Jiangmen Benlida Printed Circuit Co., Ltd. v. Circuitronix, LLC

United States District Court

for the

Southern District of Florida

Jiangmen Benlida Printed Circuit )

Co., Ltd., Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Civil Action No. 21-60125-Civ-Scola

)

)

Circuitronix, LLC, Defendant.

Order Denying Both Benlida’s Motion for Reconsideration and

Circuitronix’s Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law

The dispute in this case centers around tens of millions of dollars’ worth

of printed circuit boards, manufactured by Plaintiff and Counter-Defendant

Jiangmen Benlida Printed Circuit Co., Ltd. (“Benlida”) which it sold and

distributed to Defendant and Counter-Plaintiff Circuitronix, LLC. Benlida

complains that Circuitronix owes it over $13 million for unpaid invoices for

printed circuit boards which Benlida delivered. (3rd Am. Compl. (“Compl.” or

the “complaint”), ECF No. 26.) Circuitronix, however, in its counterclaim,

maintains, to the contrary, that it overpaid Benlida, by over $10 million, and

seeks to recover that overpayment. (Ans. and Countercl., ECF No. 34.) The

Court granted summary judgment in Circuitronix’s favor with respect to the

entirety of Benlida’s complaint (SJ Order, ECF No. 221) and thereafter held a

six-day jury trial on Circuitronix’s claims against Benlida. After deliberating,

the jury unanimously found that Benlida had breached the parties’ contract,

awarding $7,585,847 in damages to Circuitronix. (Verdict, ECF No. 273.) Five

days into the trial, Benlida moved for reconsideration of the Court’s order

granting summary judgment. (Benlida’s Mot., ECF No. 267.) At the close of all

the evidence, Circuitronix moved orally for partial judgment as a matter of law,

also filing a written motion (Circuitronix’s Mot., ECF No. 269), which the Court

reserved ruling on. Both motions have now been fully briefed and are ripe for

the Court’s determination (Circuitronix’s Resp., ECF No. 288; Benlida’s Reply,

ECF No. 291; Benlida’s Resp., ECF No. 290; Circuitronix’s Reply, ECF No. 292.)

After a careful review of the record, the briefing, and the relevant legal

authorities, the Court denies Benlida’s motion for reconsideration (ECF No.

267) and denies in part and denies as moot in part Circuitronix’s motion for

judgment as a matter of law (ECF No. 269).

1. Benlida fails to establish that reconsideration is warranted.

“[I]n the interests of finality and conservation of scarce judicial resources,

reconsideration of an order is an extraordinary remedy that is employed

sparingly.” Gipson v. Mattox, 511 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1185 (S.D. Ala. 2007). A

motion to reconsider is “appropriate where, for example, the Court has patently

misunderstood a party, or has made a decision outside the adversarial issues

presented to the Court by the parties, or has made an error not of reasoning

but of apprehension.” Z.K. Marine Inc. v. M/V Archigetis, 808 F. Supp. 1561,

1563 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (Hoeveler, J.) (citation omitted). “Simply put, a party may

move for reconsideration only when one of the following has occurred: an

intervening change in controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the

need to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice.” Longcrier v. HL-A Co.,

595 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1247 (S.D. Ala. 2008) (quoting Vidinliev v. Carey Int’l,

Inc., No. CIV.A. 107CV762-TWT, 2008 WL 5459335, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 15,

2008)). However, “[s]uch problems rarely arise and the motion to reconsider

should be equally rare.” Z.K. Marine Inc., 808 F. Supp. at 1563. Certainly, if

any of these situations arise, a court has broad discretion to reconsider a

previously issued order. Absent any of these conditions, as here, however, a

motion to reconsider is not ordinarily warranted.

Benlida submits that reconsideration is warranted in order “to correct a

clear error and thereby prevent a manifest injustice.” (Benlida’s Mot. at 2.)

