Concilio Mision Cristiana Fuente de Agua Viva, Inc. v. Ortiz-Hernandez

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

CONCILIO MISION CRISTIANA

FUENTE DE AGUA VIVA, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v. CIV. NO. 22-1206 (RAM)

EDWIN LEMUEL ORTIZ-HERNANDEZ,

MARIA DEL CARMEN ARROYO

PANTOJAS, ET AL.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

RAÚL M. ARIAS-MARXUACH, United States District Judge

Pending before the Court is Edwin Lemuel Ortiz-Hernández’s

(“Defendant” or “Ortiz-Hernández”) Motion to Dismiss Amended

Complaint and for Change of Venue (“Motion to Dismiss” or

“Motion”). (Docket No. 59). For the reasons set forth below, the

Court GRANTS IN PART Plaintiff’s Motion. This action shall be

transferred to the Southern District of Florida.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On March 3, 2022, Plaintiff Concilio Misión Cristiana Fuente

de Agua Viva, Inc. (“Plaintiff” or “CMCFAV”) filed its original

Complaint with the Puerto Rico Court of First Instance, San Juan

Superior Part, against Ortiz-Hernández, his wife Maria del Carmen

Arroyo-Pantojas, and their conjugal partnership.1 (Docket No. 7-

1 Ortiz-Hernández is the only defendant in this case that has been served.

Civil No. 22-1206 (RAM) 2

1). The Complaint alleged that on December 13, 1999, CMCFAV “made

a three-million-dollar written loan” to Defendant, his wife, and

their community property (the “1999 Contract”) and that they still

owed Plaintiff repayment of $1.313 million. Id. at 2-3.

On May 5, 2022, Ortiz-Hernández filed a Notice of Removal,

removing the case to this Court pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1332.

(Docket No. 1). He asserted that this Court may exercise diversity

jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims because: Plaintiff seeks

relief in excess of $75,000; Plaintiff is organized under the laws

of Puerto Rico and has a Puerto Rico address; and Defendant and

his wife are citizens of Florida. (Docket Nos. 1 and 7-1).

On June 22, 2022, Ortiz-Hernández moved to dismiss for lack

of personal jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, under Fed.

R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(6), respectively. (Docket No. 11).

In support, he argued he was not a party to the 1999 Contract in

his personal capacity. Id. at 5-7. Alternatively, Ortiz-Hernández

sought change of venue to the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Florida. Id. at 7-8. In response, Plaintiff

moved to remand. (Docket No. 13).

The Court denied both motions on January 27, 2023. (Docket

No. 20). Regarding personal jurisdiction, the Court found that

Plaintiff had “met its present burden under the prima facie

standard for showing personal jurisdiction” but warned that the

Civil No. 22-1206 (RAM) 3

Court was not prejudging “whether Ortiz-Hernández is personally

bound by the 1999 agreement.” Id. at 10, 17-18. Regarding venue,

the Court reasoned that Ortiz-Hernández had “not made a case for

transferring this action” under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Id. at 16.

Following the Court’s ruling, Defendant answered the original

Complaint on March 17, 2023. (Docket No. 29).

On May 31, 2023, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint. (Docket

No. 42). The instant Motion to Dismiss was filed by Ortiz-Hernández

on August 7, 2023. (Docket No. 59). Ortiz-Hernández contends the

Court should dismiss the Amended Complaint for lack of personal

jurisdiction or transfer venue to the Southern District of Florida.

(Docket No. 59 at 5, 22). Plaintiff filed its Opposition on

September 27, 2023. (Docket No. 69). CMCFAV argues this Court has

personal jurisdiction over Defendant both because of a 1999 forum-

selection clause and because there are enough contacts to establish

specific personal jurisdiction. Id. at 9-15. Regarding venue,

CMCFAV invokes 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c), which governs corporations,

even though Defendant is sued in his personal capacity. Id. at 15-

16.

Defendant’s Reply, filed October 16, 2023, reiterates that

the Court lacks personal jurisdiction and contends Plaintiff has

waived opposition to Defendant’s motion to change venue. (Docket

No. 78). Plaintiff filed a Surreply on November 6, 2023, clarifying

Civil No. 22-1206 (RAM) 4

its argument for why venue is proper in Puerto Rico. (Docket No.

