Evans III v. Dart

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

DAVID EVANS III, et al., )

)

Plaintiffs, )

) No. 18 C 6018

v. )

) Judge Virginia M. Kendall

THOMAS J. DART, Sheriff of Cook )

County, Illinois; and COUNTY OF )

COOK, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

Plaintiffs David Evans III, David Sheppard, Monta Servant, and Tabas Jackson are current

or former correctional officers employed by the Cook County’s Sheriff’s Office (“CCSO”) in the

Cook County Department of Corrections. Each plaintiff was involved in an incident with a detainee

for which they were subjected to CCSO’s disciplinary procedure. Plaintiffs later sued Thomas J.

Dart as Sheriff of Cook County and Cook County, claiming that similarly situated white employees

received more lenient punishments in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The Defendants

move for summary judgment. (Dkt. 130). For the following reasons, the motion is granted. (Id.)

BACKGROUND

A. CCSO Policies and Disciplinary Practices

The Office of Professional Review (“OPR”) is tasked with investigating misconduct by

employees within the Department of Corrections. (Dkt. 153 ¶¶ 5–6). An investigation typically

begins when someone files a complaint register, at which point an investigator is appointed. (Id.)

The investigator then interviews witnesses, gathers evidence, and makes factual findings and

conclusions as to whether any policies have been violated. (Id.) The investigator also prepares a

report, which supervisors within OPR review and approve. (Id. ¶ 6). The case then moves to the

Command Channel Review (“CCR”), where a CCSO executive examines the investigation file

and findings.1 (Id. ¶ 8). The Undersheriff performs another review and provides her concurrence

or rejection. (Id. ¶¶ 11–14). For suspensions greater than thirty days or termination

recommendations, the CCSO must file a complaint before the Merit Board, a body established by

state statute. (Id. ¶ 16). There, the case is assigned to a Merit Board member, who conducts a full

evidentiary hearing. (Id. ¶¶ 17–18). After the hearing, the entire Merit Board reviews the record

and issues a written decision, subject to review under the Administrative Review Law. (Id.) When

the Department of Corrections seeks to dismiss a correctional officer, the person is entitled to a

Loudermill hearing. (Id. ¶ 19).

Department policies prohibit race discrimination in any employment decision, including

disciplinary decisions, and those who violate this guarantee are themselves subject to termination.

(Id. ¶ 21). The department, though, never reviews the discipline in comparable cases to ensure

disciplinary recommendations are free from discrimination, nor does any policy compel it do

conduct such a review. (Id.)

B. Plaintiffs

David Evans III. Evans was a correctional officer assigned to Tier 3-West at Cermak

Hospital. (Id. ¶ 30). On December 16, 2015, he was involved in an accident with a detainee who

used the arm of his wheelchair to break the glass in the door of the cell. (Id. ¶ 37). Evans entered

the cell with Lieutenant Matthew Koedyker. (Id.) When Evans tried to remove the other arm from

the wheelchair, the detainee attempted to block him. (Id.) In response, Evans allegedly struck the

individual on the head, causing him to fall to the floor. (Id. ¶ 38).

1 From 2015 to early 2016, a Disciplinary Review Board, comprised of members from several parties including Union

representatives, would inspect the investigation and make a disciplinary recommendation. (Id. ¶ 10).

Two complaints were submitted against Evans: Koedyker reported the incident to the

Superintendent, who filed a Complaint Register, and the detainee filed a separate Complaint

Register. (Id. ¶¶ 40–41). The OPR opened an investigation. (Id. ¶ 41). Evans claimed that he acted

in self-defense—the detainee, he said, attempted to use a wheelchair arm as a weapon and struck

at him with “closed handed strikes.” (Id. ¶ 43). Koedyker told a different story: he believed Evans

used excessive force. (Id. ¶ 42). OPR attempted to interview Evans without success. (Id. ¶ 44). In

the end, the office concluded that Evans used excessive force and that Evans’s official report was

inaccurate. (Id. ¶ 45). Undersheriff Zelda Whittler reviewed and approved the findings and

recommended Evans’s employment be terminated. (Id. ¶ 46). The Merit Board examined the video

evidence and listened to Koedyker testify but ultimately ordered Evans be reinstated to his

position. (Id. ¶¶ 48–49).

Tabas Jackson. On January 24, 2016, Jackson, also a correctional officer, allegedly

exchanged words with a detainee, Anthony Asare, who was seated with his hands cuffed behind

his back. (Id. ¶¶ 51–52). Jackson then grasped Asare by the throat. (Id. ¶ 52). Upon seeing the

throat-hold, Correctional Officer William Carnes grabbed Jackson’s harm to pull it off, while a

different detainee, Eddy Redmond, attempted to place his body between Jackson and Asare. (Id.)

Jackson then released his grip on Asare only to grab Redmond’s throat instead. (Id.)

Asare filed a Complaint Register against Jackson for choking him and Redmond. (Id. ¶ 53).

After reviewing surveillance video of the incident, Superintendent Salmon Martinez also filed a

Complaint Register. (Id.) OPR investigated the incident. (Id. ¶ 54). In a sworn interview, Jackson

denied every choking Asare and Redmond; instead, he claimed that he only placed his hands on

them to hold them down after they became agitated. (Id. ¶¶ 56–58). OPR concluded that Jackson

used excessive force; two other corrections officers along with Jackson failed to document or

notify their superiors of the incident; and Jackson made a false report and false statements in his

official report. (Id. ¶ 61). Undersheriff Whittler agreed with the findings and determined that

Jackson’s employment should be terminated. (Id. ¶ 62). The Merit Board, after a trial, ordered his

termination. (Id. ¶¶ 64–65).

Monta Servant. Servant was assigned to a housing unit for “acute psyche” detainees. (Id.

¶ 66). On April 2, 2015, Servant allegedly placed a detainee in a “chokehold” by grabbing him

from behind, placing his arm around the person’s neck, and pulling the detainee backward by the

neck. (Id. ¶¶ 68–69). Servant used this technique to walk the detainee down the hallway into an

isolation cell. (Id.) The Sheriff Office’s Orders, however, prohibit chokeholds except “as a last

resort … to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to the officer or another person.” (Id.

¶ 71). The detainee here was not engaging in aggressive behavior, so the use of a chokehold, if

proven, was unwarranted. (Id.)

On May 15, 2015, the Use of Force Review unit recommended supplemental training for

Servant. (Id. ¶ 72) As a result, OPR opened an investigation. (Id. ¶ 73). Servant denied, in his

sworn interview, ever using the maneuver. (Id. ¶ 74). OPR found that this characterization was

inaccurate and that the use of a chokehold was unjustified. (Id. ¶¶ 75–76). The disciplinary board

recommended that Servant’s employment be terminated, and Undersheriff Whittler agreed. (Id.

¶ 77). The Merit Board sided with Servant though—over the dissent of one member—and Servant

was allowed to return to work. (Id. ¶ 78).

Delphine Bridges. A detainee reported that Bridges took his property bag, ordered him

handcuffed, and hit him with her keys several times. (Id. ¶¶ 79–81). The video testimony

purportedly showed the detainee had a visibly swollen eye with red marks below the socket, and

he was at some point taken for medical attention and treated for swelling and a corneal abrasion.

(Id. ¶¶ 82–83).

The detainee submitted a Complaint Register against Bridges, and OPR began

investigating the allegations. (Id. ¶¶ 84–85) Bridges acknowledged interacting with the detainee

but denied causing him or his property any harm. (Id. ¶ 86). Nonetheless, OPR believed there was

enough evidence to sustain the misconduct allegations. (Id. ¶¶ 87–90) Surveillance video revealed

Bridges slapping the property bag out of the detainee’s hand, and although the video moved away

from the scene after that point, four other detainees corroborated the account in addition to the

medical records. (Id. ¶ 87). Thus, it concluded Bridges used impermissible force, never reported

the incident, made false statements, and neglected to help the detainee receive medical care. (Id.

