Trexler v. City of Belvidere

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

WESTERN DIVISION

Tyler Trexler, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) Case No. 20 CV 50113

v. )

) Magistrate Judge Lisa A. Jensen

City of Belvidere, et. al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Defendant City of Belvidere has moved to bifurcate and stay discovery on Plaintiff’s

Monell claim. Dkt. 42. For the following reasons, the motion to stay discovery on Plaintiff’s

Monell claim is denied. The motion to bifurcate the Monell claim for trial is denied without

prejudice as premature. Any motion to bifurcate the Monell claim at trial may be presented to the

District Judge after fact discovery is complete.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Tyler Trexler’s suit against Defendants City of Belvidere (“the City”) and

Brandon Parker alleges that, on August 9, 2018, he was stopped, kicked by Defendant Parker, and

bitten by Defendant Parker’s K9. Plaintiff alleges unreasonable seizure and excessive force claims

against Defendant Parker. He also alleges a Monell claim and an indemnification claim against the

City. Plaintiff’s Monell claim alleges that the City has the following unconstitutional practices,

policies, and customs: arbitrary use of excessive force; preparing false and incomplete police

reports and/or not preparing police reports to cover up police misconduct; filing false charges and

pursuing baseless prosecutions; maintaining a code of silence in which police officers fail to report

police misconduct; applying the code of silence so that police officers either remain silent or give

false and misleading information to cover up misconduct; failing to adequately train, supervise,

and discipline police officers; failing to adequately investigate citizen complaints against police

officers; and failing to adequately discipline police officers for misconduct.

Before the Court is the City’s motion to bifurcate Plaintiff’s Monell claim pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b) and stay any further Monell discovery pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 26(d).

II. DISCUSSION

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b) provides “[f]or convenience, to avoid prejudice, or

to expedite and economize, the court may order a separate trial of one or more separate issues,

claims, crossclaims, counterclaims, or third-party claims.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b). The Seventh

Circuit has emphasized that only one of the above criteria, prejudice or judicial economy, needs to

be satisfied for a court to grant bifurcation “as long as doing so will not prejudice the non-moving

party or violate the Seventh Amendment.” Chlopek v. Fed. Ins. Co., 499 F.3d 692, 700 (7th Cir.

2007). The district court has considerable discretion in deciding whether to bifurcate claims.

Krocka v. City of Chicago, 203 F.3d 507, 516 (7th Cir. 2000). In recent years, motions to bifurcate

Monell claims have become “commonplace” and there is a growing body of precedent for both

granting and denying bifurcation of Monell claims in § 1983 cases. See Williams v. City of Chi.,

315 F. Supp. 3d 1060, 1080 (N.D. Ill. 2018); see also Giles v. Ludwig, No. 12-CV-6746, 2013 WL

6512683, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 6, 2013). However, “[b]ecause bifurcation risks additional delay, it

has remained the exception and not the rule.” Tate v. City of Chi., No., 18 CV 07439, 2019 WL

2173802, at *3 (N.D. Ill. May 20, 2019) (quotation and citation omitted). “[T]he decision to grant

or deny bifurcation is a heavily fact-intensive analysis, dependent upon costs and benefits

of bifurcation under the unique circumstances of each case.” Awalt v. Marketti, No. 11 C 6142,

2012 WL 1161500, at *10 (N.D. Ill. April 9, 2012). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(d) also

permits a court to stay discovery on Monell claims. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d); see also, e.g., Horton v.

City of Chi., No. 13-CV-6865, 2016 WL 316878, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 26, 2016); Saunders v. City

of Chi., 146 F. Supp. 3d 957, 968 (N.D. Ill. 2015).

A. Judicial economy

i. Individual liability requirement

The City argues that bifurcation will avoid unnecessary and onerous discovery. The City

contends that, as a general rule, Plaintiff must succeed on his claims against Defendant Parker

before the City can be liable. As such, the City argues the Monell claim may not need to be

adjudicated at all. The City acknowledges the possibility for a municipality to be held liable

without a liable individual but argues that it is an “unlikely scenario” given the nature of Plaintiff’s

claims. Defendant cites Sallenger v. City of Springfield as authority for the proposition that a

Monell claim based on an alleged failure to train cannot exist independently of an underlying

constitutional claim. 630 F.3d 499 (7th Cir. 2010).

