“This is so even when the other party does not move to strike the pleading”
How later courts described this case
- “This is so even when the other party does not move to strike the pleading”
- instructing that “if the plaintiff fails to comply with the court’s order—by filing a repleader with the same deficiency—the court should strike his pleading or, depending on the circumstances, dismiss his case and consider the imposition of monetary sanctions.” (quotations omitted)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
United States District Court
for the
Southern District of Florida
Juan Francisco Mendieta, Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 23-23439-Civ-Scola
)
Holiday CVS, LLC, Defendant. )
Order Striking State Court Complaint
This matter is before the Court on an independent review of the record.
This negligence action arises from injuries allegedly sustained by Plaintiff Juan
Francisco Mendieta when he slipped and fell in a CVS store owned by the
Defendant. (State Ct. Compl., ECF No. 1-2.) The Plaintiff initially filed this
action in Florida state court, and the Defendant removed the case. (Not. of
Removal, ECF No. 1.)
As a preliminary matter, the Court is satisfied that the Defendant has
met its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the case
meets the requirements for federal subject matter jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. §§
1332, 1446(c); Roe v. Michelin N. Am., Inc., 613 F.3d 1058, 1061-1062 (11th
Cir. 2010). With respect to diversity of citizenship, the Defendant has provided
evidence that the sole member of Holiday CVS, LLC is CVS Pharmacy, Inc., a
Rhode Island Corporation (Def. Annual Report, ECF No. 1-4.), and the Plaintiff
stated in the state court complaint that he is a Florida citizen. (ECF No. 1-2 ¶
2.) With respect to the amount in controversy, the state court complaint seeks
only damages in excess of $50,000, but also alleges “bodily injury resulting in
pain and suffering, disability, disfigurement, permanent and significant
scarring, mental anguish, loss of the capacity for the enjoyment of life, expense
of hospitalization, medical and nursing care and treatment, loss of earning,
loss of the ability to earn money, activation of a latent condition and/or
aggravation of [sic] previously existing condition.” (Id. ¶¶ 11, 17.) “Eleventh
Circuit precedent permits district courts to make ‘reasonable deductions,
reasonable inferences, or other reasonable extrapolations’ from the pleadings to
determine whether it is facially apparent that a case is removable. Roe, 613
F.3d at 1061-62 (citation omitted). Given the minimum amount pleaded by the
Plaintiff and the nature of the injuries alleged in the complaint, the Court finds
that the amount in controversy more than likely exceeds the jurisdictional
threshold. See Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., 574 U.S. 81, 88 (2014). The
Court therefore has subject matter jurisdiction and the Defendant has properly
removed the case to federal court.
Moving to complaint itself, the Plaintiff asserts two counts of negligence
against the Defendant. (State Ct. Compl., ECF No. 1-2 ¶¶ 7-17.) Within each
count of negligence—“premises liability” and “negligence under the non-
delegable duty doctrine”—Mendieta alleges sixteen ways in which the
Defendant breached its duties to “maintain the premises in a reasonably safe
condition, and to warn Plaintiff of [sic] dangerous condition on their premises.”
(Id. ¶¶ 8-16.) Many of these “breaches” raise distinct theories of liability, some
of which do not appear to be based on duties that are even alleged or
cognizable. (E.g., Compl. at ¶ 9.g. (“Negligently failing to train and/or
inadequately training its employees . . . .”)) Others are redundant. (Compare,
e.g., id. at ¶ 9.c. (“Negligently failing to inspect or adequately inspect the aisle .
. . .”) with id. at ¶ 9.d. (“Negligently failing to inspect . . . the dangers in the
aisle . . . .”))
“Courts in the Eleventh Circuit have little tolerance for shotgun
pleadings.” Vibe Micro, Inc. v. Shabanets, 878 F.3d 1291, 1294-95 (11th Cir.
2018). They violate Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) and 10(b), “waste
scarce judicial resources, inexorably broaden the scope of discovery, wreak
havoc on appellate court dockets, and undermine the public’s respect for the
courts.” Id. (quotations and alterations omitted). When presented with a
shotgun pleading, a district court “should strike the pleading and instruct
counsel to replead the case—if counsel could in good faith make the
representations required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b).” Jackson v. Bank of Am., N.A.,
898 F.3d 1348, 1357-58 (11th Cir. 2018) (“This is so even when the other party
does not move to strike the pleading”). One type of shotgun pleading is where a
complaint fails to “separate[] into a different count each cause of action or
claim for relief.” Weiland v. Palm Beach Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 792 F.3d 1313,
1322-23, n.13 (11th Cir. 2015). The complaint here is this type of shotgun
pleading.
Mendieta attempts to fit multiple distinct theories of liability into both
counts. (Compl. at ¶¶ 8-16.) Each distinct theory, however, is a separate cause
of action that must be asserted independently and with corresponding
supporting factual allegations. See Garcia v. Carnival Corp., 838 F. Supp. 2d
1334, 1337, n.2 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (Moore, J.) (dismissing maritime negligence
claim that “epitomizes a form of ‘shotgun’ pleading,” where the plaintiff alleged
that the defendant owed a duty of “reasonable care under the circumstances,”
and then “proceed[ed] to allege at least twenty-one ways in which [the
d]efendant breached this duty”); Brown v. Carnival Corp., 202 F. Supp. 3d
1332, 1338 (S.D. Fla. 2016) (Ungaro, J.) (“Simply alleging that Carnival owed
Plaintiff a duty of ‘reasonable care’ in a conclusory fashion, while also pleading
[“forty-one”] alleged breaches that purport to impose a heightened duty upon
Carnival, is not sufficient to state a valid negligence claim under maritime law,”
and holding that “the burden will remain on Plaintiff to review her Complaint
and ensure that each factual allegation is supported by law and plausible facts,
and is alleged in good faith.”); Gayou v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., No. 11-23359-
Civ, 2012 WL 2049431, at *5-*6, n.2 (S.D. Fla. June 5, 2012) (Scola, J.)
(ordering plaintiff to amend complaint to “separately allege an independent
count” for various theories of liability that were lumped into a single negligence
claim); Flaherty v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., No. 15-22295, 2015 WL
8227674, *3n.3 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 7, 2015) (Lenard, J.) (same); Doe v. NCL
(Bahamas) Ltd., 2016 WL 6330587, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 27, 2016) (Ungaro, J.)
(holding that Plaintiffs “boilerplate allegations” of breach of duty failed to state
a claim for negligent hiring and retention, training and supervision, and
ordering Plaintiff to “allege each of these three claims in separate Counts” in
an amended complaint (emphasis in original)).
Accordingly, the Court strikes the complaint, (ECF No. 1-2), asa
shotgun pleading. Mendieta may file an amended complaint by October 13,
2023, provided it complies with this order, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a)
and 10(b), and the Iqgbal/ Twombly standard. Furthermore, Mendieta is
admonished not to include redundant claims or counts in his amended
pleading.
Mendieta is forewarned that failure to comply with this order may result
in the dismissal of this case with prejudice or other appropriate sanctions. See
Jackson, 898 F.3d at 1358-59 (instructing that “if the plaintiff fails to comply
with the court’s order—by filing a repleader with the same deficiency—the
court should strike his pleading or, depending on the circumstances, dismiss
his case and consider the imposition of monetary sanctions.” (quotations
omitted)).
In light of the above, the Defendant’s motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs
complaint is denied without prejudice (ECF No. 5).
Done and ordered in Miami, Florida on October 4, 2023.
fon N. Scola, Jr.
United States District Judge