¶¶ 89–90). Undersheriff Whittler recommended that her employment be terminated, and the Merit

Board agreed. (Id. ¶¶ 90, 99)

C. Procedural History

Plaintiffs sued Thomas J. Dart in his official capacity as Cook County Sheriff and Cook

County, bringing disparate treatment and disparate impact claims under Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964 (Counts I & II); equal protection and due process claims under § 1983 (Counts

III & IV); a § 1981 claim against Sheriff Dart (Count V); and indemnification from Cook County

(Count VI). (See generally Dkt. 1). The defendants moved to dismiss all counts for failure to state

a claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). This Court granted the motion for Counts I, II, and IV but denied

it for Counts III (equal protection), V (§ 1981), and VI (indemnification). (Dkt. 113 at 9). On Count

III, plaintiffs sufficiently alleged that the defendants did not ensure consistency in disciplinary

outcomes, resulting in discrimination against non-Caucasian officers because similarly situated

Caucasian officers received more lenient sanctions. (Id. at 5–6). And because the complaint stated

an equal-protection claim, plaintiffs’ § 1981 and indemnification claims survived, (id. at 7–9). The

defendants now move for summary judgment on the remaining three counts. (Dkt. 130).

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as

to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(a). The Court construes all facts in favor of the nonmoving party and does not “weigh

conflicting evidence, resolve swearing contests, determine credibility, or ponder which party's

version of the facts is most likely to be true.” Stewart v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 14 F.4th

757, 760 (7th Cir. 2021). The “one task and one task only” is to decide whether there is a “any

material dispute of fact that requires a trial.” Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 770–71 (7th Cir.

2003) (quoting Waldridge v. Am. Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 920 (7th Cir. 1994)). A genuine

issue of material fact exists when there is “sufficient evidence” for a jury to return a verdict in

favor of the nonmoving party. Birch|Rea Partners, Inc. v. Regent Bank, 27 F.4th 1245, 1249 (7th

Cir. 2022) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)).

DISCUSSION

I. Equal Protection Claim (Count III)

Plaintiffs seek to recover damages from the municipal defendants based on alleged

violations of the Equal Protection Clause. To succeed, they must show a deprivation of a federal

right that can be traced to a policy attributable to the municipality itself. Dean v. Wexford Health

Sources, Inc., 18 F.4th 214, 235 (7th Cir. 2021).

A. Underlying Constitutional Violation

Plaintiffs do not clearly articulate what federal right they were deprived of and how the

government caused the deprivation. They simply assert that “there is a widespread custom at the

CCSO of recommending discipline without controlling for race discrimination given to other

officers based on similar alleged misconduct.” (Dkt. 152 at 7). But no attempt is made to root this

statement in any constitutional provision, statute, or caselaw—mostly likely because no support

exists for the claim. The suggestion that the government must take affirmative steps to eradicate

disparate-impact racism runs counter to the general maxim that the Constitution is “a charter of

negative liberties.” Hilton v. City of Wheeling, 209 F.3d 1005, 1007 (7th Cir. 2000). The document

“creates areas in which the government has to let people alone; it does not entitle them to demand”

specific actions. Id.; see generally David P. Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights,

53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 864 (1986). More likely, plaintiffs mean to argue that the relevant

decisionmakers acted with an impermissible motive in doling out discipline to correctional officers

within the department, which if true and properly supported would violate plaintiffs’ federal rights.

Plaintiffs, however, cannot establish the necessary discriminatory purpose to make out a successful

claim.

The Equal Protection Clause provides no state “shall … deny to any person within its

jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV. A plaintiff alleging an

equal-protection violation “has the burden of proving ‘the existence of purposeful discrimination’”

based on race. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987) (quoting Whitus v. Georgia, 385

U.S. 545, 550 (1967)). An “official action will not be held unconstitutional solely because it results

in a racially disproportionate impact.” Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.

252, 265 (1977); see also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (“[T]he invidious quality

of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory

purpose.”). A “discriminatory purpose or intent” is required. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S.

352, 360 (1991) (quoting Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265). A “discriminatory purpose …

implies that the decisionmaker … selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action … ‘because

of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.” Personnel Adm’n of

Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (footnote omitted); see also Conley v. United States, 5

F.4th 781, 789 (7th Cir. 2021).

