Miller II v. Loves Park Police Dept.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

WESTERN DIVISION

Benjamin A. Miller II (#94824), )

)

Plaintiff, )

) Case No. 18 C 50334

v. )

) Judge Philip G. Reinhard

Winnebago County Sheriff’s Office, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER

The court has reviewed plaintiff’s amended complaint [7] pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A,

and it is dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which federal relief can be

granted. Plaintiff is granted until February 15, 2019 to submit a proposed second amended

complaint that states a cognizable federal claim in light of the principles discussed in this order.

Failure to do so will result in summary dismissal of this case for failure to state a claim. The Clerk

of Court is directed to mail plaintiff a copy of this order, a blank amended complaint form, and

instructions. Plaintiff’s motion for attorney representation [9] is denied without prejudice.

STATEMENT

Plaintiff Benjamin A. Miller II, an inmate confined at the Winnebago County Jail, brings

this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. By order of November 27, 2018, the

court dismissed plaintiff’s original complaint without prejudice to the submission of an amended

complaint that was limited to a claim or claims that could be properly joined in one lawsuit. Now

before the court is plaintiff’s amended complaint, which alleges that he has been subjected to

“unnecessary lockdowns at the Winnebago County Jail due to understaffing.”

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court is required to screen prisoners’ complaints and dismiss

the complaint, or any claims therein, if the court determines that the complaint or claim is frivolous

or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against

an immune defendant. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 214 (2007); Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d

645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013). Courts screen prisoners’ complaints in the same manner they review

motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Maddox v. Love, 655 F.3d

709, 718 (7th Cir. 2011).

A complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader

is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). The short and plain statement must “give the

defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citation omitted). The statement also must contain sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” which means

that the pleaded facts must show there is “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant acted

unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). When screening a pro se plaintiff’s

complaint, courts construe the plaintiff’s allegations liberally. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,

94 (2007) (per curiam). Courts also must “accept all well-pleaded facts as true and draw

reasonable inferences” in the plaintiff’s favor. Roberts v. City of Chicago, 817 F.3d 561, 564 (7th

Cir. 2016).

Plaintiff’s eight-line amended complaint alleges that he has been subjected to unnecessary

lockdowns at the jail due to understaffing. ([7], at pg. 4.) Plaintiff states that this has caused him

“undue emotional stress, mental anguish, increased aggression, increased anxiety, and increase[d]

hostility in a situation that is already difficult to begin with.” (Id.) Plaintiff attributes this problem

to negligence on the part of the Winnebago County Board, which he states has $14 million in a

public safety fund but has not used those funds to fully staff the county jail. (Id.)

Liberally interpreting plaintiff’s allegations, the court finds that the complaint fails to state

a colorable federal cause of action. Pretrial detainees do not have a “general liberty interest in

movement outside [their] cell[s] guaranteed by the Due Process Clause.” Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81

F.3d 1422, 1430 (7th Cir. 1996) (affirming, in relevant part, 12(b)(6) dismissal of pretrial

detainee’s claim that lockdowns of his unit were “arbitrary and capricious”); see also Higgason v.

Farley, 83 F.3d 807, 809 (7th Cir. 1996) (“The Due Process Clause … does not create a right for

prisoners to leave the area around their cells, to visit other prisoners, or not to be subjected to

lockdowns”). Thus, plaintiff has no right to procedural due process in connection with jail

lockdowns. Rather, whether a lockdown (or repeated lockdowns) violates an inmate’s rights is

examined as a conditions-of-confinement claim. See Higgason, 83 F.3d at 809.

The Due Process Clause prohibits conditions that amount to punishment of a pretrial

detainee for the crime with which he has been charged. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979).

Courts analyze a pretrial detainee’s claim of unconstitutional conditions of confinement under the

Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, rather that the Eighth Amendment, which applies

to convicted prisoners. Smith v. Dart, 803 F.3d 304, 309 (7th Cir. 2015). Under either standard,

however, “the alleged conditions must be objectively serious enough to amount to a constitutional

deprivation, and the defendant prison official must possess a sufficiently culpable state of mind.

An adverse condition amounts to a constitutional deprivation when it results in the denial of a basic

human need . . . such as adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care.” Id. at 309-10 (internal

citations and quotations omitted).

What constitutes a “sufficiently culpable state of mind” has been in flux since Kingsley v.

Hendrickson, — U.S. —, 135 S.Ct. 2466, 2470 (2015), in which the U.S. Supreme Court applied

an objective unreasonableness standard, rather than the Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference

standard applied to convicted prisoners, to an excessive force claim by a pretrial detainee.

Recently, the Seventh Circuit explicitly adopted this objective unreasonableness standard for

inadequate medical care claims and suggested that this standard applies to all types of Fourteenth

Amendment claims by pretrial detainees. Miranda v. Cty. of Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 352 (7th Cir.

