state to

protect an individual from such a danger must be the proximate cause of the injury to the

individual.” Johnson, 936 F.3d at 708. Proximate cause is generally understood to mean that there

must be a direct relationship between the alleged wrongful conduct and injury. Paroline v. United

States, 572 U.S. 434, 444 (2014). To satisfy the proximate cause requirement here, “the danger

created or increased by the State must be a foreseeable type of risk to a foreseeable class of

persons[.]” First Midwest, 988 F.3d at 988-89. “A generalized risk of indefinite duration and

degree is insufficient.” Id. In addition, as with other constitutional torts, causation in fact must be

sufficiently alleged. Flint, 791 F.3d at 770.

Proximate cause is sufficiently alleged because Earley fell within the class of foreseeable

victims. Earley was attacked in the same manner as prior victims, in the same general location,

and within an hour of the officers’ decision not to pursue. Causation in fact is more tenuous,

however, because the complaint does not allege facts to support the conclusion that Brownlee’s

attack on Earley would not have happened absent the officers’ decision not to pursue. While

Earley’s response brief speculates as to how the decision not to pursue may have affected Brownlee

(e.g., by emboldening him), the complaint does not contain any allegations to support such

speculation.

III. Indemnification

Because the indemnification claim in Count III rises and falls with Counts I and II, Count

III is also dismissed.

IV. Other Matters

In the interest of judicial economy, the Court will briefly address other matters raised by

the parties in their briefs so that they do not need to be relitigated if Earley decides to amend the

complaint.

A. Official Capacity Claims Against Lightfoot and Brown

The official-capacity claims against Lightfoot and Brown are duplicative of the claims

against the City of Chicago. See Wilhelm v. City of Calumet City, Ill., 409 F. Supp. 2d 991, 994

n. 1 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (dismissing official-capacity claims as redundant of claims against

municipality) (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985)). Thus, Earley cannot

maintain Monell and state-created danger claims against the City and Lightfoot and Brown in their

official capacities at the same time.

B. Personal Capacity Claim Against Brown

Because there are no allegations of any personal involvement by Brown in the decision not

to pursue Brownlee, the personal-capacity claim against Brown on Count II is viable only to the

extent that Earley is able to allege facts consistent with supervisor liability. “[F]or a supervisor to

be liable for the allegedly wrongful conduct of others, he must both (1) ‘know about the conduct’

and (2) facilitate, approve, condone, or turn a blind eye toward it.” Gonzalez v. McHenry Cnty.,

Ill., 40 F.4th 824, 828 (7th Cir. 2022) (quoting Kemp v. Fulton Cnty., 27 F.4th 491, 498 (7th Cir.

2022)). “Under the second prong, a supervisor is liable if he acted purposefully, knowingly, or

recklessly, but not negligently.” Id. (emphasis in original). As alleged, the complaint lacks factual

allegations about any involvement by Brown in the decision not to pursue Brownlee that would

support a personal capacity claim.

C. Injunctive Relief

To the extent that the parties agree that Earley’s request for injunctive relief is improper, it

should be omitted from any amended complaint. If Earley later discovers information that he

believes would support standing for such relief, he may request leave to amend.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted, and Plaintiff's

complaint is dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint

consistent with this ruling by March 25, 2024. If no amended complaint is filed by that date, the

case will be deemed dismissed with prejudice and closed without further notice.

DATED: February 26, 2024 ENTERED:

Aotimdo A Lut

LaShonda A. Hunt

United States District Judge

16