Plaintiffs lack any direct evidence that the decisionmakers within the Department of

Corrections acted with a discriminatory purpose in allegedly punishing them more harshly than

their white counterparts. Instead, they rely on comparisons of the disciplines between Black and

white employees. Putting aside the possibility that factual distinctions account for the different

penalties, the sole reliance on a form of rough statistics is insufficient to prevail here. “Only in

‘rare cases [has] a statistical pattern of discriminatory impact demonstrated a constitutional

violation.” Chavez v. Ill. St. Police, 251 F.3d 612, 647 (7th Cir. 2001). Statistical evidence might

be accepted as proof of an equal-protection violation in the selection of a jury venire for a particular

district, Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266, for statutory violations of Title VII, Bazemore v.

Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 400–01 (1986) (Brennan, J., concurring), and possibly for challenges to

legislative redistricting, Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 548–49 (1999). See generally Chavez,

251 F.3d at 647. This case, however, presents none of these circumstances. Therefore, the plaintiffs

have not shown how the decisionmakers in their respective cases acted with the requisite

discriminatory intent, and consequentially, they cannot demonstrate a violation of the Equal

Protection Clause.

B. Municipal Liability

Even if plaintiffs could establish that county decisionmakers discriminated against them

because of their race, they falter in their attempt to hold the municipal defendants directly liable

for the alleged violations of their constitutional rights. Section 1983 creates a private cause of

action to seek a remedy against “[e]very person” who under the color of state law “causes … the

deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A municipality is a “person” within the meaning of § 1983, but “the statute does not incorporate

the common-law doctrine of respondeat superior, so a municipality cannot be held liable for the

constitutional torts of its employees and agents.” First Midwest Bank Guardian of Est. of LaPorta

v. City of Chicago, 988 F.3d 978, 986 (7th Cir. 2021); see also Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs.,

436 U.S. 658 (1978). Rather, a municipality can only be liable “for its own violations of the federal

Constitution and laws.” LaPorta, 988 F.3d at 986 (emphasis added). A plaintiff seeking to hold a

municipality liable must establish three elements: a policy or custom (or lack thereof); municipal

fault; and a causal link between the alleged action and the deprivation of “rights, privileges or

immunities secured by the Constitution.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see also Dean, 18 F.4th at 235.

i. Municipal Action

A municipal “action” can come in one of three forms: “(1) an express policy that causes a

constitutional deprivation when enforced; (2) a widespread practice that is so permanent and well-

settled that it constitutes a custom or practice; or (3) an allegation that the constitutional injury was

caused by a person with final policymaking authority.” Dean, 18 F.4th at 235 (quoting LaPorta,

988 F.3d at 987). Alternatively, in rare cases, inaction can give rise to liability where “it reflects

‘a conscious decision not to take action.’” Id. (quoting Glisson v. Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 849 F.3d

372, 381 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc)). Plaintiffs rely on an inaction theory: specifically, the CCSO’s

failure to control for race discrimination in disciplinary recommendations. (Dkt. 152 at 9). The

“path to Monell liability based on inaction,” however, is much “steeper because, unlike in a case

of affirmative municipal action, a failure to do something could be inadvertent and the connection

between inaction and a resulting injury is more tenuous.” J.K.J. v. Polk County, 960 F.3d 367, 378

(7th Cir. 2020) (en banc). Therefore, “rigorous standards of culpability and causation must be

applied to ensure that the municipality is not held liable solely for the actions of its employee.”

Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 405 (1997).

ii. Municipal Fault

Municipal fault requires evidence that “policymakers were deliberately indifferent to a

known risk that [a] policy would lead to constitutional violations.” Hall v. City of Chicago, 953

F.3d 945, 950 (7th Cir. 2020). Deliberate indifference is “a high bar.” LaPorta, 988 F.3d at 986.

