Ford v. Dart

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

MAURICE FULSON; HENRY FORD, )

)

Plaintiffs, )

) No. 22 C 1894 & 22 C 2064

v. )

) Judge Sara L. Ellis

THOMAS DART, Sheriff of Cook County, )

and COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

While housed in the Residential Treatment Unit (“RTU”) at the Cook County Jail

because of certain medical conditions, Plaintiffs Maurice Fulson and Henry Ford contracted the

coronavirus. Plaintiffs have separately sued Defendants Thomas Dart, the Sheriff of Cook

County, Illinois, in both his official and individual capacities, and Cook County,1 seeking

damages for injuries they sustained while detained. In nearly identical complaints, Plaintiffs

allege claims of unconstitutional conditions of confinement and shackling by excessive force in

violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Dart now moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaints under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Plaintiffs have sufficiently

pleaded enough facts to allege a plausible claim for unconstitutional conditions of confinement

and excessive force against Dart in his official capacity. However, because Plaintiffs have failed

to allege that Dart knew of the specific circumstances that allegedly give rise to their excessive

force claims, the Court dismisses Plaintiffs’ claims against Dart in his individual capacity.

1 Plaintiffs bring their claims against Cook County pursuant to Carver v. Sheriff of LaSalle County, 324

F.3d 947, 948 (7th Cir. 2003), which clarified that “a county in Illinois is a necessary party in any suit

seeking damages from an independently elected county officer (sheriff, assessor, clerk of court, and so

on) in an official capacity.” As such, the Court only addresses Dart going forward.

BACKGROUND2

Dart is the Sheriff of Cook County. Fulson and Ford were pretrial detainees at Cook

County Jail during the relevant time period. Both Fulson and Ford suffer from diabetes and high

blood pressure, and Fulson has only one kidney. Due to their medical conditions, Cook County

Jail considered Fulson and Ford medically compromised and placed them in the RTU.

Since January of 2020, Dart knew that the coronavirus posed a high risk to the health and

well-being of detainees at Cook County Jail. Despite this knowledge, Dart failed to provide the

detainees with sufficient hygiene products, cleaning supplies, and proper personal protective

equipment (“PPE”), including gowns, face-shields, gloves, and bleach; did not frequently clean

or disinfect high-touch surfaces and objects; and did not implement social distancing strategies

for detainees residing in the RTU.

By March of 2020, Cook County Jail likely had multiple cases of coronavirus, with

several detainees assigned to the RTU exhibiting coronavirus symptoms. In April, Plaintiffs

contracted the coronavirus and fell very ill. Cook County Jail transferred them to Stroger

Hospital for treatment. Per Dart’s instructions, both Fulson and Ford, like all other detainees

hospitalized at outlying hospitals, were shackled by hand and foot to their hospital beds. The

restraints caused Plaintiffs significant pain and limited their ability to position themselves in a

way that would assist with their breathing and allow them to recover from symptoms of the

coronavirus. Because the restraints prohibited Plaintiffs from using the restroom, they urinated

and defecated on themselves.

2 The Court takes the facts in the background section from Plaintiffs’ complaints and presumes them to be

true for the purpose of resolving Dart’s motions to dismiss. See Phillips v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am.,

714 F.3d 1017, 1019–20 (7th Cir. 2013).

LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the complaint, not

its merits. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Gibson v. City of Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510, 1520 (7th Cir.

1990). In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court accepts as true all well-pleaded facts in

the plaintiff’s complaint and draws all reasonable inferences from those facts in the plaintiff’s

favor. Kubiak v. City of Chicago, 810 F.3d 476, 480–81 (7th Cir. 2016). To survive a Rule

12(b)(6) motion, the complaint must assert a facially plausible claim and provide fair notice to

the defendant of the claim’s basis. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); Adams v. City of Indianapolis, 742 F.3d 720, 728–29 (7th

Cir. 2014). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

ANALYSIS

I. Unconstitutional Conditions of Confinement Claim

Dart argues that Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts to support their claims that they were

subjected to unconstitutional conditions of confinement that led to them contracting the

coronavirus. The Fourteenth Amendment governs claims by pretrial detainees regarding their

conditions of confinement.3 See Hardeman v. Curran, 933 F.3d 816, 821–22 (7th Cir. 2019).

To state a claim, Plaintiffs must allege that Dart “acted purposefully, knowingly, or perhaps even

recklessly” and that his conduct was objectively unreasonable. McCann v. Ogle Cnty., 909 F.3d

3 Because Plaintiffs only proceed against Dart in his official capacity on their conditions of confinement

claims, their claims arise under Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S.

658 (1978). In addition to pleading a constitutional violation, Monell requires Plaintiffs to establish that a

policy or practice of Dart’s office caused that violation, or that the violation was caused by a person with

final policymaking authority. Rossi v. City of Chicago, 790 F.3d 729, 737 (7th Cir. 2015). Dart only

focuses on whether Plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded a Fourteenth Amendment claim, and so the Court does

not address the remaining elements of a Monell claim.

