Caddo Systems, Inc. v. Siemens Aktiengesellschaft (AG)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

CADDO SYSTEMS, INC. and 511

TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,

No. 20 C 05927

Plaintiffs,

Judge Thomas M. Durkin

v.

SIEMENS AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT (AG)

and SIEMENS INDUSTRY, INC.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Caddo Systems, Inc. and 511 Technologies, Inc. (collectively, “Caddo”) filed

patent infringement claims against Siemens Aktiengesellschaft (AG) and Siemens

Industry, Inc. (“SII”). Siemens AG moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal

jurisdiction.1 Caddo opposed and moved for leave to conduct expedited jurisdictional

discovery in lieu of dismissal. For the reasons set forth below, Siemens AG’s motion

to dismiss is granted and Caddo’s motion for jurisdictional discovery is denied.

Background

Caddo’s complaint alleges infringement of six patents: U.S. Patent Numbers

7,191,411, 7,216,301, 7,640,517, 7,725,836, 8,352,880, and 10,037,127 (collectively,

the “Asserted Patents”). The Asserted Patents are alternatively titled “Active Path

1 SII separately moved for summary judgment on the claims against it, which the

Court granted. Caddo Sys., Inc. v. Siemens Aktiengesellschaft (AG), 2022 WL 444134

(N.D. Ill. Feb. 11, 2022).

Menu Navigation System” or “Active Path Navigation System.” The patents generally

claim methods for displaying graphical user menus, displaying items in a given menu

level, and enabling selection thereof via an invention Caddo refers to as an “active

path.” Caddo alleges that Siemens AG’s website practices the patented methods by

displaying a hierarchical menu system when users navigate to different sections of

the site. It does not identify any other Siemens AG products among its Accused

Instrumentalities. See R. 70.

Siemens AG is a foreign corporation based in Germany and organized under

German law. Its principal places of business are in Munich and Berlin. R 76-1 ¶ 3.

Siemens AG does not have any offices in the United States—it previously subleased

office space in Houston, Texas for Lisa Davis, a member of its Managing Board with

responsibility for the Siemens energy business. Between July 2014 and February

2021, Siemens AG was registered as a foreign entity doing business in the state of

Texas. R. 76-1 ¶ 10 n.3. Davis left the company in February 2020, at which time

Siemens AG closed its Houston office. Siemens AG contributed to a pension fund for

Ms. Davis through January 2021. R. 85-1 ¶¶ 11-13.

Caddo identified three individuals on LinkedIn it alleges are presently

employed by Siemens AG in the United States. R. 82-1 Exs. 22-24. At least two of

those employees appear to work for subsidiaries of Siemens AG, while the precise

employer of the third is unclear. According to declarations submitted by Siemens AG’s

in-house counsel Paul Salazar, the company has not employed anyone in the United

States since February 2020, when Ms. Davis left her board position. R. 76-1 ¶ 12; R.

85-1 ¶ 21.

Siemens AG holds thousands of U.S. patents. R. 82-1 Exs. 10-13. Caddo also

cited evidence that Siemens AG has entered into purchase contracts and license

agreements with at least one U.S.-based software vendor, Progress Software

Corporation (“PSC”). The software products Siemens AG purchased allegedly

encompass the .NET user interface components of the Accused Instrumentalities,

including the Siemens AG website. R. 97, at 2-3.

Siemens AG’s website was developed in and is managed from locations outside

the United States (it is hosted in Ireland). R. 85-1 ¶¶ 25-26. When a user accesses the

website, at least for the first time, the user is prompted to review and agree to a

Cookies Notice, a Privacy Notice, and certain Terms of Use. Acceptance of at least the

cookies policy is mandatory in order to use the website, and such use functionally

constitutes acceptance of the Terms of Use. The Privacy Notice informs users of

certain rights they have against Siemens AG, including the right to obtain

information regarding how their personal data is processed and the right to correct

inaccurate personal data. U.S. residents who access the website also have the right

to annually request a list of any personal data Siemens AG has disclosed to third

parties for direct marketing purposes in the previous year. R. 82-1 Exs. 3-7. The

Privacy Notice is required, to at least some extent, by the European Union’s General

Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”) and is included on other international versions

of the Siemens AG website. R. 85, at 5; R. 85-2 Ex. 6.

