Silas v. Dixon

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 23-CV-61120-RAR

RUDOLPH SILAS,

Petitioner,

v.

RICKY D. DIXON, SECRETARY,

FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,

Respondent.

_________________________________________/

ORDER DENYING 28 U.S.C. § 2254 HABEAS PETITION

THIS CAUSE comes before the Court on a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus,

filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging Petitioner’s convictions and sentences imposed by

the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit Court in and for Broward County, Florida, in Case No. 18-003099-

CF10A. See Petition [ECF No. 1] (“Pet.”). Respondent filed a Response to the Petition. See

Response to Order to Show Cause [ECF No. 8] (“Resp.”). Having carefully reviewed the record

and governing law, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES the Petition in its

entirety.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The State of Florida charged Petitioner and a codefendant by Information with four counts:

burglary of a conveyance (Count 1), carjacking (Count 2), robbery with aggravated battery (Count

3), and aggravated battery with a deadly weapon (Count 4). See Information [ECF No. 9-1] at 7–

9. On December 13, 2018, a Broward County jury found Petitioner guilty of all four counts as

charged in the Information. See Verdict [ECF No. 9-1] at 11–14. Prior to sentencing, the trial

court vacated Petitioner’s conviction on Count 4 after the State conceded that it violated the rule

against double jeopardy. See Order Vacating Count 4 [ECF No. 9-1] at 16; Sentencing Tr. [ECF

No. 10-5] at 16 (“[The Court]: Count IV is dismissed by the court because it would constitute

double jeopardy to sentence him on that count as well.”). The trial court adjudicated Petitioner

guilty of Counts 1 through 3 and sentenced him to life in prison. See Judgment and Sentencing

Orders [ECF No. 9-1] at 18–29.

Petitioner appealed his convictions and sentences to Florida’s Fourth District Court of

Appeal (the “Fourth DCA”). See Direct Appeal Notice of Appeal [ECF No. 9-1] at 36. Petitioner

argued on appeal that: (1) the trial court “should have granted [Petitioner’s motion for judgment

of acquittal] where there was insufficient evidence to establish that [Petitioner] was a principal to

the crimes committed[,]” and (2) “[t]he trial court erred when it admitted evidence of a suggestive

show-up identification of [Petitioner].” Direct Appeal Initial Brief [ECF No. 9-1] at 51. On March

26, 2020, the Fourth DCA summarily affirmed the trial court in an unwritten opinion. See Silas v.

State, 292 So. 3d 1181 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020).

On April 4, 2021,1 Petitioner, now proceeding pro se, filed a motion for postconviction

relief in state court pursuant to FED. R. CRIM. P. 3.850. See Postconviction Motion [ECF No. 9-1]

at 106–24. Petitioner raised three grounds for relief in his Postconviction Motion: (1) “[t]rial

counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel when he misadvised the defendant about his

need to testify in this case[,]” id. at 112; (2) “[t]rial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of

counsel when he misadvised the defendant regarding a favorable plea offer[,]” id. at 116; and (3)

“the cumulative effect of such errors denied the defendant a fair and impartial trial,” id. at 120.

On October 28, 2022, the state postconviction court rendered an order denying all three grounds.

1 “Under the ‘prison mailbox rule,’ a pro se prisoner’s court filing is deemed filed on the date it is delivered

to prison authorities for mailing.” Williams v. McNeil, 557 F.3d 1287, 1290 n.2 (11th Cir. 2009). “Absent

evidence to the contrary, [courts] assume that a prisoner delivered a filing to prison authorities on the date

that he signed it.” Jeffries v. United States, 748 F.3d 1310, 1314 (11th Cir. 2014).

See Order Denying Postconviction Motion [ECF No. 9-1] at 137–39. Petitioner appealed the

denial of his Postconviction Motion, see Postconviction Notice of Appeal [ECF No. 9-1] at 144,

but the Fourth DCA again affirmed the lower court in an unwritten opinion, see Silas v. State, 360

So. 3d 386 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023). The Fourth DCA’s mandate issued on May 26, 2023. See

Postconviction Mandate [ECF No. 9-1] at 163. The instant habeas petition was filed in this Court

on June 6, 2023. See Pet. at 1.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. Review Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254

“As amended by [the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”)],

28 U.S.C. § 2254 sets several limits on the power of a federal court to grant an application for a

writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a state prisoner.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181

(2011). Some of the more restrictive limits are found in § 2254(d). Under that provision, a federal

court may grant habeas relief from a state court judgment only if the state court’s decision on the

merits was (1) contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d). Consequently, § 2254(d) constructs a “highly deferential standard for evaluating

state-court rulings” because, after all, this standard “demands that state-court decisions be given

the benefit of the doubt.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002).

“A state court’s decision is ‘contrary to’ federal law if the ‘state court arrives at a

conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law or if the state court

decides a case differently than the Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable

facts.’” Consalvo v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 664 F.3d 842, 844 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412–13 (2000)) (brackets omitted). A state court’s decision

qualifies as “an unreasonable application of federal law if the state court identifies the correct

governing legal principle from the Supreme Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that

principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 413) (cleaned up).

“‘If this standard [seems] difficult to meet’—and it is—‘that is because it was meant to be.’” Burt

v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 20 (2013) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011)).

