Medina v. Berwyn South School District 100

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

Gloria Medina, )

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 16 C 2189

) Judge Ronald A. Guzmán

Berwyn South School District )

100, )

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

For the reasons stated below, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment [42] is granted and

Plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment [54] is denied. All pending motions are denied as

moot. Civil case terminated.

STATEMENT

After she was terminated from her position as an administrative assistant with Berwyn

School District 100 (“District”), Gloria Medina sued the District for discrimination in violation

of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101, et seq. (“ADA”) and interference with

her rights under the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq. (“FMLA”). Both

the District and Medina move for summary judgment on both claims. For the reasons set forth

below, the District’s motion is granted and Medina’s motion is denied.

Facts

Medina was hired by the District on or about January 5, 1998 to serve as the secretary

and receptionist for the Building and Grounds Department. (Pl.’s Resp. Def.’s Stmt. Facts, Dkt.

# 56, ¶ 1.) In 2000, Medina became the secretary to the Director of Title VII Grants, and in July

2001, she assumed the additional role of Administrative Assistant to the Director of the Bilingual

Grant Program. (Id. ¶¶ 2, 3.) The Director of Title VII Grants and the Director of the Bilingual

Grant Program were the same individual. (Id. ¶ 3.) Medina’s duties as Administrative Assistant

to the Bilingual Department included, among other things, providing clerical support to the

director, interpreting and translating documents as needed, monitoring and meeting scheduled

program reports, and maintaining an accurate record-keeping system. (Id. ¶ 4.) Medina’s job

required organizational, communication, and computer skills, effective interpersonal skills, and

proficiency in both written and oral Spanish and English. (Id. ¶ 5.) Medina reported to the

Director of the Bilingual Grant Program/Bilingual Department and the Superintendent. (Id. ¶ 6.)

Medina was approved for and took an FMLA leave between July 30, 2014 and August 18, 2014,

which was subsequently extended to October 1, 2014. (Id. ¶ 7.) Medina was approved for a

second FMLA leave from July 6, 2015 to October 6, 2015, but returned to work on August 31,

2015. (Id. ¶¶ 11, 12.)

Beatriz Maldonado, who was Principal of the District’s Emerson Elementary School, also

became Director of the Bilingual Department in July 2015. (Id. ¶ 8.) Around the time that

Medina was returning to work after her second FMLA leave, the District was combining the

offices of Heritage School and Emerson Elementary School into one main office in the Heritage

School building. (Id. ¶ 13.) Medina moved with Maldonado to the new combined office in the

Heritage Building, and her job title remained the same. (Id. ¶ 14.) A new database for tracking

student information, PowerSchool, was being introduced prior to the start of Medina’s FMLA

leave in July 2015. (Id. ¶ 15.) In a July 1, 2015 email to Medina, Maldonado informed Medina

that she had arranged for Medina to be trained on the PowerSchool system, explaining that “data

accuracy is one of the biggest responsibilities in the department, thus the importance of this task

is high.” (Id. ¶ 16.) In her July 2, 2015 response, Medina agreed with Maldonado that “data

accuracy is a major responsibility,” but she did not receive the training prior to her taking the

scheduled FMLA leave. (Id. ¶¶ 15, 18.) The PowerSchool program was “very different” from

the previous program used by the District, and knowledge of the PowerSchool program was

required for Medina’s position. (Id. ¶ 19.)

In a meeting on the morning of August 31, 2015, Medina’s first day back, Maldonado

told Medina that her priorities were learning and familiarizing herself with the PowerSchool

program and translating. (Id. ¶¶ 20, 21.) While the parties dispute whether Medina had a private

office prior to the combination of the Emerson and Heritage Schools, and the record is unclear in

this regard, it is undisputed that upon her return to work on August 31, 2015, Medina was placed

in a newly-combined office with two other secretaries, which served both Emerson and Heritage

Schools. (Def.’s Resp. Pl’s Stmt. Facts, Dkt. # 59, ¶ 16.)

On August 31, 2015, at 2:42 p.m., Jean Suchy, Assistant Principal of Emerson School,

sent Medina an email asking her to complete a translation of a Welcome Back to School letter by

noon on September 1, 2015. (Pl.’s Resp. Def.’s Stmt. Facts, Dkt. # 56, ¶ 23.) At approximately

3:00 p.m. on September 1, 2015, Medina had a meeting with Maldonado in her office, at which

Suchy was also present. (Id. ¶ 24.) Medina explained that “she couldn’t do the translations”

because she had trouble concentrating due to the noise and confusion in the office. (Id. ¶ 25.)

