Ali v. Chicago

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

KHALID ALI, )

)

)

Plaintiff, ) No. 1:19-CV-00022

)

v. )

) Judge Edmond E. Chang

CITY OF CHICAGO, CHICAGO POLICE )

OFFICERS NORA VALDES and JOHN )

KELYANA, LIEUTENANT KEVIN )

REPPEN, and SERGANT VINCENT VOGT, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This is a case of mistaken identity. In a stroke of very bad luck, Khalid Ali

happened to share the name as the subject of an arrest warrant. In April 2018, he

mistakenly was arrested on that warrant and spent a night in jail before posting bond

the next morning. In this civil-rights lawsuit, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, he seeks damages

from Chicago Police Officers Nora Valdes, John Kelyana, Kevin Reppen, and Vincent

Vogt for making a false arrest by continuing to hold him after it was clear that he

was not the subject of the warrant.1 R. 26, Second Am. Compl..2 Ali also brings state

law claims against only the City of Chicago. Id. ¶ 30. Lastly, the complaint includes

a Monell claim against the City of Chicago, alleging that a City policy prevented him

from posting bond and avoiding the night in jail. Id. ¶ 26. The individual officers have

1The Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C.

§ 1343(a)(2), and supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

2Citations to the record are “R.” followed by the docket entry number and, if needed,

a page or paragraph number.

moved for summary judgment. R. 65, Defs’ Mot. Summary Judgment. (The Monell

claim is apparently headed for trial, as are presumably the state law claims, which

appear to be parallel respondeat superior claims for the alleged false arrest.) For the

reasons explained in this Opinion, the motion is granted in part and denied in part.

I. Background

The facts narrated below are undisputed unless otherwise noted (and if dis-

puted, the evidence is viewed in Ali’s favor).3

A. The Traffic Stop

On June 12, 2017, the Circuit Court of DuPage County issued a civil body-

attachment order for an individual named Khalid Ali. DSOF ¶ 7. That other Khalid

Ali (not the Plaintiff) had failed to appear in a civil case, so the state court issued

what is in effect an arrest warrant for “indirect civil contempt.” R. 74-2, DSOF Exh.

B, Warrant. On April 15, 2018, Ali (the Plaintiff) made an illegal U-turn while driving

his cab on Michigan Avenue in Chicago. DSOF ¶ 8. Officer Valdes, who was patrolling

nearby, made a traffic stop to issue Ali a traffic citation. Id. ¶ 9. During the traffic

stop, Ali gave his driver’s license to Valdes. Id. ¶ 10. Valdes would later use Ali’s

driver’s license to write a traffic ticket. R. 74-4, DSOF, Exh. D, Valdes Dep. at 9:10–

21; see also R. 74-5, DSOF, Exh. E, Traffic Ticket. According to the traffic ticket, which

relied on information from the driver’s license, Ali was 5’ 8’’ and weighed 200 pounds.

3Citations to the parties’ Local Rule 56.1 Statements of Fact are identified as follows:

“DSOF” for the Defendants’ Statement of Facts [R. 74]; “Pl. Resp. DSOF” for Ali’s response

to Defendants’ Statement of Facts [R. 86]; “PSOF” for Ali’s Statement of Facts [R. 86]; and

“Def. Resp. PSOF” for Defendants’ response to Ali’s Statement of Facts [R. 89].

See Traffic Ticket. The ticket also reflects that Ali was born in April 1972 and that

his address was located on North Harding Avenue in Chicago. Id.

While Ali remained in his taxicab, Valdes asked the dispatcher to run a check

on Ali’s name. PSOF ¶ 4. The dispatcher responded that a “Khalid Ali” was the sub-

ject of an outstanding warrant for contempt of court in DuPage County. Id. ¶ 5. Val-

des then called DuPage County to confirm the warrant, but the County refused to

provide confirmation over the telephone. Id. ¶ 6. Seeking guidance, Valdes explained

the situation to the LEADS desk and also sought advice from her sergeant. Id. ¶¶ 8,

9. LEADS is a nationwide database containing the status of driver’s licenses and

other law-enforcement information, including active warrants. DSOF ¶ 12. Those ef-

forts proved unsuccessful, and Valdes still was unable to confirm the warrant. For

his part, not surprisingly, Ali denied any knowledge about the warrant. PSOF ¶ 11.

Meanwhile, Officer Kelyana arrived on the scene to assist. DSOF ¶ 20. Valdes

placed Ali under arrest and transported him to the 18th District police station for

further investigation. Id. ¶ 21. Before leaving for the station, Valdes learned that Ali

was carrying more than $400 in cash (this is important because the bond on the war-

rant was set for just $150). PSOF ¶ 14. Kelyana continued to ask Ali about the war-

rant en route to the police station. Id. ¶ 15. Ali repeated that he did not know about

the warrant, had not missed court anywhere, and had never even been to DuPage

County. Id. ¶ 16.