84). Most significantly, CMCFAV alleges Defendant and his wife

travelled to Puerto Rico to seek out and receive investment funds

there. Id. at 2, 4.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND2

From 1999 to 2006, Ortiz-Hernández and his wife, both pastors

living in Florida, did ministry as members of CMCFAV, an

organization based in Puerto Rico. (Docket No. 42 at 1-2).

Defendant and his wife also ran an organization called Genesis

Broadcasting Network Co. (“Genesis Broadcasting”). Id. at 2. On

December 13, 1999, “Plaintiff and Genesis Broadcasting Network

Co., represented by its President Edwin Lemuel Ortiz executed a

Purchase and Sale Agreement for the sale to Plaintiff of Radio

Station 90.9 FM.” Id. at 2-3. From 1999 to 2003, CMCFAV made a

series of payments to Defendant, totaling at least a million

dollars. Id. at 2-5.

On July 8, 2006, the board of directors of Genesis

Broadcasting discussed “efforts to seek financing for the

repayment of the Council’s investment.” (Docket No. 42-8 at 1).

The board resolved that its president, Ortiz-Hernández, would

2 The following facts are derived from Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint and its

corresponding exhibits and are taken as true for purposes of the analysis

herein. (Docket No. 42).

Civil No. 22-1206 (RAM) 5

create a new corporation that could obtain credit to be used in

repaying a certain debt “contracted with the Fuente de Agua Viva

Council of P.R.” (Docket No. 42-10 at 1).

On November 15, 2010, Plaintiff, Defendant, and his wife

signed a letter (the “2010 Letter”) agreeing to a payment plan by

which Defendant and his wife would pay Plaintiff $1,700,000.

(Docket Nos. 42 at 5 and 42-12 at 1-3). Defendant and his wife

made multiple payments to CMCFAV, and the parties continued to

negotiate the amounts. (Docket Nos. 42 at 6-8 and 42-27 at 1).

CMCFAV alleges that “[a]fter October 2019,” Defendant breached his

“written and verbal agreements to repay.” (Docket No. 42 at 9).

Plaintiff seeks payment of $1,313,500. Id.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Transfer Under Section 1404(a) of the Judicial Code

Section 1404(a) of the Judicial Code of the United States

provides that, “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in

the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil

action to any other district or division where it might have been

brought or to any district or division to which all parties have

consented.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). This section codified and

liberalized the common law doctrine of forum non conveniens, which

was embraced by the Supreme Court in Gulf Oil Co. v. Gilbert, 330

U.S. 501 (1947). In Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, the Supreme Court

Civil No. 22-1206 (RAM) 6

reasoned that “Congress, by the term ‘for the convenience of

parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice,’ intended to

permit courts to grant transfers upon a lesser showing of

inconvenience” than previously required under the doctrine of

forum non conveniens. 349 U.S. 29, 32 (1955).

When determining whether to grant a transfer, the relevant

private-interest factors to be examined by a court are:

[T]he relative ease of access to sources of

proof; availability of compulsory process for

the attendance of unwilling and the cost of

obtaining the attendance of willing witnesses;

possibility of view of the premises; if view

would be appropriate to the action; and all

other practical problems that make trial of a

case, easy, expeditious and inexpensive.

Gulf Oil Co., 330 U.S. at 508-509; see also Aquakem Caribe, Inc.

v. Kemiron Atl., Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 199, 201-202 (D.P.R. 2002).

Public-interest factors also have a bearing on the transfer

determination. Gulf Oil Co., 330 U.S. at 509. These factors have

included “the trial judge’s familiarity with the applicable state

law, the local interest in adjudicating disputes at home; court

congestion in the two forums, [and] the fairness of placing the

burden of jury duty on the citizens of the state with greater

interest in the dispute.” NPR, Inc. v. Am. Int’l Ins. Co. of Puerto

Rico, 242 F. Supp. 2d 121, 125 (D.P.R. 2003) (internal quotations

omitted).