Siemens AG also enters into data protection agreements with its U.S.

subsidiaries and affiliates, which number in the dozens. These agreements entitle

users and customers in the U.S. to certain rights against Siemens AG regarding

protection of their personal data. R. 82-1 Ex. 5. Siemens AG claims that these

agreements are not directed toward the U.S., citing to a section that references the

GDPR and restricts its geographical scope to “companies located in the European

Union Area.” R. 85, at 5-6.

Caddo claims that Siemens AG’s website facilitates contacts with customers in

the U.S., including specifically in Illinois, in several ways. First, Caddo says the

website enables product sales with customers in the U.S. For example, Caddo alleges

that users can navigate the Siemens AG website to product listings for Siemens AG’s

“Desigo System,”2 including “valves and actuators,” “automation control,” and “room

thermostats,” and make purchases. The website also allows users to select “USA” as

a country of interest and create login profiles. R. 82-1 Exs. 19-24. Caddo further

alleges that Siemens AG’s website directs new and existing customers to

“RUGGEDCOM” sales representatives located in Illinois. R. 82-1 ¶ 24.

Next, Caddo claims Siemens AG uses its website to recruit potential employees

in the U.S. Specifically, Caddo cites to 39 job listings in Chicago, IL accessible through

Siemens AG’s website. R. 82-1 Ex. 25. Customers in the U.S. can also subscribe to

2 Desigo CC is a building management software program and is one of the Accused

Instrumentalities. It is discussed in more detail in the Court’s summary judgment

opinion. See Caddo Sys., 2022 WL 444134.

newsletters and printed publications by providing their contact information through

the website. R. 82-1 Ex. 26. Finally, customers can obtain product support, download

software and firmware updates, and obtain other product documentation through the

Siemens AG website. R. 82-1 Ex. 27.

Caddo also cites to Siemens AG’s 2020 Annual Report as evidence of U.S.-

focused activities. According to Caddo, the Report shows that Siemens AG attributes

billions of dollars in revenues to sales in the United States and engages in “the same”

research and development activities as its U.S. subsidiaries. R. 82-1 Ex. 8.

Siemens AG disputes several of these points at least in part. According to

Salazar, Siemens AG itself does not sell or market any products in the U.S.—rather,

its U.S.-based subsidiaries do so. It notes that several of the websites cited by Caddo

with various product listings are identified as belonging to its subsidiary, Siemens

Switzerland Ltd. Furthermore, RUGGEDCOM is a trademark of Siemens Canada

Ltd., which manufactures and sells those products. 85-1 ¶ 8; 85-2 Ex. 4. Siemens AG

does not control the day-to-day operations of these subsidiaries. R. 85-1 ¶¶ 5, 7.

Siemens AG responds that the Annual Report defines “Siemens” to includes both

Siemens AG and its subsidiaries. R. 85-1 ¶ 3. To what extent the revenue of Siemens

AG’s subsidiaries flows to Siemens AG itself is not immediately clear from the record.

As to the job listings, Siemens AG notes they are populated by its subsidiaries,

and that none of Caddo’s cited listings are solicited by Siemens AG itself. R. 85, at 2-

3. Siemens AG also notes that the cited newsletter page is a landing page that allows

users to select online newsletters from more than 100 countries. R. 85-1 ¶ 29.

Legal Standard

“[P]ersonal jurisdictional issues in patent infringement cases are reviewed

under Federal Circuit law, not regional circuit law.” Synthes (U.S.A.) v. G.M. Dos Reis

Jr. Ind. Com de Equip. Medico, 563 F.3d 1285, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2009).3 When a court

decides a Rule 12(b)(2) motion based on the submission of written materials without

holding an evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff must make a “prima facie case for

personal jurisdiction.” Grober v. Mako Prods., Inc., 686 F.3d 1335, 1345 (Fed. Cir.

2012); Autogenomics, Inc. v. Oxford Gene Tech., Ltd., 566 F.3d 1012, 1017 (Fed. Cir.