According to Benlida, the Court’s clear error manifested in several ways: (1) by

the Court’s failure to apprehend that Benlida’s complaint put Circuitronix on

notice that Benlida sought recovery from Circuitronix for circuit boards ordered

by another company, Circuitronix (Hong Kong) Ltd. (“CTX-HK”) (id. at 2–3); (2)

by the Court’s improperly requiring Benlida to plead its agency theory (id. at 3–

8); (3) by the Court’s not affording Benlida an opportunity to cure its violation

of Local Rule 56.1(b)(1)(B) (id. at 8–9); (4) by the Court’s disregarding the

declaration of one of Benlida’s witnesses (id. at 9–10); and (5) by the Court’s

improperly focusing on Benlida’s allegation that Circuitronix “expressly agreed

to pay the amounts specified in the invoices” (id. at 12–13). While Benlida has

made its disagreement with the Court’s order granting Circuitronix’s motion for

summary judgment abundantly clear, it has nonetheless failed to satisfy its

heavy burden of establishing that reconsideration is warranted.

As an initial matter, Benlida’s grievances either rehash arguments that

have already been raised and addressed or present new arguments or facts

that could have been presented in response to the motion for summary

judgment but weren’t. Neither avenue paves a path towards reconsideration.

See Z.K. Marine, 808 F. Supp. at 1563 (“A motion for reconsideration should

not be used as a vehicle to present authorities available at the time of the first

decision or to reiterate arguments previously made.”).

Furthermore, Benlida’s arguments all fail on their merits as well. First,

Benlida appears to misapprehend the distinction between presenting “enough

facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” on the one hand,

and a merely “wholly conclusory statement of claim,” on the other. Bell Atl.

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 561, 570 (2007). Thus, Benlida’s reliance on

Circuitronix’s principal’s deposition testimony indicating his awareness that

Benlida sought to recoup payment from Circuitronix for orders placed by CTX-

HK misses the point. Simply setting forth “the mere possibility of loss

causation,” does not come even close to providing a defendant with “fair notice

of the grounds for entitlement to relief.” Id. at 557, 561 (emphasis added).

Accordingly, Circuitronix’s awareness that Benlida was suing it for orders

placed by CTX-HK does nothing to remedy Benlida’s pleading deficiency.

Second, and relatedly, Benlida’s repeated insistence that the Court

improperly required Benlida to plead a specific theory is misplaced. That is a

mischaracterization of the Court’s order. As the Court explained, Benlida’s

complaint is deficient because it “supplies neither any notice nor factual

allegations that could be construed as advancing its vicarious liability

theories.” (SJ Order at 9.) This is not a hyper-technical application of the law or

the imposition of a heightened pleading standard, as Benlida protests. Rather,

it is a straightforward and unremarkable application of basic federal pleading

standards: “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint,

they must be supported by factual allegations.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

679 (2009) (emphasis added).1

Next, Benlida complains about the Court’s assessment of an affidavit

submitted by one of its auditors. First, Benlida takes issue with the Court’s

“excessively formalistic” (Benlida’s Mot. at 9) insistence that Benlida comply

with the Court’s local rule requiring parties to supply “specific, pinpoint

references to particular parts of record material,” L. R. 56.1(b)(1)(B)), when

disputing an opposing party’s statement of fact. Second, Benlida complains the

Court improperly made a credibility determination when it disregarded the

affidavit. The Court is not persuaded as to either point. To begin with, Benlida

cites no legal authority, and the Court is aware of none, that allows for an

exception to Rule 56.1 where “there is no mystery as to where in the docket the

. . . declaration was.” (Benlida’s Mot. at 8.) Nor does Benlida cite to any

authority supporting its theory that a Court is required to afford a

1 Perhaps muddying the waters here, Benlida’s complaint not only lacks factual allegations, but

it also fails to even include any conclusory allegations regarding the vicarious-liability theories

it advanced in response to Circuitronix’s motion for summary judgment.

noncompliant party the opportunity to cure its defective statement of material

facts. Further, the Court did not make a credibility determination as to the

declaration. Instead, it disregarded the auditor’s statement to the extent his

statement encompassed a legal conclusion—that Circuitronix was responsible

for CTX-HK’s debt. See Avirgan v. Hull, 932 F.2d 1572, 1577 (11th Cir. 1991)

(“The evidence presented [in opposing a motion for summary judgment] cannot

consist of conclusory allegations or legal conclusions.”).