There are two limited means by which a plaintiff can establish culpability. Taylor v. Hughes, 26

F.4th 419, 435 (7th Cir. 2022). The first and most straightforward one occurs when the

municipality maintains an “express municipal policy or affirmative municipal action [that] is itself

unconstitutional.” Id. “In such cases, a single instance of a constitutional violation caused by the

policy suffices to establish municipal liability.” Id. The second method involves “situations in

which a municipality has knowingly acquiesced in an unconstitutional result of what its express

policies have left unsaid.” Id. On this path, a plaintiff must show either “a prior pattern of similar

constitutional violations,” Dean, 18 F.4th at 236, or—in rare and exceptional circumstances—that

“‘the unconstitutional consequences’ of municipal inaction are ‘so patently obvious that a city

could be liable under § 1983 without proof of a pre-existing pattern of violations,’” Taylor, 26

F.4th at 435–36 (quoting Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 64 (2011)).2

Plaintiffs chose to proceed exclusively on the most difficult path—that Cook County

maintained a policy in which it was patently obvious that unconstitutional consequences would

2 See also City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 824 (1985) (plurality); Bohanon v. City of Indianapolis, 46

F.4th 669, 677 (7th Cir. 2022); Stockton v. Milwaukee County, 44 F.4th 605, 616–18 (7th Cir. 2022); Quinn v. Wexford

Health Sources, Inc., 8 F.4th 557, 567–68 (7th Cir. 2021); Calderone v. City of Chicago, 979 F.3d 1156, 1164 (7th

Cir. 2020); Ruiz-Cortez v. City of Chicago, 931 F.3d 592, 599 (7th Cir. 2019); Glisson, 849 F.3d at 382; Chatham v.

Davis, 839 F.3d 679, 685 (7th Cir. 2016); Hahn v. Walsh, 762 F.3d 617, 638 (7th Cir. 2014).

occur. This decision is logical. It would be impossible to claim that a municipality both does not

have a policy and maintains one that is facially unconstitutional, and the record is devoid of any

prior pattern of similar constitutional violations. But, as explained above, rarely does a

municipality have a policy or lack of policy that is “so patently obvious that a city could be liable

under § 1983 without proof of a pre-existing pattern of violations.” Connick, 563 U.S. at 64.

The absence of a control system for race discrimination in CCSO disciplinary

recommendations did not create patently obvious constitutional deficiencies rising to deliberate

indifference. To begin, the CCSO had rigorous procedures to ensure fairness and accuracy

throughout the disciplinary process (which remain largely unchanged). First, the Office of

Professional Review conducted investigations into allegations of serious misconduct. Investigators

reviewed the alleged facts, interviewed witnesses, went over accompanying documentation, and

rendered a final opinion. (Dkt. 153 ¶¶ 4-5). The final report was sent to the Squad Director and

Executive Director, who both had the authority to disagree. (Id. ¶ 6). Second, the case went to the

Command Channel Review for a review of the investigation file and findings. (Id. ¶ 8). Third,

Undersheriff Whittler examined all the cases sent to her, looking for consistency in the

investigation and thoroughness of the report. (Id. ¶ 9). She then would either concur or decline to

concur. (Id.) If she declined to concur, the file would be sent back to OPR for additional action.3

(Id.) Fourth and finally, the Merit Board reviewed any punishment greater than a thirty-day

suspension, as only it could impose such a sentence. (Id. ¶ 15). When the CCSO filed a disciplinary

complaint before the board, a member was assigned to conduct a trial, where parties could call

witnesses, present evidence, and cross-examine witnesses. (Id. ¶ 18). The Board then made factual

3 For a brief time, a Disciplinary Review Board would also review the file before it was sent to the head of the

department; eventually, that added layer was removed, and the bureau chief took over the role from the Undersheriff.

(Id. ¶¶ 10, 13–14).

findings and issued a written decision, subject to additional procedures under the Administrative

Review Law. (Id.) In cases where the sought punishment was termination, the board conducted a

Loudermill hearing to determine whether the employee should be suspended without pay. (Id.

¶ 19).

This multistep procedure for imposing discipline could hardly be considered blatantly

unconstitutional, and the plaintiffs cannot point to any step in the process that inaction obviously

results in racial discrimination. Rather, it ensured just and fair results for correctional officers

accused of misconduct. Additionally, the CCSO has detailed rules to protect against the harms

alleged by plaintiffs. Specifically, it has written policies prohibiting racial discrimination, which

extend to employment decisions such as those involving discipline. (Id. ¶ 21). Employees violating

this protection—that is, any employee intentionally discriminating against another employee based

on race—can have their employment terminated. (Id.) The antidiscrimination policy also expressly

provides training and options for employees to report violations.