B. Detention at Police Station

Ali arrived at the station at 2:34 p.m. (of course still on the date of arrest, April

15, 2018). PSOF ¶ 21. According to Ali, he spoke to two white-shirted4 officers who

repeatedly asked him about his age. Id. ¶ 39. At the station, Kelyana contacted a

LEADS representative to confirm the warrant by providing the warrant number con-

tained in the LEADS report and information from Ali’s driver’s license. DSOF ¶ 32;

R. 74-13, DSOF, Exh. M, Kelyana Decl. ¶ 3. Kelyana has averred that the LEADS

desk verified the warrant as active and confirmed (whatever that means for the

LEADS representative with limited personal knowledge) that Ali was the warrant’s

subject. Kelyana Decl. ¶ 3. Meanwhile, Valdes completed the Arrest Report at 4:11

p.m. and submitted it to Lieutenant Reppen, the watch operations lieutenant on duty

at the time. DSOF ¶¶ 35–36; PSOF ¶ 36. Upon reviewing the Arrest Report, Reppen

approved probable cause for arresting Ali at 4:14 p.m. PSOF ¶ 38. But Reppen had

no personal contact with Ali on that day. DSOF ¶ 62.

Going back in time a bit, Sergeant Vogt was the desk sergeant on duty when

Ali arrived at the station. PSOF ¶ 24. In an important development, Vogt received a

fax of the warrant from DuPage County at 3:04 p.m. Id. ¶ 27. The top of the warrant

named “Khalid Ali” as the respondent and set a cash bond at $150. See Warrant. The

bottom part of the warrant, which supplied the biographical information needed for

the Sheriff to execute the warrant, revealed a residential address (Skokie, Illinois),

4White uniform shirts have special meaning in the Chicago Police Department: super-

visors (like sergeant and lieutenants) often wear white uniform shirts when on duty, PSOF

¶ 40, whereas the video of the arrest shows that line officers (like Valdez and Kelyana) wear

blue uniform shirts, R. 74-10.

place of employment (S.A. Auto, also in Skokie), birth date (in 1957), height (5' 7"),

and weight (250 pounds) that differed from what was known about Ali from his

driver’s license and from his own statements. Compare id. with Traffic Ticket, R. 74-

9, DSOF, Exh. I, Arrest Report. Not surprisingly for a civil body attachment, the war-

rant had no number or information that would be associated to an individual by their

fingerprints. DSOF ¶ 28.

But Sergeant Vogt only reviewed the top part of the warrant because he be-

lieved that the LEADS Report accurately reflected the contents of the warrant. DSOF

¶ 30. The LEADS Report describes the warrant’s respondent as Khalid Ali, a 5' 8"

male weighing 167 pounds, and born in 1972 (remember that the warrant itself listed

a birth year of 1957). R. 74-8, DSOF, Exh. H, LEADS Report. The LEADS report also

listed a driver’s license number that matched Ali’s. Compare id. with Traffic Ticket.

And so information in the LEADS Report (as distinct from the warrant) matched with

Ali’s on birth year, name, sex, and driver’s license number. The height was also a

close match, but the weight differed by more than 30 pounds. The bottom of the

LEADS Report warns, “Confirm with ORA.” See LEADS Report. This instructs the

reader to confirm the information in the Report with the originating agency. DSOF

¶ 24. In any event, Vogt gave final approval to hold Ali on the warrant at 7:01 p.m.

Id. ¶ 43. In his deposition, Vogt also testified that he had seen an electronic version

of the Arrest Report at some point during the evening. R. 74-6, DSOF, Exh. F, Vogt

Dep. at 12:8–16. For their part, Valdes, Kelyana, and Reppen deny ever seeing the

warrant, though Ali testified that, at one point, “everybody was seeing” a document

that he believed to be the warrant. DSOF ¶ 31; Pl. Resp. DSOF ¶ 31; R. 74-3, DSOF,

Exh. 3, Ali Dep. at 33:6–11. This is a key factual dispute discussed in more detail

later.

Sometime after 7 p.m. Ali’s arrest was processed and he spent the night in

custody. DSOF ¶¶ 50, 57. Earlier in the day, Kelyana expressed to Ali his belief that

Ali probably could post bond. Id. ¶ 52. But Valdes, Kelyana, and Reppen have averred

that they had no involvement in the decision to delay Ali’s posting of the bond. Id.

¶ 54. Vogt has no memory on whether Ali was permitted to post bond. Id. ¶ 53. In any

event, Ali posted bond the following morning (now April 16) after appearing in the

Circuit Court of Cook County. Id. ¶ 58. He later appeared in DuPage County, where

the state court determined that he was not the Khalid Ali sought by the warrant. Id.

¶ 59. The state court ordered that the posted bond be refunded to Ali. R. 74-20, DSOF,

Exh. T, DuPage Circuit Court Order.

II. Standard of Review

Summary judgment must be granted “if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine issue of material fact exists if “the

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving

party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In evaluating sum-

mary judgment motions, courts must “view the facts and draw reasonable inferences

in the light most favorable to the” non-moving party. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372,

378 (2007) (cleaned up).5 The Court “may not weigh conflicting evidence or make cred-

ibility determinations,” Omnicare, Inc. v. UnitedHealth Grp., Inc., 629 F.3d 697, 704

(7th Cir. 2011) (cleaned up), and must consider only evidence that can “be presented

in a form that would be admissible in evidence.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). The party

seeking summary judgment has the initial burden of showing that there is no genuine

dispute and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Carmichael v. Vil-

lage of Palatine, 605 F.3d 451, 460 (7th Cir. 2010); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If this burden is met, the adverse party must then “set forth

specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at

256.

III. Analysis

A. Motion to file Class Action

Before addressing the merits of the claims against the individual officers, the

Court denies Ali’s motion to file a third amended complaint in order to add a proposed

class action. R. 62. Arguably, the request to amend is governed by the stricter good-

cause standard in Civil Rule 16(b), R. 15 (setting Rule 16(b) deadline), but even under

Civil Rule 15(a)(2)’s more accommodating interests-of-justice standard, the motion is

rejected. First, the request came late in the case: specifically, after three extensions,

R. 21, 27, 39, the fact discovery deadline expired on December 6, 2019. Ali moved for

class certification two days before the close of fact discovery—on December 4, 2019.