Civil No. 22-1206 (RAM) 7

Considering the aforementioned factors, the decision to

transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) necessarily requires an

“individualized, case-by-case consideration of convenience and

fairness.” Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29

(1988) (quoting Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 622 (1964)).

B. The Court’s Discretion to Transfer

The decision to transfer is within the Court’s discretion.

See Codex Corp. v. Milgo Elec. Corp., 553 F.2d 735, 737 (1st Cir.

1977). The Court need not determine the best venue but “merely a

proper venue.” Astro–Med v. Nihon Kohden of Am., 591 F.3d 1, 12

(1st Cir. 2009) (citing Uffner v. La Reunion Francaise, S.A., 244

F.3d 38, 42 (1st Cir. 2001)).

Moreover, courts may transfer an action under § 1404(a) on

their own initiative. See Desmond v. Nynex Corp., 37 F.3d 1484

(1st Cir. 1994) (“It is well settled that a court may transfer a

case sua sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404(a) . . . .”) (citing

Caldwell v. Palmetto State Sav. Bank, 811 F.2d 916, 919 (5th Cir.

1987)); Lead Indus. Assoc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Admin.,

610 F.2d 70, 79 n.17 (2d Cir. 1979); Mobil Corp. v. S.E.C., 550 F.

Supp. 67, 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).

C. Forum-selection Clauses

“When the parties have agreed to a valid forum-selection

clause, a district court should ordinarily transfer the case to

Civil No. 22-1206 (RAM) 8

the forum specified in that clause.” Atl. Marine Const. Co. v.

U.S. Dist. Ct. for W. Dist. of Texas, 571 U.S. 49, 62 (2013). To

determine whether there is a valid forum-selection clause, a court

must first decide whether “the parties entered into a valid

contract of which the forum selection clause was an agreed-to

provision.” Expedition Leather LLC v. FC Org’l Prods. LLC, 2013 WL

160373, at *1 (D.N.H. 2013) (quoting Provanzano v. Parker View

Farm, Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 53, 58 (D. Mass. 2011)). The party

asserting enforcement of a forum-selection clause has the burden

of showing the parties agreed to it. See id. (citing Altvater

Gessler–J.A. Baczewski Intern. (USA) Inc. v. Sobieski Destylarnia

S.A., 572 F.3d 86, 89 (2d Cir. 2009)).

IV. DISCUSSION

Ortiz-Hernández requests the Court dismiss this action for

lack of personal jurisdiction or change its venue to the Southern

District of Florida (“SDFL”). (Docket No. 59). He contends venue

in the District of Puerto Rico (“DPR”) is improper under 28 U.S.C.

§ 13913 and that transfer is therefore mandatory. Id. at 22-23.

However, a separate statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), authorizes

courts to transfer cases to a different venue “[f]or the

3 The Court cautions Defendant that the text of 28 U.S.C. § 1391 has been amended

since enactment of the version cited in Defendant’s brief. Compare 28 U.S.C.

§ 1391(b) (2011), with (Docket No. 59 at 22) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)).

Civil No. 22-1206 (RAM) 9

convenience of parties and witnesses [and] in the interest of

justice.” As explained below, the Court finds it is in the interest

of justice to transfer the present case to SDFL. See Desmond v.

Nynex Corp., 37 F.3d 1484 (1st Cir. 1994) (recognizing a court’s

authority to transfer an action sua sponte); Gerena v. Korb, 617

F.3d 197, 205 (2d Cir. 2010) (noting the various reasons permitting

transfer, including improper venue, want of jurisdiction, and

convenience under § 1404(a)).

The Court begins its analysis by considering again whether

Defendant is bound by a forum-selection clause, since a valid

forum-selection clause would alter the § 1404(a) analysis. Atl.

Marine, 571 U.S. at 62. The Court then considers whether it is in

the interest of justice to transfer this case to SDFL.