Plaintiff responds to this argument by emphasizing that his Monell claim is not derivative

of his individual claims. He points out that Seventh Circuit case law indicates that “a municipality

can be held liable under Monell, even when its officers are not, unless such a finding would create

an inconsistent verdict.” Thomas v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 604 F.3d 293, 305 (7th Cir. 2010).

In Thomas, the Seventh Circuit rejected the argument that individual officer liability was always

required before a municipality could ever be held liable under Monell. Id. To determine whether a

municipality’s liability is dependent on its officers, the Seventh Circuit looked to “the nature of

the constitutional violation, the theory of municipal liability, and the defenses set forth.” Id.

In Estate of McIntosh v. City of Chicago, No. 15 C 1920, 2015 WL 5164080 (N.D. Ill.

Sept. 2, 2015), a court in this district addressed an argument similar to the one made by the City

here in a factual setting that was also similar. In McIntosh, the complaint alleged a Fourth

Amendment unconstitutional seizure claim that also implicated an excessive force claim. Id. The

complaint alleged that the defendant officers’ actions were done “pursuant to one or more

interrelated de facto policies, practices and/or customs” of the defendant municipality. Id. The

court determined that the underlying claims were partially premised on the actions of the individual

defendants, but also based on the presence of policies, practices, and customs including “the failure

to properly train and supervise Chicago police officers with regards to discharging their weapons

at civilians, particularly at young Black men.” Id. The court noted that the plaintiff's allegations

referred to constitutional violations that factually overlapped with, but could still be distinct from,

the Monell allegations. Id. at 8. The court found that, due to the early stage of litigation1 and

because the defendant officers had asserted qualified immunity,2 it was “premature to

unequivocally state that there [could] be no municipal liability in the absence of underlying

individual liability.” McIntosh, 2015 WL 5164080, at *8. In other words, it was possible that there

would be two separate trials that resulted in different but compatible verdicts, in which case

bifurcation would add complexity to the discovery process. Id.3

In this case, the constitutional violations alleged are an unconstitutional seizure claim and

an excessive force claim. The complaint states that Defendant Parker’s actions “were done

pursuant to, and as a result of, one or more of the above de facto policies, practices and customs”

of Defendant City of Belvidere. Pl.’s Compl. at 5, Dkt. 1. The underlying claims are premised on

Defendant Parker’s actions in part but are also based on the presence of the practices, policies, and

customs, which include “failing to adequately train, supervise and discipline police officers” in

areas such as use of excessive force. Id. at 4-5. The allegations in the complaint overlap with, but

may still be distinct from, the Monell allegations, given the early stage of litigation4 and that

Defendant Parker has asserted a qualified immunity defense. See Def.’s Answer at 7-8, Dkt. 19.

Additionally, the City’s citation of Sallenger is not applicable because, in that case, qualified

immunity had already been denied and a jury had found the defendant officers not liable. 630 F.3d

at 502-03. Based on this analysis, the Court finds it premature to conclude that Plaintiff must

succeed on his claims against Defendant Parker before the City can be held liable. Therefore,

bifurcation is not warranted on this basis.

ii. Burdensome discovery

1 To the court, the motion was brought at an “early stage of litigation” because it was “prior to depositions of any

individual defendants and the production of policy and training documents.” Id. In another case, the court found it

premature to decide whether there could be municipal liability in the absence of underlying individual liability

partially because the motion was brought prior to the completion of substantive discovery. Estate of Loury by

Hudson v. City of Chicago, No. 16-CV-04452, 2017 WL 1425594, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 20, 2017).

2 The Seventh Circuit in Thomas had found the absence of any qualified immunity issues significant because

“[w]ithout any affirmative defenses, a verdict in favor of the officer necessarily meant that the jury did not believe

the officer violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights. And since the City's liability was based on the officer's

actions, it too was entitled to a verdict in its favor.” Thomas, 604 F.3d at 304-05 (citing City of Los Angeles v.

Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 798-99 (1986). However, when qualified immunity defenses are raised, it is possible that a

jury could credit those defenses without foreclosing a plaintiff’s Monell claims. See Scott v. Buncich, No. 2:16-CV-

114, 2018 WL 1556412, at *5 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 30, 2018).