5This Opinion uses (cleaned up) to indicate that internal quotation marks, alterations,

and citations have been omitted from quotations. See Jack Metzler, Cleaning Up Quotations,

18 Journal of Appellate Practice and Process 143 (2017).

R. 41. This was even before any class-action allegation had even been asserted in the

case. By sheer necessity, then, if the class-action allegation were allowed to be

added—which the certification motion did not even formally seek—fact discovery

would have to be extended again in order for the defense to explore whether certifi-

cation would meet the requirements of Civil Rule 23. Because of the rarity of moving

for class certification without even having alleged a class action, or without having

sought to leave to amend the complaint to allege a class action, the Court mistakenly

overlooked the absence of the class allegation and set a briefing schedule on the mo-

tion. R. 43; see also R. 59. Only later did the Court realize its mistake, after the City

raised the issue, so the Court terminated the certification motion and instructed Ali

to seek leave to amend if he wished to pursue a class action. R. 59. So the delay in

seeking leave to pursue the class action two days before the thrice-extended fact-dis-

covery deadline militates against granting permission.

In the same vein, as early as September 20, 2019, Ali was on notice that the

defense intended to rely on a Circuit Court-issued General Administrative Order to

justify bringing Ali to bond court before allowing him to post bond (instead of just

accepting bond at the police station). Specifically, the City disclosed the Administra-

tive Order on September 20, 2019, in response to a supplemental document request.

R. 69, Exh. 1 ¶ 1. On the same date, the City also responded to requests to admit, and

again directed Ali to the Administrative Order issue by the Chief Judge of the Circuit

Court of Cook County. R. 69, Exh. 2 ¶ 2. So it was plain that Ali was probably not

alone in being subject to a broad policy requiring an appearance in bond court. At the

very least, even if officers have some discretion in implementing the Administrative

Order, it was more than a reasonable basis to allege a proposed class action. Instead

of proposing it, or even asking for a fact discovery extension in order to pursue it

further (though that was not necessary to do before proposing it), Ali dropped the

certification bomb with two days left on the discovery clock. Whether the subjective

motive was to box out the City from engaging in discovery or not, objectively the delay

was not reasonable. Indeed, ultimately, the motion to file the third amended com-

plaint was not filed until February 12, 2020. R. 62. The in-between time was con-

sumed by the City’s motion to strike the certification motion and Ali’s resistance to

that motion.

Although Ali argues that the defense would suffer no prejudice from the

amendment, adding the class-action allegation obviously would greatly expand the

case from a single-plaintiff, overnight-jail case to potential liability for a class that

Ali estimated at 2,942 arrestees. R. 41 at 5. No doubt too that potential liability of

that scope would justify substantial and extended discovery on the propriety of class

certification. On the eve of the eve of discovery (that is, two days before the end), then,

Ali proposed to radically expand the case without warning. The defense also credibly

explains that it would have seriously considered making a much earlier Rule 68 offer

of judgment to cut off (or at least tamp down) attorney’s fees, given the relatively low

compensatory damages in an overnight-jail-stay case (there is no corresponding un-

constitutional jail-conditions claim, just the overnight stay). All in all, Ali is still able

to pursue his individual claims without the substantial prejudice that the defense

would experience if permission was granted. The motion for leave to amend is de-

nied.6

B. Probable Cause

Moving on to the merits, Ali first contends that his continued detention post-

arrival of the warrant violated his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable

seizures. R. 87, Pl. Resp. at 9. He clarifies that his false-arrest claim does not begin

until 3:04 p.m. (on the date of the arrest, April 15, 2018), which is when Vogt received

the warrant via fax from DuPage County. Id. at 3. In other words, Ali advances no

challenge to the arrest on Michigan Avenue, or his continued detention en route to

the police station. Id. The warrant’s arrival is the key turning-point moment when,

according to Ali, there was no longer probable cause to detain him.

A law enforcement officer violates the Fourth Amendment if the officer seizes

a person unreasonably; here, that means without probable cause. See Bentz v. City of

Kendallville, 577 F.3d 776, 779 (7th Cir. 2009). Probable cause exists “if the totality

of the facts and circumstances known to the officer at the time of the arrest would

warrant a reasonable, prudent person in believing that the arrestee had committed,

was committing, or was about to commit a crime.” Abbott v. Sangamon Cnty., Ill., 705

F.3d 706, 714 (7th Cir. 2013) (cleaned up). When police officers mistake a person for

someone they seek to arrest, the arrest still complies with the Fourth Amendment “if

the officers (1) have probable cause to arrest the person sought; and (2) reasonably

6Ali relies again on Chapman v. First Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 785 (7th Cir. 2015), to

argue that he did not need to give any notice to the defense that he was pursuing a class

action. That argument is rejected for the same reasons already discussed in the order of Jan-

uary 29, 2020. R. 59.

believe that the person arrested is the person sought.” Catlin v. City of Wheaton, 574

F.3d 361, 365 (7th Cir. 2009).

Because Ali limits the false-arrest claim to the time after the warrant arrived

at the police station, see Pl. Resp. at 6, the question in this case is whether each indi-

vidual officer could still reasonably believe after the warrant’s arrival, given the facts

and circumstances, that Ali was the person sought by the warrant.

