PARKEY v. CARTER

United States District Court

for the

Southern District of Florida

Ashley Parkey, individually, and, )

together with Nathan Tierney, as )

parents and natural guardians of )

their minor children, C.J.T., R.T., )

and W.T., Plaintiffs, ) Civil Action No. 23-22192-Civ-Scola

) In Admiralty

v. )

)

Ryan S. Carter, an individual, and )

Live Action Sportfishing LLC, )

Defendants. )

Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Motion to Dismiss

This matter is before the Court on the Defendants Ryan S. Carter

(“Carter”) and Live Action Sportfishing LLC’s (“Live Action”) (collectively, the

“Defendants”) motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs Ashley Parkey (“Parkey”) and

Nathan Tierney’s (“Tierney”) (collectively, the “Plaintiffs”) amended complaint.

(Mot., ECF No. 11.) The Plaintiffs have responded opposing the Defendants’

motion (ECF No. 13), and the Defendants have replied (ECF No. 16). Having

reviewed the record, the parties’ briefs, and the relevant legal authorities, the

Court grants in part and denies in part the Defendants’ motion to dismiss.

(Mot., ECF No. 11.)1

1. Background2

This maritime negligence matter arises from an incident that took place

while onboard the Defendants’ fishing vessel. Parkey and Tierney are the

parents of CJ.T., R.T., and W.T., who are twelve (12), ten (10) and eight (8),

respectively. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1–2, 18, ECF No. 10.) Carter is a professional

1 The Court notes that the Plaintiffs unsuccessfully attempt to proceed under the Court’s

diversity jurisdiction. The Plaintiffs fail to allege the citizenship of all the LLC Defendants’

members. See Rolling Greens MHP v. Comcast SCH Holdings, LLC, 374 F.3d 1020, 1021–22

(11th Cir. 2004). Because the Plaintiffs’ allegations leave the Court unable to determine

whether it has diversity jurisdiction over this case, the Court proceeds under its admiralty

jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(h)(1).

2 This background is based on the allegations in the amended complaint. For the purposes of

evaluating the Defendants’ motion, the Court accepts the Plaintiffs’ factual allegations as true

and construes the allegations in the light most favorable to them per Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6).

sports fisherman who operates as the managing member of Live Action, a

sports fishing charter company located in Key West, Florida. (Id. ¶¶ 3–4, 9.)

In June 2020, Parkey purchased a half-day fishing trip with the

Defendants for herself and her three minor children on the Defendants’ fishing

vessel, a 2013 24’ Pathfinder (“Pathfinder”). (Id. ¶¶ 7, 15.) On June 18, 2020, at

approximately 5:00 p.m., Parkey and the children joined Carter and proceeded

on the fishing trip as the only passengers on the Pathfinder. (Id. ¶¶ 16, 18.) The

fishing activities took place within three miles from shore, in the fishing flats

near Key West, Florida. (Id. ¶ 16.)

Although Parkey had been under the impression that they would only be

fishing for tarpon, at some point during the trip Carter started fishing for

sharks. (Id. ¶¶ 19–20.) Carter baited the sharks by dropping dead fish, like

tarpon and barracuda, on a line over the side of the Pathfinder, immediately

attracting numerous sharks which, in a frenzy, were aggressively feeding on

the chum. (Id. ¶ 20.) With Carter’s assistance, Parkey’s son, C.J.T., hooked a

lemon shark. (Id. ¶ 21.) Parkey describes the hooked lemon shark as

“aggressive” and notes that it was “thrashing about.” (Id.) In addition, Parkey

recalls Carter commenting that “the shark [wa]s freaking out.” (Id.)

Notwithstanding this, once the shark had been pulled close to the Pathfinder,

Carter instructed C.J.T. to reach down and grab the shark’s fin for Parkey to

take a photo, all the while informing and assuring C.J.T. and PARKEY that the

shark would not rise out of the water. (Id. ¶¶ 22–23.)