A. The Forum-selection Clause in the 1999 Contract Does Not

Govern This Case

Plaintiff maintains this action must be litigated in DPR

because of the forum-selection clause in the 1999 Contract. (Docket

No. 42 at 2). However, CMCFAV has not met its burden of showing

Defendant “entered into a valid contract of which the forum

selection clause was an agreed-to provision.” Expedition Leather,

2013 WL 160373, at *1 (citation omitted). In its Amended Complaint,

Plaintiff admits the 1999 Contract is between CMCFAV and Genesis

Civil No. 22-1206 (RAM) 10

Broadcasting. See, e.g., (Docket Nos. 42 at 2-3 and 69 at 3, 6).4

Indeed, the 1999 Contract itself, which Plaintiff attaches, names

CMCFAV and Genesis Broadcasting as the two contracting parties.

(Docket No. 42-6 at 1). Because Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint shows

Defendant was not a party to the 1999 Contract at the time it was

signed, Plaintiff must assert some other reason for why Defendant

is bound by the forum-selection clause.

Plaintiff appears to advance two theories. First, CMCFAV

intimates that Defendant was treated as if he were a party to the

contract, even though Defendant signed on behalf of Genesis

Broadcasting. Plaintiff alleges Defendant “was paid personally”

and that Defendant and his wife treated the radio station “as their

own.” (Docket Nos. 42 at 3 and 69 at 3). However, Plaintiff makes

no legal argument for why these facts lead to the conclusion that

Defendant is bound by the 1999 Contract.

Second, Plaintiff argues the 2010 Letter, which Defendant,

his wife, and Plaintiff signed, is a modification of the 1999

Contract. (Docket No. 42 at 5). CMCFAV seems to suggest that by

signing the 2010 Letter, Defendant became a party to the 1999

4 This is different than what Plaintiff asserted in its original Complaint.

Compare (Docket No. 7), with (Docket No. 42). There, Plaintiff stated that “[o]n

December 13, 1999, in Carolina, Puerto Rico, the plaintiff made a three-million-

dollar written loan to the defendant Edwin Lemuel Ortiz Hernández.” (Docket No.

7-1 ¶ 4). But in its Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that “the 1999

Purchase and Sale was executed between corporations.” (Docket No. 42 at 3).

Civil No. 22-1206 (RAM) 11

Contract. (Docket No. 69 at 5-7, 9-11). However, Plaintiff’s

argument for how an agreement between CMCFAV and Defendant could

change an agreement between CMCFAV and Genesis Broadcasting is

unsupported and flawed. Plaintiff urges that “the facts of the

case,” such as prior communications between Plaintiff and

Defendant, “modified [the] original agreement.” Id. at 5. But

Plaintiff does not explain how. Plaintiff reiterates that the

monies agreed to in the 1999 Contract were “personally delivered

to Defendants” but fails to identify the relevance of this fact.

Id. at 6. Finally, CMCFAV quotes the Court’s previous holding that

CMCFAV had met its prima facie burden of establishing personal

jurisdiction by virtue of the forum-selection clause. Id. at 10-

11 (quoting (Docket No. 20 at 7-9)). However, Plaintiff disregards

that the Court’s January 27, 2023, Order involved a different legal

question (personal jurisdiction), a different burden (a prima

facie showing), and different allegations (those in the original

Complaint). See (Docket No. 20 at 3, 5-6).

Plaintiff’s various arguments fall short of showing that the

1999 Contract’s forum-selection clause should be enforced against

Defendant. Moreover, after reviewing the exhibits attached to

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, the Court is unable to find any

convincing evidence that the 1999 Contract was modified to include

Defendant as a party. Accordingly, the Court finds that the forum-

Civil No. 22-1206 (RAM) 12

selection clause in the 1999 Contract need not be considered when

determining whether to transfer this case to a different venue.

B. This Action Could Have Been Brought in SDFL

Without consent by the parties, transfer to another district

court under § 1404(a) is permitted only if this case “might have

been brought” there in the first place. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). In

the case at bar, this would require the United States District

Court for SDFL to have jurisdiction and for venue to be proper

there. See Colon Perez v. Metan Marine, Inc., 2018 WL 1664697, at

*8 (D.P.R. 2018) (citing Marel Corp. v. Encad Inc., 178 F. Supp.

2d 56, 58 (D.P.R. 2001)).

Both requirements are met. The fact that Defendant and his

wife (a defendant that has not been served) live in SDFL5 would

have permitted venue there. See (Docket No. 42 at 1-2); 28 U.S.C.