2018) (observing that “the Supreme Court has been signaling that courts must pay careful attention

to the different status of pretrial detainees” and “[w]e see nothing in the logic the Supreme Court

used in Kingsley that would support [the] dissection of the different types of claims that arise under

the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.”). In order to state a claim for unconstitutional

conditions of confinement under this standard, a pretrial detainee must allege facts supporting an

inference “that the defendant-official acted intentionally to impose the alleged condition, or

recklessly failed to act with reasonable care to mitigate the risk that the condition posed to the

pretrial detainee even though the defendant-official knew, or should have known, that the condition

posed an excessive risk to health or safety.” See Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 35 (2d Cir. 2017).

Here, plaintiff has not alleged facts suggesting that he can satisfy either prong of a

conditions-of-confinement claim. First, the court discerns no objectively serious deprivation.

When assessing the severity of a deprivation in the context of a conditions-of-confinement claim,

the court must consider not only the nature of the hardship, but also its duration, and whether the

hardship has caused harm. See Thomas v. Illinois, 697 F.3d 612, 614-15 (7th Cir. 2012).

“Punishment” requires something more than routine discomfort. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S.

337, 349 (1981); Halmon v. Greer, No. 14 CV 3607, 2015 WL 2357632, at *1 (N.D. Ill. May 14,

2015) (Kocoras, J.). Punishment in the constitutional sense generally requires allegations of

extreme deprivations over an extended time. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1992);

see also Bell, 441 U.S. at 542 (confining pretrial detainees “in such a manner as to cause them to

endure genuine privations and hardship over an extended period of time might raise serious

questions under the Due Process Clause as to whether those conditions amounted to punishment”).

In this regard, frequent or protracted lockdowns may create conditions amounting to a

constitutional deprivation when the periods of confinement deny an inmate the ability to exercise

and trigger health concerns. See Turley, 729 F.3d at 652 (prisoner stated a claim where he alleged

that frequent and lengthy lockdowns in small cells without opportunity to exercise caused health

problems); see also Smith, 803 F.3d at 313 (lack of exercise can rise to the level of a constitutional

violation when movement is denied to the extent that it causes muscle atrophy). In Turley, for

example, the plaintiff alleged frequent lockdowns over a 33-month period, with the longest

continuous lockdown for 81 days. 729 F.3d at 648; see Turley v. Rednour, No. 10-cv-789, 2011

WL 615027, at *1 (S.D. Ill. Feb. 11, 2011) (“During such lockdown periods, Plaintiff was locked

in his cell 24 hours a day without privileges, exercise, or property.”) The Seventh Circuit found

these allegations sufficient to state a claim. Turley, 729 F.3d at 652.

By contrast, most short-term lockdowns do not pose such problems. See Martin v. Lane,

766 F. Supp. 641, 647 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (denial of recreation for a short period of time does not

violate the Constitution); see also Isby v. Brown, 856 F.3d 508, 522 (7th Cir. 2017) (state prisoner’s

prolonged confinement in administrative segregation was not a serious enough adversity to

implicate the Eighth Amendment, notwithstanding his complaints about the lighting, food,

temperatures, sleeping arrangements, and restricted time for showers and exercise in the

segregation unit). Rather, a prisoner must articulate some “egregious deprivation” with respect to

the conditions of his confinement. Isby, 856 F.3d at 523 (citing Walker v. Shansky, 28 F.3d 666,

672-73 (7th Cir. 1994)).

In the instant case, plaintiff has alleged no facts indicating the length or frequency of the

lockdowns. Nor does he indicate what restrictions were placed upon him during these lockdowns.

While plaintiff understandably alleges that the lockdowns are stressful, his brief complaint does

not allege any facts indicating a sufficiently serious deprivation that rises to the level of a

constitutional violation.

Next, the complaint does not allege facts supporting an inference that any particular jail

official knew or should have known that the lockdowns posed an excessive risk to his health but

failed to act reasonably to mitigate that risk. In this regard, courts must give correctional

administrators “wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices

that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain

institutional security.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 547 (collecting cases). As such, lockdowns by themselves

do not violate an inmate’s constitutional rights. See Wrinkles v. Davis, 311 F. Supp. 2d 735, 739-

40 (N.D. Ind. 2004) (explaining that the Constitution “creates no liberty interest in inmates

avoiding an institutional lockdown” and that “[i]nstitutional lockdowns . . . do not present the type

of ‘atypical’ deprivation in which a state might conceivably create a liberty interest.”).

Plaintiff names as defendants the Winnebago County Sheriff’s Office, Winnebago County

Board, and “Winnebago County Corrections.” This is problematic for several reasons. First,

“Winnebago County Corrections” is not a suable entity. Smith v. Knox Cty. Jail, 666 F.3d 1037,

1040 (7th Cir. 2012); Castillo v. Cook County Mail Room Dep't, 990 F.2d 304, 307 (7th Cir. 1993).

