Simpson v. Cook County Sheriff's Office

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

JOSEPH D.G. SIMPSON, FREDERICK )

MERKERSON, MAURICE RICHARDSON, )

and JONATHAN HARRIS, on behalf of ) Case No. 18-cv-553

themselves and all others similarly situated, )

) Judge Sharon Johnson Coleman

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. )

)

COOK COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE, )

COOK COUNTY SHERIFF’S MERIT )

BOARD, and COUNTY OF COOK )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER

The Cook County Sheriff’s Office and County of Cook’s motion to dismiss [31] is granted

in part and denied in part. The Cook County Sheriff’s Office is dismissed without prejudice, and

Sheriff Dart is substituted as a defendant in his official capacity. Counts III, IV, and V are dismissed

with respect to plaintiffs Merkerson and Harris.

STATEMENT

The plaintiffs, Joseph D.G. Simpson, Frederick Merkerson, Maurice Richardson, and

Jonathan Harris, allege that the Cook County Sheriff’s Office and Cook County Sheriff’s Merit

Board have discriminated against them based on their race by rejecting their applications to be

correctional officers, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Section 1981 of the

Civil Rights Act of 1866, the Illinois Civil Rights Act, and the Equal Protection Clause of the United

States Constitution. They specifically allege that since 2013 the number of African Americans hired

to be correctional officers has declined noticeably, and that this decline is attributable to racial bias

and racial discrimination during the hiring process. The Cook County Sheriff’s Office and the

County of Cook move to dismiss portions of the plaintiffs complaint against them for failure to

state a claim.

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal

sufficiency of the complaint, not the merits of the allegations. The allegations must contain

sufficient factual material to raise a plausible right to relief. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 569 n.14, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). Although Rule 8 does not require a plaintiff

to plead particularized facts, the complaint must assert factual “allegations that raise a right to relief

above the speculative level.” Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 751–52 (7th Cir. 2011). When ruling

on a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as

true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Boucher v. Fin. Sys. of Green Bay, Inc.,

880 F.3d 362, 365 (7th Cir. 2018).

The defendants first contend that the Cook County Sheriff’s Office should be dismissed

because it is not a suable entity. As the parties’ arguments demonstrate, within this district there is

some ambiguity as to whether the Cook County Sheriff’s Office is a proper defendant in section

1983 actions. The Court need not resolve that issue, however, as the plaintiffs have conceded that it

would be appropriate to dismiss the Cook County Sheriff’s Office and to substitute Sheriff Dart in

his official capacity, with the substitution relating back to the filing of the original complaint. This

Court agrees that the Cook County Sheriff’s Office and Sheriff Dart, in his official capacity, are

effectively the same entity for the purpose of this suit. The Court therefore dismisses the Cook

County Sheriff’s Office without prejudice and substitutes Sheriff Dart in his official capacity.

The defendants next contend that the County of Cook is not liable for the alleged actions of

the Sheriff’s Office. It is undisputed that the plaintiffs have named Cook County as a defendant

solely for purposes of indemnification. Askew v. Sheriff of Cook Cty., Ill., 568 F.3d 632, 636 (7th Cir.

2009). To the extent that the complaint is ambiguous on this point, the plaintiffs concede, and this

Court holds, that the complaint only contains a claim for indemnification against Cook County.

The defendants contend that the plaintiffs’ claims are time-barred. A plaintiff is not required

to plead facts in the complaint to anticipate and defeat affirmative defenses such as a statute of

limitations defense. Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 579 (7th Cir. 2009). A complaint, however, may be

dismissed on statute of limitations grounds when the allegations of the complaint make clear that

relief is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Logan v. Wilkins, 644 F.3d 577, 582 (7th Cir.

2011); U.S. v. Lewis, 411 F.3d 838, 842 (7th Cir. 2005). Here, the parties agree that a two-year statute

of limitations applies to the plaintiffs’ section 1981 and 1983 claims. Dominguez v. Hendlery, 545 F.3d

585, 588 (7th Cir. 2008). Accordingly, in order to be timely the plaintiffs’ claims must have accrued

after January 24, 2016.

