Burgess v. Palm Beach County, Florida

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 23-cv-81265-ALTMAN

RAYQUAN BURGESS,

Plaintiff,

v.

PALM BEACH COUNTY, et al.,

Defendants.

_______________________________/

ORDER

In this civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, our Plaintiff, Rayquan Burgess, alleges

that “Palm Beach County Jail officials failed to protect him from attack by other inmates then

unreasonably delayed his medical treatment . . . in disregard to his safety and health.” Amended

Complaint [ECF No. 11] ¶ 1. We previously ordered Burgess to file this Amended Complaint after

concluding that his original complaint was “an impermissible shotgun pleading” that didn’t comply

with Rule 8(a)(2). Order to Amend [ECF No. 8] at 7. We also found that Burgess had failed to state a

claim against some of the defendants he’d named. See ibid. After screening Burgess’s Amended

Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, we find that he’s fixed the procedural defects we identified in

our Order to Amend. Still, he’s failed to state a claim against some of the Defendants. We therefore

DISMISS the Amended Complaint in part and allow the rest to PROCEED to service.

THE LAW

The Court “shall review . . . a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from

a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (emphasis

added). The definition of a “prisoner” includes “any person incarcerated or detained in any facility

who is . . . accused of [or] convicted of . . . violations of criminal law.” Id. §1915A(c). In conducting

its screening of a prisoner’s complaint, the Court must “dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the

complaint,” when it is: (1) “frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted”; or (2) “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id. §

1915A(b). When screening a complaint under § 1915A, we must “tak[e] the allegations in the

complaint as true.” Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 2006), abrogated in part on other

grounds by Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34 (2010).

To state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a complaint’s factual allegations “must be

enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level”—with “enough facts to state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007). Under this

standard, legal conclusions “are not entitled to the assumption of truth” and are insufficient to state a

claim. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). Moreover, “[w]here a complaint pleads facts that are

merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and

plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Id. at 678 (internal quotation marks omitted).

ANALYSIS

In his Amended Complaint, Burgess names seven Defendants—all in their individual

capacities1: the Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office (“PBSO”), Captain John Cardaropoli, Captain “K.

1 Burgess does say that he’s suing Deputy Williams in his official capacity. See Amended Complaint ¶ 7.

But, for three reasons, we think this is either a scrivener’s error or some other inadvertent mistake.

First, Burgess has sued all the other individual Defendants in their individual capacities, and he gives

us no good reason to believe that his suit against Deputy Williams should be treated any differently.

Second, Burgess is suing Deputy Williams for monetary damages, see id ¶ 53, and we’ve already told

Burgess that “state officials sued for damages in their official capacity are immune from suit in federal

court,” Order to Amend at 4 (quoting Jackson v. Ga. Dep’t of Transp., 16 F.3d 1573, 1575 (11th Cir.

1994)). Third, Burgess alleges that Deputy Williams “acted with careless, reckless, gross negligence and

deliberate indifference in failing to adequately protect Burgess,” Amended Complaint ¶ 47, which isn’t

the kind of language one would typically use when suing someone in his official capacity. After all, a

party can only be sued in his official capacity if “the entity’s ‘policy or custom’ . . . played a part in the

violation of federal law”—and not (as Burgess alleges here) when the party’s careless, reckless, or

negligent conduct “caused the deprivation of a federal right.” Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991)

(cleaned up). Consistent with our obligation to “liberally construe[ ] . . . pro se complaint[s],” Erickson

Kinsey,” “Deputy Williams,” Sergeant Endora Thurmond, Sheriff Ric Bradshaw, and Palm Beach

County. See Amended Complaint ¶¶ 4–10. Burgess says that he alerted an unnamed “intake

classification member” in late March 2023 that he didn’t want to be housed in the “South 8-B” or

“South 4-D” dormitories because he’d been assaulted there before. Id. ¶¶ 14–15. Despite this warning,

Burgess was placed in “South 4-D,” even though he’d been told that “an additional member of

classification [would] interview him for a pre-housing assignment.” Id. ¶¶ 14, 17. Unfortunately for

Burgess, on April 8, 2023, another inmate beat and “violently stabbed” him, after which he bled

profusely. Id. ¶ 18. Rather than administer medical treatment to Burgess, though, Sergeant Thurmond

“conducted a search of the dorm,” handcuffed Burgess, and ordered Burgess to “wait in the vestibule”

until she’d completed her investigation. Id. ¶ 19. Burgess only received medical treatment after a nurse

noticed that he’d “partial[ly] los[t] consciousness[.]” Id. ¶ 20.