Trusting Carter’s assurances, C.J.T. reached down and grabbed the

shark’s fin. (Id. ¶ 24.) But the shark suddenly flipped over, rose out of the

water, and grabbed C.J.T.’s left hand with its teeth. (Id. ¶ 25.) The shark bit

C.J.T.’s hand severely, to the point where his left middle finger seems to have

been partly or completely amputated. (Id.) Parkey, R.T., and W.T. were within a

few feet of C.J.T. when his hand was in the shark’s mouth. (Id. ¶ 27.) At that

moment, Carter began punching the shark with his fist, causing it to

eventually release its grip on C.J.T. (Id. ¶ 29.) Immediately following the attack,

Carter did not give C.J.T. any medical aid or treatment or point Parkey to

anywhere on the vessel where she might access a first aid kit. (Id. ¶¶ 31–33.)

Carter drove the Pathfinder back to shore, where C.J.T. was transported via

EMS and then helicopter to Nicklaus Children’s Hospital. (Id. ¶¶ 34–38.)

Based on the foregoing events, the Plaintiffs bring eight causes of action

against the Defendants: intentional infliction of emotional distress against

Carter (Count One); vicarious liability for intentional infliction of emotional

distress against Live Action (Count Two); negligence against Carter (Count

Three); vicarious liability for negligence against Live Action (Count Four);

negligent training and negligent supervision against Live Action (Counts Five

and Six); negligent infliction of emotional distress against Carter (Count Seven);

and vicarious liability for negligent infliction of emotional distress against Live

Action (Count Eight). (See generally id.) The Defendants have moved to dismiss

all the Plaintiffs’ claims, in addition to their request for punitive damages.

(Mot., ECF No. 11.) In their response, the Plaintiffs oppose the Defendants’

motion as to all but Counts Five and Six, conceding that these two counts

should be dismissed. (See Resp. 9, ECF No. 13.) For the reasons stated below,

the Court also grants the Defendants’ motion as to Counts One, Two, Seven,

Eight, and the Plaintiffs’ request for punitive damages, and grants in part and

denies in part the motion as to Counts Three and Four. (Mot., ECF No. 11.)

2. Legal Standard

A court considering a motion to dismiss, filed under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6), must accept all of the complaint’s allegations as true,

construing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Pielage v.

McConnell, 516 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2008). Although a pleading need

only contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader

is entitled to relief, a plaintiff must nevertheless articulate “enough facts to

state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the

court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has

alleged—but it has not shown—that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)) (internal

punctuation omitted). A court must dismiss a plaintiff’s claims if she fails to

nudge her “claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Twombly, 550

U.S. at 570.

3. Analysis3

A. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (Count One) and

Vicarious Liability for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

(Count Two)

Courts sitting in admiralty typically look to the standards set out in the

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 (1965) as well as state law to evaluate

claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”). See, e.g., Wallis v.

Princess Cruises, Inc., 306 F.3d 827, 841 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted)

(noting that since there is no maritime law concerning IIED claims, courts

regularly employ the Restatement (Second) of Torts to evaluate IIED claims in

3 The parties agree that the Plaintiffs’ claims are governed by general maritime law. (See Am.

Compl. ¶ 17, ECF No. 10; Mot. 3, ECF No. 11.)

federal maritime cases); Stires v. Carnival Corp., 243 F.Supp.2d 1313, 1319

(M.D. Fla. 2002) (citing to both the Restatement (Second) of Torts and Florida

state law in case asserting claim for IIED for tort that occurred on a cruise

ship).

Section 46 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts states, in relevant part,

that “one who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly

causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such

emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such

bodily harm.” To state a claim for IIED under Florida law, a plaintiff must

show: (1) deliberate or reckless infliction of mental suffering; (2) outrageous

conduct; (3) that the conduct caused emotional distress; and (4) that the

distress was severe. Nettles v. City of Leesburg Police Dep’t, 415 F. App’x. 116

(11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Hart v. United States, 894 F.2d 1539, 1548 (11th Cir.

