The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
LINDA S. MOORE, as Independent Executor of )
the Estate of Kathleen S. Williams, deceased, )
)
Plaintiff, ) Case No. 19 C 2951
)
v. )
) Judge Robert W. Gettleman
ALASKA AIRLINES, INC., ALASKA AIR )
GROUP, and JOHN DOE, an Alaska Airlines, Inc. )
agent, )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Linda S. Moore, as independent executor of the Estate of Kathleen S. Williams,
deceased (“Williams”), has brought a one count complaint against defendants Alaska Airlines,
Inc. (“Alaska Airlines”), and Alaska Air Group, Inc. (“Alaska Group”) (jointly as “Alaska Air”),
and John Doe, an Alaska Airlines’ agent1, for negligently causing Williams to fall out of her
wheelchair at the Milwaukee Mitchell Airport (“Milwaukee”), which led to her death eight days
later. Alaska Air has moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(2). For the reasons stated below, the motion is granted.
BACKGROUND
On May 2, 2018, Williams boarded Alaska Airlines Flight 1232 (“AS 1232”) in Los
Angeles scheduled to fly into O’Hare International Airport in Chicago (“O’Hare”). Williams –
who was 75 years old – was returning to her residence in Aurora, Illinois, after being released
1 Based on the record before the court, John Doe has not been identified or served with process.
The specific jurisdictional issues described herein apply equally to John Doe.
with the approval of her doctors from treatment in California. She intended to continue
treatment with her internist in Aurora after arriving in Chicago. When purchasing her ticket
online, Williams arranged with Alaska Airlines to provide the highest level of care, including
wheelchair services for boarding and deplaning Williams.
During the flight on May 2, 2018, AS 1232 was diverted to Milwaukee because of bad
weather. Williams was talking, laughing, and fully communicating with her travel companions
during the flight. Additionally, Williams was alert, feeding herself, able to adjust herself, and
had control of her hands, arms, legs, and feet. Upon arrival in Milwaukee, an agent of Alaska
Airlines, John Doe, came aboard the aircraft and, at the direction of Alaska Airlines, placed
Williams in an aisle wheelchair to take her off the aircraft. At the junction between the aircraft
doorway and the jetway, John Doe unbuckled Williams from the aisle chair. After unbuckling
her, John Doe allegedly “carelessly and negligently shoved or jerked the aisle wheelchair and
caused [Williams] to fall from the aisle wheelchair.” Williams hit her head on a metal portion
of the jetway or aircraft, landing in the jetway.
Immediately after falling on the left side of her head, Williams began to bleed profusely
from her head, became non-responsive, and could not focus her eyes. She was transported from
the airport to Froedtert hospital in Milwaukee. During her stay at the hospital, physicians
diagnosed her with acute encephalopathy, head trauma, cerebral edema, metastatic
chondrosarcoma, and a concussion. Additionally, physicians noted Williams had athetoid
movements of her limbs. On May 4, 2018, two days after the fall, Williams, was discharged
from Froedtert Hospital and was driven by ambulance to her home in Aurora, Illinois. At the
time of her discharge, Williams had garbled speech, was not able to fully communicate fully,
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could not feed herself, could not control her body movements, and was bedridden because of her
head injury. Between May 4, 2018, and May 10, 2018, Williams’s condition did not improve.
On May 10, 2018, Williams died in her home in Aurora, Illinois.
DISCUSSION
Alaska Air argues that plaintiff has failed to allege facts that establish a prima facie case
for personal jurisdiction over them. “Whether a forum's courts can bind defendants to their
judgments depends on principles of due process.” Murray v. Cirrus Design Corp., 339 F. Supp.
3d 783, 786 (N.D. Ill. 2018). “Those principles require that defendants ‘have certain minimum
contacts with [the forum] such that . . . the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice.’" International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 66 S. Ct. 154, 158 (1945).
When defendants have those minimum contacts, the forum's courts have personal jurisdiction.
Id.