2009). “In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(2) motion, courts are not limited to consideration of

facts alleged in the complaint, but may also consider affidavits and other written

materials in the absence of an evidentiary hearing.” Indag GmbH & Co. v. IMA

S.P.A., 150 F. Supp. 3d 946, 956 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (citing Autogenomics, 566 F.3d at

1017). Courts must construe the pleadings and affidavits in the light most favorable

to the plaintiff. Avocent Huntsville Corp. v. Aten Int’l Co., 552 F.3d 1324, 1329 (Fed.

Cir. 2008).

Analysis

Siemens AG denies that it is subject to personal jurisdiction on Caddo’s

infringement claims anywhere in the United States. “Analysis of personal jurisdiction

in federal court begins with Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”

3 Because the Federal Circuit and Seventh Circuit are largely in harmony on personal

jurisdiction issues, Seventh Circuit cases remain strongly persuasive. See

Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Techtronic Indus. Co., Ltd., 2017 WL 3394741, at *3 (N.D.

Ill. Aug. 8, 2017).

Touchcom, Inc. v. Bereskin & Parr, 574 F.3d 1403, 1410 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Rule

4(k)(1)(A) states that service of process establishes personal jurisdiction over a

defendant “who is subject to the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the

state where the district court is located.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A). Under this

analysis, the federal court “analyz[es] the long-arm statute and governing principles

of the forum state.” Touchcom, 574 F.3d at 1410. Alternatively, Rule 4(k)(2) “allow[s]

a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant if (1) the plaintiff's claim

arises under federal law, (2) the defendant is not subject to jurisdiction in any state’s

courts of general jurisdiction, and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction comports with due

process.” Synthes, 563 F.3d at 1293-94. Because the Illinois long-arm statute “permits

its courts to exercise personal jurisdiction up to the limits of the Due Process Clause

of the Fourteenth Amendment,” this Court’s due process inquiry is nearly the same

under either rule. Kipp v. Ski Enter. Corp. of Wis., 783 F.3d 695, 697 (7th Cir. 2015)

(citing 735 ILCS 5/2-209(c)). The only difference is the relevant forum—the due

process analysis under Rule 4(k)(2) “contemplates a defendant’s contacts with the

entire United States, as opposed to the state in which the district court sits.” Synthes,

563 F.3d at 1295.

In determining whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with due

process, the “constitutional touchstone” is “whether the defendant purposefully

established ‘minimum contacts’” in the relevant forum. Burger King Corp. v.

Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.

310, 316 (1945)). “[I]t is essential in each case that there be some act by which the

defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the

forum . . ., thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” Hanson v. Denckla,

357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). “Contacts with the forum that are ‘random,’ ‘fortuitous,’ or

‘attenuated,’ or that result from the ‘unilateral activity of another party or third

person’ are not sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction.” Touchcom, 574 F.3d at

1412 (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475).

Caddo argues that the Court should evaluate Siemens AG’s motion under

4(k)(2). The first prong of this rule, that the plaintiff’s claim arises under federal law,

is clearly met. See R. 41 ¶ 1. The second prong is satisfied if the defendant is not

subject to personal jurisdiction in any state’s courts of general jurisdiction. This

requirement poses practical difficulties for both sides—it “either places a burden on

the plaintiff of proving a negative many times over, viz., that defendant is not subject

to jurisdiction in any of the fifty states, or requires that the defendant concede its

potential amenability to suit in federal court (by denying its amenability to suit in

any state court) or submit[ ] to jurisdiction in a particular state, an uninviting choice.”

Touchcom, 574 F.3d at 1413. Citing Rule 4(k)(2)’s purpose of closing the loophole by

which defendants could escape jurisdiction in federal court despite having minimum

contacts with the United States, the Federal Circuit adopted an approach from the

Seventh Circuit that permits a court to use Rule 4(k)(2) if the defendant contends

that it cannot be sued in the forum state and refuses to identify any other state where

suit is possible. Id. at 1415 (citing ISI Int’l Inc. v. Borden Ladner Gervais LLP, 256

F.3d 548, 552 (7th Cir. 2001).

Siemens AG clearly disputes personal jurisdiction in Illinois, and it has offered

no alternative state where it would be amenable to suit. Accordingly, this prong is

satisfied, and the Court may consider Siemens AG’s aggregate contacts with the

United States as a whole under Rule 4(k)(2).

The remaining prong asks whether the exercise of jurisdiction comports with

due process. Caddo claims Siemens AG has sufficient contacts with the United States

to establish general jurisdiction, or failing that, specific jurisdiction.

I. General Jurisdiction

“A court may assert general jurisdiction over foreign . . . corporations to hear

any and all claims against them when their affiliations with the [forum] are so

‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in the forum . . . .”

Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011). This

constitutional requirement is “considerably more stringent” than what is necessary

to show specific jurisdiction. Abelesz v. OTP Bank, 692 F.3d 638, 654 (7th Cir. 2012);

see also Avocent, 552 F.3d at 1330. “The Supreme Court has identified two ‘paradigm

all-purpose forums for general jurisdiction’ for a corporation: the state of the

corporation’s principal place of business or the state of its incorporation.” Indag, 150

F. Supp. 3d at 958. Outside these “easy cases,” general jurisdiction has been found

only on “exceptional facts.” See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 129 & n.8

(2014).

In its various submissions, Caddo identifies several “continuous and

systematic contacts” it claims Siemens AG has with the United States as a whole:

• Entering into cookies, privacy, and terms of use contracts with U.S.-based

users of Siemens AG’s website;

• entering into data protection agreements with its U.S. subsidiaries and

California citizens;

• attributing revenue to sales in the U.S.;

• applying for and holding U.S. patents;

• business registration and sublease of office space in Texas;

• employing and contributing to the pension fund of a Houston-based

Managing Board member;

• self-identification of certain U.S. residents as Siemens AG employees;

• posting open job listings in Chicago; and

• research and development activities in the United States.

R. 97, at 4 & n.3.

Several of these contacts can be disregarded or discounted. Ms. Davis, the

board member, left Siemens AG before this suit was filed, and Siemens AG closed its

Texas office at the same time (though its business registration continued for a short

time post-filing). The allegations of U.S. employees and job postings are also not

supported by the evidence. Siemens AG reviewed its corporate directory and

organizational chart and did not identify any of the identified individuals as Siemens

AG employees, and none of the job postings are from Siemens AG itself.

Siemens AG’s holding of U.S. patents also carries little weight in this

jurisdictional analysis. Caddo cites to two cases from this district that relied at least

in part on patent ownership to confer jurisdiction. See SRAM Corp. v. Sunrace Roots

Enter. Co., 390 F. Supp. 2d 781, 787 (N.D. Ill. 2005); Viskase Companies, Inc. v. World

PAC Int’l AG, 710 F. Supp. 2d 754, 760 (N.D. Ill. 2010). But both of those decisions

concerned specific jurisdiction, and the patents at issue in the core dispute were held

by the defendants. Patent ownership may subject a defendant to specific jurisdiction

in certain cases, but that does not mean general jurisdiction is appropriate on the

same basis. See Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 927 (“[T]ies serving to bolster the exercise of

specific jurisdiction do not warrant a determination that, based on those ties, the

forum has general jurisdiction over a defendant.”).

Furthermore, to the extent any of these contacts are carried out in the U.S. by

Siemens AG’s subsidiaries (for example, product sales or research and development

activities), they cannot simply be imputed to Siemens AG. The Supreme Court in

Daimler rejected such an agency theory that would “subject foreign corporations to

general jurisdiction whenever they have an in-state subsidiary or affiliate,” saying it

would “sweep beyond even the ‘sprawling view of general jurisdiction’” rejected in

Goodyear. 571 U.S. at 135-36. The establishment of subsidiaries as separate and

distinct legal entities is a key component of a corporation’s ability to “structure [its]

primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and

will not render [it] liable to suit.” Id. at 139 (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472).

Ultimately, even if the Court were to consider every plausible contact Caddo

identifies, it would be insufficient to establish general jurisdiction over Siemens AG

in the United States. The Supreme Court has held that even engaging in a

“substantial, continuous, and systematic course of business” in a forum is insufficient

to establish general jurisdiction, calling such a formulation “unacceptably grasping.”