1990)). Here, the Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs’ allegations fail to rise to

the level of outrageous conduct necessary to state a claim for IIED. (Mot. 4–6,

ECF No. 11.)

The amended complaint alleges that the Defendant Carter started fishing

for sharks without Parkey’s prior knowledge and baited the sharks by

chumming the water near the Pathfinder. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 19–20, ECF No. 10.)

Attracted by the dead fish, numerous sharks came near the vessel, and

frenziedly started attacking the bait. (Id. ¶ 20.) Carter helped C.J.T. hook a

lemon shark among the group and instructed C.J.T. to reach down and grab

the lemon shark’s fin to pose for a picture. (Id. ¶¶ 21–22.) Carter reassured

C.J.T. that it was okay to grab the shark’s fin despite knowing that the shark

was behaving aggressively and that its feeding had just been interrupted. (Id.

¶¶ 23–24.) Indeed, Carter even commented that the lemon shark was “freaking

out.” (Id. ¶ 21.) When the shark jumped out of the water and bit C.J.T’s hand,

Carter started punching the shark to get it to release C.J.T. (Id. ¶¶ 29–30.)

After C.J.T. was free of the shark, Carter did not give him any medical aid or

treatment, but drove the Pathfinder back to shore, where someone call 911. (Id.

¶¶ 31–35.)

Carter’s alleged conduct fails to rise to the level of outrageousness

required by the Restatement (Second) of Torts and Florida state law.

“Outrageous” conduct is that which “goes beyond all possible bounds of

decency and is regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized

community.” Rubio v. Lopez, 445 F. App’x 170, 175 (11th Cir. 2011). The

Restatement and Florida courts have stated that:

It has not been enough that the defendant has acted with an intent

which is tortious or even criminal, or that he has intended to inflict

emotional distress, or even that his conduct has been characterized

by ‘malice,’ or a degree of aggravation which would entitle the

plaintiff to punitive damages for another tort.

Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 46, cmt. d; see also Brown v. Zaveri, 164 F.

Supp. 2d 1354, 1362 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (Lenard, J.) (explaining that

“outrageousness refers to the attitude of society toward what is done” (cleaned

up)).

Notably, the cause of action for IIED is “sparingly recognized by the

Florida courts.” Vamper v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 14 F. Supp. 2d 1301, 1306

(S.D. Fla. 1998) (King, J.). A plaintiff alleging IIED faces an extremely high

burden, as Florida courts have repeatedly found a wide spectrum of behavior

insufficiently “outrageous.” A brief survey of Florida and maritime cases

addressing claims of IIED underscores this point. See, e.g., Rubio, 445 F. App’x

at 175 (finding failure to allege sufficient outrageous conduct where deputy

sheriff hobble-tied arrestee on black asphalt pavement in sun, resulting in

second-degree burns to face and chest); Wallis, 306 F.3d at 842 (finding no

outrageous conduct where crew member on cruise ship remarked in the

plaintiff’s hearing after her husband fell overboard that her husband was

probably dead and that his body would be sucked under the ship, chopped up

by the propellers, and would probably not be recovered); Garcia v. Carnival

Corp., 838 F. Supp. 2d 1334, 1339 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (Moore, J.) (finding no

outrageous conduct where crew members assaulted cruise passenger and

prevented her from leaving her room for a period of time); Vamper, 14 F. Supp.

2d at 1306–07 (finding no outrageous conduct where defendants fabricated

reckless driving charge against plaintiff, called him the “n” word, threatened

him with termination, and physically struck him on ankle); Blair v. NCL

(Bahamas) Ltd., 212 F. Supp. 3d 1264, (S.D. Fla. 2016) (Seitz, J.) (finding

failure to allege sufficiently outrageous conduct where plaintiff’s child drowned

in a pool advertised as “kid friendly,” though lacking life guards, lifesaving

equipment, and personnel prepared to respond to a drowning event).