Based on these factual allegations, Burgess divides the Amended Complaint into four counts:

(1) a supervisory-liability claim against the seven Defendants, id. ¶¶ 24–31; (2) a deliberate-

indifference-to-safety claim against Captain Kinsey, id. ¶¶ 32–38; (3) a deliberate-indifference-to-

serious-medical-needs claim against Sergeant Thurmond, id. ¶¶ 39–45; and (4) a deliberate-

indifference-to-safety claim against Deputy Williams, id. ¶¶ 46–53. After careful review, we find that

Burgess’s second, third, and fourth counts can proceed to service. The first count, by contrast, we

dismiss in part.

A. Count 1: The Supervisory-Liability Claim

Burgess’s first count is (admittedly) hard to follow. Burgess blames each of the seven

Defendants for “letting prisoners in a maximum security dorm . . . intermingle without adequate

supervision” and for “delaying a seriously injured inmate from receiving medical treatment.” Id. ¶¶

v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), we find that Burgess has asserted an individual-capacity claim against

Deputy Williams.

27–28. Doing our very best, we’ve construed this count as asserting a supervisory-liability claim, which

arises when a supervisory official “personally participates in the alleged unconstitutional conduct or

when there is a causal connection between the actions of a supervising official and the alleged

constitutional deprivation.” Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003).

We’ll start with the Defendants against whom Burgess has obviously failed to state a supervisory-

liability claim. First, PBSO is not a “legal entit[y] subject to suit” under § 1983, Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d

1210, 1214 (11th Cir. 1992)—and, in any event, it’s a duplicative defendant since Burgess has already

sued the head of the PBSO: Sheriff Bradshaw, see Navarro v. City of Riviera Beach, 192 F. Supp. 3d 1353,

1361 (S.D. Fla. 2016) (Bloom, J.) (“Thus, the Sheriff . . . , and not the county ‘Sheriff’s Office,’ is the

proper party to an action against the Sheriff[.]”). Second, Palm Beach County is a municipality and, as

such, cannot be sued in its “individual capacity.” Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 776 (11th Cir.

1991) (holding that “direct suits against municipalities” are “functionally equivalent” to “suits against

a municipal officer sued in his official capacity”). And we’ve already held that Palm Beach County

can’t be sued in its official capacity, either, because Sheriff Bradshaw “is the only official who oversees

‘the daily operation of the jails and the supervision of inmates’” and, therefore, is the only party who’s

responsible “for the Jail’s allegedly unconstitutional policies or customs.” Order to Amend at 6

(quoting Jones ex rel. Albert v. Lamberti, 2008 WL 4070293, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 28, 2008) (Cooke, J.)).

Third, Burgess’s supervisory-liability claims against Sergeant Thurmond, Captain Kinsey, and Deputy

Williams are duplicative of the allegations he’s advanced in Counts 2, 3, and 4 (viz., that these

Defendants “personally participate[d] in the alleged unconstitutional conduct”). Rather than consider

the same allegations twice, we’ll dismiss these Defendants from Count 1. See Manning v. Carnival Corp.,

2012 WL 3962997, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 11, 2012) (Altonaga, J.) (“To promote judicial economy, a

court ‘should dismiss claims that are duplicative of other claims.’” (quoting Wultz v. Islamic Republic of

Iran, 755 F. Supp. 2d 1, 81 (D.D.C. 2010))).

That leaves us with two potentially viable Defendants in Count 1: Sheriff Bradshaw and Captain

Cardaropoli. For either of these Defendants to be liable under § 1983, Burgess must show that there

was a “causal connection between the[ir] actions . . . and the alleged constitutional deprivation” by

establishing: (1) “a history of widespread abuse [that] puts the reasonable supervisor on notice of the

need to correct the alleged deprivation, and he fails to do so”; (2) “a supervisor’s custom or policy

[that] results in deliberate indifference to constitutional rights”; or (3) the supervisor’s failure “to

adequately train [his] officers[.]” Christmas v. Harris Cnty., Ga., 51 F.4th 1348, 1355 (11th Cir. 2022)

(cleaned up).

Starting with Sheriff Bradshaw, Burgess alleges that he “negligently operated and managed the

Palm Beach County Jail” by (1) hiring employees with “poor character and judgment,” (2) failing to

create policies or rules that “reasonably protect Burgess and others detained within the jail from being

exposed to a substantial risk of harm,” and (3) failing to “supervise and review the operation and

management of [the] Jail.” Amended Complaint ¶ 26.2 Burgess’s allegations against Captain

Cardaropoli are much harder to parse. As far as we can tell, Burgess claims that Captain Cardaropoli

“failed to properly supervise the actions of county jail officials,” and that he “should have known”

that the Jail’s policies would allow “some inmates [to] become victims of attack by other inmates[.]”

Id. ¶¶ 5, 27. Liberally construed, these allegations suggest that Captain Cardaropoli (in concert with

Sheriff Bradshaw) (1) implemented unconstitutional policies or customs and (2) failed to adequately

supervise his subordinates.

Beginning with implementation, Burgess has plausibly alleged that Sheriff Bradshaw—but not

Captain Cardaropoli—was responsible for an unconstitutional custom of “letting prisoners in a

maximum security dorm . . . intermingle without adequate supervision[.]” Id. ¶ 27. “A custom is an

2 Although some of Burgess’s allegations contradict one another, he’s still allowed (at this very early

stage of the proceedings) to “set out 2 or more statements of a claim or defense alternatively or

hypothetically,” even if the claims themselves are inconsistent. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(d)(2)–(3).

unwritten practice that is applied consistently enough to have the same effect as a policy with the force

of law.” Goebert v. Lee Cnty., 510 F.3d 1312, 1332 (11th Cir. 2007). According to Burgess, the Jail allows

prisoners in its maximum-security dorms to comingle with each other freely and with only minimal

supervision from prison officials. See Amended Complaint ¶¶ 26–27. This “custom” has caused many

inmates—including Burgess on multiple occasions—to become “victims of attack” by other inmates who

are known to be “combative.” Id. ¶ 27. These assertions are sufficient to establish a “causal

connection” between this allegedly unconstitutional custom and Burgess’s injuries. Cottone, 326 F.3d

at 1360. But only Sheriff Bradshaw (according to Burgess) is responsible for this custom. Although

Captain Cardaropoli is “entrusted to supervise all areas of security,” Amended Complaint ¶ 5, Sheriff

Bradshaw is the only defendant “who creates the policies, customs, practices, rules, regulations,

procedures that the jail must follow and the fact he oversees the daily operation of the jail and the

supervision of the inmates[,]” id. ¶ 23 (errors in original). Burgess, in short, fails to allege that Captain

Cardaropoli is responsible for implementing any policies or customs—and, as a result, fails to allege a

“causal connection” between a custom Captain Cardaropoli was responsible for and “the alleged

constitutional deprivation.” Cottone, 326 F.3d at 1360. Captain Cardaropoli thus isn’t a proper

defendant here.

Burgess also says that the Jail has a “policy” (as opposed to an unwritten or informal “custom”)

of withholding medical treatment from seriously injured inmates until Jail officials can complete an

“investigation.” See Amended Complaint ¶ 28 (“[I]t was confirmed by Captain John Cardaropoli that

unconstitutional customs of detaining and delaying a seriously injured inmate from receiving medical

treatment to conduct an investigation is allowed per policies, rules, regulations, and procedure[.]”).

But, even accepting everything in the Amended Complaint as true, this conclusory assertion isn’t

enough to state a viable claim. A policy is “a decision that is officially adopted” as “a persistent and

wide-spread practice.” Christmas, 51 F.4th at 1356. Notwithstanding Captain Cardaropoli’s

“admission” that Jail officials should delay giving treatment until an “investigation” has been completed,

Burgess hasn’t suggested that this “policy” ever resulted in harm to another inmate. See generally

Amended Complaint. And the law is clear that “[a] single incident [is] not so pervasive as to be a

custom or practice.” Greech v. Clayton Cnty., Ga., 335 F.3d 1326, 1330 n.6 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing City

of Okla. City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823–24 (1985)). Burgess has thus failed to show that the Jail

implemented a “persistent and wide-spread” policy or custom of delaying (pending an internal inquest)

medical treatment for injured inmates.