1. Sergeant Vogt

Sergeant Vogt contends that he was entitled to rely fully on the LEADS Report

to find probable cause, even though he received a copy of the warrant which contained

different identifying information. Def. Br. at 6. Remember that Vogt only reviewed

the top half of the warrant—which basically only contained the name Khalid Ali—

and determined probable cause existed because he believed that Ali’s identifying in-

formation matched that of the LEADS Report. DSOF ¶¶ 30, 44–45. Remember that

the bottom half of the warrant—which listed the biographical information of the

sought-after Khalid Ali—would have shown discrepancies with the LEADS Report in

birth year (by 15 years) and weight (by a significant difference of 83 pounds). Compare

Warrant with LEADS Report.

Vogt argues that he could simply rely on the LEADS Report to find probable

cause under the warrant—even if he had reviewed the entire warrant. Def. Br. at 6.

To support this proposition, Vogt cites Lauer v. Dahlberg, 717 F.Supp. 612 (N.D. Ill

1989), but the circumstances there are distinguishable from this case. In Lauer, the

arrestee (later turned plaintiff) provided the arresting officer with a copy of a pur-

ported order that supposedly recalled the warrant. Id. at 613–14. Lauer held that the

officer still had sufficient probable cause to effectuate the arrest because it was objec-

tionably reasonable to believe that the warrant remained active. Id. The officer had

conducted a LEADS check, contacted central dispatch, and inquired about the war-

rant once he transported the arrestee to the police department. Id. at 613. Each in-

quiry revealed that the warrant was still active. Id. Plus, the purported recall order

was not certified. Id. at 614. So Lauer did not even involve a dispute over whether the

plaintiff was the person sought by the warrant. The issue there was whether the of-

ficer had reason to believe that the warrant remained active. It is one thing to rely on

LEADS (and other sources) for probable cause that a warrant is still active. It is quite

another to rely on LEADS to conclude that the arrestee is the subject of a warrant

without matching the information on LEADS to the warrant with a quick glance at

the bottom half of the warrant.

Similarly, the Defendants’ reliance on Hernandez v. Sheahan, 455 F.3d 772

(7th Cir. 2006), is also unpersuasive. Hernandez involved a Monell claim alleging that

the City of Chicago ought to have, in essence, a triple-check on the identity of an

arrestee when compared to the warrant. See id. at 775. Hernandez presented a very

different challenge because the plaintiff and the warrant’s target in that case

matched in birthdays, as well as “sex, height, weight, and eye color.” Id. at 773. So

the Seventh Circuit confronted a request, in effect, by the plaintiff to believe all ar-

restees when they deny that they are the warrant’s target. Here, Ali’s false-arrest

claim is premised on checking the actual warrant after it arrives at the station (re-

member, he limits the claim to after the warrant’s receipt), especially where the

LEADS Report itself contains a significant mismatch with the arrestee (167 pounds

versus 200 pounds) and warns to “confirm with ORA,” that is, to confirm with the

originating agency.

Vogt relies on three more cases to absolve him of the false-arrest claim. Def.

Br. at 6. First, in Tibbs, the Seventh Circuit held that an officer had probable cause

to make a mistaken arrest despite discrepancies between the warrant and the ar-

restee’s driver’s license. Tibbs v. City of Chicago, 469 F.3d 661, 665 (7th Cir. 2006).

There, an officer stopped a man who fit the description of a suspicious person who

was reportedly loitering in the area. Id. at 662. The man produced a valid driver’s

license identifying him as “Ronald A. Tibbs” born on October 14, 1955. Id. The squad-

car computer returned an unexecuted traffic warrant for a man named “Ronald L.

Tibbs” born on January 9, 1949. Id. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment

for the officer despite the discrepancies between the middle initial and the six-year-

age difference. Id. at 665. Also, the officer’s reasonable belief was bolstered by the

arrestee’s statement when questioned about the warrant. Id. 662–63. The arrestee,

thinking that the officer was referring to a different traffic violation that he had com-

mitted, unwittingly acknowledged the warrant. Id.

In contrast, Ali repeatedly disclaimed any knowledge of an outstanding war-

rant out of DuPage County. PSOF ¶¶ 11, 16–17. It is not clear whether Vogt ever

learned of Ali’s protestations, but it is not as if Ali confessed to Vogt that he was the

subject of the warrant. More importantly, the warrant’s information was starkly dif-

ferent from the information about Ali (at least a reasonable jury could so find), and

Vogt acted unreasonably in failing to check the bottom-half of the warrant.

In Phelan v. Village of Lyons, 531 F.3d 484 (7th. Cir. 2008), the Seventh Circuit

held that an officer did not act reasonably by reading only the first two lines of a

LEADS report when arresting the plaintiff for driving a stolen car. Id. at 488 (cited

by Pl. Resp. Br. at 10). If the officer had simply read the third line of the report, then

he would have realized that the suspect had stolen a motorcycle. Id. The court could

not “ignore the information contained in the third line,” which appeared on the very

same screen as the first two lines. Id. And had the officer read past the second line

“he would have realized, at the very least, that further investigation was warranted.”

Id. The sensible principle in Phelan is consistent with the Seventh Circuit’s admoni-

tion to officers: when determining probable cause, officers should not “close [their]

eyes to facts that would clarify the situation.” McBride v. Grice, 576 F.3d 703, 707

(7th Cir. 2009); see also Guzell v. Hiller, 223 F.3d 518, 520 (7th Cir. 2000) (“Police

must act reasonably on the basis of what they know ... [and] they can’t close their

eyes to [ ] additional information.”).