Even construing the facts in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs,

Carter’s alleged conduct is not such that it “goes beyond all possible bounds of

decency and is regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized

community.” See Rubio, 445 F. App’x at 175. While the Plaintiffs’ allegations

describe distressing events, the allegations simply do not rise to the level of

outrageousness required by the applicable case law.

Finally, because the Plaintiffs’ claim for intentional infliction of emotional

distress against Carter fails, their claim for vicarious liability for the same

conduct against Live Action necessarily fails as well. See, e.g., Dillard v. Patriot

Grp. Int’l, No. 6:12-cv-178-Orl-18KRS, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 205790, at *8-9

(M.D. Fla. May 18, 2012) (“Because Count VI alleges vicarious liability for

intentional infliction of emotional distress, Count VI fails with the underlying

claim and is dismissed as well.”).

B. Negligence (Count Three) and Vicarious Liability for Negligence

(Count Four)

“To plead negligence in a maritime case, a plaintiff must allege that (1)

the defendant had a duty to protect the plaintiff from a particular injury; (2) the

defendant breached that duty; (3) the breach actually and proximately caused

the plaintiff’s injury; and (4) the plaintiff suffered actual harm.” Franza v. Royal

Carribean Cruises, Ltd., 772 F.3d 1225, 1253 (11th Cir. 2014). “Under

maritime law, the owner of a ship in navigable waters owes passengers a ‘duty

of reasonable care’ under the circumstances.” Sorrels v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd.,

796 F.3d 1275, 1279 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale

Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 632, 79 S. Ct. 406, 3 L. Ed. 2d 550 (1959)).

“Breach of duty” is an “issue[] of fact normally within the province of the jury.”

Franks v. Bolden, 774 F.2d 1552, 1556 (11th Cir. 1985).

The Defendants argue that Counts Three and Four of the amended

complaint should be dismissed because they improperly seek to impose a

heightened duty of care on them. (Mot. 7–8, ECF No. 11.) The Defendants are

correct in pointing out that the Plaintiffs’ negligence claims are not wholly clear

as to the standard of care they seek to impose on the Defendants. The Plaintiffs

cite the correct standard of care in alleging that the Defendants “owed a duty to

the Plaintiffs to exercise reasonable care for the safety of their invitees and

passengers under the circumstances.” (See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 60, 66, ECF No. 10.)

However, in later expanding on what that duty was, the Plaintiffs seem to want

to impose a heightened duty on the Defendants, such as by alleging that the

Defendants owed a duty to “exercise reasonable care in supervising passengers

with all safety care matters while aboard the subject vessel” and to “ensure the

safety of the Plaintiffs.” (Id. ¶¶ 61(c), 61(g), 68(c), 68(g) (emphases added).) The

Plaintiffs’ response in opposition to the motion to dismiss only serves to

confuse matters, by arguing that the Defendants indeed owed a heightened

duty of care, but also that they owed a duty to exercise reasonable care in

providing medical care to C.J.T. following the subject incident. (See generally

Resp. 6–9, ECF No. 13.)

The Plaintiffs are incorrect that the Defendants owed them a heightened

duty of care. As noted, Eleventh Circuit precedent “is clear that the owner of a

vessel in navigable waters owes passengers a duty of reasonable care under the

circumstances.” Kressly v. Oceania Cruises, Inc., 718 F. App’x 870, 872 (11th

Cir. 2017); see also Amy v. Carnival Corp., 961 F.3d 1303, 1308 n.4 (11th Cir.

2020) (same). Indeed, in Kressly, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the appellant’s

argument that the court should “adopt a heightened standard of care for

vessels when they transport passengers during tumultuous weather,”

explaining that the appellant “d[id] not provide any circuit precedent to support

her contention that, under the specific circumstances of th[e] case, [the

appellee] owed her a heightened standard of care.” 718 F. App’x at 872. Like

the appellant in Kressly, the Plaintiffs here do not provide any authority that

supports the imposition of a heightened standard of care on the Defendants

under the circumstances of this case. The authority that the Plaintiffs do cite is

either misquoted or distinguishable.