Medina further stated that the translation would take more time because she had to answer

phones, take care of parents, and help a colleague. (Id.) According to Medina, Maldonado

became upset when Medina told her she needed more time, and Maldonado, after telling Medina

that “she needed to multitask, or else,” “lunged” toward Medina. (Id. ¶ 26.) When Medina

responded “Or else, what?”, Maldonado told Medina she was being insubordinate. (Id.) On

September 2, 2015, Maldonado had a conversation with Medina at her desk regarding the

translations, and Medina recorded the conversation with her cell phone. (Id. ¶¶ 28, 29.) Later

that day, at approximately 3:00 p.m., Medina and Maldonado met in Maldonado’s office, again

with Suchy present, and Maldonado pointed out errors in Medina’s translation of the Welcome

Back letter. (Id. ¶¶ 30, 31.) During the meeting, Maldonado asked Medina why she was holding

her cell phone, and Medina responded by twice asking, “Why can’t I hold my phone?” (Id. ¶

33.)

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Maldonado told Medina she was being insubordinate and ended the meeting. (Id. ¶¶ 33,

34.) Medina, who described her anxiety level at that time as being “high,” accused Maldonado

of treating her like an animal and kicking her out of the office. (Id. ¶ 34.) Using her cell phone,

Medina called her therapist, who instructed her to call an ambulance. (Id. ¶ 35.) Medina then

went to the main office, which she described as “noisy” and “crowded” with parents and

students. (Id. ¶ 36.) Using her desk phone in the main office, Medina called 911 and hung up,

called 911 a second time and again hung up, and on the third call, told the dispatch operator that

she was having a panic attack. (Id. ¶ 37.) After the hang ups, a 911 operator called the school

back, and the Assistant Principal of Heritage School, Allison Boutet, who was in the main office

at the time, told the operator that the person who had called and hung up was, at that moment, on

the phone with a 911 operator. (Id. ¶ 38.) Boutet told Medina the address of the school to

provide to the 911 operator, and then escorted Medina to the nurse’s office, which is located

right next to the main office. (Id. ¶¶ 38, 39.) A police officer and paramedics arrived and took

Medina out on a gurney while Maldonado and Suchy were standing in the hallway. (Id. ¶ 41.)

As she was being taken out, with students and parents present, Medina testified that she yelled,

“[Y]ou caused it. You did this to me. You both—you—did this to me, Beatrice. You did this to

me,” and Maldonado smirked. (Medina Dep., Def.’s Ex. K, Dkt. # 41-12, at 74.)

Suchy believed that Medina’s behavior toward Maldonado in the meetings on September

1 and 2, 2015, which included raising her voice and using an inappropriate tone, was

disrespectful and unprofessional. (Pl.’s Resp. Def.’s Stmt. Facts, Dkt. # 56, ¶ 43.) While the

District disputes the evidentiary support for certain of Medina’s statements of fact, it appears

uncontested that Medina was diagnosed with major depression and generalized anxiety disorder

at least as of August 2014, and that there was no physical harm or property damage related to

Medina’s purported panic attack on September 2, 2015. (Def.’s Resp. Pl.’s Stmt. Facts, Dkt. #

59, ¶¶ 3, 8, 11.)

The District sent a letter dated September 3, 2015 to Medina stating that she was being

placed on administrative leave, effective immediately, due to her unprofessional and

insubordinate conduct towards her supervisor and her 911 hang-up calls. (Pl.’s Resp. Def.’s

Stmt. Facts, Dkt. # 56, ¶ 44.) The letter indicated that an investigation was necessary, and she

would be arrested if she set foot on District property. (Id.) In a letter to the District dated

September 4, 2015, Medina’s psychiatrist, Dr. Lee Weiss, and her therapist, David Hodgson,

related that it was in Medina’s best interests to be placed on medical leave under the FMLA due

to her medical condition and her inability to function at work. (Id. ¶ 45.)1

In a letter dated September 10, 2015, the District informed Medina that after an

investigation, Superintendent Stanley Fields was recommending to the Board of Education of

Berwyn South School District 100 (“Board”) that Medina be terminated because she engaged in

1 Because the parties construe this September 4, 2015 letter as a request for FMLA leave,

the Court does as well.

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misconduct. (Id. ¶ 49.) Specifically, the letter stated, in part, as follows:

Your conduct on September 2, 2015, constitutes insubordination and misconduct.