On the other hand, Burgess has successfully alleged that both Sheriff Bradshaw and Captain

Cardaropoli failed to supervise their subordinates and that this lack of supervision caused his injuries.

“[A]n allegation of a failure to train or supervise can be the basis for liability under § 1983. The

Supreme Court has instructed that these ‘limited circumstances’ occur only when the municipality

inadequately trains or supervises its employees, this failure to train or supervise is a [policy], and that

[the policy] causes the employees to violate a citizen’s constitutional rights.” Gold v. City of Miami, 151

F.3d 1346, 1350 (11th Cir. 1998) (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 387, 389–91 (1989)). In

other words, Burgess must show that the Defendants “knew of a need to [supervise] in a particular

area [but] made a deliberate choice not to take any action.” Ibid. Burgess claims that both Sheriff

Bradshaw and Captain Cardaropoli knew that “the number of guards [in the dormitories] was

insufficient to prevent [attacks] and [would be] inadequate to rescue inmates from attacks.” Amended

Complaint ¶ 27. And yet (Burgess alleges), both Defendants failed to supervise the security of the

prison dormitories—even though it was “highly foreseeable that some inmates would become victims

of attack by other inmates[.]” Ibid. Burgess has adequately pled—at this early stage of the case—a

failure-to-supervise claim against Sheriff Bradshaw and Captain Cardaropoli.

Finally, we turn to Burgess’s accusation that Sheriff Bradshaw hired employees of “poor

character and judgment as to be unfit” to ensure the safety of the Jail’s prisoners. Id. ¶ 26. Here, we

assume that Burgess is advancing a negligent-hiring claim against Sheriff Bradshaw. Although a claim

of negligent hiring typically arises under state law, “claims of negligent hiring and retention brought

against a municipality under § 1983 are not without precedent.” Paul v. Bradshaw, 2013 WL 12084298,

at *8 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 7, 2013) (Rosenbaum, J.) (citing Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty., Okla. v. Brown,

520 U.S. 397, 405 (1997)); see also Griffin v. City of Opa-Locka, 261 F.3d 1295, 1313 (11th Cir. 2001) (“To

impose § 1983 liability based on a hiring decision, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the municipal

actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of hiring the applicant.”).3 Burgess says that Sheriff

Bradshaw “kn[ew] or should have known” that his subordinates (i.e., the other Defendants in this

case) were of “poor character and judgment”—and, therefore, that they wouldn’t “reasonably protect

Burgess and others detained within the Jail from being exposed to [a] substantial risk of harm” and

would instead “intentional[ly] inflict[ ] harm” on the Jail’s inmates. Amended Complaint ¶ 26. When

we accept Burgess’s factual allegations as true (as we must at this stage of the case), we conclude that

Burgess has done enough to advance a negligent-hiring claim against Sheriff Bradshaw. See Brown, 520

U.S. at 411 (“Only where adequate scrutiny of an applicant’s background would lead a reasonable

policymaker to conclude that the plainly obvious consequence of the decision to hire the applicant

would be the deprivation of a third party’s federally protected right can the official’s failure to

adequately scrutinize the applicant’s background constitute ‘deliberate indifference.’”).

3 We presume that Burgess intended to bring his negligent-hiring claim under § 1983 (rather than

under Florida tort law). Burgess, after all, never mentions state law in his Amended Complaint—and

it seems clear to us that he intended his negligent-hiring claim to serve as an alternative means of

pleading supervisory liability against Sheriff Bradshaw (as opposed to stating a new state-law tort claim).

See Amended Complaint ¶ 1 (asserting that the Defendants violated his “rights, privileges, [and]

immunities secured to him by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution”); id.

¶ 26 (listing negligent hiring as one of the ways in which Sheriff Bradshaw violated Burgess’s

constitutional rights). If we’re mistaken about this, Burgess may correct our misperception by filing a

second amended complaint—in which he may try to advance a negligent-hiring claim under Florida

law against Sheriff Bradshaw. Any such second amended complaint must, of course, comply with

FED. R. CIV. P. 15.

