Endencia v. American Psychiatric Association

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

FRANCES ENDENCIA,

Plaintiff(s),

Case No. 21-cv-02360

v.

Judge Mary M. Rowland

AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC

ASSOCIATION, et al.

Defendant(s).

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Frances Endencia, a prolific litigator, owned the Pampered Pet Veterinary

Service, which she says experienced multiple break-ins between 1999 and 2007. After

one such break-in in 2005, she contacted the Streamwood Police. Apparently at the

police department’s recommendation, the Illinois Department of Financial &

Professional Regulation (“IDFPR”) required her to undergo a psychiatric evaluation.

As a result of the evaluation, the IDFPR suspended Endencia’s veterinary license.

Soon after, and seemingly unrelated, Endencia lost custody of her daughter. Endencia

has filed numerous lawsuits in this court stemming from the alleged break-ins, losing

her professional license, and losing custody of her daughter (now an adult). See

Endencia v. Am. Psych. Assoc., et. al., No. 1:19-cv-03161 (N.D. Ill. 2019); Endencia v.

Henry et. al., No. 1:18-cv-05477 (N.D. Ill. 2018); Endencia v. DCFS of Glen Ellyn et.

al., No. 1:18-cv-05476 (N.D. Ill. 2018); Endencia v. IDFPR et. al., No. 1-17-cv-003306

(N.D. Ill. 2017); Endencia v. IDFPR et. al., No. 1:17-cv-02045; Endencia v. ADT, et.

al., No. 1:08-cv-04541 (N.D. Ill. 2008).

Endencia brings this suit against over twenty defendants essentially

rehashing claims she previously asserted. The defendants who have filed

appearances have filed motion to dismiss and some have requested sanctions against

Endencia. [8], [15], [19], [24], and [29]. After the motions were fully briefed, Endencia

filed two motions to amend her complaint and requested leave to add new defendants.

[47], [51] and [68]. For the reasons explained below, the Court grants Defendants’

motions to dismiss and denies Endencia’s motions for leave to amend.

I. Claims

The Complaint is difficult to follow. Endencia purchased a veterinary practice

from PMH Partners in 1999. Dr. Joel Price, Dr. Joel Price Jr. and Dr. John Coyne

were apparently the previous owners. She alleges that PMH Partners is in conspiracy

with ADT, the security company. PMH and ADT “utilize psychiatrists & police

officers to frame their victims … to cause suspension of license and loss of income.

[This is what happened to Plaintiff-Frances.].” Dkt. 1 at 11.

In Count I, Endencia alleges that Defendants Knox Box Co. (Knox Box), ADT,

PMH Partners and Dr. Stafford Henry conspired to commit fraud against Endencia,

the citizens of the United States, and the court under both 18 U.S.C. § 1031(a)(2) and

the Civil RICO Act, 18 U.S.C. §1961. Dkt. 1 at 18. The fraud against her occurred

when Knox Box sold master keys to Defendant Bartlett Fire and Police Departments.

Endencia further alleges a fraud when defendants created local ordinances that

required business owners to provide keys (presumably to local authorities). Id.

Endencia references “consumer fraud” when she refers to § 1031, (Id. at 9), although

that statute governs fraud against the United States in contracting. Endencia alleges

ADT stole from her, hired law enforcement, illegally monitored their clients, had an

illegal exculpatory clause in its contract, and manually controlled the monitoring

devices in their clients’ businesses and homes. She also asserts that “courts” are a

part of this conspiracy. Id.

Count II asserts a claim of fraud upon the Court. Id. at 17. This claim arises

out of the 2008 administrative action where the Illinois Department of Financial and

Professional Regulation (IDFPR) suspended her license to practice veterinary

medicine. Id.

Count III also alleges fraud upon the court, this time based on the state court

proceedings involving Endencia’s daughter in 2009. Endencia brings this claim

against the state court judge, the Honorable Lisa Fabiano (Fabiano), the Zeke Legal

Clinic at Northern Illinois University1 (NIU), and attorney Wendy Vaughn2

(Vaughn), and Alexian Brothers Behavioral Health and its staff members Mohinder

Chadha and Tina Bhargava who prepared reports and/or provided testimony at the

2009 hearing. Endencia claims she was “not allowed to examine witness testimony or

interrogate before and during trial.” Id. at 18. Defendants NIU, Mohinder Chadha,

1 The Board of Trustees of Northern Illinois University (NIU) are correct that Zeke Legal Clinic is the

improper party because it is not an entity that can be sued, but rather a sub-entity of NIU. Pursuant

to Illinois law, when bringing a civil suit against NIU, the proper entity to sue is “The Board of Trustees

of Northern Illinois University.” See 110 ILCS 685 /30-40.