Specifically, yelling at Principal Maldonado and Assistant Principal Suchy;

speaking on your cell phone in an unprofessional manner in the presence of

students, parents, and other staff in the Emerson main office; calling and hanging

up in 911 emergency dispatchers from a District school phone line; and failing to

follow proper District procedures for requesting and taking a personal day, is

conduct that disrupts the educational environment and violates Board Policies

5:120, 5:125 and 5:330. Accordingly, I will be recommending your termination

from employment with the District to the [Board] at its Wednesday, September

23, 2015, regularly scheduled Board meeting.

(Def.’s Ex. DD, Dkt. # 41-31, at 2.) The letter advised Medina that she had the right to address

the Board and present evidence. (Id.) Although the District moves to strike the relevant

statements of fact, Medina purportedly related to her therapist, Hodgson, that she felt harassed

by the administration and believed that Fields was looking to get rid of her. (Def.’s Resp. Pl’s

Stmt. Facts, Dkt. # 59, ¶¶ 29, 30.)2

Medina provided a Certification of Health Provider dated September 18, 2015 and signed

by Weiss and Hodgson, indicating that Medina was unable to do her job due to her mental health

condition. (Pl.’s Resp. Def.’s Stmt. Facts, Dkt. # 56, ¶ 46.) The District acknowledged receipt

of the certification in a letter to Medina dated September 22, 2015, which stated: “Please be

advised that because you are currently on paid administrative leave, pending the Board of

Education’s vote on Dr. Fields’ September 10 2015, recommendation to terminate your

employment, the District will consider your FMLA request after the Board of Education’s

September 23, 2015 meeting.” (Id. ¶ 51.) On September 23, 2015, the Board dismissed Medina

from her administrative assistant position. (Id. ¶ 52.)

Standard

“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Shell v. Smith, 789 F.3d 715, 717 (7th Cir. 2015). To survive summary

judgment, the nonmoving party must “do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical

doubt as to the material facts,” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

586 (1986), and instead must “establish some genuine issue for trial such that a reasonable jury

could return a verdict in her favor.” Gordon v. FedEx Freight, Inc., 674 F.3d 769, 772-73 (7th

Cir. 2012). The Court gives the nonmoving party “the benefit of conflicts in the evidence and

reasonable inferences that could be drawn from it.” Grochocinski v. Mayer Brown Rowe & Maw,

2 The Court need not rule on the motion to strike these statements of facts as they are not

material to resolution of the motions for summary judgment.

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LLP, 719 F.3d 785, 794 (7th Cir. 2013). The Court must not make credibility determinations or

weigh conflicting evidence. McCann v. Iroquois Mem’l Hosp., 622 F.3d 745, 752 (7th Cir.

2010).

Analysis

ADA Discrimination (Count I)

Medina alleges that she was terminated in violation of the ADA “as the result of conduct

that was a manifestation of her disability, that is, severe work-related stress.” (Compl., Dkt. # 1,

¶ 56.) “The ADA . . . prohibit[s] an employer from discriminating against a qualified individual

with a disability.” Guzman v. Brown Cty., No. 16-3599, 2018 WL 1177592, at *6 (7th Cir. Mar.

7, 2018) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112; 29 U.S.C. § 794). “In order to defeat summary judgment on

her disability discrimination claim, [Medina] must point to evidence capable of establishing that

(1) she is a person with a disability within the meaning of the ADA . . . ; (2) she is qualified to

perform the essential functions of her job with or without a reasonable accommodation; and (3)

she suffered from an adverse employment decision as a result of her disability.” Id. Under

current Seventh Circuit precedent, if the parties do not argue for a different type of causation, the

“but for” standard is appropriate. Monroe v. Ind. Dep’t of Transp., 871 F.3d 495, 504 (7th Cir.

2017) (noting that the ADA Amendments Act changed the language from prohibiting employers

from discriminating ‘because of’ a disability to ‘on the basis of’ a disability, but stating that

because “the parties . . . have not argued that another causation standard should apply, . . . we

will continue to apply the ‘but for’ causation standard”) (citations omitted). “To show that

disability discrimination was the ‘but for’ reason for the termination, a plaintiff can use either

direct or circumstantial evidence.” Id. While direct evidence is essentially an admission that the

defendant fired the plaintiff due to her disability, circumstantial evidence can include:

(1) suspicious timing; (2) ambiguous statements or behavior towards other

employees in the protected group; (3) evidence, statistical or otherwise, that

similarly situated employees outside of the protected group systematically receive

better treatment; and (4) evidence that the employer offered a pretextual reason

for an adverse employment action.

Bunn v. Khoury Enters., Inc., 753 F.3d 676, 684 (7th Cir. 2014).