Indeed, as a factual matter too, according to Lieutenant Reppen, it was Ser-

geant Vogt’s responsibility as desk sergeant to determine whether an arrestee was

being erroneously held on a warrant. PSOF ¶ 29. Had Vogt simply moved his eyes to

the bottom of the warrant, he would have noticed a 15-year age gap (1957 on the

warrant versus 1972), different addresses in different cities (Skokie on the warrant

versus Chicago),7 and at least a 50-pound weight difference (250 pounds on the war-

rant versus 200). Given these facts, a reasonable jury could find no probable cause

remained to hold Ali after the warrant’s arrival.

The other cases cited by Vogt do seem to present even worse circumstances for

the hapless arrestees, but the cases in fact do not support Vogt’s position. In Johnson

v. Miller, the plaintiff (Johnson) was mistakenly arrested twice. 680 F.2d 39, 40 (7th

Cir. 1982). There, a woman named Annette Jenkins defrauded a bank using the plain-

tiff’s savings account. Id. Although the bank had figured out Jenkins had committed

the fraud, it also filed a criminal complaint against Johnson and—crucially—gave

Johnson’s home address to the police. Id. The police issued an arrest warrant for a

“Miss Johnson,” described as a 5' 7" black woman born on February 5, 1951. Id. But

the plaintiff was a 5' 5" white woman born on May 2, 1951. Id. Despite the differences,

an officer executed the warrant and arrested Johnson at her home (remember that

the bank supplied the home address to the police). Id. At a preliminary hearing, the

court cleared Johnson and ordered the warrant to be reissued. Id. The new warrant,

however, was exactly the same as the first—which meant that Johnson’s home ad-

dress was still on it—except that (worse) it now matched the plaintiff’s birthdate. See

id. A second officer, even though he knew about the prior arrest, arrested Johnson at

her home for a second time. Id. For a second time, she was dismissed after going

through the same routine in court. Id.

7Compare the LEADS Report (R. 74-8) and the Arrest Report (R. 74-6), the latter hav-

ing been reviewed by Vogt on a computer, see DSOF ¶ 44, Vogt Dep. at 12:8–16, with the

Warrant (R. 74-2).

Although the Seventh Circuit described the government’s conduct as “outra-

geous,” it held that neither of the arresting officers had committed a false arrest un-

der the Fourth Amendment. Johnson, 680 F.2d at 42. The appeals court reasoned

that the arresting officers were simply executing an arrest warrant containing false

information caused by someone else’s negligence. Id. at 41–42. Remember that John-

son’s home address was on the warrant, and the officers simply went to her address

and arrested her there both times. Id. at 40. The Seventh Circuit decided on the “prac-

tical ground” that the Fourth Amendment should not force arresting officers to “back-

stop the mistakes of their superiors.” Id. at 42.

Just so in the other false-arrest cases cited by the Defendants. Each time, the

Seventh Circuit relied on similar practical considerations to conclude that probable

cause still supported the mistaken-identity arrests. In Patton, the arrestee’s name

and race matched, and the police were confronted with an on-the-scene decision to

arrest the plaintiff. Patton v. Przbylski, 822 F.2d 697, 698–700 (7th Cir. 1987) (high-

lighting “practical dilemma[s],” “confused and ominous circumstances,” and “the edg-

iness that all policemen feel in confronting a criminal suspect”). Another case in-

volved a warrant that sought a dangerous felon who was a flight risk. Catlin, 574

F.3d at 365–66 (officers had probable cause for mistaken arrest where warrant

matched description of the plaintiff’s motorcycle and officers believed that they were

apprehending a felon who presented an escape risk). Other decisions presented sim-

ilar on-the-scene decisions or involved closer matching information. White v. Olig, 56

F.3d 817, 820 (7th Cir. 1995) (concluding it would be “imprudent” for an officer to

release plaintiff despite discrepancies in race and height); Brown v. Patterson. 823

F.2d 167, 169 (7th Cir. 1987) (officer would have been “imprudent” not to arrest plain-

tiff whose name matched suspect’s alias, was close to suspect in age, and shared the

same race and gender).

All these cases involve officers either following the instructions on the warrant

or making spur-of-the-moment arrests on the scene. In contrast, as discussed earlier,

Ali limits the false-arrest claim to after the warrant’s receipt by Vogt in the police

station. Vogt was not trying to decide (as Valdes and Kelyana were in the first in-

stance) whether to take Ali into custody amongst the hustle and bustle of Michigan

Avenue in the early afternoon. Instead, Vogt was the desk sergeant specifically as-

signed to decide, after receipt of the warrant in the police station with Ali already in

custody, whether to approve the continued detention of Ali. DSOF ¶¶ 42–44; PSOF

¶ 29. And unlike the officers in Johnson, he was not being asked to backstop superiors

who received faulty information in crafting the warrant in the first place. Johnson,

680 F.2d at 40 (explaining that the victim-bank supplied the plaintiff’s home ad-

dress). Vogt simply failed to review all of it. DSOF ¶ 30. Nor was Vogt (or any of the

officers, for that matter) confronted with a suspected dangerous felon or someone who

presented a flight risk. Indeed, not many criminal offenses for which warrants are

issued are less serious than “indirect civil contempt” for failure to appear in a civil

case. R. 74-2, Warrant. The alleged crime literally arose in a civil-case context. On

these facts, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Ali, a reasonable jury

easily could find that a reasonable officer in Vogt’s position no longer had probable

cause to hold Ali after the warrant arrived.