2 Vaughn represented Plaintiff’s mother in seeking an order of protection against Plaintiff and in the

guardianship matter regarding custody of Endencia’s teenage daughter. According to court records,

Judge Fabiano granted the order of protection and transferred guardianship of the minor to Plaintiff’s

sister. The guardianship terminated in June of 2010 when Plaintiff’s daughter turned 18.

Tina Bhargava and Alexian Brothers Behavioral Heath produced improper

psychological reports during the hearing. Endencia also asserts that Bill Maffy of

DCFS Glen Ellyn, Wheaton Youth Outreach (WYO)3 and its staff psychologist, Dan

Benyousky (Benyousky) caused “loss of affection of mother and child by informing

family members not to allow them to speak to each other since July 2009.” Id. at 18.

Endencia asserts these same allegations in support of an “alienation of affection”

claim in Count V. Id. at 19-20.

Endencia brings Count IV under a criminal statute, Unborn Victims of

Violence Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1841, asserting that Benyousky “orchestrated the stress”

that caused her daughter, Altessia, to have a miscarriage “by surrounding her with

people who placed psychological violence to cause the death of her child.” Id. at 19.

In Count VI, Endencia brings a claim for “attempt[] murder by Rockford Police

officer.” Id. She does not assert any facts to support this claim but cites a state case:

People of State of Ill. V. Endencia, No. 1 2009-cf-000228 (Cir. Ct. 17th 2009).

Count VII does not name any defendants but criticizes the current practice of

psychiatry. According to Endencia, psychiatry dehumanizes patients while

psychiatrists corroborate with each other for financial gain, and are strategically

located within law enforcement, among other things. Id. at 20. It is potentially aimed

at the American Psychiatric Association (“APA”).

3 According to Defendant, Wheaton Youth Outreach (WYO) is not a legal entity but is a name used by

Outreach Community Ministries, Inc., an Illinois not-for-profit entity. (Dkt. 20 at 2 n. 1). The Court

will use (WYO) in this motion.

All defendants assert Endencia has failed to state a claim under Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). ADT and Wheaton Youth Outreach, both of which have

been sued several times by Endencia, assert res judicata and statute of limitations.

ADT, as it has previously, also relies on an exculpatory provision in its contract. The

defendants involved in the child custody action rely on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,

and the Honorable Lisa Fabiano asserts absolute judicial immunity.

II. Standard

A motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of a complaint, not the merits of the case.

Gibson v. City of Chi., 910 F.2d 1510, 1520 (7th Cir. 1990). “To survive a motion to

dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the complaint must provide enough factual information

to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face and raise a right to relief above

the speculative level.” Haywood v. Massage Envy Franchising, LLC, 887 F.3d 329,

333 (7th Cir. 2018) (quotations and citation omitted). See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)

(requiring a complaint to contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing

that the pleader is entitled to relief.”). A court deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion accepts

plaintiff’s well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draws all permissible

inferences in plaintiff’s favor. Fortres Grand Corp. v. Warner Bros. Entm't Inc., 763

F.3d 696, 700 (7th Cir. 2014). A plaintiff need not plead “detailed factual allegations”,

but “still must provide more than mere labels and conclusions or a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action for her complaint to be considered

adequate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8.” Bell v. City of Chi., 835 F.3d 736,

738 (7th Cir. 2016) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Dismissal for failure to state a claim is proper “when the allegations in a

complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief.” Bell Atl.

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1966 (2007). Deciding the

plausibility of the claim is “‘a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court

to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.’” McCauley v. City of Chi., 671

F.3d 611, 616 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679, 129 S. Ct.

1937, 1950 (2009)). In addition, the Court construes the pro se complaint liberally,

holding it to a less stringent standard than lawyer-drafted pleadings. Cesal v. Moats,

851 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017).

III. Analysis

A. Count I

Endencia’s first claim is brought under 18 U.S.C. § 1031(a)(2) (fraud against the

United States in contracting) and 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (RICO). It is not clear from

Endencia’s complaint or her response briefing how any Defendant has legally

committed a criminal fraud on the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1031. As

ADT notes, that statute does allow for private civil actions to address discrimination

in “employment by an employer because of lawful acts done by the employee… in

furtherance of a prosecution under [Section 1031].” 18 U.S.C. § 1031(h)(1) (emphasis

added). But there are no allegations in the complaint that involve an employment

relationship between Plaintiff and any defendant or that allow any inference of a

fraud being committed on the United States.

Count I also relies on RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1961 and § 1962(c), to assert a claim. It

is well-settled that a RICO violation under §1962 requires “(1) conduct (2) of an

enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity.” Sedima, S.P.R.L. v.

Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 496 (1985). Furthermore, §1961 clarifies that a pattern

of racketeering activity consists of at least two predicate acts of racketeering

committed within a ten-year period. Midwest Grinding Co. v. Spitz, 976 F.2d 1016,

1019 (7th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted).

In addition, the law requires RICO claims to be pled consistent with Fed. R. Civ.

P. 9(b). This requires Endencia to allege “1) the precise statements, documents, or

misrepresentations made; (2) the time and place of and person responsible for the

statement; (3) the content and manner in which the statements misled the Plaintiffs;

and (4) what the Defendants gained by the alleged fraud.” Ambrosia Coal & Constr.

Co. v. Pages Morales, 482 F.3d 1309, 1316-17 (11th Cir. 2007); See also Goren v. New

Vision Int'l, Inc., 156 F.3d 721, 726 (7th Cir.1998) (holding allegations of fraud in a

civil RICO complaint are subject to the heightened pleading standard of Fed. R. Civ.

P. 9(b), which requires a plaintiff to plead all averments of fraud with particularity.”).

Endencia alleges that ADT steals from its clients, “hires local law enforcement”,

and conspires with “the courts” to enforce the exculpatory provision in its contract.

Dkt. 1 at 16. She asserts that “ADT [ ] has been stealing from their own clients,” and

“the Knox [sic] Box Co[.] [ ] has been selling the Knox Rapid Access System master

locks to fire departments in USA [sic] and create local village ordinances requiring

business owners provide keeps to the fire department.” Dkt. 1 at 16. These allegations

fail to plausibly allege the existence of an enterprise that affects interstate commerce.

Count I is dismissed.

C. Count II

Endencia’s second count charges “fraud against the court” and cites to IDFPR

v. Endencia, No. 2005-01942. She claims that PMH Partners, the entity from which

Endencia purchased her veterinary practice, and its owners were responsible for the

indefinite suspension of her veterinary license. Dkt. 1 at 2, 17. She further alleges

that “the psychiatric medical record had grossly distorted facts to create the

diagnosis” and refusal of medication caused the suspension of her license. Id.

To assert fraud upon the court, Endencia must allege conduct that “seriously

affects the integrity of the normal process of adjudication . . . defile[s] the court itself

or that is perpetrated by officers of the court so that the judicial machinery cannot

perform in the usual manner its impartial task of adjudging cases.” United States v.

Hosseini, No. 05 CR 254, 2016 WL 1569412, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 19, 2016). It is clear

from this and prior cases that Endencia disagrees with Dr. Henry’s diagnosis. See

Endencia v. Henry et. al., 18-cv-05477 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (Dow, J). But Endencia does

not allege how any court was defrauded by any medical findings. In fact, Count II

states that after her license was suspended: “she sought several psychiatric

evaluations, only to discover medicalization, lack of science in creating psychiatric

disorders (aka diagnosis), and the psychiatric medical record had grossly distorted

facts to create the diagnosis. Dr Alex Reynish of Behavioral Health Care Associates

charged her $1,500. He refused to contradict Dr Henry's report…” Id. at 17. These

allegations do not show that any person impacted the integrity of the judicial process.

Count II is dismissed.

D. Counts III through V

Counts III and V focus on the custody hearing regarding her daughter,

Altessia, in 2009. They assert fraud on the court and alienation of affection,

respectively. Dkt. 1 at 18 – 19. Count IV asserts a claim under the Unborn Victims of

Violence Act on behalf of her daughter who had a miscarriage.

Count III alleges that attorney, Wendy Vaughn, and Zeke Legal Clinic at NIU,

“produced witness [sic] plaintiff never met and saw before trial.” Dkt. 1 at 18.

Endencia also alleges that psychiatric reports were provided without proper

interviews and the court improperly overruled objections made by Endencia. Id. Not

only do Endencia’s assertions fail to state a plausible claim of fraud upon the court,

but federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to review state court proceedings

under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Under Rooker-Feldman, it is well-settled that

courts, except for the Supreme Court, lack jurisdiction to upset the judgments of state

courts. Endencia cannot attack the state court custody proceedings in this court. See

also Guyinn v. City of Indianapolis, 79 Fed. Appx. 233, 234 (7th Cir. 2003) (“proper

remedy for fraud on the court … is a request that the rendering court reopen its

judgement. Collateral attack in a different judicial system is not an option.”). The

Court lacks jurisdiction to consider claims attacking the state court guardianship

proceedings.

Additionally, Endencia has named the state court judge, the Honorable Lisa

Fabiano. Fabiano is protected by absolute judicial immunity. See Dawson v. Newman,

419 F. 3d 656, 660-61 (7th Cir. 2005) (granting judicial immunity to defendant judge

named for making judicial decision and using her discretion in her official role).

Kowalski v. Boliker, 893 F.3d 987, 999 (7th Cir. 2018) (judicial immunity applies to

an Illinois judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County). Endencia takes issue with

Judge Fabiano’s evidentiary rulings and findings. Fabiano is entitled to judicial

immunity. Count III is dismissed with prejudice.

In Count IV Endencia attempts to state a claim against psychotherapist

Benyousky under the Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2004. 18 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1).

This criminal statute does not provide a private cause of action.4 Count IV is

dismissed with prejudice.

Lastly, Endencia’s claim for “alienation of affection” in Count V also fails. She

asserts that the named defendants manipulated her daughter causing her to refuse

to visit or speak with Endencia. Dkt. 1 at 19. There is no state or federal cause of

action for alienation of affection. Illinois abolished the law allowing recovery for this

tort in 2016. See 740 ILCS 5/7.1(b) (“An action may not be brought for alienation of

affections based on facts occurring on or after the effective date of this amendatory

Act of the 99th General Assembly.”).5 Further, when this tort existed in Illinois, it

4 Even if there was a cause of action available, Endencia would not have standing to bring it and she

does not state coherent facts that plausibly implicate Benyousky. Endencia states that Benyousky

“orchestrated the stress to cause the death of Altessia’s unborn child by surrounding her with people

who placed psychological violence to cause death of her child.” Dkt. 1 at 19.

5 The conduct Endencia complains about took place after 2006.

was limited to loss of affection between spouses. See Roberts v. Zemen, 191 F.R.D. 575

(N.D. Ill. 2000) (“[T]he elements [include] love and affection of the spouse for the

plaintiff.”) (emphasis added). Count V is dismissed with prejudice.

E. Count VI

Liberally construing Count VI, Endencia brings a claim against an unknown

Rockford police officer for attempting to murder her. Endencia does not state facts,

allegations, or background for this claim. She simply provides a citation to a 2009

Illinois state case, People of State of IL. [sic] v. Endencia, No 1 2009-CF-000228.

Simply citing a thirteen-year-old case without any allegations or facts is well below

the required standard under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. In a response brief, Endencia states

that an officer attempted to kill her “utilizing the hold that killed George Floyd” when

she was attempting to pick her daughter up from college. Dkt. 34 at 4. Even with

these additional facts, it is not clear what cause of action Endencia is attempting to

bring, or against whom. Furthermore, any case arising out of 2009 as the citation to

the Illinois case implies, would be barred by the status of limitations. For this reason,

Count VI is dismissed with prejudice.

F. Count VII

Endencia’s last claim, a rambling indictment of psychiatric medicine also fails.

She argues that the practice of psychiatry causes brain pathology, dehumanizes

patients and that doctors share medical records. Dkt. 1 at 20. She states that because

psychiatry is not based on science “it is a consumer fraud against the United States.”

Id. She claims that the practice is a violation of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 21.

She does not name any particular defendant, allege dates of bad acts or plead any

detail other than taking issue with the industry. This Count is perhaps aimed toward

the APA. While Endencia is free to have an opinion on the medical industry, that is

not a sufficient basis to bring a claim to federal court. Count VII is dismissed with

prejudice.