The Defendants do not argue, however, that the Plaintiffs’ negligence

claims should be dismissed to the extent that they only seek to hold the

Defendants to a duty of reasonable care. Here, the key question is whether

Carted failed to exercise reasonable care in not taking adequate precautions to

prevent the occurrence, and extent, of C.J.T’s injuries while a passenger on the

Pathfinder. Thus, because Counts Three and Four may fairly be read to impose

the correct standard of care, the Court will not dismiss them completely. See,

e.g., Jackson-Davis v. Carnival Corp., Civil Action No. 17-24089-Civ-Scola,

2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48218, at *7 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 23, 2018) (Scola, J.)

(explaining that “when viewed through the proper lens, [] allegations

amount[ed] to violations of [the defendant’s] overarching duty to exercise

reasonable care under the circumstances”). Instead, the Court dismisses

Counts Three and Four only to the extent they seek to impose a heightened

duty on the Defendants. See, e.g., Hesterly v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, 515 F.

Supp. 2d 1278, 1288 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (Gold, J.) (“Royal Caribbean’s Motion to

Dismiss Count I of the Complaint is DENIED insofar as plaintiff has alleged the

correct standard of care, and GRANTED only to the extent that Plaintiff has

alleged a duty of ‘due diligence for plaintiff’s safety’ and ‘a duty to warn of all

dangers.’”); Holguin v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., No. 10-20215-CIV, 2010 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 43638, at *2 (S.D. Fla. May 4, 2010) (Altonaga, J.) (“The Court will

not strike alleged duties from the Complaints in line-item fashion. It is

sufficient that Count I alleges facts supporting a duty of care.”).

C. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress (Count Seven) and

Vicarious Liability for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

(Count Eight)

A claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress (“NIED”) requires an

adequately pled underlying claim of negligence. Chaparro v. Carnival Corp., 693

F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir. 2012). In addition, an NIED claim “requires mental

or emotional harm (such as fright or anxiety) that is caused by the negligence

of another. . . .” Id. at 1337-38 (quoting Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S.

532, 544, 114 S. Ct. 2396, 129 L. Ed. 2d 427 (1994)). Federal maritime law

utilizes the “zone of danger” test. Id. The zone of danger test permits recovery

for emotional injury to those plaintiffs who sustain a physical impact as a

result of a defendant’s negligent conduct. Tassinari v. Key West Water Tours,

L.C., 480 F.Supp.2d 1318, 1323 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (Moore, J.) (citing Consol. Rail

Corp., 512 U.S. at 547–48). In addition, the zone of danger test permits

recovery for NIED if “a plaintiff is placed in immediate risk of physical harm by

defendant’s negligent conduct.” Chaparro, 693 F.3d at 1337–38 (internal

quotations and citations omitted). In other words, the Plaintiffs must allege

more than merely being a witness to a traumatic event to sufficiently plead

NIED; the plaintiff must be, at least, threatened with imminent physical

impact. Id.

Counts Seven and Eight are brought by Parkey individually, and by

Parkey and Tierney on behalf of R.T. and W.T. The Defendants argue that these

counts must be dismissed because the Plaintiffs fail to sufficiently allege that

Parkey, R.T., or W.T. either suffered a physical impact due to the Defendants’

negligent behavior or were placed in immediate risk of physical harm as a

direct result of that behavior. The Court agrees with the Defendants.

The Plaintiffs do not allege that Parkey, R.T., or W.T. sustained a

physical impact as a result of Carter’s conduct. In their response opposing the

motion to dismiss, the Plaintiffs argue that Parkey, R.T., and W.T.’s proximity

to C.J.T and to the shark supports a conclusion that they were within the zone

of danger created by Carter’s negligent conduct. The Plaintiffs highlight the

small size of the Pathfinder and the fact that “[w]hen the shark flipped over, it

aggressively rose out of the water[.]” (See Am. Compl. ¶ 25, ECF No. 10.)

