Ferrer v. Deandre

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Case No. 23-cv-24699-BLOOM

ALEJANDRO FERRER,

Plaintiff,

v.

DANIELS DEANDRE, et al.,

Defendants.

_________________________/

SCREENING ORDER

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Plaintiff Alejandro Ferrer’s pro se civil rights

Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, ECF No. [1], and Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma

pauperis, ECF No. [3]. In the Complaint, Plaintiff raises a construed Fourteenth Amendment

failure to protect claim against two correctional officers, the Miami-Dade County Clerk of Courts,

and the Miami-Dade Corrections and Rehabilitation Department. See generally ECF No. [1].

Because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant who has not paid the required filing fee, the screening

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) apply. Under the statute, the Court shall dismiss a suit “at any

time if [it] determines that . . . (B) the action or appeal . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to

state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who

is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Upon application of the screening provisions,

the Court finds the Complaint must be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(ii)-(iii).

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee confined at Turner Guilford Knight Correctional Facility

(“TGK”) in Miami, Florida. See ECF No. [1] at 2.1 He brings this civil rights action against the

following four Defendants: (1) Daniels Deandre, Classification Sergeant; (2) Ragin Pye, Corporal

and Records Supervisor; (3) Juan Fernandez-Barquin, the Miami-Dade County Clerk of Courts;2

and (4) the Miami-Dade Corrections and Rehabilitation Department. See id. at 2-3. Plaintiff sues

Defendants Daniels and Ragin in their individual capacities and Defendants Fernandez-Barquin

and the Miami-Dade Corrections and Rehabilitation Department in their official capacities. See id.

The allegations substantiating the Complaint’s sole claim for relief are as follows. On

March 13, 2006, Plaintiff pled guilty to multiple felony counts in state court and was sentenced to

ten years in prison, followed by two years of probation. See id. at 5. Plaintiff was released on an

unspecified date in early 2015, but was subsequently rearrested on August 17, 2019, for violating

the terms of his probation. See id. After being rearrested, Plaintiff was brought to TGK for pretrial

detention. See id. Plaintiff alleges that, upon his arrival, TGK staff mistakenly placed him in a cell

reserved for maximum security inmates (i.e., inmates sentenced to terms of imprisonment greater

than twenty-five years). See id. Plaintiff filed an inmate grievance regarding his placement in a

1 The Court uses the pagination generated by the electronic CM/ECF database, which appears in the headers

of all court filings.

2 Plaintiff names Harvey Ruvin, in his role as the Miami-Dade County Clerk of Courts, as a Defendant in

this action. See ECF No. [1] at 3. However, Mr. Ruvin died on January 31, 2023, and has since been succeed

by Juan Fernandez-Barquin. See Daniel Riviero, Harvey Ruvin, Miami-Dade’s longest serving elected

official, leaves environmental legacy, WLRN, (Jan. 6, 2009, 5:16 PM), https://www.wlrn.org/politics/2023-

01-06/harvey-ruvin-miami-dades-longest-serving-elected-official-leaves-environmental-legacy; The

Florida Bar, Governor appoints two county clerks and comptrollers, www.floridabar.org (June 13, 2023),

https://www.floridabar.org/the-florida-bar-news/governor-appoints-two-county-clerks-and-comptrollers/

(reporting that “Juan Fernandez-Barquin was tapped by Gov. Ron DeSantis to be the new Miami-Dade

County Clerk of the Court and Comptroller and was sworn in June 12[, 2023]”). Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court substitutes Mr. Ruvin with Mr. Fernandez-Barquin as a

party to this action. See id. (“An action does not abate when a public officer who is a party in an official

capacity dies, resigns, or otherwise ceases to hold office while the action is pending. The officer’s successor

is automatically substituted as a party.”).

maximum-security cell; Defendant Daniels responded to the grievance, stating that prison records

indicated that he was a maximum-security inmate and, therefore, properly placed. See id. Shortly

thereafter, a fellow inmate attacked Plaintiff, leaving him with a fractured eye socket and nose.