Id. at 137-38; see also Abelesz, 692 F.3d at 656 (“The proper inquiry [for general

jurisdiction] is not … whether a defendant’s contacts ‘in the aggregate are

extensive.’”). Siemens AG’s U.S. contacts, considered in the aggregate, at most

demonstrate that it engages in some business (loosely defined) in the United States.

This makes a less compelling case than circumstances the Supreme Court has already

rejected and falls far short of rendering Siemens AG “essentially at home” in the

United States. See 571 U.S. at 136-39 (finding no general jurisdiction over German

car manufacturer in California despite 10% of U.S. sales and 2.4% of worldwide sales

occurring in California); BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1559 (2017) (finding

no general jurisdiction in Montana over railway company that maintained 2,000

miles of track and employed over 2,000 people in the state); see also Synthes, 563 F.3d

at 1297 (finding no general jurisdiction over foreign corporation that attended trade

show in U.S., purchased and sold some goods in the U.S., and engaged in domestic

consultations about product development). Accordingly, the Court cannot rely on

general jurisdiction over Siemens AG.

II. Specific Jurisdiction

The Federal Circuit uses a three-part test to evaluate the exercise of specific

jurisdiction. The test “considers whether (1) the defendant purposefully directed its

activities at residents of the forum, (2) the claim arises out of or relates to the

defendant’s activities with the forum, and (3) assertion of personal jurisdiction is

reasonable and fair.” Synthes, 563 F.3d at 1297.

As the second prong of this test suggests, contacts that do not relate to or

provide the factual basis for the plaintiff’s claim are not relevant to a specific

jurisdiction inquiry. See NexLearn, LLC v. Allen Interactions, Inc., 859 F.3d 1371,

1377 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Given this limitation, the Court must keep in mind exactly

what “contacts” make up the factual basis for Caddo’s infringement action. Caddo

alleges that its suit arose from the use of Siemens AG’s website by U.S. consumers

for various purposes, such as to facilitate the purchase of other products or provision

of technical support information. But this is not a typical “internet stream of

commerce” case where the allegedly infringing product was sold through a website.

See, e.g., Trintec Indus., Inc. v. Pedre Promotional Prods. Inc., 395 F.3d 1275 (Fed.

Cir. 2005); Original Creations, Inc. v. Ready America, Inc., 836 F. Supp. 2d 711 (N.D.

Ill. 2011). Here, the accused instrumentality is a feature of Siemens AG’s website

itself, not the products allegedly sold through it. As such, the analysis must be

cabined to contacts directly occasioned by use of the website itself, not the after-effects

of that use.

It is undisputed that Siemens AG’s website is neither managed nor hosted in

the United States. Furthermore, Caddo’s own evidence shows that several of the

specific websites it cited in support of its allegations regarding product sales are in

fact run by Siemens AG subsidiaries, such as Siemens Switzerland or Siemens

Canada. Nonetheless, the record shows that Siemens AG’s own website is clearly

accessible from the U.S., and any U.S. resident who uses it will at minimum encounter

the cookies notice, privacy notice, and terms of use supplied by Siemens AG itself.

The question is whether the website or its relevant functionalities are “purposefully

directed” at consumers in the United States.

In general, the mere existence of a website accessible from a particular forum

is insufficient to create the minimum contacts required for jurisdiction. NexLearn,

859 F.3d at 1378. There must be additional evidence that the defendant targeted the

subject forum. See id. at 1379-80; Am. Bridal & Prom Indus. Ass’n, Inc. v. The P’ships

& Unincorporated Ass’ns Identified on Schedule A, 192 F. Supp. 3d 924, 933 (N.D. Ill.

2016). Such evidence is lacking here. While Caddo need not show that the United

States was the only market for Siemens AG’s website, it cannot establish personal

jurisdiction on the basic fact that U.S. residents interact with the site. Any U.S.-

specific content is accessed by the actions of the user, who must select their particular

country or region from many options. This is not meaningfully different from the

inclusion of a state in a drop-down menu, which does not amount to “targeting.” See

NexLearn, 859 F.3d at 1378. Likewise, the cookies, privacy, and terms of use

agreements are imposed on all website visitors as a condition of use. The

jurisdictional significance of these routine or technical interactions, which are

increasingly pervasive, is questionable too. See, e.g., Shippitsa Ltd. v. Slack, 2019 WL

2372687, at *6-7 (N.D. Tex. June 5, 2019) (suggesting that website functionality that

merely facilitates communication via a web browser cannot be a basis for

jurisdiction).