G. Res Judicata as to certain claims

Several defendants raise res judiciata as a basis to dismiss certain claims. Res

judicata bars all claims that arise from the same core of operative facts, regardless of

whether later suits assert different legal theories. See White v. Ill. State Police, 15

F.4th 801, 809 (7th Cir. 2021). The test stems from the rule that a party must allege

in one proceeding all claims for relief arising out of a single occurrence or be precluded

from pursuing them in the future. Bernstein v. Bankert, 733 F.3d 190, 227 (7th 2013);

see also Nalco Co. v. Chen, 843 F.3d 670, 674 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing Restatement

(Second) of Judgments § 24 (1982)). If the doctrine applies, the plaintiff is barred

from raising not only every matter that was actually determined in the first suit, but

also every matter that might have been raised and determined in that suit. Parungao

v. Cmty. Health Sys., 858 F.3d 452, 457 (7th Cir. 2017) (internal citations and

quotation omitted).

Res judicata precludes Endencia from raising her claims regarding (1) her

purchase of her veterinary business, (2) the alleged thefts at her business that

resulted in her undergoing a psychiatric evaluation; (3) the loss of her license.

Endencia’s efforts to repackage the same facts into different legal theories is exactly

what is disallowed by res judicata. These matters have been litigated repeatedly and

any claims that could have been made are now precluded. See Endencia v. APA et al,

19-3161 2019 WL 4934601 (N.D.Ill. Oct. 7, 2019) (Rowland, J.), aff’d, 2020 WL

6386595 (7th Cir. 2020) (challenging the loss of her professional license under the

Federal Trade Commission Act and as negligent misrepresentation); Endendia v.

Henry et al, 18-5477 (Oct. 24, 2018) (Dow, J.) (fraud claims against ADT and PMH

Partners and others challenging the purchase of the veterinary practice); and

Endencia v. Rush Behavioral Health, 2014 IL App (1st) 132129-U, appeal denied,

2015 Ill. LEXIS 573 (Ill. 2015), cert. denied, 2015 U.S. LEXIS 7658 (U.S., Nov. 30,

2015). Counts I and II are therefore dismissed with prejudice.

H. Sanctions

Defendants APA and Wheaton Youth Outreach have requested sanctions in

the form of attorney’s fees or an order barring Endencia from bringing suits in this

Court without prior leave of court. Dkt. 8; Dkt. 19. The Seventh Circuit is clear that

district courts maintain discretion to grant sanctions. See Brown v. Federation of

State Medical Bds. of the United States, 830 F.2d 1429, 1438 (7th Cir. 1987); See also

See McCready v. eBay, Inc., 453 F.3d 882, 892 (7th Cir. 2006) (recognizing the

inherent power of the courts to sanction litigants who have “abused the judicial

process with frivolous litigation” and caused “the harassment of opposing parties”

and “waste[d] . . . limited and valuable judicial resources”); See, e.g., In re Anderson,

114 S. Ct. 1606, 1608 (1994) (holing that any sanction imposed by a federal court for

the abuse of its process should be tailored to the abuse). Further, pro se litigants are

not immune from sanctions. See Support Sys. Int’l, Inc. v. Mack, 45 F.3d 185, 186 (7th

Cir. 1995).

This Court will not, on its own, require pre-filing review of Endencia’s filings.

But the Court will forward a request to the Northern District of Illinois Executive

Committee to determine whether Endencia should be classified as a restricted filer

based on her prolific and unsuccessful, essentially frivolous litigation track record.6

If deemed a restricted filer, all future filings by Endencia would be reviewed pursuant

to Northern District of Illinois procedures. The Court declines to award fees.

IV. Motion to Amend and Motion to Add Defendants

The Court denies Endencia’s motions to amend or correct the complaint or to

add additional defendants. [51], [68]. Leave of the court to amend may be “freely

give[n]” “when justice so requires”. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Denial of an amendment

is appropriate, however, when an amendment would be futile. Villars v. Kubiatowski,

128 F. Supp. 3d 1039, 1043 (N.D. Ill. 2015). An amended complaint is futile if it

asserts the same facts, asserts a previously determined claim, fails to state a valid

theory of liability, or could not withstand a motion to dismiss. Id. (citing Bower v.