§ 1391(b)(1). The SDFL district court would have had diversity

jurisdiction because Plaintiff is resident of a different state6

than Defendant, and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See

(Docket No. 42 at 1-2); 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Finally, the court

would have had personal jurisdiction since Defendant and his wife

are residents of that district. (Docket Nos. 42 at 1-2 and 29 at

5 SDFL “comprises the counties of Broward, Dade, Highlands, Indian River, Martin,

Monroe, Okeechobee, Palm Beach, and Saint Lucie.” 28 U.S.C. § 89(c).

6 The law treats Puerto Rico as a state for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.

28 U.S.C. § 1332(e).

Civil No. 22-1206 (RAM) 13

1); Colon Perez, 2018 WL 1664697, at *8 (holding that transferee

forum would have had personal jurisdiction over defendant who

resided in that district). See also In re Genentech, Inc., 566

F.3d 1338, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“There is no requirement under

§ 1404(a) that a transferee court have jurisdiction over the

plaintiff . . .; there is only a requirement that the transferee

court have jurisdiction over the defendants . . . .” (citing

Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 343-44 (1960))).

C. Private-interest Factors

1. The convenience of the parties and witnesses

On the one hand, Plaintiff’s choice of venue is accorded a

“strong presumption” in its favor. Cuadrado Concepción v. United

States, 2019 WL 5847216, at *3 (D.P.R. 2019) (citing Coady v.

Ashcraft & Gerel, 223 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2000)). That said,

“[t]he most important factor in deciding whether to transfer an

action is the convenience of the witnesses.” Colon Perez, 2018 WL

1664697, at *9 (quoting Demers, Jr. v. Pilkington N. Am., Inc.,

2010 WL 4683780, at *6 (D.N.H. 2010)).

In this case, most of the operative events took place in SDFL,

which makes it likely most of the relevant witnesses are located

there. See id. at *8. Moreover, courts give less weight to a

plaintiff’s choice of forum when the operative events occurred

elsewhere. Id. SDFL is where Defendant and his wife signed the

Civil No. 22-1206 (RAM) 14

2010 Letter. (Docket No. 42-12). It is the location, proposed by

CMCFAV’s then-Secretary, where Defendant and Plaintiff met in 2018

to negotiate payments. (Docket Nos. 42-14 at 2, 42-25 at 3-4 and

42-27 at 1).

SDFL is also the location of the property that led to the

parties’ dispute: a radio station in Homestead, Florida. (Docket

No. 42 at 2-3). Many of the checks made out by Defendant to CMCFAV

appear to have been written in SDFL. See, e.g., (Docket Nos. 42 at

6 and 42-11 at 3). Also, it was in SDFL where Genesis

Broadcasting’s board of directors met and passed a resolution

discussing a debt “contracted with the Fuente de Agua Viva Council

of P.R.” See (Docket Nos. 42 at 4, 42-8 at 1 and 42-10 at 1).

It is true that the 1999 Contract appears to have been signed

in Puerto Rico and that CMCFAV’s headquarters is located there.

(Docket Nos. 42-6 at 3 and 42 at 1). Additionally, Plaintiff

alleges in its Opposition and Surreply that Defendant travelled to

Puerto Rico to request and receive money. (Docket Nos. 69 at 12

and 84 at 2, 4). None of these facts, however, tips the balance in

favor of venue in DPR. As discussed above, Defendant is not a party

to the 1999 Contract. The location of Plaintiff’s headquarters is

a neutral factor at best since Defendant and his wife reside in

Florida. Finally, because Defendant alternated between acting in

his personal capacity and representing Genesis Broadcasting,

Civil No. 22-1206 (RAM) 15

Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendant requested and received

money in Puerto Rico fail to show how these events relate to the

dispute in this case, i.e., a claim against Defendant in his

personal capacity.

2. Relative access to sources of proof

While electronic communication diminishes the relevance of

geographic proximity to physical evidence, that “does not render

this factor superfluous.” Cuadrado Concepción, 2019 WL 5847216, at

*3 (quoting In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 545 F.3d 304, 316 (5th

Cir. 2008)). To the extent proximity aids in ease of access,

evidence regarding the radio station, the decisions of Genesis

Broadcasting, Defendant’s finances, and the signing of the 2010

Letter will be easier to obtain in SDFL than in this district.