881, 886 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing Miranda v. Cnty. of Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 353–54 (7th Cir. 2018)).

Objective unreasonableness “turns on the facts and circumstances of each particular case.”

Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 397 (2015) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks

omitted). “When evaluating reasonableness, . . . courts must afford prison administrators wide-

ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment

are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security.” Mays

v. Dart, 974 F.3d 810, 820 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing Henry v. Hulett, 969 F.3d 769, 783 (7th Cir.

2020)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, Dart does not seem to challenge whether Plaintiffs have sufficiently pleaded the

requirement of knowing conduct. In any event, Plaintiffs satisfy this requirement; they allege

that Dart knowingly failed to take reasonable steps to stop the spread of coronavirus at the Cook

County Jail. Dart instead focuses on whether Plaintiffs satisfied the objective unreasonableness

requirement, arguing that he took unprecedented measures to address the spread of coronavirus.

In support, Dart points to the Seventh Circuit’s ruling in Mays v. Dart, another case challenging

coronavirus prevention measures at the Cook County Jail. Id. But, as other courts in this district

have concluded with respect to nearly identical claims, Mays does not conclusively establish the

objective reasonableness of Dart’s actions. See Albarran v. Dart, No. 21 C 1024, 2022 WL

1556103, at *3 (N.D. Ill. May 17, 2022) (concluding that Mays did not require dismissal of

unconstitutional conditions of confinement claims against Dart and collecting cases); Brown v.

Dart, No. 20-CV-4193, 2021 WL 4401492, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 25, 2021) (explaining that

“[t]he Mays cases neither indisputably nor definitively establish that [Dart’s] response to the

coronavirus was objectively reasonable” (citation omitted) (internal quotation mark omitted));

Cullom v. Dart, No. 20 C 4034, 2020 WL 7698366, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 27, 2020) (rejecting

defendants’ contention that Mays precludes claims against Dart regarding his response to the

coronavirus); Gama v. Dart, No. 20 C 3449, 2020 WL 6802030, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 19, 2020)

(rejecting Dart’s reliance on the district court’s findings in Mays). Although the Seventh Circuit

noted that Dart “took numerous proactive measures to prevent the spread of COVID-19,” it

emphasized that it was “not address[ing] the merits of whether Plaintiffs have demonstrated that

they have suffered a constitutional violation” and instead only considered potential legal errors

the district court committed in evaluating whether to grant a preliminary injunction. Mays, 974

F.3d at 815, 822. Thus, Mays does not definitively establish that Dart’s response to the

coronavirus cannot meet the objective unreasonableness standard. See MacDonald v. Chicago

Park Dist., 132 F.3d 355, 357–58 (7th Cir. 1997) (a decision on a preliminary injunction “is not a

decision on the merits of the plaintiff’s suit” (quoting Ayres v. City of Chicago, 125 F.3d 1010,

1013 (7th Cir. 1997))); Cullom, 2020 WL 7698366, at *2 (refusing to give Mays preclusive

effect because it involved a ruling on a preliminary injunction request).

Dart also argues that Plaintiffs’ allegations are not plausible. In their complaints,

Plaintiffs allege that Dart failed to take reasonable steps to stem the spread of the coronavirus by

failing to provide adequate PPE and sufficient hygiene and cleaning supplies, adequately sanitize

common areas, and implement social distancing strategies. Rather than explaining why these

allegations fail to meet the plausibility standard, Dart highlights various steps he took to stem the

spread of the coronavirus at the Cook County Jail that purportedly contradict Plaintiffs’

allegations. But this is a question for a later stage; on a motion to dismiss, the Court must take

the facts as alleged in the complaints and draw all inferences in Plaintiffs’ favor, without

considering Dart’s counter-facts. See Brown, 2021 WL 4401492, at *4 (refusing to consider

defendants’ arguments that they “took a more aggressive approach to COVID-19 prevention”

because “any counter-facts or affirmative defenses pose questions for a later stage” (internal

quotation marks omitted)); Cullom, 2020 WL 7698366, at *2 (“[D]efendants also cite in support

of dismissal the efforts that [Dart] undertook to address the coronavirus outbreak . . . . The

problem with this argument is that it relies on claimed facts that are not contained in the

complaint.”). Although Plaintiffs may not ultimately be able to prove their claims, at this stage,

Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that Dart’s actions were “insufficient to protect the medically

vulnerable,” including Plaintiffs, whose medical conditions created a higher risk of contracting

the coronavirus. Gama, 2020 WL 6802030, at *3; see also Cullom, 2020 WL 7698366, at *3

(allowing plaintiff to proceed on conditions of confinement claim against Dart in his official

capacity concerning coronavirus prevention measures at the Cook County Jail).

II. Shackling Claim

Dart next challenges Plaintiffs’ claim that the Cook County Jail’s restraint policy violates

the Fourteenth Amendment.4 The Due Process Clause prohibits the use of bodily restraints in a

way that serves to punish a pretrial detainee. May v. Sheahan, 226 F.3d 876, 884 (7th Cir. 2000).