3 Courts in this district commonly deny bifurcation of Monell claims, at least in part, because the defendant officers

asserted the defense of qualified immunity. See Loury, 2017 WL 1425594, at *3; Marshbanks v. City of Calumet

City, No. 13 C 2978, 2015 WL 1234930, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 16, 2015); Martinez v. Cook Cty., No. 11 C 1794,

2011 WL 4686438, at *1–2 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 4, 2011); Clarett v. Suroviak, No. 09 C 6918, 2011 WL 37838, at *1–3

(N.D. Ill. Jan 3, 2011); Medina v. City of Chicago, 100 F. Supp. 2d 893, 896 (N.D. Ill. 2000).

4 In the instant case, depositions have not occurred and discovery is ongoing.

The City argues that proceeding with discovery on the Monell claim would be extremely

burdensome. They state that discovery would likely include investigations into “a large number”

of incidents and list the “[areas] of potential discovery.” Def.’s Mot. at 5-6, Dkt. 43. The City

“anticipates Plaintiff will continue to seek extensive written discovery” and expects that “costly

expert discovery will invariably follow,” which will generate “numerous lengthy reports” and

cause “additional costs.” Id. at 6. The City points out that Plaintiff has already requested

depositions of three individuals and his first requests to produce, for which the City produced over

2,100 pages, resulted in Plaintiff requesting “even more documents.” Id. at 5. The City contends

that if Plaintiff is unable to determine the scope of the remaining discovery after 2,100 pages, it is

“reasonable to infer” Monell discovery will be “onerous, excessively time consuming, and

resource intensive.” Def.’s Reply at 4, Dkt. 52. Additionally, the City asserts that Plaintiff’s claims

against Defendant Parker are much different from his claims against the City, so bifurcation would

allow the claims against Defendant Parker to proceed without the “unnecessary and burdensome

discovery” of the Monell claim. Def. Mot. at 7-8, Dkt. 43.

Plaintiff counters that the City’s motion is premature because they are largely unaware of

what discovery he will request. Plaintiff also argues that, even if the motion was not premature,

the City has failed to meet their burden of establishing that bifurcation is warranted. He contends

that the City has used hyperbolic and non-specific language to characterize the potential burden of

Monell discovery but has not explained how Plaintiff’s discovery requests would lead to such a

burden.

Responding to Defendant’s assertion that the vast difference in the types of claims justifies

bifurcation, Plaintiff cites Swanigan v. City of Chicago, where the Seventh Circuit stated that

“courts cannot prevent plaintiffs from pursuing potentially viable Monell claims that . . . are distinct

from the claims against individual defendants.” 775 F.3d 953, 963 (7th Cir. 2015). He contends

that his Monell claims are distinct, “especially when it comes to report writing, discipline of

officers, and the training and use of the K9 Unit.” Pl.’s Resp. at 8, Dkt. 48. Therefore, Plaintiff

argues, because an adverse resolution of the individual claims would not necessarily dispose of

the Monell claim, bifurcating and staying the Monell claim would reduce efficiency by delaying

the adjudication of his claims.

As an initial matter, this Court notes that the language the City uses to argue that proceeding

with Monell discovery would be burdensome is vague and speculative. For example, Defendant

refers to the likelihood of a “large” amount of discovery, speculates about possible areas of

discovery, and attempts to predict Plaintiff’s discovery plan. This sort of language is unpersuasive

to the Court. See Rodriguez v. City of Chicago, No. 17 CV 7248, 2018 WL 3474538, at *3 (N.D.

Ill. July 19, 2018) (denying bifurcation of Monell discovery noting that the assertions of the high

costs of Monell discovery is speculative and “broader scope” does not necessarily translate to an

“undue burden”); Scott, 2018 WL 1556412, at *7 (stating that hyperbolic and non-specific

allegations are not enough to persuade the court that bifurcation was warranted); Cadiz v. Kruger,

No. 06 C 5463, 2007 WL 4293976, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 29, 2007) (finding that a non-specific

assertion of burden is insufficient when used in support of bifurcating a Monell claim).

Moreover, a party’s assertion that discovery would be overly burdensome is typically

accompanied by a showing, such as an affidavit or other reliable evidence, supporting the assertion.