Although a defendant’s physical presence in the forum State is not required, there must
exist sufficient minimum contacts such that the defendant “should reasonably anticipate being
haled into court there.” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 2183 (1985) quoting
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 100 S. Ct. 559, 567 (1980). The exercise of personal
jurisdiction by a federal court sitting in diversity turns on the law of the forum state. Kipp v. Ski
Enterprise Corp., 783 F.3d 695, 697 (7th Cir. 2015). Illinois's long-arm statute allows personal
jurisdiction on any basis allowed by the United States Constitution, so "there is no operative
difference between [the] two constitutional limits." Mobile Anesthesiologists Chicago, LLC v.
Anesthesia Associates of Houston Metroplex, P.A., 623 F.3d 440, 443 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing 735
ILCS 5/2-209(c)). The question thus merges into "whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction
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would violate federal due process." Id. Under federal due process principles, personal
jurisdiction comes in two types: general and specific. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v.
Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2855 (2011). Plaintiff has the burden to show personal jurisdiction, but
because there has been no evidentiary hearing, plaintiffs' showing need only be prima facie.
Northern Grain Marketing., LLC v. Greving, 743 F.3d 487, 491-92 (7th Cir. 2014).
Alaska Air argues that plaintiff has failed to establish general jurisdiction. Plaintiff
counters that general jurisdiction exists because Alaska Air is “at home” in Illinois because of
Alaska Air’s daily, continuous, and substantial billion-dollar business activities in Illinois. “The
paradigm all-purpose forums for general jurisdiction are a corporation’s place of incorporation
and principal place of business.” Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S.Ct.
2846, 2854 (2011); Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S.Ct. 746, 760 (2014). In Daimler AG, the
Supreme Court rejected the argument that general jurisdiction exists in any state in which a
corporation “engages in a substantial, continuous, and systematic course of business.” Daimler
AG, 134 S.Ct. at 761. The Court instead held that general jurisdiction exists only where the
defendant is “fairly regarded at home,” and for a corporation, “the place of incorporation and the
principal place of business are paradigm bases for general jurisdiction.” Id. at 760. “Those
affiliations have the virtue of being unique - this is, each ordinarily indicates one place – as well
as easily ascertainable.” Id. Although the Court recognized there may be a rare situation where
a corporation is subject to general jurisdiction in a state other than the state of its incorporation or
principal place of business, it stated that it would have to be an “exceptional case.” Id. at 761 n.
19.
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The correct inquiry for general jurisdiction “is not whether a foreign corporation’s in-
forum contacts can be said to be in some sense continuous and systematic, it is whether that
corporation’s affiliations with the State are so continuous and systematic as to render [it]
essentially ‘at home’ in the forum State.” Id. at 761. In rejecting the notion that a corporation is
subject to general jurisdiction “in every State in which a corporation engages in a substantial,
continuous, and systematic course of business,” the Court held that such a standard would be
“unacceptably grasping,” because “[a] corporation that operates in many places can scarcely be
deemed at home in all of them. Id. at 761,762 n. 20. Thus, the standard for general jurisdiction
is a high one.
In the instant case, Illinois is neither the state of incorporation nor the principal place of
business of Alaska Air. Specifically, Alaska Group is a Delaware corporation and has its
principal place of business in Seattle, Washington. Alaska Airlines is an Alaskan corporation
and also has its principal place of business in Seattle, Washington. As Daimler AG makes clear,
because Illinois is neither the place of incorporation nor the principal place of business of Alaska
Air, general jurisdiction over Alaska Air would require this to be an exceptional case. Plaintiff
presents no unique facts before this court that support such an exceptional conclusion. Rather,
Alaska Air’s limited business activities in Illinois actually support the opposite conclusion: that
Alaska Air is not “at home” in Illinois. Just because plaintiff alleges that Alaska Airlines
operates many, if not hundreds, of flights to and from O’Hare, advertises in Chicago, and
maintains offices at O’Hare, this does rise to Alaska Air being “at home” in Illinois.
Alaska Airlines cannot be deemed “at home” in every state that in which it operates,
especially because Alaska Airlines also provides air services to more than 100 destinations
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world-wide, and more than ninety-seven percent of Alaska Airlines’ scheduled air services occur
outside of Illinois. Further, more than ninety-seven percent of Alaska Airlines’ revenue is
generated outside of Illinois, more than ninety nine percent of Alaska Airlines’ employees work
outside of Illinois, and more than ninety-seven percent of Alaska Airlines’ advertising occurs
outside of Illinois.2 Contrary to plaintiff’s position, the same allegations regarding Alaska Air’s
activities in Illinois would apply to any other state where Alaska Air provides air services.