See id. Following the attack, Plaintiff filed a second inmate grievance; this time, another

corrections officer—one not party to this action—wrote back, advising Plaintiff to contact the state

court and advise it of his misplacement. See id. at 6. Plaintiff’s family then wrote to the Honorable

Ariana Fajardo Orshan of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit Court of Florida; Judge Orshan called

Plaintiff, explaining to Plaintiff that there was an error in TGK’s classification system and that

staff would correct his misplacement. See id. TGK staff corrected Plaintiff’s misplacement on July

11, 2022. See id. at 10. For his injuries, Plaintiff seeks $1,500,000.00 in damages.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

To state a claim for relief, a pleading must contain: “(1) a short and plain statement of the

grounds for the court’s jurisdiction . . . ; (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that

the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). “A

party must state its claims or defenses in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable

to a single set of circumstances.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b). More importantly, “a complaint must

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 570 (2007)). The complaint must “give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the

grounds upon which it rests[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (alteration adopted; citation and

quotation marks omitted).

Courts must “construe pro se pleadings liberally, holding them to a less stringent standard

than those drafted by attorneys.” Arrington v. Green, 757 F. App’x 796, 797 (11th Cir. 2018)

(citing Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1160 (11th Cir. 2003)). Still, a pro se party must abide by

“the relevant law and rules of court, including the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Moon v.

Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989).

III. DISCUSSION

The Complaint suffers from two deficiencies that compel its dismissal. First, Defendants

Fernandez-Barquin and the Miami-Dade Corrections and Rehabilitation Department are immune

from suits for monetary damages. Second, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Defendants

Daniels and Ragin. The Court addresses both deficiencies below.

A. Improper Defendants

Plaintiff indicates that he is suing Defendants Fernandez-Barquin and the Miami-Dade

Corrections and Rehabilitation Department solely in their official capacities. See ECF No. [1] at

3. However, Plaintiff seeks only monetary damages, and official capacity claims yield only

injunctive relief. See Cross v. Ala. Dep’t of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 49 F.3d 1490,

1503 (11th Cir. 1995)) (“The Eleventh Amendment bars [plaintiff’s §] 1983 lawsuit for monetary

damages against [defendants] in their official capacities.”); Grizzle v. Kemp, 634 F.3d 1314, 1319

(11th Cir. 2011) (explaining that “a suit alleging a violation of the federal constitution against a

state official in his official capacity for injunctive relief on a prospective basis is not a suit against

the state, and, accordingly, does not violate the Eleventh Amendment” (citations omitted)). With

such being the case, the Complaint must be dismissed in part under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii)

because Plaintiff seeks monetary damages from Defendants immune from such relief.

B. Failure to State a Fourteenth Amendment Failure to Protect Claim

Against the Complaint’s remaining Defendants, Daniels and Ragin, Plaintiff fails to state

a Fourteenth Amendment failure to protect claim.

Because Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee, the Court analyzes his deliberate indifference claim

based on a failure to protect claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. See ECF No. [1] at 4;

Goodman v. Kimbrough, 718 F.3d 1325, 1331 (11th Cir. 2013) (“A prison official’s deliberate

indifference to a known, substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate violates the Fourteenth

Amendment.” (quotation marks omitted)).3 It is well-established that “prison officials have a duty

. . . to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511

U.S. 825, 833 (1994) (quoting Cortes-Quinones v. Jimenez-Nettleship, 842 F.2d 556, 558 (1st Cir.

1988); other citation omitted). “To establish a § 1983 claim for deliberate indifference [based on

a failure to protect], [Plaintiff] must show ‘(1) a substantial risk of serious harm; (2) [Defendants’]

deliberate indifference to that risk; and (3) causation.’” Marbury v. Warden, 936 F.3d 1227, 1233

(11th Cir. 2019) (quoting Lane v. Philbin, 835 F.3d 1302, 1307 (11th Cir. 2016)).

