Goodlet v. City of Chicago

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

ALONZO GOODLET, )

)

Plaintiff, ) No. 22 C 570

v. )

) Judge Virginia M. Kendall

CITY OF CHICAGO, )

)

Defendant. )

)

)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

After Plaintiff Alonzo Goodlet, who is Black, posted a picture of himself holding a gun on

social media, he lost his job as a motor truck driver with the City of Chicago Department of

Aviation. During his employment, Goodlet alleges his white coworkers used racial slurs, insulted

him, excluded him, and lodged false complaints against him. Goodlet brings claims of race and

national origin discrimination and intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Dkt. 1). The City

of Chicago moves to dismiss certain of Goodlet’s claims. (Dkt. 19). For the reasons below, the

City’s partial motion to dismiss is granted.

BACKGROUND

Unless otherwise noted, the following factual allegations are taken from Goodlet’s

Complaint (Dkt. 1) and are assumed true for purposes of the City’s motion. W. Bend Mut. Ins. Co.

v. Schumacher, 844 F.3d 670, 675 (7th Cir. 2016). Goodlet, who is African American and lives in

Cook County, Illinois, has worked various jobs for the City of Chicago since 2008. (Dkt. 1 ¶ 3).

Most recently, Goodlet worked as a motor truck driver for the Department of Aviation. (Id.). On

November 7, 2020, while on vacation, Goodlet uploaded a photo of himself on Facebook in which

he was holding a gun in the bathroom of a Menards store. (Id. at ¶ 5). Goodlet holds a Firearm

Owners Identification and a concealed-carry permit. (Id.) Nonetheless, Goodlet removed the photo

from Facebook shortly after posting it. (Id.).

When Goodlet returned to work, Chicago Police Department officers escorted him to the

office of his supervisor, Mr. Landers, who is white. (Id. at ¶ 6). Landers told Goodlet that he had

broken COVID-19 protocols and needed to turn in his city identification and badge. (Id. at ¶ 7).

Later that day, a human resources representative from the Department of Aviation told Goodlet

that the Department was placing him on administrative leave for potentially bringing a gun to

work. (Id. at ¶ 8). This was the first time during Goodlet’s employment with the City that he had

been subject to disciplinary proceedings or an employee complaint. (Id. at ¶ 16). Because his badge

was revoked, Goodlet was unable to work his second job for DHL. (Id. at ¶ 17).

Following Goodlet’s suspension, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) investigated

the incident. (Id. at ¶ 9). The OIG received complaints from five of Goodlet’s white colleagues,

each of whom had allegedly shown racist tendencies on social media. (Id. at ¶¶ 9–13). For

example, one complainant’s social media posts included an image of the Confederate flag and

suggested that he owned a gun. (Id. at ¶ 10). A second complainant’s profile picture showed him

“shooting a firearm and wearing a ‘Make America Great Again’ hat.” (Id. at ¶ 11). A third

complainant called Goodlet “Hoodratlet” in a text message. (Id. at ¶ 12). In addition, Goodlet’s

other coworkers had shared Facebook posts including racial slurs and white supremacy signs. (Id.

at ¶ 13). Goodlet’s colleagues referred to him as “stupid,” “moron,” and “idiot” over radio

communications and excluded Goodlet from social meetings in the drivers’ room. (Id. at ¶¶ 14–

15). Goodlet was the only driver of color at the Department of Aviation. (Id.)

In March 2021, Goodlet returned to his workplace, where Landers helped him to get a new

identification badge to use for his DHL job. (Id. at ¶ 17). But the badge did not work when Goodlet

tried to use it the next day, and police officers escorted him off the premises. (Id.). The OIG

completed its investigation and notified Goodlet on September 21, 2021 that his employment was

being terminated. (Id. at ¶ 18). Goodlet filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). (Id. at ¶ 19; Dkt. 19-1).1 In the EEOC charge,

Goodlet provided the dates of his suspension and termination, checked the box indicating he

suffered race discrimination, and stated: “I believe I have been discriminated against because of

my race, Black, in violation of Title VII.” (Dkt. 19-1). The EEOC sent Goodlet a notice of his right

to sue on November 1, 2021. (Dkt. 1 ¶ 19; Dkt. 1-1).

Goodlet filed suit against the Department of Aviation, alleging race and national origin

discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Section 1981 of the

Civil Rights Act of 1866 (Count I); and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) (Count

II). (Dkt. 1 at 6–7). The City moves, without opposition, to replace the Department of Aviation as

the Defendant, since the Department of Aviation is not a suable entity. (Dkt. 19 at 3–4; Dkt. 25 at

2). That motion is granted. The City also moves to dismiss, arguing that Goodlet (1) failed to

exhaust his administrative remedies on the Title VII national origin discrimination claim; (2) failed

to state a Section 1981 discrimination claim; and (3) failed to state an IIED claim. (Dkt. 19).

LEGAL STANDARD

To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the complaint must contain “a

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Kaminski v.

Elite Staffing, Inc., 23 F.4th 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2022) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). Thus, “a

plaintiff must allege ‘enough facts to state a claim that is plausible on its face.’” Allen v. Brown

1 Goodlet did not attach his EEOC charge to his Complaint, but the Court may consider the charge since it is critical

to the Complaint, and even if it was not, it is a public record. See Dean v. Nat’l Production Workers Union Severance

Tr. Plan, 46 F.4th 535, 543 (7th Cir. 2022); see also, e.g., Williams v. City of Chicago, 2022 WL 2915632, at *3 n.2

(N.D. Ill. July 25, 2022).

Advisory, LLC, 41 F.4th 843, 850 (7th Cir. 2022) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 566 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). The Court accepts the well-

pleaded factual allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint as true, “drawing all reasonable inferences

in his favor.” Id. (citing W. Bend. Mut. Ins., 844 F.3d at 675). Yet, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements” are not enough. Oakland

Police & Fire Ret. Sys. v. Mayer Brown, LLP, 861 F.3d 644, 649 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 678). The complaint’s factual content must “raise a right to relief above the speculative

level.” Kaminski, 23 F.4th at 776 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

DISCUSSION

I. Discrimination and Monell Liability (Count I)

In Count I, Goodlet alleges race and national origin discrimination in violation of Title VII

and Section 1981. (Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 20).

A. Failure to Exhaust Title VII National Origin Discrimination Claim

Initially, the City argues that Goodlet has failed to exhaust his national origin

discrimination claim under Title VII and requests dismissal of the claim with prejudice. (Dkt. 19

at 9–11; Dkt. 28 at 9). Goodlet “does not object” but seeks leave to amend. (Dkt. 25 at 2). A district

court should give leave to amend freely “when justice so requires,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2), but

“may deny leave to amend if amendment would be futile.” Kap Holdings, LLC v. Mar-Cone

Appliance Parts Co., 55 F.4th 517, 529 (7th Cir. 2022).

Before suing under Title VII, Goodlet was required to file an EEOC charge within 300

days “after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.” Palmer v. Ind. Univ., 31 F.4th

583, 588 (7th Cir. 2022) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1)). Further, Goodlet’s claims in this

action are limited to those “like or reasonably related to the allegations of the charge and growing

out of the allegations.” Chaidez v. Ford Motor Co., 937 F.3d 998, 1004 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting

Geldon v. S. Milwaukee Sch. Dist., 414 F.3d 817, 819 (7th Cir. 2005)); see also Bilal v. Rotec

Indus., Inc., 326 F. App’x 949, 953 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Jenkins Blue Cross Mut. Hosp. Ins.,

Inc., 538 F.2d 164, 168 (7th Cir. 1976) (en banc)) (explaining that courts “look to the substance of

the charges, not merely whether a particular box was checked on the EEOC form”). The exhaustion

requirement serves two purposes: (1) giving the EEOC and the employer a chance to settle the

matter; and (2) giving the employer notice of the challenged conduct. Chaidez, 937 F.3d at 1004

(citing Teal v. Potter, 559 F.3d 687, 691 (7th Cir. 2009)). At a minimum, the charge and the

complaint must “describe the same conduct and implicate the same individuals.” Id. (quoting

Cheek v. W. & S. Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 497, 500 (7th Cir. 1994)). In comparing Goodlet’s EEOC

charge with his Complaint, the Court “read[s] the claims in the EEOC charge liberally,” since

Goodlet submitted the charge without legal representation. Chaidez, 937 F.3d at 1005 n.3.