Consequently, Alaska is not “at home” in Illinois.
Plaintiff next argues that even if Alaska Air is not subject to general personal
jurisdiction in Illinois, they are subject to specific personal jurisdiction. Plaintiff’s complaint
alleges that specific jurisdiction exists over Alaska Air because Williams’ injury was related
to Alaska Airs’ extensive Illinois business activities. Additionally, plaintiff’s complaint
alleges that Williams would have never been on the Alaska Airlines’ plane had Alaska
Airlines not arranged flights into Illinois, not allowed for the purchase of online tickets, and
not paid the City of Chicago for the right to operate out of O’Hare. In particular, plaintiffs
argue specific jurisdiction is established because it is foreseeable that Williams could have
fallen at O’Hare had the flight not been diverted to Milwaukee.
Alaska Air counters that plaintiff does not offer the necessary facts to establish “suit-
related conduct” to create specific jurisdiction in Illinois just because Alaska Airlines
operates many, if not hundreds, of flights to and from Illinois. Moreover, Alaska Air
2 Defendants also assert that Alaska Air does not own any real property, or operate any hubs or
maintenance facilities in Illinois.
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asserts that where the aircraft was scheduled to land (whether it was Wisconsin, Illinois, or
any other state) is not relevant to the specific jurisdiction analysis.
Compared to general jurisdiction, specific jurisdiction is “very different” – it
requires that “the suit…aris[e] out of or relat[e] to the defendant’s contacts with the forum.”
Murray, 339 F. Supp. 3d at 787; Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S.Ct.1773,
1780 (2017). Specific jurisdiction “focuses on the relationship among the defendant, the
forum, and the litigation” and requires that “the defendant’s suit-related conduct…create a
substantial connection with the forum State.” Walden, 134 S.Ct. at 1121. For the purposes
of specific jurisdiction, a defendant’s general connections with the forum are not enough.”
Murray, 339 F. Supp. 3d at 788 (quoting Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 137 S.Ct. at 1781).
The key question is “where defendants’ ‘suit-related conduct’ took place.” Id. (citing
Walden, 134 S.Ct. at 1115).
Following Walden, the Seventh Circuit addressed specific jurisdiction in Brook v.
McCormley, 873 F. 3d 549, 552-53 (7th Cir. 2017):
Specific jurisdiction requires a defendant’s contacts with the forum State to be
directly related to the conduct pertaining to the claims asserted. The mere fact that
a defendant’s conduct affects a plaintiff with connections to the forum State is not
sufficient to establish jurisdiction. The inquiry must focus on the relationship
among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation. The defendant’s relationship
with the plaintiff is not sufficient to create the necessary minimum contacts.
Rather, the relationship must arise out of contacts that the defendant himself creates
with the forum State, and the defendant’s contacts with the forum State itself.
In the instant case, the facts concerning Williams’ injury are clear and not in dispute.
Williams’ injury occurred in Milwaukee. The Alaska Airlines’ employee, John Doe, who
assisted Williams in Milwaukee, was based in Milwaukee, and the decisions to move
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Williams in a wheelchair was made in Wisconsin. Thus, all the physical acts relating to
the movement of Williams occurred in Wisconsin. No Alaska Airlines’ employee based
in O’Hare (where the flight was scheduled to land), or otherwise in Illinois traveled to
Milwaukee to assist Williams in Milwaukee. Similarly, no Alaska Airlines’ employee at
O’Hare, or at any other location in Illinois, participated in making any decisions regarding
how to move Williams at Milwaukee. Consequently, defendants’ motion to dismissed is
granted because neither specific nor general jurisdiction can be established over the
defendants in Illinois.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, defendants’ motion to dismiss [ Doc 7 ] is granted.
Because this dismissal is based on lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendants (including
John Doe), it is without prejudice to plaintiff's filing in an appropriate jurisdiction.
ENTER: November 5, 2019
[@ W. Gettleman
United States District Judge