“The first element of deliberate indifference—whether there was a substantial risk of

serious harm—is assessed objectively and requires the plaintiff to show ‘conditions that were

extreme and posed an unreasonable risk of serious injury to his future health or safety.’” Marbury,

936 F.3d at 1233 (quoting Lane, 835 F.3d at 1307). “Deliberate indifference ‘has two components:

one subjective and one objective.’” Mosley v. Zachery, 966 F.3d 1265, 1270 (11th Cir. 2020)

(quoting Caldwell v. Warden, FCI Talladega, 748 F.3d 1090, 1099 (11th Cir. 2014)). “[A] plaintiff

must show both that the defendant actually (subjectively) kn[ew] that an inmate [faced] a

substantial risk of serious harm and that the defendant disregard[ed] that known risk by failing to

3 The deliberate indifference cause of action grew up in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and applies only

to convicted prisoners. See Purcell ex rel. Estate of Morgan v. Toombs Cnty., Ga., 400 F.3d 1313, 1318 n.

13 (11th Cir. 2005). Where a plaintiff is a pretrial detainee, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment, not the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, governs the

Court’s analysis. See Hale v. Tallapoosa Cnty., 50 F.3d 1579, 1582 n. 4 (11th Cir. 1995). Nevertheless,

whether a deliberate indifference claim is analyzed under the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments makes no

difference because “the standards under the Fourteenth Amendment are identical to those under the Eighth.”

Goebert v. Lee Cnty., 510 F.3d 1312, 1326 (11th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).

respond to it in an (objectively) reasonable manner.” Mosley, 966 F.3d at 1270 (alterations in

original; quoting Bowen v. Warden, Baldwin State Prison, 826 F.3d 1312, 1320 (11th Cir. 2016)).

“Merely negligent failure to protect an inmate from attack does not justify liability under [§] 1983.”

Brown v. Hughes, 894 F.2d 1533, 1537 (11th Cir. 1990) (citing Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S.

344, 347-48 (1986)). Finally, to satisfy the third element of causation, Plaintiff must show two

causal links: (1) a link between Defendants’ deliberately indifferent acts and omissions and the

excessive risk of violence; and (2) a link between the excessive risk of violence and Plaintiff’s

injury. Hale v. Tallapoosa Cnty., 50 F.3d 1579, 1584 (11th Cir. 1995).

Plaintiff fails to provide sufficient facts to plausibly allege that Defendants Daniels and

Ragin had information from which to infer that Plaintiff faced a substantial risk of serious harm

and, consequently, Plaintiff fails to allege either deliberate indifference or causation. While “an

excessive risk of inmate-on-inmate violence at a jail creates a substantial risk of serious harm[,]

occasional, isolated attacks by one prisoner on another” typically do not constitute a constitutional

violation. See Lane, 835 F.3d at 1307 (quotation marks omitted). Instead, it is “confinement in a

prison where violence and terror reign [that] is actionable.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). Here,

Plaintiff’s attack appears to have been an isolated incident occurring without warning and not due

to a persistent and pervasive threat of inmate-on-inmate violence. Due to the incident’s sudden and

isolated nature, Plaintiff fails to allege that Defendants Daniels and Ragin were deliberately

indifferent to the risk of serious harm that Plaintiff purportedly faced because they had no advance

notice of it. And, because Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege that Defendants Daniels and Ragin were

deliberately indifferent, he has not plausibly alleged a causal link between his injuries and their

purported indifference.

Case No. 23-24699-CIV-BLOOM

In sum, the Complaint is subject to dismissal in part under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i1)

because Plaintiff failed to plausibly allege a Fourteenth Amendment failure to protect claim against

the Complaint’s remaining Defendants.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiff Alejandro

Ferrer’s Complaint, ECF No. [1], is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE under 28 U.S.C.

§§ □□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□ and his Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis, ECF No. [3], is

DENIED AS MOOT. The Clerk shall CLOSE the case.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, on December 22, 2023.

BETH BLOOM

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies to:

Alejandro Ferrer, PRO SE

190154600

Turner Guilford Knight Correctional Center

7000 NW 41st Street

Miami, Florida 33166