That does not end the analysis, however, because Vogt also argues that he is

protected from monetary damages by qualified immunity. Qualified immunity pro-

tects public officials from liability for damages if their actions did not violate clearly

established rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Harlow v. Fitz-

gerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). To defeat qualified immunity, a plaintiff must es-

tablish both that (1) the defendant violated a constitutional right and (2) the right

was clearly established. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009). In false-arrest

cases, qualified immunity provides officers with an additional layer of protection, be-

cause even if a jury can find lack of probable cause on a given set of facts, the question

still is whether a reasonable officer would have mistakenly believed that the arrest

lacked probable cause. Williams v. Jaglowski, 269 F.3d 778, 781 (7th Cir. 2001);

Humphrey v. Staszak, 148 F.3d 719, 725 (7th Cir. 1998). If an officer had even “argu-

able probable cause” to arrest the plaintiff, then qualified immunity applies. Wil-

liams, 269 F.3d at 781.

The problem for Vogt is that the stark differences between the warrant and Ali

himself refute that Vogt had even “arguable probable cause” to continue to detain Ali.

To repeat, the warrant sought someone who was born in 1957 (not 1972) and weighed

250 pounds (not 200 pounds), and who lived and worked in Skokie, not in Chicago.

See Warrant. Also, the video shows what Ali looked like on the date of the arrest, and

he simply does not look like he was 60 years old at the time, and certainly not 250

pounds. R. 74-10, Valdes Body Camera Video. And it was clearly unreasonable, in

light of Phelan, to fail to read the bottom part—really, the crucial part with the re-

spondent’s biographical information—of the warrant. 531 F.3d at 488. Given the facts

and the governing law, this was not a close enough call to justify the application of

qualified immunity.

2. Officers Valdes and Kelyana

Ali does not contest that Valdes had probable cause to make the initial traffic

stop. Pl. Resp. at 3. Neither does Ali contest the detention on Michigan Avenue, the

decision to go to the police station, or even the detention in the station until the war-

rant’s arrival. Id. So the question as to Valdes and Kelyana is whether the evidence

would allow a reasonable juror to infer that Valdes and Kelyana (in addition to Vogt)

became aware of the discrepancies between the warrant and Ali. This possibility

arises from the fact that Valdes and Kelyana stuck around to help process the arrest

after transporting Ali to the police station. Valdes wrote the Arrest Report and also

wrote the traffic citation issued to Ali. DSOF ¶ 34. Kelyana contacted a LEADS rep-

resentative to confirm that the warrant was valid. Id. ¶ 32. Both Valdes and Kelyana

assert, however, that they (a) never saw the warrant, id. ¶ 31, and (b) had no involve-

ment with Ali’s detention after his arrest was processed, id. ¶ 61.

In response, Ali contends that Valdes and Kelyana saw the warrant. Pl. Resp.

DSOF ¶ 31. Along with some surrounding circumstances, Ali relies on his deposition

testimony, in which he said that “everybody was seeing” a piece of paper that, in

context, appears to have been the warrant. Id.; Ali Dep. at 32:23–33:21. Ali described

being asked about the information on the warrant, and he says that everybody in the

immediate vicinity was looking at this piece of paper. Id. 33:2–13. But Ali’s deposition

testimony does not establish, even circumstantially, that Valdes was among those

officers. Throughout Ali’s deposition, he refers to Valdes as the “female” officer. See

Id. at 29:6–17 (“When we got to the police station, the female officer opened the door

and then we went inside the police station in the back.”). Ali testified that while he

was handcuffed to a wall, an officer wearing a white shirt (as opposed to a uniformed

officer, such as Valdes) came in with “the paper.” Id. at 31:5–7. He further testified

that another “male officer” said to him “now we know why you are here … somebody

sued you and it’s [a] civil suit.” Id. at 31:7–11. Later on, Ali appears to refer to this

second male officer as the “blue” officer. Id. at 33:6–11. According to Ali, the blue

officer received the “paper” from the white-shirted officer. Id. at 33:8–10. It is in this

context that Ali testified that “they was taking [it] from each other. Everybody was

seeing it.” Id. at 33:9–11. Later in the deposition, Ali revisited this episode and added

only that “the female police officer, she was in the computer. But the two who were

having the paper that I saw, it was the white shirt police officer and the uniform

police officer.” Id. at 43:6–9. Even read with its surrounding context, and even giving

reasonable inferences to Ali, no reasonable jury could find that Valdes was part of the

“everybody was seeing”-the-warrant event. That would just be speculation. In fact,

Ali testified that “the female officer” was on the computer when the white and blue

uniformed officers entered the room with “the paper.” Id. The summary judgment

record is insufficient to rebut Valdes’s specific disavowal of ever seeing the warrant.

The claim against Valdes is dismissed.

Kelyana is a different story. For him, a reasonable juror could infer from Ali’s

testimony that Kelyana saw the warrant. Throughout his deposition, Ali refers to

Kelyana as “the male officer.” See Ali Dep. 25:20 (“The male officer talked to me.”).

He also described him as having a blue uniform, id. at 22:17–19, which is consistent

with Kelyana’s non-supervisory position. Indeed, video footage from Valdes’ body

camera confirms that Kelyana was wearing a blue-colored shirt underneath his jacket

when speaking with Ali at the scene on Michigan Avenue. See Body Camera Video.