To summarize our holding on Count 1: (1) We DISMISS for failure to state a claim all

supervisory-liability claims against the PBSO, Captain Kinsey, Deputy Williams, Sergeant Thurmond,

and Palm Beach County; (2) we ALLOW Burgess’s supervisory-liability claim to proceed against

Sheriff Bradshaw—except for Burgess’s claim that Sheriff Bradshaw implemented an unconstitutional

policy of unreasonably delaying medical treatment to an injured inmate; (3) we ALLOW Burgess to

bring a supervisory-liability claim against Captain Cardaropoli—but only on the theory that he failed to

supervise his subordinates; and (4) we DISMISS for failure to state a claim any other supervisory-

liability claims against Captain Cardaropoli and Sheriff Bradshaw.

B. Count 2: Deliberate Indifference Against Captain Kinsey

In Count 2, Burgess says that Captain Kinsey—the Jail’s “classification administrator”—was

deliberately indifferent to his safety when she failed to move Burgess to a new dorm before he was

attacked on April 8, 2023. See Amended Complaint ¶ 35 (“[H]ad Captain Kinsey made responsible

inquiry as her job requires she would have discovered . . . the on-going threat/danger Burgess faced

in South 4-D, especially in light of the previous assault on him in that same dorm[.]” (errors in

original)). Burgess insists that Captain Kinsey was aware he wasn’t safe in the South 4-D dormitory,

because she knew that Burgess had been attacked in that same dorm “90 days prior[.]” Id. ¶ 33. Still,

Burgess claims, Kinsey refused to move Burgess to a new unit because Burgess “was unable to identify

all [of the] assailants[.]” Id. ¶ 35. In Burgess’s view, Captain Kinsey’s refusal to move him to a new

dorm was the “direct and proximate [cause]” of his being “beaten and violently stabbed and

hospitalized” on April 8, 2023. Id. ¶ 37.

A defendant is deliberately indifferent to an inmate’s safety when there is: “(1) a substantial

risk of serious harm; (2) the defendant[ ] [is] deliberate[ly] indifferent to that risk; and (3) causation.”

Goodman v. Kimbrough, 718 F.3d 1325, 1331 (11th Cir. 2013). “Deliberate indifference in the context of

a failure to prevent harm has a subjective and an objective component, i.e., a plaintiff must show both

that the defendant actually (subjectively) knew that an inmate faced a substantial risk of serious harm

and that the defendant disregarded that risk by failing to respond to it in an (objectively) reasonable

manner.” Bowen v. Warden, Baldwin State Prison, 826 F.3d 1312, 1320 (11th Cir. 2016) (cleaned up).

Burgess has adequately alleged (1) that Captain Kinsey knew he’d been “assaulted in the same

dorm (South 4-D) by multiple combative inmates,” (2) that Captain Kinsey didn’t change Burgess’s

housing assignment despite this knowledge, and (3) that, because of her refusal to transfer him,

Burgess was attacked again and suffered severe injuries. Amended Complaint ¶ 33. That’s sufficient

to establish a deliberate-indifference-to-safety claim. See Caldwell v. Warden, FCI Talladega, 748 F.3d

1090, 1102 (11th Cir. 2014) (“[T]his Court already clarified that a prison guard violates a prisoner’s

Eighth Amendment right when that guard actually (objectively and subjectively) knows that one

prisoner poses a substantial risk of serious harm to another, yet fails to take any action to investigate,

mitigate, or monitor that substantial risk of serious harm.”). We’ll therefore ALLOW Count 2 to

proceed against Captain Kinsey.

C. Count 3: Deliberate Indifference Against Sergeant Thurmond

Count 3 asserts a viable deliberate-indifference-to-serious-medical-needs claim against

Sergeant Thurmond. Sergeant Thurmond responded to the scene after Burgess was attacked on April

8, 2023. Rather than administer medical treatment, however, Sergeant Thurmond “made [Burgess]

wait inside of the vestibule and placed [him] in handcuffs,” even though Burgess was “bleeding out.”

Amended Complaint ¶ 41. Burgess says that he “suffered unnecessary physical pains and mental pains”

because of this treatment delay. Id. ¶ 44. We agree with Burgess that this is a clear-cut example of

deliberate indifference.