Finally, Benlida’s position that it was clear error for the Court to focus on

Benlida’s allegation that Circuitronix “expressly agreed” to pay the amounts

specified in the invoices is meritless. To begin with, Benlida itself highlighted

that allegation in its response to Circuitronix’s motion. (ECF No. 188, 11.)

Further, Benlida highlighted that allegation in an effort to support its newly

advanced theory of vicarious liability. The Court’s analysis merely pointed out

that Benlida’s own reliance on an alleged express agreement actually undercut

its contention that Circuitronix was responsible for CTX-HK’s debts based on

principles of vicarious liability.

In short, Benlida’s arguments on reconsideration are improperly raised

and, in any event, fail on their merits.

2. Aside from those aspects of Circuitronix’s motion for judgment as a

matter of law that were mooted by the verdict, Circuitronix fails to

carry its heavy burden as to the remainder.

As acknowledged by the parties, the only aspect of Circuitronix’s motion

for judgment as a matter of law that was not mooted is Circuitronix’s position

that it should be awarded $317,539 in damages for improper premium

charges, in addition to the verdict amount. In support, Circuitronix points to

“substantial evidence,” not disproved by Benlida, that Circuitronix submitted

payment for these premiums that it was not required to pay. While this may be

true, the Court finds this is not enough to warrant judgment as a matter of

law.

Ordinarily, “[a] motion for judgment as a matter of law is . . . made

against the party asserting a claim on the basis that the party failed to meet its

burden of proof to establish its claim.” Handley v. Werner Enterprises, Inc., 655

F. Supp. 3d 1348 (M.D. Ga. 2023), aff’d, 23-10587, 2023 WL 6628921 (11th

Cir. Oct. 11, 2023). In such a case, courts should grant judgment as a matter

of law only “if the evidence is so overwhelmingly in favor of the moving party

that a reasonable jury could not arrive at a contrary verdict.” Middlebrooks v.

Hillcrest Foods, Inc., 256 F.3d 1246 (11th Cir. 2001). Here, however, the

proponent of the claim, bearing the burden of proof, seeks the judgment as a

matter of law. In that case, “granting judgment as a matter of law in favor of a

party bearing the burden of proof,” is considered “an extreme step which can

be done only when the evidence favoring the claimant is so one-sided as to be

of overwhelming effect.” Handley v. Werner Enterprises Inc., 23-10587, 2023

WL 6628921, at *3 (11th Cir. Oct. 11, 2023). Courts consider this a more

exacting standard, requiring a showing that the movant “has established his

case by evidence that the jury would not be at liberty to disbelieve.” Weese v.

Schukman, 98 F.3d 542, 547 (10th Cir. 1996) (cleaned up). “As a result of this

heavy burden, courts rarely grant judgment as a matter of law in favor of the

party having the burden of proof.” OneSource Facility Services, Inc. v. Mosbach,

205CV525FTM34DNF, 2008 WL 11430040, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 18, 2008)

(cleaned up). Circuitronix fails to convince the Court it has met this demanding

standard—indeed it does not even direct any argument towards it.

Instead, Circuitronix paints its argument with broad strokes, contending

in mostly summary fashion that it “put forth substantial evidence” in support

of its claim, pointing to its principal’s testimony, by way of an “example,” as

well as “undisputed documents.” (Circuitronix’s Mot. at 3-4.) Without more, the

Court finds this is not enough to support taking the “extreme step” of granting

judgment as a matter of law in Circuitronix’s favor, especially where the

testimony relied on issues from Circuitronix’s own principal. See Reeves v.

Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 151 (2000) (“[T]he court

should give credence to the evidence favoring the nonmovant as well as that

evidence supporting the moving party that is uncontradicted and

unimpeached, at least to the extent that that evidence comes from

disinterested witnesses.”).

3. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the Court denies Benlida’s motion for

reconsideration (ECF No. 267) and denies in part and denies as moot in part

Circuitronix’s motion for judgment as a matter of law (ECF No. 269). Because

a jury verdict has been rendered and it appears no further issues remain for

resolution, the Court directs the Clerk to close this case. A separate judgment

will follow. Any pending motions are denied as moot.

Done and ordered in Miami, Florida, on November 30, 2023.

[se N. fd Jr.

United States District Judge