Goodlet’s EEOC charge complained only of race discrimination, stating: “I believe I have

been discriminated against because of my race, Black, in violation of Title VII.” (Dkt. 19-1). In

general, claims of national origin discrimination do not relate to or grow out of claims based on

race.2 Of course, Goodlet’s failure to check the “national origin” box would not be fatal if his

2 See, e.g., Johnson v. Joliet Junior Coll., 2009 WL 674357, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 13, 2009) (reasoning that “a claim

of national origin discrimination may also substantiate a claim for racial discrimination,” but “the reverse is not true”

(citing Abdullahi v. Prada U.S.A. Corp., 520 F.3d 710, 735–36 (7th Cir. 2008)); Baker v. Ind. Fam. & Soc. Servs.

Admin., 260 F. Supp. 2d 731, 735 (S.D. Ind. 2003) (“[T]he term ‘Black’ does not encompass national origin nor would

it reasonably provide the EEOC with a sufficient basis to initiate an investigation of a national origin discrimination.”

(citing Torres v. City of Chicago, 2000 WL 549588, at *2 (N.D. Ill. May 1, 2000)); Thompson v. Fairmont Chi. Hotel,

525 F. Supp. 2d 984, 989 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (“Other courts have previously concluded that discrimination on the basis

of color is not reasonably related to discrimination on the basis of race.” (citing Sullivan v. Presstronics, Inc., 1997 WL

327126, at *2 (N.D.Ill. Aug. 31, 2004)); Carrillo v. Ill. Bell Telephone Co., 538 F. Supp. 793, 797–98 (N.D. Ill. 1982)

(national origin discrimination complaint in EEOC charge did not exhaust race discrimination claim).

allegations had “clearly intended the EEOC to investigate” national origin discrimination. See,

e.g., Alicea v. City of Chicago, 2002 WL 1021553, at *3 (N.D. Ill. May 20, 2002) (quoting Cheek,

31 F.3d at 502). But the sparse allegations in Goodlet’s charge do not suggest any such intent. Nor

would Goodlet’s EEOC charge have put the City on notice of a national origin discrimination

claim, since the words “race” and “Black” do not hint at discrimination relating to Goodlet’s

national origin. See Chaidez, 937 F.3d at 1004; Johnson, 2009 WL 674357, at *3.

Considering the 300-day deadline to file an EEOC charge, it is too late for Goodlet to file

a new charge based on national origin discrimination. Under these circumstances, amendment

would be futile. Accordingly, Goodlet’s Title VII national origin discrimination claim is dismissed

with prejudice.

B. Section 1981

The City also challenges the sufficiency of Goodlet’s Section 1981 claim. (Dkt. 19 at 11–

13). Section 1983 provides “the exclusive remedy” for Section 1981 claims against state actors.

Campbell v. Forest Pres. Dist. of Cook Cnty., 752 F.3d 665; 671 (7th Cir. 2014); see also Freeman

v. Metro. Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater Chi., 927 F.3d 961, 966 (explaining that Section

1981 “does not create a private right of action against public bodies unless the plaintiff has raised

Monell allegations”). To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that a

municipality’s “policy, custom, or act by a final decisionmaker caused him to suffer a

constitutional injury” or discrimination. Freeman v. Metro. Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater

Chi., 927 F.3d 961, 966 (7th Cir. 2019) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y.,

436 U.S. 658, 694–95 (1978), and Campbell, 752 F.3d at 667, 669).

Surviving dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) requires allegations that go beyond isolated

incidents: While a plaintiff need not provide examples of “every other or even one other

individual” who suffered due to a policy or practice, White v. City of Chicago, 829 F.3d 837, 843–

44 (7th Cir. 2016), he must “plausibly allege that such examples exist.” Gill v. City of Milwaukee,

850 F.3d 335, 344 (7th Cir. 2017). Goodlet fails to do so. Goodlet’s Complaint alleges that the

City “has demonstrated a history of targeting minority employees.” (Dkt. 1 ¶ 27). But this vague

allegation does not give rise to a plausible inference that the City maintained a discriminatory

policy or practice.3 Indeed, the Complaint is devoid of any factual allegations permitting such an

inference. Goodlet has therefore failed to state a Section 1983 claim.

II. IIED (Count II)

In Count II, Goodlet alleges that the City intended to inflict severe emotional distress on

him, citing his coworkers’ racially abusive treatment and baseless complaints. (Dkt. 1 at ¶¶ 31–

35). The City argues that Goodlet’s IIED claim (1) is preempted by the Illinois Human Rights Act

(IHRA); and (2) fails to state a claim. Since the Court agrees with both arguments, it does not reach

the City’s affirmative defense that the IIED claim is time-barred.

A. IHRA Preemption

The City argues that Goodlet’s IIED claim is preempted by the Illinois Human Rights Act

(IHRA), which grants the Illinois Human Rights Commission exclusive jurisdiction over civil

rights violations. 775 ILCS 5/8-111(D) (“Except as otherwise provided by law, no court of this

state shall have jurisdiction over the subject of an alleged civil rights violation other than as set

forth in this Act.”). Civil rights violations under the IHRA include acting “with respect to

recruitment, hiring, promotion, renewal of employment, selection for training or apprenticeship,

3 In his response opposing the City’s motion to dismiss, Goodlet argues: “The Board here, with a final policymaking

authority instilled [a] policy of discrimination[.] Plaintiff is not the only African American being discriminated and

City data reflects this.” (Dkt. 25 at 13). Even if the Court could consider these assertions, they would not move the

needle. See Barwin v. Village of Oak Park, 54 F.4th 443, 455 n.12 (7th Cir. 2022) (noting that courts evaluating

motions to dismiss are “confined to the four corners of the complaint”). Goodlet does not point to any particular data,

and his statements are otherwise conclusory.

discharge, discipline, tenure or terms, [or] privileges or conditions of employment on the basis of

unlawful discrimination . . . .” 775 ILCS 5/2-102(A). Unlawful discrimination includes race

discrimination. 775 ILCS 5/1-103(Q).

The IHRA “preempts all other state-law claims that are ‘inextricably linked to a civil rights

violation such that there is no independent basis for the action apart from the Act itself.’” Doe v.

Toys R Us, 2010 WL 3168299, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 5, 2010) (quoting Maksimovic v. Tsogalis,

687 N.E.2d 21, 23 (Ill. 1997)); Nischan v. Stratosphere Quality, LLC, 865 F.3d 922, 934 (7th Cir.

2017). Tort claims are not inextricably linked with a civil rights violation “where a plaintiff can

establish the necessary elements of the tort independent of any legal duties created by the Illinois

Human Rights Act.” Maksimovic, 687 N.E.2d at 24; Nischan, 865 F.3d at 934.

IHRA preemption does not turn on whether the same facts supporting the IIED claim also

support an employment discrimination claim. Naeem v. McKesson Drug Co., 444 F.3d 593, 604

(7th Cir. 2006); Blount v. Stroud, 904 N.E.2d 1, 9 (Ill. 2009). Rather, “the concrete question to ask

is whether the plaintiff states a valid common-law claim without needing to rely on the rights and

duties created by the [IHRA].” Richards v. U.S. Steel, 869 F.3d 557, 564 (7th Cir. 2017); see also

Nischan, 865 F.3d at 934 (affirming IHRA preemption where taking “the civil rights allegations

out of the complaint” would leave the complaint without an IIED claim). Notably, the plaintiff

need not bring an IHRA claim for preemption to apply. See, e.g., Geise v. Phoenix Co. of Chi.,

Inc., 639 N.E.2d 1273, 1276–78 (Ill. 1994); Richards, 869 F.3d at 566 n.4.

Goodlet cannot sustain his IIED claim independent of the City’s duties under the IHRA.

According to the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer is only liable for its employees’

torts “committed within the scope of employment.” Richards, 869 F.3d at 565 (quoting Boston v.

U.S. Steel Corp., 816 F.3d 455, 467 (7th Cir. 2016)); Pyne v. Witmer, 543 N.E.2d 1304, 1308 (Ill.

1989). In assessing whether an employee’s conduct is within the scope of his or her employment,

Illinois courts consider whether the conduct “(1) is of the kind the employee is employed to

perform; (2) occurs substantially within the authorized time and space limits; and (3) is actuated,

at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master.” Richards, 869 F.3d at 565 (quoting Restatement

(Second) of Agency § 228 (1958)); Bagent v. Blessing Care Corp., 862 N.E.2d 985, 992 (Ill.

2007). Thus, an employer cannot be liable for an employee’s acts that did not benefit the employer.

Richards, 869 F.3d at 565 (citing Boston,816 F.3d at 467).

Goodlet’s IIED claim is based on his coworkers’ “incendiary racial slurs and offensive

insults” along with “racially abusive treatment” and “baseless complaints.” (Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 33–35). But

Goodlet’s Complaint is missing allegations suggesting that his coworkers’ misconduct aimed to

benefit the City—even in part. Cf. Richards, 869 F.3d at 565–66 (citing Doe ex rel. Doe v.

Lawrence Hall Youth Servs., 966 N.E.2d 52, 61 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012)) (explaining that an

employee’s sexual misconduct is not within the scope of employment since it does not benefit the

employer). The misconduct by Goodlet’s coworkers underlying his IIED claim went beyond the

scope of their employment. So Goodlet cannot state an IIED claim without relying on the legal

duties which the IHRA imposes. Id. at 564. IHRA preemption necessarily follows.

B. Failure to State a Claim

Preemption and respondeat superior aside, Goodlet’s IIED claim further fails to allege the

“extreme and outrageous” element. To state a claim for IIED, a plaintiff must allege that “(1) the

defendant's conduct was truly extreme and outrageous; (2) the defendant intended to inflict severe

emotional distress (or knew that there was at least a high probability that its conduct would cause

severe emotional distress); and (3) the defendant’s conduct did in fact cause severe emotional

distress.” Richards, 869 F.3d at 566 (citing Feltmeier, 798 N.E.2d at 80). “[T]he nature of the

defendant’s conduct must be so extreme as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency and be

regarded as intolerable in a civilized community.” Id. (quoting Feltmeier, 798 N.E.2d at 83). In

the employment context, recovery is limited further to situations where “the employer's conduct

has been truly egregious” since “personality conflicts and questioning of job performance are

unavoidable aspects of employment” which often “produce concern and distress.” Id. at 567

(quoting Van Stan v. Fancy Colours & Co., 125 F.3d 563, 567–68 (7th Cir. 1997)). Accordingly,

workplace conduct does not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous unless the “employer

clearly abuses the power it holds over an employee in a manner far more severe than the typical

disagreements or job-related stress caused by the average work environment.” Id. (quoting Naeem,

444 F.3d at 605).

Goodlet alleges his coworkers used racial slurs and insults, excluded him based on his race,

and lodged false complaints against him. While these allegations are disturbing, they cannot

overcome the high hurdle of the extreme-and-outrageous standard. See, e.g., Bannon v. Univ. of

Chicago, 503 F.3d 623, 626, 630 (7th Cir. 2007) (supervisor’s use of racial epithets against

plaintiff for many years and excluding her from meetings was not extreme and outrageous); Chi v.

Loyola Univ. Med. Ctr., 787 F. Supp. 2d 797, 807–08 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (plaintiff’s allegations that

coworkers used racial slurs in his presence, spread false rumors about him, and gossiped about his

mental health were not extreme and outrageous); Shamim v. Siemens Indus., Inc., 854 F. Supp. 2d

496, 512 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (dismissing IIED claim because supervisor’s use of racial, ethnic, and

religious slurs “amount to a complaint that [his supervisor] verbally insulted him”). Goodlet

correctly points out that the Court can “consider whether the defendant knew that the plaintiff was

particularly susceptible to emotional distress.” Cairel v. Alderden, 821 F.3d 823, 836 (7th Cir.

2016); McGrath v. Fahey, 533 N.E.2d 806, 811 (Ill. 1988). But Goodlet’s Complaint does not

contain facts evincing his heightened susceptibility or his coworkers’ knowledge of that

susceptibility. Thus, Goodlet’s ITED claim fails.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons above, the City’s partial motion to dismiss [19] is granted. The Court

dismisses the Department of Aviation and directs the Clerk of Court to amend the case caption to

reflect that the City of Chicago is the sole Defendant. As to Count I, Goodlet’s Section 1981 claim

is dismissed without prejudice, while his Title VII national origin discrimination claim is dismissed

with prejudice. Count II is dismissed without prejudice. Goodlet may file an amended complaint

by April 4, 2023.

HY OO

Apuncal Lenser

Go peel A

Vivernid M. Kendall

Jny tates District Judge

Date: March 14, 2023

11