Jones, 978 F.2d 1004, 1008 (7th Cir. 1992)). See also Li v. Illinois Dep’t. of Financial

6 In addition to the federal claims listed previously, the court is aware of the following state court

matters: Endencia v. Rush Behavioral Health, 2014 IL App (1st) 132129-U; Endencia v. Wells Fargo

Bank, 93 N.E.3d 1062 (Ill. 2017); Endencia v. Rush Behavioral Health, 577 U.S. 1008, 136 S. Ct. 554,

193 L. Ed. 2d 429 (2015); Endencia v. Adtalem Glob. Educ., Inc., 2021 IL App (2d) 200378-U; Endencia

v. Illinois Dept. of Prof'l Regulation, 391 Ill. App. 3d 1110, 982 N.E.2d 984 (1st Dist. 2009), aff’d

Endencia v. Vill. of Streamwood, Ill., 565 U.S. 939, 132 S. Ct. 445, 181 L. Ed. 2d 253 (2011); Endencia

v. Arce, 141 S. Ct. 2626, 209 L. Ed. 2d 753 (2021); Endencia v. Vill. of Streamwood, 949 N.E.2d 658

(Ill. 2011); Endencia v. Wells Fargo Bank, 138 S. Ct. 1994, 201 L. Ed. 2d 256 (2018);

and Professional Regulation, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48734, at *17 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 23,

2018) (denying leave to amend because amendment would be futile).

Neither Endencia’s motion to amend nor her proposed amended complaint

demonstrate that the defects in this case would be cured by the amended complaint.7

To the contrary, her proposed third amended complaint is more unintelligible than

her original complaint. It raises the same counts against largely the same defendants.

Unlike the operative Complaint, it cites to case authority and to the Bible.

Significantly, Endencia did not respond to any of the deficiencies raised by

Defendants’ motions. Instead, her amended complaint raises the same claims with

further unclear details regarding her past.

Additionally, Endencia requests to add new defendants, IDFPR Administrative

Judge Jeffrey Canavan and the American Medical Association (AMA). [68]. She

requests to add the American Medical Association for supporting consumer fraud by

silence, and Judge Canavan for indefinitely suspending her veterinary license. Dkt.

68 at 1. The Court finds that adding these defendants would be futile and therefore

denies the motion.

Both Endencia’s motion to amend and her motion to add defendants are denied.

V. Conclusion

For the reasons explained herein, the Court grants Defendants’ motions to

dismiss. [8], [15], [19], [24], and [29]. The requests for sanctions are denied but the

7 On December 8, 2021, Endencia requested leave to file a Third Amended Complaint and included the

proposed complaint. [47]. A week later, on December 15, 2021, she again sought leave to amend her

complaint but did not attach a proposed updated version of the complaint. [51].

Court will refer Ms. Endencia to the Executive Committee of the Northern District of

Illinois for a determination whether she should be classified as a restricted filer. The

Court denies Endencia’s motions for leave to amend and add defendants. [51], [68].

The Clerk is directed to substitute The Board of Trustees of Northern Illinois

University for Zeke Legal Clinic. The Clerk is directed to enter judgement in favor of

all the Defendants.® Civil case terminated.

ENTER:

Dated: January 11, 2022 Marg [Vi bo L/

MARY M. ROWLAND

United States District Judge

8 It appears all defendants were served improperly as notice was sent via United States Postal Service.

The following defendants have not appeared in this suit: PMH partners; Dr. Joel Price, Sr.; Dr. Joel

Price, Jr.; Dr. John Coyne (DVM); Dan Maloney; Dr. Stafford Henry; the Knox Company; Dan

Benyousky; Alexian Brother Behavioral Health; Nathan Hamacek; Bartlett Fire/Police Department;

James Keegan; Mandarino; Laura Siedleski; Steve Kisch; Bill Maffy of DCFS Glen Ellyn; DCFS Glen

Ellyn; and Mohinder Chadha. These defendants are dismissed with prejudice based on res judicata,

failure to state a claim and the futility of any amendment. Haywood v. Massage Envy Franchising,

LLC, 887 F.3d 329, 335 (7th Cir. 2018) (“[C]ourts are within their discretion to dismiss with prejudice

where a party does not make [a] showing [that the party might cure the defects in the complaint].”);

Lt v. Illinots Dep't. of Financial and Professional Regulation, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48734, at *17

(N.D. Il. Mar. 23, 2018) (finding claim preclusion barred plaintiff's action against two defendants who

had not yet appeared).

16