Apart from evidence of communications between Plaintiff and

Defendant, most of the support for Plaintiff’s allegations will

likely come from the radio-station dealings, the actions of Genesis

Broadcasting, the 2010 Letter, and the payments from Defendant. As

such, the Court weighs the location of that evidence more than the

location of the 1999 Contract signing, the location of CMCFAV’s

headquarters, and Defendant’s alleged trips to Puerto Rico.

Civil No. 22-1206 (RAM) 16

D. Public-interest Factors

1. Familiarity with the applicable law

“[A] court’s familiarity with the applicable law has . . .

been recognized in this circuit as an appropriate factor in

deciding a motion to transfer.” Cuadrado Concepción, 2019 WL

5847216, at *3 (quoting Scholtens v. Gyrus Acmi, Inc., 2019 WL

2528377 (D. Mass. 2019), R&R adopted, 2019 WL 2565664). Here,

Plaintiff asserts that Puerto Rico law governs its breach-of-

contract claim. (Docket No. 42 at 2, 8-9). However, even if

Plaintiff is correct, that would weigh only slightly against

transfer. The issues in this case appear to be whether a contract

exists between the parties and if so, whether Defendant breached

it. Given the relatively straightforward nature of Puerto Rico law

involved, a federal court in DPR would not be significantly more

competent than a federal court in SDFL at resolving these issues.

See BMJ Foods Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Metromedia Steakhouses Co.,

L.P., 562 F. Supp. 2d 229, 234 (D.P.R. 2008) (transferring case to

the Northern District of Texas despite claim arising under Puerto

Rico’s Act 75 dealership law).

2. Court congestion

The most recent caseload statistics prepared by the

Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts show that during the 12-

month period ending March 31, 2023, SDFL had roughly 209 cases

Civil No. 22-1206 (RAM) 17

pending per district court judge, compared to DPR’s roughly 230

cases per judge.7 Because the individual caseloads of judges in

either district is roughly comparable, the factor of court

congestion is neutral as to whether the instant case should be

transferred.

3. Local interest and burden of jury duty

Considerations of local interests in adjudicating disputes at

home weigh in favor of transferring this case to SDFL. The claims

in this lawsuit stem from the financing, construction, and

operation of a radio station in Homestead, Florida. (Docket No. 42

at 2-3). At least one Florida bank, Suntrust Bank Miami, was

allegedly involved. Id. at 3. The 2010 Letter, arguably the most

important evidence of Defendant’s alleged debt, was signed before

a Florida notary. (Docket No. 42-12). This means citizens in SDFL

have a stronger interest in deciding this case than do citizens of

Puerto Rico. In turn, that greater interest makes it fairer to

burden citizens in Florida with jury duty for this case than

citizens in Puerto Rico.

7 See Table C-1 -- U.S. District Courts -- Civil Federal Judicial Caseload

Statistics (March 31, 2023), U.S. Courts,

https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/c-1/federal-judicial-caseload-

statistics/2023/03/31 (last visited Jan. 26, 2024); Table D Cases -- U.S.

District Courts -- Criminal Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics (March 31,

2023), U.S. Courts, https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/d-cases/federal-

judicial-caseload-statistics/2023/03/31 (last visited Jan. 26, 2024).

Civil No. 22-1206 (RAM) 18

V. CONCLUSION

After reviewing the parties’ submissions regarding

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, as well as the record as a whole,

the Court finds that transferring this case sua sponte is

appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Plaintiff is unable to meet

its burden to enforce the 1999 Contract’s forum-selection clause,

and most of the operative events in this case occurred in SDFL.

After considering both private- and public-interest factors, the

Court concludes it is in the interest of justice to transfer this

case to SDFL.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART Ortiz-

Hernández’s Motion to Dismiss at Docket No. 59. The Clerk of Court

shall TRANSFER this case to the United States District Court for

the Southern District of Florida. This case is now closed in the

District of Puerto Rico for statistical purposes.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 29th day of January 2024.

s/Raúl M. Arias-Marxuach_________

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE