Opinion

Morrison, M.D. v. Delray Medical Center, Inc

Court
District Court, S.D. Florida
Filed
Apr 12, 2024
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 20.2%

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 23-CV-80512-BER

JOHN F. MORRISON, M.D. and

MORRISON CLINIC, P.A.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

DELRAY MEDICAL CENTER, INC., et. al.

Defendants.

__________________________________________/

ORDER OF RECONSIDERATION ON PRIOR SEALING ORDERS

“Judicial records are open to the public, and for good reason—access to judicial

proceedings is crucial to our tradition and history, as well as to continued public

confidence in our system of justice.” Callahan v. United Network for Organ Sharing,

17 F.4th 1356, 1358–59 (11th Cir. 2021). These records “are presumptively available

to the public under the common law so that the judicial process can remain accessible

and accountable to the citizens it serves.” Id. at 1363. “Judicial records provide

grounds upon which a court relies in deciding cases, and thus the public has a valid

interest in accessing these records to ensure the continued integrity and transparency

of our governmental and judicial offices.” Comm'r, Alabama Dep't of Corr. v. Advance

Loc. Media, LLC, 918 F.3d 1161, 1173 (11th Cir. 2019).

Dr. John Morrison sues multiple defendants, including Delray Medical Center

(“the Hospital”) in a 14 count Complaint alleging both federal and state claims. At

the request of the parties, the Court sealed the following unredacted pleadings and

many of their attachments:

Docket Entry Pleading Description

12 Complaint

49-1 Motion to Dismiss

57 Amended Complaint

67 Zucker Defendant’s Answer and Affirmative Defenses

68 Medical Staff Answer and Affirmative Defenses

69 Hospital Answer, Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaims

79 Motion to Dismiss Counterclaims

83 Response in opposition to Motion to Dismiss Counterclaims

87 Reply in support of Motion to Dismiss Counterclaims

108 Answer and Affirmative Defenses to Counterclaims

119 Motion for Judgment on Pleadings

124 Opposition to Motion for Judgment on Pleadings

130 Reply in support of Motion for Judgment on Pleadings

133 Corrected Reply

150 Hearing exhibits

Redacted versions of these documents are in the record. The question now before me

is whether good cause exists to continue sealing pleadings that neither party disputes

are judicial records.

I issued an Order to Show Cause why the pleadings should not be unsealed,

except for private health information about non-parties. ECF No. 151. The Order to

Show Cause raised questions about whether the documents had been properly sealed.

It offered preliminary thoughts on the issues, but did not reach any final conclusions

nor make any binding rulings. It invited the parties to share their thoughts. In

response, the Court received thoughtful and informative pleadings. ECF Nos. 153

(Dr. Morrison); 154 (Hospital), 155 (other defendants adopting the Hospital’s

response). This matter is ripe for decision.

The public right of access is not absolute. It must give way when there is good

cause, as determined by “balanc[ing] the asserted right of access against the other

party's interest in keeping the information confidential.” Chicago Tribune v.

Bridgestone/Firestone, 263 F.3d 1304, 1309 (11th Cir. 2001). “[W]hether good cause

exists . . . is . . . decided by the nature and character of the information in question .

. .” Id. at 1315.

In balancing the public interest in accessing court documents against a

party’s interest in keeping the information confidential, courts consider,

among other factors, whether allowing access would impair court

functions or harm legitimate privacy interests, the degree of and

likelihood of injury if made public, the reliability of the information,

whether there will be an opportunity to respond to the information,

whether the information concerns public officials or public concerns, and

the availability of a less onerous alternative to sealing the documents.

See In re Alexander Grant & Co. Litig., 820 F.2d 352, 356 (11th Cir.

1987); Shingara v. Skiles, 420 F.3d 301, 305–06 (3d Cir. 2005); Amodeo,

71 F.3d at 1050–51. A party’s privacy or proprietary interest in

information sometimes overcomes the interest of the public in accessing

the information. See Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598,

98 S. Ct. 1306, 1312, 55 L.Ed.2d 570 (1978); Arthur R. Miller,

Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to the Courts, 105

Harv. L. Rev. 427, 464–74 (1991).

Romero v. Drummond Co., 480 F.3d 1234, 1246 (11th Cir. 2007). The presumption of

public access is particularly strong with regard to dispositive documents that relate

to the merits of the case. See Romero, 480 F.3d at 1245-46. Court rules and other

positive law may also prohibit public disclosure of information. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ.

P. 5.2.

The redacted information comprises four primary categories: (1) information

about a peer review of Dr. Morrison’s medical staff privileges at the Hospital, (2)

mandatory reporting by the Hospital to a federal database, (3) the Settlement

Agreement and related negotiations, and (4) allegedly defamatory statements about

Dr. Morrison. The parties’ Motions to Seal gave the following reasons for sealing:

• The pleadings contain information that is protected from public

disclosure by state and federal statutes. See 42 U.S.C. § 11137(b)(1); Fla.

Stat. §§ 395.0193(8), 395.0191, 766.101; Health Insurance Portability &

Accountability Act (“HIPAA”); 5 U.S.C. § 552a (Privacy Act)

• The Amended Complaint contains defamatory statements that “are

highly damaging to Dr. Morrison and his ability to practice medicine.”

See, e.g., ECF Nos. 5, 53, 122, 127, 148.

Allegedly Defamatory Statements

Dr. Morrison has not shown good cause to seal the allegedly defamatory

statements. He argues that disclosing this information may affect his ability to

practice medicine and earn a living. He further says, “The public’s interest in viewing

these false and defamatory statements are of little to no importance. Unlike other

cases involving the competing balance of interests test, there is no motion from a non-

party to view otherwise sealed information. The potential damage to Dr. Morrison’s

ability to earn a living and practice medicine substantially outweigh the abstract and

unasserted interest by the public in viewing the specifics of these false statements.”

ECF No. 153 at 4.

Dr. Morrison brought this lawsuit. He chose to challenge the accuracy of these

statements in a public courtroom. If disclosing the allegedly-defamatory statements

invades his privacy or causes him injury, it is solely the result of his own actions and

decisions. Disclosing these statements will not impair court functions. They do not

involve public officials or public concerns. Dr. Morrison will be able to respond to the

information; he brought the defamation claim specifically so he could disprove the

statements. There is no lesser alternative than unsealing.

The alleged defamatory statements are the gravamen of Dr. Morrison’s

defamation and injurious falsehood claims. He cannot win on these claims without

proving to a jury that the statements are not true. That process must occur in public.

Likewise, the Defendants can defend themselves only by discussing these alleged

statements in public. In short, it is logistically impossible to adjudicate the

defamation and injurious falsehood claims without publicly discussing the allegedly-

false statements.

Dr. Morrison’s other arguments also fail. First, it is irrelevant that no third

party has asked to unseal the documents. Even without a third-party request, the

Court must evaluate whether to exempt judicial records from the public right of

access. Second, perhaps the reason no one has asked for the information is because it

is under seal. The allegedly-false statements relate to the professional competence of

a surgeon in the local community. Once the public and the media know that fact, they

may have a substantial interest in evaluating for themselves whether the allegations

are true.

NPDB Reporting

Dr. Morrison argues that the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986

(HCQIA) prohibits public disclosure of materials relating to the National

Practitioner’s Data Bank (NPDB). Defendants concede that the Court has discretion

to unseal the NPDB-related materials. ECF No. 154 at 10-12.

Subchapter II of the HCQIA requires hospitals to submit reports to the NPDB

about certain actions relating to a physician’s clinical privileges. 42 U.S.C. §§11133,

11134. The information submitted to the NPDB is confidential:

Information reported under this subchapter is considered

confidential and shall not be disclosed (other than to the physician or

practitioner involved) except with respect to professional review

activity, as necessary to carry out subsections (b) and (c) of section

11135 of this title (as specified in regulations by the Secretary), or in

accordance with regulations of the Secretary promulgated pursuant

to subsection (a).

42 U.S.C. §11137(b)(1).

I agree with the other federal courts that have interpreted this statute

narrowly, to apply only to peer review material submitted to the Secretary of HHS

under the statute’s mandatory reporting provisions. See Dunn v. Dunn, 163 F. Supp.

3d 1196, 1209 (M.D. Ala. 2016) (collecting cases). This interpretation is most faithful

to the plain text of the statute. Therefore, documents sent by the NPDB are not

covered. Nor are documents voluntarily submitted by Dr. Morrison or the Hospital.

Nor are the parties’ communications with each other that predated the filing of the

NPDB report.

In the alternative, to the extent Section 11137(b)(1) is intended to protect Dr.

Morrison’s privacy, he has waived that protection. Dr. Morrison’s Complaint contends

that the Hospital sent false and defamatory reports to the NPDB. It includes direct

quotes from the Hospital’s submission to the NPDB and from Dr. Morrison’s own

submission to the NPDB. ¶¶99-104. His Answer to the Counterclaims includes

materials he voluntarily submitted to the NPDB. ECF No. 108, Ex. F.

In any event, under the circumstances of this case, the public right of access

overrides the HCQIA. I agree with the well-reasoned decision in Gabros v. Shore Med.

Ctr., that there is “nothing in binding case law or the relevant statute itself expressly

forbidding disclosure of these reports in the context of the claims brought by this

Plaintiff. Moreover, and perhaps most importantly, this Court has repeatedly

emphasized the public interest in the disclosure of materials filed on this Court's

docket, which often outweighs private interests in confidentiality.” Id., No. 1:16-

6135-NLH-JS, 2020 WL 6055151, at *4 (D.N.J. Oct. 14, 2020). The alternative is to

have Dr. Morrison’s “allegations litigated in a star chamber with a jury of ordinary

citizens presumably barred from discussing the case after their service in a closed

courtroom. There is no precedent for such a proceeding in federal court except in those

rare cases which might involve classified information or national secrets and even in

those cases redactions and sanitized versions allow for public access.” Id.

The Peer Review Information

Dr. Morrison argues that peer review information must remain sealed

pursuant to Florida law. I need not address whether Florida statutes apply. Federal

law controls whether a privilege applies, and the Eleventh Circuit has declined to

recognize a federal peer review privilege. Adkins v. Christie, 488 F.3d 1324, 1327-30

(11th Cir. 2007).

Here, the peer review materials are relevant insofar as (1) they inform whether

the Hospital’s counsel misrepresented that Dr. Morrison was “under investigation,”

(2) there was consideration for the Settlement Agreement, and (3) Dr. Morrison could

have justifiably relied on pre-Settlement representations by the Hospital. They can

otherwise be redacted to, for example, remove the names of the participants in the

peer review and any patient information.

Settlement Agreement

As a material term of their Settlement Agreement, the parties contractually

agreed to keep the settlement and all related documents confidential from third

parties. ECF No. 69-11 ¶4. As part of this lawsuit, Dr. Morrison moves to rescind the

Settlement Agreement and argues that it is unenforceable because it lacks

consideration. He also argues that, even if the Settlement Agreement is enforceable,

the release terms of the Settlement Agreement do not cover some of the claims in the

Amended Complaint. The Hospital argues that the Settlement Agreement is fully

enforceable.

The claims and defenses in this case require the Court to interpret the terms

of the Settlement Agreement. Therefore, the Settlement Agreement is intimately tied

to resolving the merits of the case. As with the allegedly-defamatory statements,

public discussion of the terms of the Settlement Agreement is necessary to resolve

claims and defenses in this lawsuit.

The parties’ contractual confidentiality agreement does not control. “It is

immaterial whether the sealing of the record is an integral part of a negotiated

settlement between the parties . . . Once a matter is brought before a court for

resolution, it is no longer solely the parties’ case, but also the public’s case.” Brown v.

Advantage Eng'g, Inc., 960 F.2d 1013, 1016 (11th Cir. 1992).

Balancing all the required factors, the Settlement Agreement should be

unsealed.

HIPAA

HIPAA protects private health information of non-parties. Any such

information shall remain under seal.

Privacy Act

The Order to Show Cause said

The Privacy Act applies to records maintained by a federal agency and

limits a person’s ability to obtain those records from the agency. See 5

U.S.C. §552a(b). Again, there is no evidence that any relevant records

were requested or obtained from a federal agency.

ECF No. 151 at 5. In their response, Defendants agreed that the Privacy Act was not

a basis to seal records in this case. Dr. Morrison did not address the issue. I therefore

deem him to have abandoned any claim that the Privacy Act requires pleadings to be

sealed.

WHEREFORE, it is ORDERED that the parties shall confer to determine what

portions of the docket entries should remain redacted in light of this Order. On or

before April 19, 2024, counsel shall email my chambers (reinhart@flsd.uscourts.gov)

advising which docket entries can be unsealed in their entirety as well as the parties’

jointly proposed redactions for any docket entries that will remain under seal.

DONE and ORDERED in Chambers at West Palm Beach, Palm Beach

County, in the Southern District of Florida, this 12 day of April 2024.

BRUCE E. REINHART

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

10

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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