The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
WESTERN DIVISION
Mark Baratta,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 3:22-cv-50125
v.
Honorable Iain D. Johnston
Melissa Gates, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Mark Baratta brings this case, alleging several acts of misconduct
by an array of defendants. Before the Court are motions to dismiss from Defendants
Melissa Gates and Path to Healing; Defendant Jennifer Heintzelman; and
Defendants Dixon Public School District No. 170, Board of Education of Dixon
Community Unit School District No. 170, Margo Empen, Matthew Magnafici, and
Melissa Gates1 (“School Defendants”). For the following reasons, the Court grants
all three motions and dismisses this case without prejudice.
I. Legal Standard
A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) challenges
the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s complaint. Carlson v. CSX Transp., Inc., 758 F.3d
819, 826 (7th Cir. 2014); Ctr. for Dermatology & Skin Cancer, Ltd. v. Burwell, 770
F.3d 586, 588 (7th Cir. 2014). A motion under Rule 12(b)(1) tests whether the court
1 Ms. Gates is listed multiple times as a defendant.
has subject matter jurisdiction. Hallinan v. Fraternal Order of Police of Chi. Lodge
No. 7, 570 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir. 2009). A court lacks jurisdiction if the plaintiff
does not have standing. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 101–
02 (1998); see also St. John’s United Church of Christ v. City of Chicago, 502 F.3d
616, 626 (7th Cir. 2007). To have standing, the plaintiff must have “suffered a
concrete and particularized injury that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct,
and is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Remijas v. Neiman
Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 691–92 (7th Cir. 2015); Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). To be “particularized,” the injury “must affect the
plaintiff in a personal and individual way.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 n.1. The injury
must also be “actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’ ” Id. at 560
(quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)). As the party invoking
federal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the required
elements. Remijas, 794 F.3d at 691.
To survive a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must allege facts
sufficient to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). For a complaint to be plausible, the plaintiff
must plead factual content that allows the Court to draw a reasonable inference
that the defendants are liable for the alleged misconduct. United States ex rel.
Berkowitz v. Automation Aids, Inc., 896 F.3d 834, 839 (7th Cir. 2018). The moving
party bears the burden of establishing the insufficiency of the plaintiff's allegations.
Gunn v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 968 F.3d 802, 806 (7th Cir. 2020).
On facial, not factual, challenges to jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) and
under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court accepts all well-pleaded facts as true and draws all
reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Berkowitz, 896 F.3d at 839; Ctr. for
Dermatology, 770 F.3d at 588. The Court “need not accept as true legal conclusions,
or threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements.” Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 578 (7th Cir. 2009). When
presented with both types of motions to dismiss, the Court addresses the
jurisdictional question first, as it is a threshold question. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 94. If
the Court concludes that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a claim, it must
dismiss the claim in its entirety. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp.¸ 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006).
II. Background2
In May 2017, Mr. Baratta and Ms. Heintzelman, following their divorce, were
granted equal parenting time of their son B.B. Dkt. 48 ¶¶ 16–17. Then in July 2017,
Ms. Heintzelman removed B.B. from Mr. Baratta’s custody. Id. ¶ 19. After three
years without seeing his son, Mr. Baratta filed a petition for indirect civil contempt
against Ms. Heintzelman in 2020. Id. ¶ 23. During the court proceedings, Ms. Gates
(who owns Path to Healing) testified that she had been treating B.B. since
September 18, 2018. Id. ¶ 24–25. Ms. Gates also testified that B.B. was afraid of
Mr. Baratta because of his abusive behavior and that Mr. Baratta had threatened
Ms. Gates. Id. ¶ 25. However, both B.B. and Ms. Heintzelman had testified that
B.B. was not in treatment. Id. ¶ 26. During these proceedings, Ms. Heintzelman
2 All facts are drawn from Mr. Baratta’s second amended complaint and must be accepted
as true at this stage. See Carlson, 758 F.3d at 826.
also testified that Mr. Baratta had failed to make child support payments, despite
Mr. Baratta’s evidence to the contrary. Id. ¶ 49–51. On November 20, 2020, Ms.
Heintzelman was held in contempt of court, but Mr. Baratta also lost custody of
B.B. Id. ¶ 28.
B.B. struggled in school, and Mr. Baratta was concerned about B.B.’s
education, learning disability, and behavioral issues. On October 27, 2021, Mr.
Baratta emailed Mr. Magnafici, B.B.’s school principal. Id. ¶ 31. After two more
emails in November, Mr. Magnafici replied back, saying he would be in touch
“shortly” to talk about B.B., but that never happened. Id. ¶ 34. Mr. Baratta insists
that there were no reported issues with B.B. until B.B. was removed from Mr.
Baratta. Id. ¶ 39.
On July 20, 2022, Mr. Baratta met with two school district employees—a
lunchroom aid and a teacher—who told him that B.B. was the victim of bullying and
unfairly disciplined by Mr. Magnafici. Id. ¶ 42. For example, one time B.B. was
sitting by himself eating lunch when some students approached; they hit him on the
head and threw applesauce in his hair, but Mr. Magnafici disciplined B.B. after the
lunchroom aid defused the situation and explained what happened. Id. Mr. Baratta
then asked other parents to come forward with stories of their children being
bullied, and he learned of many incidents where the school didn’t properly handle
bullying or harassment. Id. ¶ 43.
Mr. Baratta was also denied entrance to his daughter’s high school
graduation because he didn’t receive a ticket and he wasn’t vaccinated for COVID-
19. Id. ¶ 46.
Mr. Baratta ties all of this together by claiming Defendants conspired against
him. Id. ¶¶ 36, 45. Ms. Heintzelman and Ms. Gates planned the testimony that led
to his loss of custody, and they also made the school let B.B. advance in grade level
despite subpar performance. Id. ¶¶ 25–26, 30, 52. The “silent treatment” from Mr.
Magnafici (and School Defendants more generally) was designed to block
information about B.B.’s issues at school affecting Mr. Baratta’s custody battle,
thereby helping Ms. Heintzelman keep B.B. away from Mr. Baratta. Id. ¶ 34.
III. Analysis
Mr. Baratta brings nine claims in his second amended complaint, most of
which fail for lack of standing. At the outset, the Court notes that in many of the
claims, Mr. Baratta alleges injuries that his son has suffered. However, although
pro se parents are free to represent themselves in court, they cannot appear as legal
representatives for their minor children. See Navin v. Park Ridge Sch. Dist. 64, 270
F.3d 1147, 1149 (7th Cir. 2001). So Mr. Baratta also cannot allege such injuries on
behalf of his son to circumvent the standing requirement that he show a
particularized injury.
As for the few claims where Mr. Baratta has alleged a redressable injury
caused by Defendants sufficient to establish standing, those claims fail because he
relies on conclusory statements without factual details to support the claims that he
alleges.
A. Counts I–II (ADA and Rehabilitation Act)
Count I is a claim under the American with Disabilities Act, and Count II is
under the Rehabilitation Act. Mr. Baratta lacks standing on both counts because he
fails to allege any concrete and particularized injury that he personally suffered.
Count I states that Mr. Baratta “has suffered and continues to suffer injury,” Dkt.
48 ¶ 61, but that threadbare recitation is not enough. See Brooks, 578 F.3d at 578.
Otherwise, Counts I and II allege only injuries that Mr. Baratta’s son has suffered.
Dkt. 48 ¶¶ 54, 58–60, 62, 66. Because Mr. Baratta fails to establish any injury
under the ADA or Rehabilitation Act, Counts I and II are dismissed. See Lujan, 504
U.S. at 560 & n.1.
B. Counts III–IV (Equal Protection)
Count III is an equal protection claim under the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The only allegation of injury in
Count III is that Mr. Baratta’s son has had his constitutional right to equal
protection violated. Dkt. 48 ¶ 72. Invoking the Illinois Constitution’s counterpart to
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution, Mr.
Baratta similarly describes only injuries to his son. Id. ¶ 76. Because Mr. Baratta
fails to allege an injury that he has suffered himself, Counts III and IV are
dismissed. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 n.1.
C. Count V (Equal Protection)
Count V is another equal protection claim under the Fourteenth Amendment,
but this time Mr. Baratta does allege that his constitutional right was violated as a
result of the School Defendants’ conduct. He describes how he was unable to attend
his daughter’s high school graduation because the school’s policy allowed a person
to attend only if given a ticket by a graduate or if vaccinated. Dkt. 48 ¶¶ 79–82.
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination, Mr. Baratta must “show
that he is a member of a protected class, that he is otherwise similarly situated to
members of the unprotected class, and that he was treated differently from
members of the protected class.” Brown v. Budz, 398 F.3d 904, 916 (7th Cir. 2005).
Mr. Baratta fails to allege that he belongs to a protected class in his complaint. In
his response brief, Mr. Baratta argues that he faces discrimination based on his sex,
sexuality, and religion. Dkt. 65 at 3. However, Mr. Baratta cannot amend his
complaint to add claims in a response to a motion to dismiss. Pirelli Armstrong Tire
Corp. Retiree Med. Benefits Tr. v. Walgreen Co., 631 F.3d 436, 448 (7th Cir. 2011).
Without a factual allegation of belonging to a protected class, there is no plausible
equal protection claim, so Count V is dismissed.
D. Count VI (Fraud)
In Count VI, Mr. Baratta alleges that he relied on false statements from Ms.
Gates and Ms. Heintzelman. However, the only injury that he alleges is that his son
did not receive help “in his mental, psychological and educational development,
including an Individual Education Plan.” Dkt. 48 ¶¶ 86–87. Like with Counts I
through IV, Mr. Baratta fails to establish an injury that he personally suffered, and
so he lacks standing. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 n.1. Count VI is dismissed.
E. Count VII (Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress)
In Count VII, Mr. Baratta alleges that Defendants’ conduct not only made
him nervous and irritable, but also deprived him of participating in the upbringing
of his children. Dkt. 48 § 91. However, he provides no detail as to what Defendants
did. See id. J 89-91. The conclusory phrases “intentional acts” and “wrongful acts”
do not “present a story that holds together.” Carlson, 758 F.3d at 827. Mr. Baratta
fails to allege a plausible claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, so
Count VII is dismissed.
F. Counts VITI-IX (Negligence and Civil Conspiracy)
Finally, the last two counts of the complaint also lack the detail needed to
establish standing. Each count contains a conclusory statement of suffering
damages, see Dkt. 48 {J 95, 98, but there are no factual allegations that describe an
injury, so Mr. Baratta has failed to establish standing. See Brooks, 578 F.3d at 578.
Counts VIII and IX are dismissed.
IV. Conclusion
The Court grants all Defendants’ motions to dismiss. This case is dismissed
without prejudice.
Date: December 22, 2023 SY
Honorable Iain D. Johnston
United States District Judge