“To prevail on a deliberate indifference to serious medical need claim, Plaintiffs must show:

(1) a serious medical need; (2) the defendants’ deliberate indifference to that need; and (3) causation

between that indifference and the plaintiff’s injury.” Mann v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1306–07

(11th Cir. 2009). Burgess alleges that, rather than treat his stab wounds (which were bleeding

profusely), Sergeant Thurmond detained him while she investigated the incident. See Amended

Complaint ¶¶ 40–43. Sergeant Thurmond’s (alleged) decision to “delay[ ] necessary treatment for non-

medical reasons” would, if true, constitute deliberate indifference under binding Eleventh Circuit

precedent. Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1246 (11th Cir. 2003); see also, e.g., Knowles v. Clifton, 2016 WL

3633400, at *5 (S.D. Ga. June 29, 2016) (Baker, Mag. J.) (“According to Plaintiff, at the time he was

arrested, he had a stab wound in the back of his head [and] his clothes were covered in blood. These

medical needs are so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s

attention. . . . Despite these obvious medical needs and Plaintiff’s requests for medical treatment,

Defendants allegedly refused to provide Plaintiff any medical care. Based on these allegations, Plaintiff

has stated a plausible claim for relief.” (cleaned up)), report and recommendation adopted, 2016 WL 4432700

(S.D. Ga. Aug. 17, 2016) (Hall, J.).

Count 3, therefore, may PROCEED against Sergeant Thurmond.

D. Count 4: Deliberate Indifference Against Deputy Williams

In his final claim, Burgess asserts a deliberate-indifference-to-safety claim against Deputy

Williams. Deputy Williams (Burgess says) admitted that he knew Burgess would be attacked. See

Amended Complaint ¶ 50 (“During Burgess transport back to the hospital . . . Deputy Williams

confessed to Burgess to having knowledge of the risk he faced but chose to disregard it which led to

Burgess getting injured.” (errors in original)). If that’s true, then Deputy Williams would have been

deliberately indifferent to Burgess’s safety. See Caldwell, 748 F.3d at 1099 (“A prison official violates

the Eighth Amendment ‘when a substantial risk of serious harm, of which the official is subjectively

aware, exists and the official does not respond reasonably to the risk.’” (quoting Carter v. Galloway, 352

F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2003))).

Count 4, therefore, may PROCEED against Deputy Williams.

* * *

Having screened the Amended Complaint under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, we

hereby ORDER AND ADJUDGE as follows:

1. Burgess’s Amended Complaint [ECF No. 11] may PROCEED in full as to Counts 2, 3,

and 4.

2. Count 1 is DISMISSED in part. Count 1 may PROCEED against Captain

Cardaropoli—but only on the claim that Cardaropoli failed to supervise his subordinates.

Count 1 may also PROCEED against Sheriff Bradshaw on all claims—except the one

alleging that Bradshaw implemented an unconstitutional policy of delaying treatment for

injured inmates. Any other claim raised in Count 1 is DISMISSED.

3. Burgess’s claims against Palm Beach County and the Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office

are DISMISSED for failure to state a claim. The Clerk shall TERMINATE these

Defendants from this case.

4. Burgess’s Amended Motion to Proceed in forma pauperis [ECF No. 12] is GRANTED.

Burgess shall owe the United States $350.00, which Burgess must pay to the Clerk of Court

as funds become available. To effectuate those payments, the agency with custody over

the Plaintiff must forward these payments from the Plaintiff’s prisoner account to the

Clerk of Court anytime the account balance exceeds $10.00. That agency shall continue to

make these payments until the Plaintiff has paid the filing fees in full. The Clerk SHALL

send a copy of this Order to the Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office and this Court’s

Financial Department.

5. The Court will direct the U.S. Marshal’s Service to serve the appropriate Defendants in a

separate order. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(c)(3).

6. ‘This case shall remain CLOSED. Any party may move to reopen the case once all

Defendants have been served.

DONE AND ORDERED in the Southern District a 9, 2023.

ROYK.ALTMAN □

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

cc: Rayquan Burgess, pro se

Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office

ATTN: Inmate Trust Fund Department

3228 Gun Club Road

West Palm Beach, FL 33406

Financial Department,

United States District Court, Southern District of Florida

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