The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
JUSTIN MONTGOMERY, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) 21 C 6040
)
THE VILLAGE OF PHOENIX, ILLINOIS; ) Judge Charles P. Kocoras
ANTOINE ANDERSON, #101, Individually )
and Acting as Deputy Chief of the Village of )
Phoenix Police Department; and TRAH )
DAVIS, #42, )
)
Defendants. )
ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Village of Phoenix’s (“Village”)
Motion to Dismiss Count I of Plaintiff Justin Montgomery’s First Amended Complaint
(“FAC”) under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the following reasons,
the Court grants the Motion.
STATEMENT
For the purposes of this Motion, the Court accepts as true the following facts
from the FAC. Alam v. Miller Brewing Co., 709 F.3d 662, 665–66 (7th Cir. 2013). All
reasonable inferences are drawn in Montgomery’s favor. League of Women Voters of
Chi. v. City of Chi., 757 F.3d 722, 724 (7th Cir. 2014).
On the evening of March 5, 2020, while on duty in the Village of Phoenix,
Illinois, Officer Jarret Snowden of the Phoenix Police Department (“Phoenix PD”)
learned of a South Holland police broadcast that a white Dodge had eluded a traffic
stop. The alert was not associated with a violent crime or other felony, and the Phoenix
PD had no objective evidence of probable cause showing Montgomery was the driver
of the Dodge that was the subject of the alert. Snowden was parked near a gas station
when he saw Montgomery enter the gas station in a white Dodge.
Snowden followed Montgomery’s vehicle into the gas station and briefly parked
his patrol car behind Montgomery’s vehicle before leaving the station. Montgomery
went into the station to pay for his gas and returned to the pump. Approximately ten
minutes later, after Montgomery finished pumping his gas and was back in his car,
Snowden returned to the gas station and again parked his patrol car behind
Montgomery’s vehicle. At about that same time, an unmarked Phoenix PD SUV pulled
into the gas station and parked in front of Montgomery’s vehicle. No officer issued
commands to Montgomery or indicated in any way Montgomery was the reason for the
police presence at the gas station.
As Montgomery backed up so he could safely drive around the SUV, his vehicle
inadvertently hit Snowden’s patrol car. Neither vehicle sustained any damage, and no
officer said anything to Montgomery or signaled for him to stop driving as a result of
the minor collision. As Montgomery began to drive around the SUV, Defendant
Officers Anderson and Davis jumped out of the SUV and, without any warning, began
shooting at the windows of Montgomery’s vehicle. Montgomery, fearing for his life,
accelerated around the SUV and on to the street. Anderson and Davis continued
shooting at Montgomery, striking him in the arm, abdomen, and hip. They also shot
out the tires on Montgomery’s vehicle. Montgomery drove to his grandmother’s house
where he was later taken to a hospital by ambulance. Montgomery was arrested six
days later and charged with attempted murder, battering Defendants Davis, Anderson,
and Snowden, armed violence, and fleeing. The criminal complaint is still pending.
According to the FAC, the Phoenix PD hired Anderson and designated him as
Deputy Chief despite a long history of allegations and complaints related to excessive
violence associated with arrests, death of detainees, and tipping off a drug dealer about
an impending police raid. Davis was hired by the Phoenix PD after he was fired from
a different police department after an uncontested hearing in 2017 for not carrying his
police ID, the unauthorized carrying of a rifle, failure to wear his uniform, and
insubordination.
Montgomery alleges the Village’s hiring of the Defendant Officers, in addition
to another officer, Santos, who purportedly killed an alleged shoplifter in 2017, shows
a pattern of practice of either (1) “failing to perform even minimal background checks
that would unearth personality defects in officers that endanger the public’s Fourth
Amendment constitutional rights,” or, alternatively (2) “shows the Village is endorsing
those personality traits as examples of its view of how its police officers should view
the Fourth Amendment rights of citizens.” Dkt. # 19, ¶ 58. Montgomery says the
Village’s “history of using inadequately trained and incompetent police officers who
fail to respect the constitutionally acceptable use of force to affect an investigation or
arrest is demonstrated by its hiring of Anderson, Davis, and Santos and designating
Anderson as its Deputy Police Chief.” Id. ¶ 59.
Based on these events, Montgomery filed his two-count FAC, bringing a Monell
claim against the Village and a Fourth Amendment excessive force and unreasonable
seizure claim against the Defendant Officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Village
moves to dismiss the Monell claim in Count I for failure to state a claim.
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) “tests the sufficiency of the complaint,
not the merits of the case.” McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 694 F.3d 873, 878 (7th
Cir. 2012). The Court accepts as true well pled facts in the complaint and draws all
reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. AnchorBank, FSB v. Hofer, 649 F.3d
610, 614 (7th Cir. 2011). The allegations in the complaint must set forth a “short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 8(a)(2).