Moreover, uncontradicted expert testimony shows that the CCSO maintains accepted,

industry-wide standards for employee discipline and antidiscrimination. (Dkt. 131-77 at 11). A full

analysis of CCSO’s relevant documents indicated that they follow Illinois County Jail Standards,

as defined in the Illinois Administrative Code, the Performance-Based Standards for Adult Local

Detention Facilities, and the Core Jail Standards, an authority established by the American

Correctional Association. (Id. at 15). An agency “operating any local correctional/detention system

has enormous and complex responsibility for public safety.” (Id. at 16). The process in place

ensures “the development of a high-quality workforce” that considers the “unique facts of each

case in order to hold all staff accountable … and to help ensure the agency can achieve its public

safety mission and objectives.” (Id. at 17).

The Seventh Circuit has only recognized three instances where sufficient evidence existed

to establish a “patently obvious” policy, and each is readily distinguishable. See Polk County, 960

F.3d 367; Glisson, 849 F.3d 372; Woodward v. Corr. Med. Servs. of Ill., Inc., 368 F.3d 917 (7th

Cir. 2004). In J.K.J. v. Polk County, the municipality never created policies to detect and prevent

sexual assault committed by male guards against female inmates. 960 F.3d 367. Additionally, the

county was aware of sexual misconduct occurring in the jail; delivered a wholly inadequate

punishment for a guard who sexually assaulted inmates; and failed to develop or implement any

guidance on preventing, detecting, and responding to sexual assault. Id. at 381–84. Similarly, in

Glisson v. Indiana Department of Correction, the municipality had no protocols for “coordinated,

comprehensive treatment” that posed a danger to chronically ill inmates. 849 F.3d at 382. And

finally, in Woodward, the municipality barely, if at all, trained its employees on suicide prevention

and lacked any diligence in reviewing important mental health documents as well as adhering to

established standards. 368 F.3d at 927–28. But there are no such widespread gaps or pervasive

abandonment of duties here. CCSO never learned of any racial discrimination (a perennial problem

for plaintiffs’ argument) or entirely failed to discipline white offenders compared to their Black

colleagues. Furthermore, it developed and implemented a rigorous process to evaluate disciplinary

problems within the department, a process that conformed to industry-wide standards and was

closely adhered to.

iii. Causation

“It ‘is an explicit requirement of § 1983 and an uncontroversial application of basic tort

law’ that a plaintiff must prove that the defendant caused his injury.” Bohanon v. City of

Indianapolis, 46 F.4th 669, 677 (7th Cir. 2022) (quoting Thomas v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t,

604 F.3d 293, 306 (7th Cir. 2010)). Causation under Monell means the municipal action “was the

moving force behind the federal-rights violation.” Dean, 18 F.4th at 235 (quoting LaPorta, 988

F.3d at 987) (cleaned up); see also Brown, 520 U.S. at 404 (“[A] plaintiff ... must demonstrate a

direct causal link between the municipal action and the deprivation of federal rights.”). Moving-

force causation is a “rigorous causation standard that guards against backsliding into respondeat

superior liability.” LaPorta, 988 F.3d at 987. Here again, plaintiffs fall short of establishing Monell

liability because they cannot articulate how the use of a control matrix would have redressed their

specific injuries. See, e.g., Bohanon, 46 F 4th at 677 (emphasizing that the moving-force causation

standard “is particularly rigorous when the plaintiff claims that the municipality has not directly

caused the injury”). The absence of this causal link provides the final flaw in plaintiffs’ case.

II. Section 1981 and Indemnification (Counts V & VI)

This Court previously decided that the success of Plaintiffs’ § 1981 and indemnification

claims were linked. (Dkt. 113 at 7-9). The same is still true. Because the defendants are entitled

to summary judgment on the equal-protection claim, summary judgment in their favor is

appropriate on the remaining counts as well.*

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. (Dkt. 130).

cD oo

pace! Leathe

/ohjcs M. Kerrdall

Jnited/States District Judge

Date: September 29, 2022

Given this determination, there is no need to consider defendants’ alternative argument that one plaintiffs claims

(those of Servant) are barred by the statute of limitations. (Dkt. 131 at 14-15).

14