Pointing to the events of the day at issue, the District contends that regardless of whether

Medina was disabled, “when an employee engages in behavior that is unacceptable in the

workplace . . . , the fact that the behavior is precipitated by her mental illness ‘does not present

an issue under the Americans with Disabilities Act’; the behavior itself disqualifies her from

continued employment and justifies her discharge.” Felix v. Wis. Dep’t of Transp., 828 F.3d

560, 571 (7th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). Medina does not dispute that she engaged in the

conduct for which she was terminated. She seeks instead to downplay its seriousness, calling it a

“single day’s strained conduct,” (Pl.’s Resp., Dkt. # 54, at 7), and asserting that she was actually

terminated because she had become a “challenge and an irritation to [Superintendent] Fields’

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authority.” (Id. at 9.) In addition, she maintains that the violations cited by Fields as the basis

for his recommendation that she be terminated are “ludicrous” and unreasonable. (Id. at 11.)

But these arguments miss the point; Medina was terminated for her unprofessional

conduct, not because of her disability. At her deposition, Medina testified that her conversation

with Maldonado on the afternoon of September 2, 2015 became somewhat tense after Medina

admitted to recording their conversation earlier in the day. (Def.’s Ex. K, Medina Dep., Dkt. #

41-12, at 55-57.) When Maldonado asked Medina why she again was holding her phone at the

afternoon meeting, Medina responded twice with “Why can’t I hold my phone?” (Id. at 56-57.)3

After Maldonado told Medina she was being insubordinate and directed her to leave the office,

Medina testified that she began to have a panic attack and accused Maldonado of treating her

like an animal. (Id. at 59.) According to Medina, she was “probably” yelling. (Id. at 60.) As

she was walking down the internal hallway back to the main office, Medina used her cell phone

to call both her therapist, who directed her to call 911, and her father. (Id. at 65.) Upon reaching

the main office, Medina stated out loud to no one in particular that she was not feeling well, and

“struggl[ed] to cross the students . . . and parents” in order to “make [her] way” to her desk to

call 911. (Id. at 66-67.) After Medina called 911 and twice hung up before speaking with a

dispatcher on the third call, paramedics and a police officer arrived at the school. (Id.)

According to Medina, as she was taken out of the school on a gurney by paramedics in front of

other staff, parents, and children, she was “going crazy” and “yelling” that “Principal Maldonado

did this to me.” (Id. at 73-74.)

Superintendent Fields determined that Medina’s behavior violated at least District Policy

5:120, which provides, in part, that “[a]ll District employees are expected to maintain high

standards in their school relationships, . . . to be considerate and cooperative, and to maintain

professional and appropriate relationships with students, parents, staff members, and others.”

(Def.’s Ex. PP, District Policy 5:120 Ethics & Conduct, Dkt. # 41-43.) At a time of

significantly-heightened concerns regarding school security and the physical safety of students

and staff, the Court cannot conclude that the District’s decision to terminate Medina based on her

unprofessional and disruptive behavior violates the ADA. See Palmer v. Cir. Ct. of Cook Cty.,

117 F.3d 351, 352 (7th Cir. 1997) (“The [ADA] does not require an employer to retain a

potentially violent employee. Such a requirement would place the employer on a razor’s

edge—in jeopardy of violating the Act if it fired such an employee, yet in jeopardy of being

deemed negligent if it retained him and he hurt someone.”).

Medina’s cross-motion for summary judgment on the ADA claim is denied for the same

reason. In addition, to the extent that Medina seeks to rely on the indirect method of proof to

show discrimination, she has failed to establish a prima facie case as she does not demonstrate

that she was meeting the District’s legitimate expectations or identify any similarly-situated non-

disabled comparators who were treated more favorably. See Aberman v. Bd. of Educ. of City of

3 Medina testified that “[i]t’s vague, but I may have recorded [Maldonado]” at the

afternoon meeting. (Def.’s Ex. K, Medina Dep., Dkt. # 41-12, at 57.)

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Chi., 242 F. Supp. 3d 672, 689 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (“[S]ince Plaintiff has not shown that she was

meeting her employer’s legitimate expectations and has not shown that a . . . nondisabled

similarly situated comparator received more favorable treatment, Plaintiff has not established a

prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA. . . .”). Even assuming she established a prima

facie case of discrimination, Medina engages only in speculation and points to no record

evidence demonstrating that the District’s basis for terminating her was a lie. See Ennin v. CNH

Indus. Am., LLC, 878 F.3d 590, 596 (7th Cir. 2017) (“Because [the defendant] has proffered

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for firing [the plaintiff], he must produce evidence that

those reasons were actually pretext for discrimination”, or in other words, a “lie.”).