See Red Barn Motors, Inc. v. Cox Enterprises, Inc., No. 114CV01589TWPDKL, 2016 WL

1731328, at *3 (S.D. Ind. May 2, 2016); Symons Int'l Grp., Inc v. Cont'l Cas. Co., No. 1:01-CV-

00799-RLY-MJ, 2015 WL 1279839, at *7 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 20, 2015). This Court has noted before

that “[c]ourts in this circuit find that broadly decrying the time and expense that is expected to be

associated with responding to discovery, without any substantiation, does not establish good cause

for staying discovery.” Harper v. Cent. Wire, Inc., No. 19 CV 50287, 2020 WL 5230746, at *4

(N.D. Ill. Sept. 2, 2020) (citing cases). Additionally, once Monell discovery is issued, to the extent

that the City believes that those requests are overly broad or unduly burdensome, “the parties can

seek assistance from the Court to tailor the requests as necessary after making independent good

faith attempts to do so.” Maysonet v. Guevara, No. 18-CV-2342, 2020 WL 3100840, at *3 (N.D.

Ill. June 11, 2020) (citing McIntosh, 2015 WL 5164080, at *8).

The City has failed to make an adequate showing that proceeding with discovery on the

Monell claim would impose an undue burden. All that the City has offered in support of its motion

are the unsupported statements of counsel in the briefs, a copy of Plaintiff’s requests to produce

(to which Defendant has already responded), communication from Plaintiff’s counsel requesting

copies of videos (for which this Court recently granted Plaintiff’s motion to compel), and

Plaintiff’s indication of an intent to take three depositions. This does not constitute the sort of

showing required to support the assertion that discovery would be onerous and burdensome.

iii. Judicial resources

The City argues that bifurcation would promote judicial economy because it would

eliminate the need for judicial intervention into potential discovery disputes, ruling on their future

summary judgment motion, and presiding over a more complex trial. They note that many courts

grant Monell bifurcation motions in large part on this basis.

However, many courts in this district acknowledge that the bifurcation or staying of Monell

claims does not necessarily preserve judicial economy and may actually require more judicial

resources than if the claims had not been bifurcated. See Loury, 2017 WL 1425594, at *3 (“Given

the factual overlap between the Monell claims and the constitutional claims, a stay

of Monell discovery will likely result in continual discovery disputes between the parties about

whether Plaintiff's discovery requests invoke her Monell claim or her other claims.”); Martinez,

2011 WL 4686438, at *2 (concluding that, because a defendant officer had asserted the affirmative

defense of qualified immunity, it was possible that bifurcating proceedings would be a “waste of

judicial resources”); Cadiz, 2007 WL 4293976, at *5 (“[A] stay of Monell discovery will achieve

cost savings only if one assumes that the parties are never required to go back and conduct Monell

discovery at some later date”). Accordingly, it is premature to conclude definitively that

bifurcation or a stay would result in increased judicial economy.

B. Prejudice against the parties

The City next argues that bifurcation would eliminate the risk of unfair prejudice against

all parties. They claim that a single trial on individual and Monell liability would severely prejudice

both Defendants. Specifically, they point to the danger that evidence on issues relating to conduct

by the City would contaminate the mind of the fact finder in considering liability of Defendant

Parker and vice versa. The City also argues bifurcation would alleviate prejudice to Plaintiff’s

claims against Defendant Parker because Monell discovery tends to be more lengthy and costly

than discovery against individual defendants.

Plaintiff responds that the City’s prejudice arguments are premature and speculative. He

points out that, while Monell discovery is ongoing, none of the parties nor the Court know what

evidence would be offered at trial. Plaintiff further argues that, even if Defendants would be

prejudiced by some evidence, they can utilize tactics such as limiting instructions, the Federal

Rules of Evidence, and motions in limine to mitigate potential prejudice.

Plaintiff also argues that bifurcation and staying discovery regarding his Monell claim

would be prejudicial to him. Specifically, he contends that bifurcation and a stay would require

him to engage in two trials and two rounds of discovery, causing substantially more expense and

imposing a significant delay in the adjudication of his claims. Plaintiff cites Real v. Bunn-O-Matic

Corp., which states that, even if it may be beneficial in some way, courts should not order

bifurcation if it would result in unnecessary delay, additional expense, or some other form of

prejudice. 195 F.R.D. 618, 620 (N.D. Ill. 2000).5

As noted above, the City has brought the instant motion at a relatively early stage in the

litigation. At this point in time, neither the parties nor the Court know what evidence would be

offered at trial or how prejudicial the evidence may be. As such, it would be premature to speculate

on the prejudice that one or both Defendants would face should all of Plaintiff’s claims move

forward in one trial. When faced with this sort of uncertainty at the discovery stage, courts

routinely decline to grant motions to bifurcate. See Rodriguez, 2018 WL 3474538, at *4; Loury,