Of the two officers who came with “the paper,” Ali described one as either “the male

officer” or “the blue one.” Id. at 31:8, 33:6–7. Also, at one point, the “blue” officer re-

ceived “the paper” from the “white shirt police officer.” Id. at 33:6–9. So a reasonable

jury could infer that Kelyana was the blue-uniformed officer who also reviewed the

warrant. Indeed, this officer (who reasonably could be determined to be Kelyana)

asked Ali if he had “clean[ed] motors.” Id. at 31:12. This likely was prompted by the

warrant’s listing for place of employment as “S.A. Auto.” See Warrant. The same of-

ficer also asked if Ali had ever been to Skokie, which again probably corresponds to

the residential and employment address listed on the warrant. Ali Dep. at 31:13; see

Warrant. At the very least, a reasonable juror could infer that this officer was Kel-

yana and that he had read the warrant (including its bottom half).

In light of that potential finding by the jury, much like Vogt, that after receipt

of the warrant (and apparently reading it), a jury also could find that a reasonable

officer in Kelyana’s position did not have probable cause to continue to detain Ali.

There were too many stark discrepancies between the warrant and Ali, especially

given Kelyana’s personal observations of Ali. Kelyana directly interacted with Ali

throughout the April 15 stop and arrest. See Body Camera Video. And if Kelyana read

the warrant, then he was in a position to observe, for example, that Ali did not look

like he was 60 years old or weighed 250 pounds. See Warrant. Ali also protested di-

rectly to Kelyana that he knew nothing about the warrant. PSOF ¶¶ 15–16. Like

Vogt, Kelyana was no longer in a time-pressured environment trying to make an on-

the-scene decision. Nor was Kelyana dealing with a warrant issued for a serious crime

or dealing with a suspect who represented a flight risk.

Similar to Vogt, Kelyana also is not entitled to qualified immunity. The differ-

ences were too stark to characterize this as a case of arguable probable cause. A rea-

sonable officer would have known that there was insufficient probable cause to be-

lieve that the much younger, much lighter, non-Skokie resident was not the Ali

sought by the warrant. The false-arrest claim against Kelyana survives.

3. Lieutenant Reppen

The summary judgment record does not establish, even giving Ali the benefit

of reasonable inferences, that Officer Reppen saw the warrant, so the false-arrest

claim against him must fail. Reppen was the watch operations commander on duty

when Ali was brought to the station on the day of the arrest. DSOF ¶ 37. Based on a

review of the Arrest Report, Reppen gave initial approval of probable cause to arrest

Ali under the warrant. DSOF ¶¶ 38–39. The Arrest Report accurately describes Ali’s

actual height, weight, age, address, and driver’s license. See Arrest Report. Reppen

avers that he had no personal contact with Ali. Id. ¶ 62; R. 74-16, DSOF, Exh. P,

Reppen Decl. ¶ 5. The most that Ali has on that front is Ali’s previously discussed

testimony to the effect that “everybody was seeing” the warrant. Pl. Resp. DSOF ¶ 31.

So the question is whether a reasonable jury could infer that Reppen was one

of the officers who approached Ali with “the paper.” See Ali Dep. at 43:6–9. The an-

swer is no. To start, Ali actually does not dispute Reppen’s assertion that Reppen had

no personal contact with Ali on April 15, 2018. See Pl. Resp. DSOF ¶ 62. Also, the

record does not suggest that Reppen was the “blue”-shirted male officer. Id. at 31:7–

11; 33:6–11. As Ali acknowledges, generally sergeants and lieutenants in the Chicago

police department wear white shirts (if they are not working undercover). PSOF ¶ 40.

On the date of Ali’s arrest, Reppen held the rank of lieutenant. R. 74-11, DSOF, Exh.

K, Reppen Dep. at 4:12.

The record does not establish Reppen as the white-shirted officer either. Ali

Dep. at 31:5–7. During his deposition, Ali described the white-shirted officer as hav-

ing a similar height as Ali and weighing around 200 lbs. Id. at 32:13–22. But without

any other evidence in the summary judgment record describing Reppen’s appearance,

a reasonable jury could not place Reppen among the officers who saw the warrant.

Process of elimination might have been enough circumstantial evidence, but Ali of-

fered no evidence on how many supervisors (that is, how many people were probably

wearing white shirts) were at the police station at the time Ali was held there. So

nothing but speculation supports a finding that Reppen reviewed the warrant or

would otherwise be expected to do so. Reppen too is dismissed from the case.

C. Delay in Posting Bond

Moving on from the false-arrest claim based on the warrant, Ali also alleges

that the Defendants violated the Constitution by denying him an opportunity to post

bail promptly. Pl. Resp. at 11. He fashions this claim as a challenge under the Fourth

Amendment, not the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. In any

event, the Seventh Circuit, unlike other circuits, has not recognized a “substantive

due process protection liberty interest” that “attaches once arrestees are deemed eli-

gible for release on bail.” Steele v. Cicchi, 855 F.3d 494, 502 (3d Cir. 2017); see also

Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185, 1192 (10th Cir. 2010), Campbell v. Johnson, 586

F.3d 835, 840 (11th Cir. 2009). Moreover, the Supreme Court held in Manuel that the

Fourth Amendment generally governs a claim for unlawful pretrial detention. Ma-

nuel v. City of Joliet, Ill., 137 S. Ct. 911, 920 (2017).

