Opinion

Primerica Life Insurance Company v. Wright-Delaine

Court
District Court, N.D. Illinois
Filed
Jun 6, 2022
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 21.0%

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

PRIMERICA LIFE INSURANCE )

COMPANY, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) No. 21 C 6558

v. )

) Judge Sara L. Ellis

LIBRA WRIGHT-DELAINE, )

MICHAEL HARDING BROWN, )

ARRIEN RICHARDSON, )

MARY MEADOWS, and )

NNEKA MALONE, )

)

Defendants. )

_______________________________________)

)

LIBRA WRIGHT-DELAINE, )

)

Cross-Claimant, )

)

v. )

)

MICHAEL HARDING BROWN, )

)

Cross-Defendant. )

ORDER

The Court grants in part and denies in part Defendant Michael Harding Brown’s motion

to dismiss [28]. The Court dismisses Count II of Primerica’s interpleader complaint [1] without

prejudice. See Statement.

STATEMENT

Plaintiff Primerica Life Insurance Company (“Primerica”) brought an interpleader

complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1335 to resolve the competing claims to certain life insurance

proceeds. Defendant Libra Wright-Delaine, the former beneficiary, filed a crossclaim against

Defendant Michael Harding Brown, the current majority beneficiary, alleging fraud and

requesting a constructive trust on the portion of the funds already dispersed. Harding Brown has

filed a motion to dismiss both Primerica’s constructive trust claim and Wright-Delaine’s entire

crossclaim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Because Primerica does not contest

dismissal of its constructive trust claim, the Court dismisses Count II of the interpleader

complaint without prejudice. Because Wright-Delaine has pleaded sufficient facts to put

Harding Brown on notice of the fraud allegations, the Court denies the motion to dismiss the

crossclaim.

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the complaint, not

its merits. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Gibson v. City of Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510, 1520 (7th Cir.

1990). In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court accepts as true all well-pleaded facts in

the plaintiff’s complaint and draws all reasonable inferences from those facts in the plaintiff’s

favor. Kubiak v. City of Chicago, 810 F.3d 476, 480–81 (7th Cir. 2016). To survive a Rule

12(b)(6) motion, the complaint must assert a facially plausible claim and provide fair notice to

the defendant of the claim’s basis. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); Adams v. City of Indianapolis, 742 F.3d 720, 728–29 (7th

Cir. 2014). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Fraud claims must also satisfy Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement, which requires a

party to “state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b);

Cornielsen v. Infinium Cap. Mgmt., LLC, 916 F.3d 589, 598 (7th Cir. 2019); AnchorBank, FSB v.

Hofer, 649 F.3d 610, 614–15 (7th Cir. 2011). “This ordinarily requires describing the ‘who,

what, when, where, and how’ of the fraud, although the exact level of particularity that is

required will necessarily differ based on the facts of the case.” AnchorBank, 649 F.3d at 615

(citation omitted).

Harding Brown seeks dismissal of Wright-Delaine’s entire crossclaim on the basis that it

does not meet the heightened fraud pleading standard of Rule 9(b). However, Wright-Delaine

has sufficiently alleged fraud. She pleads that Harding Brown “intentionally, maliciously, and

fraudulently created the Disputed Change of Beneficiary Form . . . for his own personal profit.”

Doc. 15 ¶ 34. She further pleads that she could not find her son’s insurance paperwork in the

house that he shared with Harding Brown, and that Harding Brown, who is an agent of

Primerica, would not answer any questions about the insurance policy except to say that she was

no longer a beneficiary. Id. ¶¶ 31–34. Wright-Delaine’s crossclaim “paint[s] a sufficiently

detailed picture of the alleged” uncomplicated scheme. AnchorBank, 649 F.3d at 616. Harding

Brown also seeks dismissal of Wright-Delaine’s constructive trust claim because it relies on the

fraud claim. Because the Court finds Wright-Delaine’s fraud count to be sufficiently pleaded, it

will not dismiss her constructive trust claim on this basis.

Date: June 6, 2022 /s/__Sara L. Ellis____________

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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