2017 WL 1425594, at *4; Cadiz, 2007 WL 4293976, at *5-6; Medina, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 897. If

the City still has concerns about prejudice at a later stage as trial approaches, the Court may

reconsider granting bifurcation of the trial. The Court and the parties may also be able to mitigate

potential prejudice through tools such as limiting instructions, motions in limine, and the Rules of

Evidence. See Houskins v. Sheahan, 549 F.3d 480, 495-96 (7th Cir. 2008); Giles, 2013 WL

6512683, at *2; Awalt, 2012 WL 1161500, at *13; Medina, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 897.

C. Prejudice to Plaintiff’s recovery

The City’s final argument is that bifurcation and a stay of the Monell claim would not affect

Plaintiff’s recovery of any compensatory damages. The City contends that they have a statutory

obligation to indemnify Defendant Parker if Plaintiff recovers compensatory damages against him,

so Plaintiff would not be able to recover additional compensatory damages based on the Monell

claim. Further, they argue that, if the Monell claim were bifurcated, a second round of discovery

would not be per se necessary because Plaintiff can “choose to forego proceeding with additional

extensive discovery in order to recover only nominal damages.” Def.’s Reply at 7-8.

Plaintiff counters that there are important non-economic objectives, such as deterrence and

reform, that would be negatively impacted if the Monell claim were bifurcated. He notes that a

local news source has conducted investigative reports looking into misconduct by the Belvidere

5 Plaintiff adds that he could agree to narrowing his Monell claims to the K9 unit, use of force, report writing, and

discipline.

Police Department, but officials have yet to take any action based on the reports. Plaintiff states

that his Monell claim could contribute to fostering deterrence and reform.

Courts have long recognized and acknowledged the validity and import of non-economic

objectives a plaintiff may have for their litigation. See McIntosh, 2015 WL 5164080, at *10

(“Plaintiffs in Section 1983 civil actions have other important objectives . . . [including] deterrence

and reform that would be furthered by a judgment holding Defendant City liable for Defendant

Officers' misconduct... A judgment against a municipality can be a catalyst for change, because

..can encourage the municipality to reform the patterns and practices that led to constitutional

violations, as well as alert the municipality and its citizenry to the issue.”) (internal citations and

quotations omitted); King v. Evans, No. 13-CV-1937, 2015 WL 4397761, at *2 (N.D. IL. July 17,

2015) (‘[A] successful Monell action could have the benefit of deterring future official

misconduct. That is a legitimate goal that a Section 1983 plaintiff may wish to pursue even if it

results in an award of only nominal additional monetary damages.”); Awalt, 2012 WL 1161500,

at *13 (“Deterrence is a well-founded part of our system of tort liability and a proper objective of

bringing suit.”); Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992) (“The purpose of § 1983 is to deter state

actors from using the badge of their authority to deprive individuals of their federally guaranteed

rights and to provide relief to victims if such deterrence fails.”). Here, Plaintiff has affirmed that

he does have non-economic objectives, including deterrence and reform. Therefore, granting

Defendant City’s motion to bifurcate would effectively deprive Plaintiff of his right to be the

“master of his complaint” and proceed on his Monell claim against Defendant City as he intended.

See McIntosh, 2015 WL 5164080, at *9.

The Court concludes that the City’s motion to bifurcate Plaintiff's Monell claim and stay

discovery are not in accordance with Rule 42(b)’s considerations of convenience, economy,

expedition, and prejudice. The potential for bifurcation or a stay to serve the interests of judicial

economy and avoid unfair prejudice is speculative at this point in the litigation, especially when

weighed against the interests of and prejudice to Plaintiff as the non-moving party.

il. CONCLUSION

The Court denies Defendant City of Belvidere's motion to bifurcate

Plaintiff's Monell claim and stay discovery and trial on that claim pending resolution of the claims

against Defendant Parker, without prejudice to a renewed motion to bifurcate for trial after

discovery is completed.

Date: February 10, 2021 By: ( x : :

Lisa A. Jensen

United States Magistrate Judge