However, this ignores the critical fact that the shark was only able to bite

C.J.T. because he “reached down to grab [its] fin.” (Id. ¶ 24.) While Parkey,

R.T., and W.T. would necessarily have been near C.J.T. and the shark when

this occurred, there are no allegations in the complaint that would support a

conclusion that they were at immediate risk of physical harm from the shark,

which always remained in the water and outside the Pathfinder.

Accordingly, the Plaintiffs cannot assert a claim for NIED on behalf of

Parkey, R.T., or W.T. and Counts Seven and Eight must be dismissed.

D. Punitive Damages

Under binding Eleventh Circuit precedent, punitive damages are

available in maritime cases only “upon a showing of intentional or wanton and

reckless conduct on the part of defendants amounting to a conscious disregard

of the rights of others.” In re AMTRACK “SUNSET Ltd.” TRAIN CRASH IN BAYOU

CANOT v. WARRIOR & GULF NAVIGATION Co., 121 F.3d 1421, 1428 (11th Cir.

1997) (cleaned up); see also Doe v. Carnival Corp., 470 F. Supp. 3d 1317, 1325

(S.D. Fla. 2020) (Ungaro, J.) (“[P]unitive damages may still be available, but

only upon a showing of the defendant’s intentional misconduct.”); Incardone v.

Royal Caribbean Cruises, No. 16-20924-CIV-MARTINEZ-GOODMAN, 2020 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 10000, at *16 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 18, 2020) (Martinez, J.) (“The

Eleventh Circuit has made clear that punitive damages are precluded in

maritime personal injury claims except in exceptional circumstances and upon

a showing of intentional misconduct.”). “To demonstrate intentional

misconduct for the purposes of recovering punitive damages, plaintiffs must

show that ‘the defendant had actual knowledge of the wrongfulness of the

conduct and the high probability that injury or damage would result and,

despite that knowledge, intentionally pursued that course of conduct, resulting

in injury or damage.’” Roberts v. Carnival Corp., No. 1:19-cv-25281-KMM, 2020

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 194403, at *11 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 19, 2020) (Moore, J.) (quoting

Mee Indus. v. Dow Chem. Co., 608 F.3d 1202, 1220 (11th Cir. 2010)). A request

for punitive damages must be stricken from the complaint if the allegations

therein do not present a factual basis supporting the recovery of punitive

damages, in other words, factual allegations showing intentional misconduct.

See, e.g., Estate of Pankey v. Carnival Corp., No. 22-cv-24004, 2023 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 141125, at *8-9 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 11, 2023) (Bloom, J.).

In their response opposing dismissal, the Plaintiffs do not even argue

that the Defendants’ conduct amounted to anything like a conscious disregard

of the rights of others. Rather, they cite varying standards, ultimately

contending that the conduct at issue was, indeed, “outrageous.” (See Resp. 10–

11, ECF No. 13.) However, even if the Court were to apply the apparently more

flexible standards cited by the Plaintiffs, the outcome would be the same. In

short, as discussed in detail with respect to the Plaintiffs’ claims for intentional

infliction of emotional distress, while the Plaintiffs’ allegations describe

distressing events, they simply do not demonstrate conduct rising to the

requisite level of outrageousness.

4. Conclusion

Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, the Court grants in part and

denies in part the Defendants’ motion to dismiss. (Mot., ECF No. 11.) Counts

One, Two, Five, Six, Seven, and Eight of the Plaintiffs’ amended complaint are

dismissed with prejudice. Counts Three and Four are dismissed with

prejudice only to the extent they seek to hold the Defendants to a heightened

duty of care. In addition, the Court strikes all claims within the amended

complaint for punitive damages. The Defendants shall file an answer to the

amended complaint no later than November 28, 2023.

Done and ordered at Miami, Florida on November 14, 2023.

dobert N. Scola, Jr.

United States District Judge