A plaintiff need not provide detailed factual allegations, but it must provide
enough factual support to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The claim must be described “in
sufficient detail to give the defendant ‘fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.’” E.E.O.C. v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d 773,
776 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,” are
insufficient to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009). A claim is facially plausible if the complaint contains sufficient
alleged facts that allow the Court “to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant
is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
To establish the Village’s liability for a Section 1983 claim under the Monell
doctrine, Montgomery must show: (1) a violation of his constitutional rights; (2) an
injury; and (3) that the injury and violation of rights was directly caused by the Village’s
own action or inaction. Bd. of Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty., Okla. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397,
404 (1997). Montgomery must establish that, “through its deliberate conduct, the
municipality was the ‘moving force’ behind the injury alleged. That is, [Montgomery]
must show that the municipal action was taken with the requisite degree of culpability
and must demonstrate a direct causal link between the municipal action and the
deprivation of federal rights.” Id. Montgomery can establish such a causal link in one
of three ways, by showing:
(1) the Village had an express policy that, when enforced, causes a
constitutional deprivation; (2) the Village had a widespread practice that,
although not authorized by written law or express municipal policy, is so
permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage within the
force of law; or (3) Montgomery’s constitutional injury was caused by a
person with final policymaking authority.
McCormick v. City of Chi., 230 F.3d 319, 324 (7th Cir. 2000).
Montgomery’s Monell claim, while somewhat convoluted, seems to be premised
upon the allegation that the Village’s policy or practice of hiring officers with allegedly
checkered pasts demonstrates deliberate indifference to Fourth Amendment rights, and
the hiring of the Defendant Officers directly caused the alleged violation of
Montgomery’s Fourth Amendment Rights. Montgomery does not point to an express
Village policy, nor does the FAC say anything of an individual with final policymaking
authority. There are no allegations of who within the Village PD made the decision to
hire the Defendant Officers. Thus, the Court must presume Montgomery is proceeding
under the second theory of Monell liability: a widespread custom or practice.
In establishing the existence of such a policy or practice, it is insufficient to
“splatter-paint a picture of scattered violations” through “collateral accusations of
marginally related incidents.” Carter v. Morris, 164 F.3d 215, 218–19 (4th Cir. 1999).
A court should carefully consider Monell allegations to ensure a plaintiff is not
“provid[ing] merely boilerplate Monell allegations in order to proceed to discovery in
the hope of turning up evidence to support his accusation.” Kowalski v. Cnty. of
DuPage, 2013 WL 4027049, at *2 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (Kocoras, J.). While Montgomery
identified three Phoenix PD officers who were hired despite having past records of
varying levels of misconduct with other police departments1, he has not directly
connected these hiring practices with the alleged violation of Montgomery’s Fourth
Amendment rights. Remember, Montgomery must plead facts showing the requisite
causation, meaning the alleged widespread practice of hiring officers with histories of
1 It is unclear from the FAC whether Santos was already a Phoenix PD officer when he killed an alleged
shoplifter in 2017, or if this incident took place prior to his employment with the Phoenix PD. If Santos
was already a Phoenix PD officer, then Montgomery’s allegations pertaining to Santos lend no support to
his claim of a supposed widespread practice of hiring officers with past histories of misconduct.
misconduct was the “moving force” behind his own constitutional injury. See Brown,
520 U.S. at 407. Here, Montgomery has failed to make that connection. Count I is
dismissed, without prejudice.
In his Response to the Motion to Dismiss, Montgomery seems to suggest he is
also trying to establish Monell liability based on a decision of a final policymaker that
caused his constitutional injury. Should Montgomery choose to amend his Monell
claim, he should take care to make it clear which theory of Monell liability he is
pursuing so the Village is on proper notice of the alleged wrongdoing.
Montgomery should also keep in mind that, with respect to an official
policymaker, “the cases limit liability under Section 1983 to situations in which the
official who commits the alleged violation of the plaintiff’s rights has authority that is
final in the special sense that there is no higher authority.” Gernetzke v. Kenosha
Unified Sch. Dist. No 1, 274 F.3d 464, 469 (7th Cir. 2001). The “mere unreviewed
discretion to make hiring and firing decisions does not amount to policymaking
authority” necessary to state a claim under Monell. Kujawski v. Bd. of Comm’rs of
Bartholomew Cnty., Ind., 183 F.3d 734, 739 (7th Cir. 1999)). Instead, there must be a
delegation of authority to set policy for hiring and firing, not a delegation of only the
final authority to hire and fire. Id. (collecting cases).
Furthermore, with respect to hiring decisions, “a finding of culpability simply
cannot depend on the mere probability that any officer inadequately screened will inflict
any constitutional injury. Rather, it must depend on a finding that this officer was
highly likely to inflict the particular injury suffered by the plaintiff. The connection
between the background of the particular applicant and the specific constitutional
violation alleged must be strong.” Brown, 520 U.S. at 412 (emphasis in original). “In
other words, a plaintiff must connect the dots between the past conduct and the specific
constitutional violation.” Wilson v. Cook Cnty., 742 F.3d 775, 783 (7th Cir. 2014).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons mentioned above, the Court grants the Village’s Motion to
Dismiss [20]. Count I of Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint is dismissed without
prejudice. Status is set for 7/14/2022 at 10:00 a.m.
It is so ordered.
Dated: June 28, 2022 C | | beta
Charles P. Kocoras
United States District Judge