Demos v. Schneider

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

ANDREA DEMOS,

Plaintiff, No. 23 CV 741

v. Judge Thomas M. Durkin

JEREMY SCHNEIDER; JAMES MENDRICK;

and DUPAGE COUNTY

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

In this case, Plaintiff Andrea Demos (“Demos”) alleges that, while she was in

custody at the DuPage County Jail, Officer Jeremy Schneider (“Schneider”) and other

unnamed correctional officers used handcuffs to place her in a “hog-tie,” partially

removed her clothing, refused to provide her prescribed medications, left her in her

cell in unsanitary conditions, and intentionally delayed providing her necessary

medical care. She sues Schneider in his individual capacity and DuPage County

Sheriff James Mendrick (“Mendrick”) in his individual and official capacities under

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Demos also seeks to hold DuPage County liable under the theory of

indemnification. Defendants move for partial dismissal of Counts I, II, III, and V, and

full dismissal of Count IV under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). R. 15. For

the reasons stated below, Defendants’ motion is granted.

Legal Standard

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges the “sufficiency of the complaint.” Gunn v.

Cont'l Cas. Co., 968 F.3d 802, 806 (7th Cir. 2020). A complaint must provide “a short

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), sufficient to provide defendant with “fair notice” of the claim and

the basis for it. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). This standard

“demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me

accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While “detailed factual

allegations” are not required, “labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of

the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The

complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim

to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550

U.S. at 570). “Facial plausibility exists ‘when the plaintiff pleads factual content that

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.’” Thomas v. Neenah Joint Sch. Dist., 74 F.4th 521, 523 (7th Cir.

2023) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). In applying this standard, the Court accepts

all well-pleaded facts as true and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-

moving party. See Hernandez v. Ill. Inst. of Tech., 63 F.4th 661, 666 (7th Cir. 2023).

Background

Demos suffers from multiple medical issues, including complex regional pain

syndrome and fibromyalgia, for which she takes medications. R. 12 ¶ 10. On February

5, 2021, Demos was arrested by Schneider on an outstanding warrant and held in

custody at the DuPage County Jail (the “Jail”). Id. ¶¶ 11–13. Demos asked Schneider

why she was in custody and what she was being charged with. Id. ¶ 13. Demos alleges

that Schneider handcuffed her ankles, handcuffed her hands behind her back, and

secured her ankles and wrists together in a “hog-tie” fashion. Id. ¶ 16. While she was

in this position, Schneider and/or other correctional officers allegedly cut Demos’s

clothing off from her buttocks to her head and proceeded to remove her bra in a violent

fashion, causing personal injuries and bruising. Id. ¶¶ 17–18. Demos was left in her

cell partially naked. Id. ¶ 19. Demos states that at no point while in custody at the

Jail did she resist or pose a risk of harm to the correctional officers, staff, or

employees. Id. ¶¶ 30–31.

Demos also contends that she asked Schneider for her medications and

informed him and other correctional officers and staff that if she did not receive those

medications, she was at risk to have seizures. Id. ¶¶ 14–15. Over the course of

February 5 and 6, 2021, Demos’s mother likewise contacted the Jail over the phone,

brought medications to the Jail in-person, spoke with a nurse at the Jail, and

appeared on Zoom in bond court. Id. ¶¶ 20–23. In each interaction, Demos’s mother

informed Jail personnel that if Demos did not take her medications, she was at risk

of serious harm. Id. On February 6, 2021, Demos suffered from multiple seizures,

vomited on herself repeatedly, aspirated on her own vomit, and urinated on herself.

Id. ¶¶ 24–27. Three days later, on February 9, 2021, Demos was taken via ambulance

to Central DuPage Hospital for emergency medical treatment. Id. ¶ 28.