Accordingly, the District’s motion for summary judgment as to the ADA claim is granted

while Plaintiff’s cross-motion is denied.

FMLA Interference (Count II)

Under the FMLA, an eligible employee is entitled to twelve workweeks of leave because

of, among other reasons, “a serious health condition that makes the employee unable to perform

the functions of [her] position . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D). “The FMLA . . . makes it

unlawful for an employer to interfere with an employee’s attempt to exercise FMLA rights or to

retaliate against employees who exercise their FMLA rights.” Guzman, 2018 WL 1177592, at

*3 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 2615).4 An employee who takes FMLA leave is entitled upon returning

from the leave to be restored to the same or equivalent position she held at the time the leave

commenced. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2614(1)(A), (B). “In order to prevail on a FMLA interference claim,

an employee must establish that (1) she was eligible for the FMLA’s protections, (2) her

employer was covered by the FMLA, (3) she was entitled to leave under the FMLA, (4) she

provided sufficient notice of her intent to take leave, and (5) her employer denied her FMLA

benefits to which she was entitled.” Id.

Medina contends that when she returned from FMLA leave on August 31, 2015, she

returned to a non-equivalent position. Medina’s brief argument as to this issue, without

supporting citations to the record, is as follows:

Plaintiff returned from FMLA leave, without training, to an unfamiliar computer

database, was stationed in the schools’ secretarial pool, and was denied a private

office commensurate with her position. Plaintiff was presented with a new job

description replete with clerical tasks regarding which she was without training or

experience. Plaintiff, receiving little guidance from her superiors, was told to

4 Medina alleges only an FMLA interference claim and did not respond to the District’s

argument that she failed to allege a retaliation claim; therefore, Medina has waived any FMLA

retaliation claim. Bonte v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 624 F.3d 461, 466 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Failure to

respond to an argument . . . results in waiver.”).

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seek instruction from one of the clerks. At one point she found herself, to the

mutual dismay of herself and the school Librarian, at the school library pursuing a

project designed to keep track of the school’s I-pads! Plaintiff was left to wonder

what the future would hold for her in terms of job prospects as she gazed across . .

. the hallway to the private office occupied by Maria Anderson, whom she was

told had taken over the translation duties in Plaintiff’s absence.

(Pl.’s Resp., Dkt. # 54, at 13.)5 Notably, while making general statements about a “new” job

description, Medina fails to point to any record evidence specifically identifying how her duties

purportedly changed upon her return from FMLA leave. Nor does Medina place her perceived

demotion in context of the relevant circumstances, including the following:

C Her former school was consolidating space and operations with another

one, thus necessitating the move to a new working space

C The transition to the PowerSchool computer system was occurring before

and during her FMLA leave, and for reasons she fails to identify, Medina

did not obtain training on the new system prior to her leave, despite

Maldonado having scheduled training for her

C While complaining that she was required to perform clerical duties on her

return, Medina’s job description as Administrative Assistant to the

Director of the Bilingual Department included clerical duties to support

the Director

C Medina returned to her job on August 31, 2015 with, she admits, the same

title and salary, and still repored to the Director of Bilingual Studies.

In light of these deficiencies, the Court finds that Medina has failed to establish that she

was not restored to the same or equivalent position upon returning from FMLA leave on August

5 Medina often fails to include citations to statements of fact in her response brief, and

further does not discuss many of her statements of fact in her response. It is not this Court’s role

to sift through the statements of fact to determine which might be relevant to a party’s argument,

particularly when the party is represented by counsel. As noted by another court in this district:

It is not the Court’s responsibility to find arguments, facts, and supporting case

law for the parties. Instead, it is the advocate’s job to make it easy for the court to

rule in his client’s favor. Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in

briefs. Nor are they archaeologists searching for treasure.

In re Ace Track Co., Ltd., 556 B.R. 887, 903 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2016) (internal citations, quotation

marks, and ellipses omitted).

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31, 2015.

Medina also contends that her September 4, 2015 application for FMLA leave was

wrongly denied. Medina’s only argument in this regard is that because she was terminated in

violation of the ADA, her request for FMLA leave was also improperly denied. The Court,

however, has concluded that she was not terminated in violation of the ADA, so this argument

fails. Accordingly, the District’s motion for summary judgment as to Medina’s FMLA

interference claim is granted, and Plaintiff’s cross-motion is denied.

Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted and

Plaintiff’ s cross-motion is denied.

Powell 6 Lous

Date: April 10, 2018

Ronald A. Guzman

United States District Judge