The defendants seemingly concede that the plaintiffs have adequately alleged that the

decision not to hire Simpson and Richardson was made within the statute of limitations period. The

plaintiffs, in turn, appear to concede by omission that the decision not to hire Merkerson and Harris

occurred outside the statute of limitations period. The Complaint, moreover, is clear as to when

those plaintiffs were denied employment. Merkerson was denied employment on October 27, 2015,

when he received a Notification of Disqualification from the Merit Board. Harris’ employment

application. in turn, was rejected on March 20, 2015. The plaintiffs do not allege that tolling or

other equitable considerations should modify the application of the statute of limitations here.

Accordingly, Merkerson and Harris have failed to state timely claims under sections 1981 and 1983.

The defendants next contend that the plaintiffs’ claims for violation of the Illinois Civil

Rights Act are time barred. The defendants’ base their argument on the Local Governmental and

Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act, 745 ILCS 10/8-101(a), which provides a general one-

year statute of limitations on civil actions commenced against local governmental entities or their

employees. The Illinois Civil Rights Act, however, went into effect after 745 ILCS 10/8-101 and

expressly provides that claims brought under it are subject to a two-year statute of limitations. See

Brown v. Cook County, Nos. 17 C 8085, 17 C 8146, 17 C 9056, 2018 WL 3122174, at *11 (N.D. Ill.

June 26, 2018) (declining to decide the issue, but observing that allowing a defendant to avoid

liability for alleged discrimination under another provision of the Tort Immunity Act would

undermine the very purpose of the Illinois Civil Rights Act); see also Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v.

Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 646, 127 S.Ct. 2518, 168 L.Ed.2d 467 (2007) (recognizing that

statutory repeal may be inferred where a later statute expressly contradicts the original act). The

Court accordingly applies a two-year statute of limitations to the plaintiffs’ Illinois Civil Rights Act

claims, and therefore concludes that Merkerson and Harris cannot state timely claims under that

statute.

The defendants further argue that Simpson has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies

and therefore cannot proceed with his Title VII claims. Here, however, Simpson’s co-plaintiffs

brought timely EEOC charges. The plaintiffs assert that Simpson can therefore “piggy-back” on his

co-plaintiffs administrative exhaustion. Under the single-filing doctrine (also known as the

piggybacking doctrine), an individual who has not exhausted his administrative options may join a

lawsuit filed by another individual who has administratively exhausted, so long as both claims arise

from the same or similar discriminatory conduct committed during the same period and the other

individual’s EEOC charge noted the collective nature of the discrimination claim. Rogers v. Ford

Motor Co., No. 12 C 7220, 2013 WL 3895279, at *3 (N.D. Ill. July 26, 2013) (Gotschall, J.). Here, the

remaining plaintiffs’ EEOC complaints all involved the same conduct and same relative time period

as Simpson’s claims, and all alleged the collective nature of the discrimination complained of. The

defendants, moreover, have offered no argument opposing the application of the single-filing

doctrine. Accordingly, the Court concludes that under the single-filing doctrine Simpson was not

required to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to joining in this lawsuit.

Finally, the defendants contend that the plaintiffs cannot state a disparate impact claim

because they have not alleged or administratively exhausted allegations of a facially neutral

employment practice. Seventh Circuit precedent, however, does not require that disparate-1mpact

claims be based on a facially neutral employment practice, and the defendants’ arguments, which are

based on outdated caselaw, are therefore without merit. Adams v. City of Indianapolis, 742 F.3d 720,

731 (7th Cir.2014). (“Disparate-1mpact claims may be based on any employment policy, not just a

facially neutral policy.’”).

IT ISSO ORDERED.

Date: 8/8/2018 | ) □□ □□

Entered:

SHARON JOHNSON COLEMAN

United States District Court Judge