Demos filed her Complaint on February 6, 2023, R. 1, and her First Amended

Complaint (“FAC”) on May 22, 2023. R. 12. Counts I through III, styled as claims

arising under the Fourteenth and Eighth Amendments, allege Schneider used

excessive force against Demos, id. ¶¶ 32–39, that Schneider and Mendrick were

deliberately indifferent to her serious medical needs, and that Schneider and

Mendrick deprived her of humane and sanitary conditions of confinement. Id. ¶¶ 54,

58–64. Count IV states a Monell claim against Mendrick in his official capacity

stemming from institutional policies, customs, practices, and a failure to train that

created a risk that corrections officers would be deliberately indifferent to inmates’

serious medical needs and would result in a failure to provide medication in a timely

fashion. Id. ¶¶ 72, 75, 82. And finally, Count V asserts that the County must

indemnify Schneider pursuant to 745 ILCS 10/9-102. Id. ¶ 85.

Defendants filed an answer and a partial motion to dismiss. R. 15. Defendants

argue that, to the extent that Demos alleges that Counts I, II, and III arise under the

Eighth Amendment, they should be dismissed because the Eighth Amendment

applies only to convicted persons, and Demos was a pre-trial detainee at the time of

the alleged incidents. They also request full dismissal of Demos’s official policy,

custom and practice, and failure to train Monell claims alleged in Count IV.

Defendants finally move to dismiss Count V in part because, if Demos’s Eighth

Amendment claims cannot go forward, then DuPage County cannot be liable for

indemnification of those same claims.

Discussion

I. Eighth Amendment Claims

First, the FAC states that Counts I, II, and III arise under the Eighth and the

Fourteenth Amendments. Id. ¶¶ 32, 41, 57. The Seventh Circuit recognizes that the

Eighth Amendment provides protections to convicted prisoners. Est. of Cole by

Pardue v. Fromm, 94 F.3d 254, 259 (7th Cir. 1996), while the Fourteenth Amendment

provides protections to pre-trial detainees. Miranda v. Cty. of Lake, 900 F.3d 335,

350–51 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing Collins v. Al-Shami, 851 F.3d 727, 731 (7th Cir. 2017)).

Demos alleges that she was arrested on an outstanding warrant, and, while at the

Jail, asked Schneider why she was in custody and what she was being charged with,

indicating that, at the time of incidents, she had not been convicted of any crime. R.

12 ¶¶ 11−12. The Court infers from these facts that Demos was a pre-trial detainee.

And though Demos is correct that pre-trial detainees “are entitled to at least as much

protection” as the United States Constitution provides to convicted prisoners,

Miranda, 900 F.3d at 350 (citing Minix v. Canarecci, 597 F.3d 824, 831 (7th Cir.

2010) and Bd. v. Farnharm, 394, F.3d, 469, 477−78 (7th Cir. 2005)), those protections

arise under the Fourteenth, not the Eighth, Amendment. Therefore, the allegations

in Counts I, II, and III pertaining to the Eighth Amendment (parts of ¶¶ 32, 41, 57,

and 77) are stricken. Also, Demos may not seek for DuPage County to indemnify

Schneider for any Eighth Amendment claim. Even though the Eighth Amendment

claims are dismissed, Defendants have not moved to dismiss the Fourteenth

Amendment claims based on the same allegations, and those claims will proceed to

discovery.

II. Monell Claims

In Count IV, Demos pleads Monell claims against Mendrick in his official

capacity as DuPage County Sheriff under express policy, custom and practice, and

failure to train theories. Such claims hold local governments legally responsible for

constitutional deprivations that they cause. J.K.J. v. Polk Cty., 960 F.3d 367, 377 (7th

Cir. 2020). Further, a plaintiff must show that the “policy or custom caused the

constitutional injury.” Id. (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691–92

(1978). In other words, the plaintiff must allege that a specific policy or custom or a

failure to train “was the moving force behind the federal-rights violation.” First

Midwest Bank v. City of Chicago, 988 F.3d 978, 986–87 (7th Cir. 2021). The FAC fails

to do so as to each of Demos’s Monell theories.