Second, plaintiff names the “Winnebago County Sheriff’s Office” as a defendant, but it is

unclear whether he is attempting to proceed against Winnebago County Sheriff Gary Caruana in

his individual or official capacity. To the extent that plaintiff contends that Winnebago County

Sheriff Gary Caruana violated his rights in his individual capacity, he must allege some facts

indicating that Sheriff Caruana was personally involved in the alleged deprivation. See Kuhn v.

Goodlow, 678 F.3d 552, 556 (7th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). Supervisory officials can be

personally liable when they “know about the conduct and facilitate it, approve it, condone it, or

turn a blind eye for fear of what they might see.” Chavez v. Illinois State Police, 251 F.3d 612,

651 (7th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).

In regard to an official capacity claim, plaintiff must allege facts indicating that “his injury

was the result of [an] . . . official policy or custom.” Hahn v. Walsh, 762 F.3d 617, 640 (7th Cir.

2014) (citation omitted). “An official policy or custom may be established by means of an express

policy, a widespread practice which, although unwritten, is so entrenched and well-known as to

carry the force of policy, or through the actions of an individual who possesses the authority to

make final policy decisions on behalf of the municipality or corporation.” Id. “The plaintiff also

must establish a causal link between the . . . policy (or lack of policy) and the plaintiff’s injury.”

Id. Plaintiff may be attempting to allege that the unnecessary lockdowns are the result of an official

policy or so frequent as to be a widespread practice, but he has not alleged any facts that support

either inference.

Third, plaintiff has not stated a claim against the Winnebago County Board. While the

court has the ability to remedy constitutional violations, plaintiff should be aware that the

“separation of powers” doctrine greatly limits the court’s ability to review matters of legislative

budgeting. “Principles of federalism and separation of powers impose stringent limitations on the

equitable power of federal courts.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 385 (1996). “Article III cannot

be understood to authorize the Federal Judiciary to take control of core state institutions like

prisons, schools, and hospitals, and assume responsibility for making the difficult policy judgments

that state officials are both constitutionally entitled and uniquely qualified to make.” Id. (citation

omitted); see also Cty. of Vernon v. United States, 933 F.2d 532, 535 (7th Cir. 1991) (“The decision

of Congress not to appropriate funds for a particular Project normally is not reviewable by the

judiciary”) (citation omitted). The court can compel jail officials to rectify constitutional

violations (should they exist), but it cannot compel the Winnebago County Board to allot more

funds to the county jail.

For these reasons, the court dismisses plaintiff's amended complaint without prejudice for

failure to state a claim. If plaintiff wants to proceed with this lawsuit, he must submit a proposed

second amended complaint that states a federal claim against proper defendants. Any second

amended complaint must be submitted on the court’s required form. See Local Rule 81.1. It also

must comport with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11; Rule 11 provides that by signing a

pleading, a party represents to the court that his claims are warranted by existing law and that the

factual contentions have evidentiary support or likely will have evidentiary support after further

investigation. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b). Plaintiff must write both the case number and the judge’s

name on the second amended complaint, sign it, and return it to the Prisoner Correspondent.

Plaintiff is cautioned that an amended pleading supersedes the prior complaints and must stand

complete on its own. Therefore, all allegations against all defendants must be set forth in the

second amended complaint without reference to prior complaints. Any exhibits plaintiff wants the

court to consider in its threshold review of the amended complaint also must be attached. Plaintiff

is advised to keep a copy for his files.

The Clerk of Court will provide plaintiff with an amended civil rights complaint form and

instructions along with a copy of this order. Failure to submit a proposed second amended

complaint by the date set forth above will result in dismissal of this lawsuit for failure to state a

claim.

Plaintiffs motion for attorney representation is denied. “There is no right to court-

appointed counsel in federal civil litigation,” Olson v. Morgan, 750 F.3d 708, 711 (7th Cir. 2014),

but the court has discretion to request that an attorney represent an indigent litigant on a volunteer

basis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). The court declines to do so at this time because plaintiff's

motion does not show that he has made any effort to retain counsel on his own. The motion could

be denied on this basis alone. See Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 654-55 (7th Cir. 2007) (en banc);

Russell v. Bukowski, 608 F.App’x 426, 428 (7th Cir. 2015) (“[B]efore a district court is required

to consider recruiting counsel to assist a litigant in a civil case, the litigant must make a reasonable

attempt to secure counsel for himself.”). The court further determines that plaintiff is capable of

proceeding without counsel for the purpose of preparing a second amended complaint that provides

more detail about his claims. Accordingly, plaintiffs motion for attorney representation is denied

without prejudice to renewal should the case proceed on the second amended complaint.

Date: 01/14/2019 ENTER:

Phitiya 6 Mein hart

United States District Court Judge

Docketing to Mail Notices. (LC)