Delay of Ali’s bond gives rise to a stand-alone Fourth Amendment claim only

if it is assumed that the Defendants had probable cause to keep him overnight under

the warrant. Any individual Defendant who lacked probable cause to detain Ali after

the warrant’s arrival would be responsible for the overnight detention, which would

render the posting of the bond neither here nor there. More importantly, as a stand-

alone Fourth Amendment claim based on the delay in posting bond, the individual

Defendants are entitled to summary judgment both on the grounds of qualified im-

munity and lack of personal involvement in causing the alleged delay.

First, on whether the right to post bond before an overnight stay is clearly

established, the best case that Ali cites is an unpublished district court decision. In

Alcorn, the district court concluded that the arrestee-plaintiff sufficiently alleged that

officers detained him without probable cause. Alcorn v. City of Chicago, 2018 WL

3614010, at *7 (N.D. Ill. July 27, 2018). But the factual context of Alcorn is night-

and-day from this case. There, officers arrested the plaintiff on an out-of-county war-

rant. Id. at *8. Once officers learned that the plaintiff could post the $50 cash bond,

they brought a new non-bondable charge based on falsified reports. Id. So Alcorn had

no occasion to address how long an arrestee can be held on a bondable offense when

the arrestee is ready and able to post the bond. Instead, not surprisingly, the holding

of Alcorn was that the officers lacked probable cause to continue to detain the arrestee

based on false charges. Id. No clearly established right to promptly post bond is dis-

cernable from Alcorn.

The second flaw in Ali’s bond-posting claim against the individual Defendants

is that the evidence does not establish that any of them were personally responsible

in delaying his chance to post bond. Ali offers no affirmative evidence that any of the

individual Defendants had any control over when Ali would be allowed to post bond.

Officers Valdes and Kelyana, as well as Lieutenant Reppen, each testified that they

never told Ali that he could not post bond, and were not involved in any decision with

regard to his bond. DSOF ¶ 54. Vogt did not even remember whether Ali was permit-

ted to post bond. Id.¶ 53. Ali must establish that the individual Defendants were per-

sonally responsible for delaying the opportunity to post bond, see Thurman v. Village

of Homewood, 446 F.3d 682, 687 (7th Cir. 2006) (“A cause of action under § 1983

requires a showing that the plaintiff was deprived of a right secured by the Constitu-

tion or federal law, by a person acting under color of law.”), but Ali offers no evidence

to affirmatively establish this or to rebut what the Defendants have offered.

In objecting to the Defendants’ averments that they were not involved in the

delay in posting bond, DSOF ¶ 54, Ali asks the Court to reject what he deems “patch-

up” declarations submitted by the Defendants after their depositions. Pl. Resp. DSOF

¶ 54. It is true that outright inconsistencies in an affidavit executed after a deposition

cannot walk back admissions made in a deposition, at least absent a persuasive ex-

planation that a jury can credit. But the affidavits do not directly contradict anything

in the depositions. Indeed, the defense position that they had no personal control over

positing bond in a police station—as opposed to waiting for a court hearing—is but-

tressed by Cook County Circuit Court General Administrative Order No. 2015-06.

That Administrative Order provides that “[d]efendants taken into custody by an ar-

resting agency located within Cook County on an arrest warrant issued by an Illinois

state court outside of Cook County shall be required to appear in bond court in the

appropriate district or division of this court.” DSOF ¶ 55 (emphasis added). So, at the

least, reasonable officers would be able to rely on the Administrative Order without

violating a clearly established right (again, Ali does not point to a specific case estab-

lishing the right in these circumstances). To be sure, Ali disputes the binding nature

of the order, Pl. Resp. DSOF ¶ 55, but that would not undermine the lack of clarity

in following the Administrative Order and transporting Ali to bond court. (The Monell

claim against the City can be pursued by Ali without the burden of qualified immun-

ity.)

For all those reasons, the Fourth Amendment claim against the individual De-

fendants premised on the delay in posting bond is dismissed.

D. Fourteenth Amendment

Finally, to the extent Ali previously alleged stand-alone Fourteenth Amend-

ment claims, those claims do not survive because none are adequately advanced—

leaving aside, of course, that the Fourth Amendment is held applicable to state actors

via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. According to Ali’s sum-

mary judgment briefing, all challenges to his overnight detention are advanced as

Fourth Amendment claims. See Pl. Resp. at 6, (“[a]s explained more fully below, a

jury could find that this decision violated the Fourth Amendment”), 9 (“[t]he decision

of the Supreme Court in Manuel v. City of Joliet … requires that plaintiff’s claim be

evaluated by the objective reasonableness standard of the Fourth Amendment”), 12

(defendants’ decision to refuse to permit plaintiff to post bail violated the Fourth

Amendment). Nothing in Ali’s response brief, or his factual submissions, develops a

contention that his right to equal protection, substantive due process, or procedural

due process are at issue.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons explained above, Ali’s motion to amend the complaint is de-

nied. The Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted in favor of Valdes

and Reppen in full; in favor of all the Defendants on the bond-posting claim; but de-

nied as to Vogt and Kelyana for the false-arrest claim after the warrant’s arrival at

the police station. The tracking status hearing of December 11, 2020 is reset to De-

cember 18, 2020, at 8:30 a.m., but to track the case only (no appearance is required,

the case will not be called). Instead, the parties shall initiate settlement negotiations,

confer on the next step of the litigation, and file a joint status report on December 11,

2020.

ENTERED:

s/Edmond E. Chang

Honorable Edmond E. Chang

United States District Judge

DATE: November 30, 2020