A. Express Policy Claim

A governmental entity is liable under § 1983 if “an express policy . . . causes a

constitutional deprivation when enforced.” Spiegel v. McClintic, 916 F.3d 611, 617

(7th Cir. 2019). The plaintiff must actually “[l]ocat[e] a ‘policy,’” which “ensures that

a municipality is held liable only for those deprivations resulting from the decisions .

. . of those officials whose acts may fairly be said to be those of the municipality.” Bd.

of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty., Okla. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997); Barrios v.

City of Chicago, No. 15 C 2648, 2016 WL 164414, at *13 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 14, 2016) (“[A]

plaintiff must plead facts that show that there is a true municipal policy at issue, not

a random event.” (internal citations omitted)). Mendrick argues that Demos’s official

policy claim should be dismissed because Demos never points to any specific,

producible policy or procedure. Indeed, the FAC merely states that the Jail’s

“officially promulgated policy regarding supplying inmates with their medications” is

unconstitutional because it fails “to address the serious medical needs of the

inmates.” R. 12 ¶¶ 71–72. It further states that the policy “failed to ensure” that

officers properly verified, identified and administered medications to inmates at the

jail. Id. at 73 (1)–(10). But Demos does not identify what, exactly, that specific policy

was. These conclusory statements alone do not suffice to state a claim.1 Iqbal, 556

U.S. at 678. And without reference to the actual policy at issue, Demos also cannot

identify a direct, causal link between the policy and the constitutional violation. First

Midwest Bank, 988 F.3d at 987. Demos’s express policy Monell claim must be

dismissed.

B. Custom and Practice Claim

Demos next alleges that a Jail custom and practice “regarding supplying

inmates with their prescribed medications” is unconstitutional because it fails “to

address the serious medical needs of the inmates.” R. 12 ¶¶ 74–75. Besides making

identical conclusory allegations as the express policy claim, this claim fails because

Demos does not adequately allege the existence of an unconstitutional custom or

practice.

The Seventh Circuit has not adopted any bright-line rule defining what a

“custom or practice” is, but it has held that the plaintiff must allege “more than one

instance.” See Thomas, 604 F.3d at 303 (quoting Cosby v. Ward, 843 F.2d 967, 983

1 In each of the cases Demos cites, the plaintiffs alleged an identifiable policy or

procedure. Glisson v. Ind. Dep’t of Corrections, 849 F.3d 372, 380 (7th Cir. 2017)

(plaintiff asserted the defendant had a “deliberate policy not to require any kind of

formal coordination of medical care within an institution . . . or across institutions for

prisoners who are transferred”); Thomas v. Cook Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 604 F.3d 293,

306 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding that a policy/practice of severe understaffing was not the

cause of the plaintiff’s death); Woodward v. Med. Servs. of Ill. Inc., 368 F.3d 917, 920

(7th Cir. 2004) (finding that staff ignored written policies). Here, Demos never points

to any policy.

(7th Cir. 1988)). Though not impossible, “[i]t is difficult to sufficiently allege a Monell

claim by pointing to only . . . the plaintiff’s own experience.” Petropoulos v. City of

Chicago, 448 F. Supp. 3d 835, 841 (N.D. Ill. 2020) (listing cases). This is because the

plaintiff must plead facts that show that the practice was “so pervasive that

acquiescence on the part of policymakers was apparent and amounted to a policy

decision.” Arquero v. Dart, 587 F. Supp. 3d 721, 728 (N.D. Ill. 2022); Nettles-Bey v.

Burke, No. 11 C 8022, 2015 WL 4638068, at *12 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 4, 2015) (“[I]solated

incidents of allegedly unconstitutional conduct are insufficient to establish a

widespread practice.”).