The best evidence of purposeful direction toward the United States is the

inclusion of certain data protection and privacy provisions that are tailored to U.S.

residents. But these are difficult to distinguish from the routine agreements pushed

onto every website user as a simple condition of use—they just happen to apply to

specific users. And again, these provisions only come into play when a U.S. consumer

navigates to Siemens AG’s website, and comparable (if not identical) protections are

offered to users in other countries.

Caddo argues that the “interactivity” of Siemens AG’s website distinguishes it

from other cases that rejected jurisdiction based on merely “accessible” websites.

R.97, at 4-6.4 But the most interactive components Caddo has identified, such as

product-purchasing functionality, are provided by Siemens AG’s subsidiaries. Even if

the Siemens AG website is a starting point through which a user can navigate to

websites for those entities, this does not equate to conducting business with Siemens

AG. See GTE New Media Servs. Inc. v. BellSouth Corp., 199 F.3d 1343, 1350 (D.C.

Cir. 2000) (likening use of a website that directs consumers to other entities to

“searching a telephone book”). What remains are user-initiated requests for product

information or newsletters, which are insufficient for the reasons discussed above.

For these reasons, the record does not demonstrate that Siemens AG

“purposefully directed” its website at the United States, which defeats the first prong

of the specific jurisdiction test. The Court lacks jurisdiction over Siemens AG in this

case.

4 Caddo explicitly disclaims any reliance on the “sliding scale” approach to interactive

websites used in Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa.

1997). R. 97, at 5-6. This approach has not been adopted by either the Federal Circuit

or Seventh Circuit. See NexLearn, 859 F.3d at 1378 n.4; Illinois v. Hemi Grp. LLC,

662 F.3d 754, 758 (7th Cir. 2010).

III. Jurisdictional Discovery

Caddo requests that if the Court finds personal jurisdiction has not been

demonstrated, it should grant limited discovery on that issue rather than dismiss

Caddo’s claims outright. Regional circuit law governs a request for jurisdictional

discovery. Autogenomics, Inc. v. Oxford Gene Tech. Ltd., 566 F.3d 1012, 1021 (Fed.

Cir. 2009). In order to obtain jurisdictional discovery, a plaintiff must first “establish

a colorable or prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction.” Cent. States, Se. & Sw.

Areas Pension Fund v. Reimer Express World Corp., 230 F.3d 934, 946 (7th Cir. 2000).

“Foreign nationals usually should not be subjected to extensive discovery in order to

determine whether personal jurisdiction over them exists.” Id.

Jurisdictional discovery is not appropriate here because Caddo has not made

a colorable or prima facie case for jurisdiction. Notably, Caddo claims that the

discovery it seeks will support its argument for exercising general jurisdiction over

Siemens AG. See R. 97, at 6-7. The Supreme Court has expressed skepticism that

significant discovery should be necessary to determine where a corporation is subject

to general jurisdiction. See Daimler, 571 U.S. at 139 n.20 (“[I]t is hard to see why

much in the way of discovery would be needed to determine where a corporation is at

home.”). In any event, Caddo has not come close to showing that general jurisdiction

is be available here, and the discovery it seeks will not fill in the gaps.

As for specific jurisdiction, the degree to which the Siemens AG website creates

meaningful contacts with the United States is already evident without discovery.

Imposing burdensome discovery on a foreign corporation “at a stage where the district

court is trying to determine whether it has any power over the defendants” is not

appropriate when the central questions could be answered by ordinary pre-suit

investigation. Cent. States, 230 F.3d at 947. Accordingly, Caddo’s request for

jurisdictional discovery in lieu of dismissal is denied.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Siemens AG’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal

jurisdiction, R. 75, is granted. Caddo’s motion for jurisdictional discovery, R. 81, is

denied.

ENTERED:

Knee M Luchor

Honorable Thomas M. Durkin

United States District Judge

Dated: March 9, 2022

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