“The use of bodily restraints constitutes punishment . . . if their use is not rationally related to a

legitimate non-punitive government purpose or they appear excessive in relation to the purpose

they allegedly serve.” Id. (citation omitted).

Plaintiffs agree that shackling advances a valid non-punitive governmental purpose. See

Hart v. Sheahan, 396 F.3d 887, 893 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he detention facility has an interest in

. . . preventing escapes.”); May, 226 F.3d at 884 (“Certainly, shackling all hospital detainees

reduces the risk of a breach of security and thus furthers a legitimate non-punitive government

purpose.”). But they argue that the application of the shackling policy in their cases was

4 Although Dart analyzes the shackling claim under both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments,

Plaintiffs’ response addresses only the Fourteenth Amendment.

excessive in relation to its escape-prevention purpose. See May, 226 F.3d at 884 (finding that

policy of continuously shackling an AIDS patient to a bed while under the constant watch of a

guard was “plainly excessive in the absence of any indication that the detainee pose[d] some sort

of security risk”). Plaintiffs allege that Stroger Hospital treated them for severe cases of

coronavirus; Fulson had difficulty breathing and felt significant pain, and Ford was placed on a

respirator. Plaintiffs further allege that armed guards constantly monitor the wing on which most

detainees reside at Stroger Hospital. In their response, Plaintiffs clarify that they themselves

were guarded continuously by correctional officers.5 They also allege that the continuous

restraint of their hands and feet caused significant pain and limited their ability to position

themselves, preventing them from breathing more easily. Although Dart argues that Plaintiffs

offer only conclusory allegations that they did not pose a security risk and attempts to distinguish

this case from May, the Court finds Plaintiffs’ allegations that they had difficulty breathing and

were ill and weak because of the coronavirus, coupled with their assertions that armed guards

monitored them, sufficient to suggest that the application of the shackling policy was excessive

as to Plaintiffs. See Brown, 2021 WL 4401492, at *4 (finding “the allegations that Brown was

suffering from coronavirus, was having difficulty breathing, and had previous chronic medical

conditions that limited his mobility” sufficient to infer that he was not a security risk and did not

require shackling, even though he did not “specifically allege that he was ‘shackled to his bed 24

hours-a-day or that an armed guard was present 24 hours-a-day’” (citing May, 226 F.3d at 884));

Gama, 2020 WL 6802030, at *4 (finding plaintiff’s contentions in his response to Dart’s motion

to dismiss “that he had difficulty breathing and that he was very weak . . . sufficient to infer that

5 Plaintiffs may add factual allegations in response to a motion to dismiss so long as those allegations are

consistent with facts already alleged in the complaint. Geinosky v. City of Chicago, 675 F.3d 743, 745

n.1 (7th Cir. 2012). Here, the assertion that armed guards monitored Plaintiffs is consistent with

Plaintiffs’ allegation that most detainees reside in a specific wing of Stroger Hospital constantly

monitored by armed guards.

he was not a security risk and did not require shackling”). And because Plaintiffs have alleged

“that the shackling took place, and thus the violation of [their] constitutional rights was caused,”

because of a common Sheriff’s Office policy and practice, they may proceed on their claim

against Dart in his official capacity under Monell. Cullom, 2020 WL 7698366, at *4.

However, Plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged Dart’s liability in his individual

capacity. “It is well established that [f]or constitutional violations under § 1983 . . . a

government official is only liable for his or her own misconduct.” Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d

768, 781 (7th Cir. 2015) (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks

omitted); see also Brown, 2021 WL 4401492, at *4 (“Individual liability under Section 1983

requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation.” (citing

Perez, 792 F.3d at 781)). Because “the policy [of shackling detainees] is not inherently

unconstitutional, . . . to hold Dart liable for how it was applied to plaintiff[s] requires allegations

that Dart personally participated in that application.” Gama, 2020 WL 6802030, at *4.

Although Plaintiffs allege that Dart knew of the practice of shackling seriously ill inmates, they

have failed to plausibly allege that Dart knew of Plaintiffs’ particular circumstances. See id.

(dismissing nearly identical individual-capacity claim against Dart where plaintiff alleged only

that Dart “was aware of the widespread policy of shackling detainees while at the hospital”); see

also Brown, 2021 WL 4401492, at *4 (“Brown has not plausibly alleged that Dart was aware of

any of his particular conditions, and therefore has failed to state a claim against Dart in his

individual capacity.”). The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiffs’ individual-capacity claims

against Dart. See Cullom, 2020 WL 7698366, at *4 (dismissing plaintiff’s individual-capacity

shackling claim against Dart where his complaint did not allege that Dart was aware of the

plaintiff's particular circumstances).°

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants in part and denies in part Dart’s motions to

dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaints [No. 22-1894, Doc. 20; No. 22-2064, Doc. 15]. The Court

dismisses the shackling claim against Dart in his individual capacity.

Dated: January 3, 2023 BS Myre

SARA L. ELLIS

United States District Judge

® Because Plaintiffs fail to state a claim against Dart in his individual capacity, the Court need not

consider whether qualified immunity would otherwise bar the claim.