Demos argues that she has pleaded at least four incidents of correctional

officers at the Jail ignoring her and her mother’s requests for her medications. The

FAC does not allege that these “incidents” were pervasive or part of a larger pattern,

but rather, that they constituted a single deprivation of medication that Demos

experienced. To survive a motion to dismiss, Demos must allege more. See Grieveson

v. Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 774 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that four incidents of negligent

prescription medication disbursement that plaintiff personally experienced failed to

meet the standard of a widespread unconstitutional practice); see also Est. of

Moreland v. Dieter, 395 F.3d 747, 760 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that three incidents of

use of pepper spray on inmates that the plaintiff observed “do not amount to a

‘widespread practice’ that is ’permanent and well settled’ so as to constitute an

unconstitutional custom or policy”).

C. Claim Based in Failure to Train

Demos’s failure to train theory similarly fails to state a claim. Failure to train

liability is rare, but it can be a basis for § 1983 liability when “inadequate training

amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the employee

comes into contact.” Flores v. City of South Bend, 997 F.3d 725, 731 (7th Cir. 2021)

(cleaned up) (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989)). When a

municipality fails to train an employee whose conduct they know to be deliberately

indifferent, the municipality is itself demonstrating deliberate indifference to that

known risk. Flores, 997 F.3d at 731. Moreover, failure to train liability arises when a

municipality adheres to a training program “that they know or should know has failed

to prevent tortious conduct by employees.” Id. (citing Brown, 520 U.S. at 407).

Generally, to be held liable, the municipality must have knowledge of a “pattern of

tortious conduct demonstrating the need for additional training, ‘rather than a one-

time negligen[ce].’” Flores, 997 F.3d at 731 (citing Brown, 520 U.S. at 407–08). But a

plaintiff may base a successful claim on a single constitutional violation if the “risk

of constitutional violations [is] so high and the need for training so obvious that the

municipality’s failure to act . . . reflect[s] deliberate indifference and allow[s] an

inference of institutional culpability.” J.K.J., 960 F.3d at 380.

In her FAC, Demos alleges that Mendrick failed to train his correctional

officers and staff to identify, verify, record, and timely administer to inmates their

prescribed medications. R. 12 ¶¶ 79–81. Demos merely states, in a conclusory fashion

and without factual support or detail, that “at least one other inmate” failed to receive

his or her medications. This is not the sort of well-pleaded fact that the court must

assume is true. Hernandez, 63 F.4th at 666; Grieveson, 538 F.3d at 774 (“One broad,

vague statement about an occurrence affecting other inmates in a detention facility

does not support the inference of a ‘widespread’ custom.”). Effectively, she provides

no well-pleaded allegations that Mendrick had knowledge of unconstitutional conduct

by Jail staff and intentionally decided not to address it with training. This is fatal.

Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 1360 (citing Brown, 520 U.S. 397) (“[A] pattern of

similar constitutional violations by untrained employees is ‘ordinarily necessary’ to

demonstrate deliberate indifference for purposes of failure to train.”); cf., Flores, 997

F.3d at 731 (plaintiff adequately stated a failure to train claim where she alleged that

a city knew of at least three prior occasions during which an officer was criminally

reckless, but failed to initiate further training); J.K.J., 960 F.3d at 380–83 (evidence

that policymaker knew about sexual misconduct by correctional officers toward

female inmates, yet failed to institute sufficient sexual harassment training, was

enough to support jury verdict holding prison responsible for rapes via Monell

liability).

Therefore, each of Demos’s theories of Monell liability in Count IV do not state

a claim and are dismissed.

Conclusion

For the forgoing reasons, Defendant’s partial motion to dismiss is granted. The

claims against Schneider and Mendrick arising under the Eighth Amendment only

in Counts I, II, and III, and the claim for indemnification against the County for the

same in Count V, are dismissed with prejudice.” The Fourteenth Amendment claims

contained in those Counts will proceed. Thus, parts of paragraphs 32, 41, 57, and 77

referring to the Eighth Amendment are stricken. Count IV is dismissed in its entirety

without prejudice.

ENTERED:

Honorable Thomas M. Durkin

United States District Judge

DATED: October 27, 2023

2 These allegations are dismissed with prejudice because Demos can plead no new

facts, consistent with the FAC, that would apply the Eighth Amendment’s protections

of convicted prisoners to her.

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