By its own plain terms, § 2254(d)’s deferential standard applies only when a claim “was

adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also Cullen, 563

U.S. at 181 (“If an application includes a claim that has been adjudicated on the merits in State

court proceedings, § 2254(d), an additional restriction applies.”); Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 472

(2009) (“Because the Tennessee courts did not reach the merits of Cone’s Brady claim, federal

habeas review is not subject to the deferential standard that applies under AEDPA.”). The

summary denial of a claim with no articulated reasons presumptively serves as an adjudication on

the merits subjecting the claim to § 2254(d)’s additional restrictions. See Richter, 562 U.S. at 100

(“This Court now holds and reconfirms that § 2254(d) does not require a state court to give reasons

before its decision can be deemed to have been ‘adjudicated on the merits.’”). This is because

federal courts ordinarily presume § 2254(d)’s deferential standard applies when a constitutional

claim has been presented to a state court and denied in that forum. See, e.g., id. at 99 (“When a

federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has denied relief, it may be

presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any indication

or state-law procedural principles to the contrary.”).

At the same time, “federal court[s] should ‘look through’ [an] unexplained decision to the

last related state-court decision that does provide a relevant rationale” if one exists. See Wilson v.

Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018) (emphasis added). From there, federal courts “presume that

the unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning.” Id. “[T]he State may rebut [that]

presumption by showing that the unexplained affirmance relied or most likely did rely on different

grounds than the lower state court’s decision, such as alternative grounds for affirmance that were

briefed or argued to the state supreme court or obvious in the record it reviewed.” Id.

In addition to the standard of review imposed by AEDPA, the petitioner must also show

that any constitutional error had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence” on the verdict to

be entitled to habeas relief. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993). The Supreme Court

has explained that, while the passage of AEDPA “announced certain new conditions to [habeas]

relief,” it did not supersede or replace the harmless error standard announced in Brecht. Brown v.

Davenport, 142 S. Ct. 1510, 1524 (2022). In other words, a habeas petitioner must also satisfy

Brecht, even if AEDPA applies. See id. (“[A] federal court must deny relief to a state habeas

petitioner who fails to satisfy either [Brecht] or AEDPA. But to grant relief, a court must find that

the petition has cleared both tests.”) (emphasis in original); see also Mansfield v. Sec’y, Dep’t of

Corr., 679 F.3d 1301, 1307 (11th Cir. 2012) (“[A] habeas petition cannot be successful unless it

satisfies both [AEDPA] and Brecht.”).

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims

The Sixth Amendment affords a criminal defendant the right to “the Assistance of Counsel

for his defen[s]e.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. “The benchmark for judging any claim of

ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the

adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.” Strickland

v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel, a habeas litigant must demonstrate “that (1) his counsel’s performance was deficient and

‘fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,’ and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced

his defense.” Raleigh v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 827 F.3d 938, 957 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88).

Regarding the deficiency prong, “a petitioner must establish that no competent counsel

would have taken the action that his counsel did take” during the proceedings. Chandler v. United

States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1315 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc). If “some reasonable lawyer at the trial

could have acted, in the circumstances, as defense counsel acted at trial[,]” counsel did not perform

deficiently. Waters v. Thomas, 46 F.3d 1506, 1512 (11th Cir. 1995) (quoting White v. Singletary,

972 F.2d 1218, 1220 (11th Cir. 1992)).

As for the second prong, “a defendant is prejudiced by his counsel’s deficient performance

if ‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different.’” Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 40 (2009) (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

ANALYSIS

Petitioner raises three grounds for relief in his § 2254 petition—the same three grounds

that were originally presented in Petitioner’s Postconviction Motion. See Petition Attachment

(“Attach.”) [ECF No. 1-1] at 1–4.2 To recap, Petitioner alleges that: (1) trial counsel misadvised

2 Respondent correctly observes that the Petition “did not fully set out the issues” and instead “deferred to

attachments, which only provide the first page of each issue that was raised in state court.” Resp. at 7. The

Court agrees with Respondent that the Petition, by itself, falls far short of the pleading standard required by

AEDPA. See Blankenship v. Hall, 542 F.3d 1253, 1270 (11th Cir. 2008) (“It is the petitioner’s burden to

establish his right to habeas relief and he must prove all facts necessary to show a constitutional violation.”).

That said, the Court finds that the Petition’s attachments are identical to portions of Petitioner’s

Postconviction Motion. Compare Attach. at 2–4, with Postconviction Motion [ECF No. 9-1] at 112, 116,

and 120. The Court will assume, then, that the Petition is fully incorporating all of the factual allegations

and legal arguments Petitioner made in his Postconviction Motion.

him about his right to testify; (2) trial counsel gave “incompetent” advice which led Petitioner to

reject the State’s favorable plea offer; and (3) the cumulative effect of these errors denied Petitioner

a fair trial. See id. Respondent concedes that the Petition was timely filed, and that Petitioner

properly exhausted his claims in state court. See Resp. at 7. Consequently, the Court will apply

the standard of review set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) to Petitioner’s claims, which requires the

Court to review the reasonableness of “the last state court to decide [Petitioner’s] federal claim[s]

. . . on the merits in a reasoned opinion.” Wilson, 138 S. Ct. at 1192.

Here, the Fourth DCA issued an unwritten opinion that did not “provide a relevant

rationale,” so the Court will instead “look through the unexplained decision to the last related state-

court decision that [provided] a relevant rationale.” Id. In this case, that “last related state-court

decision” is the state postconviction court’s order denying Petitioner’s Postconviction Motion. See

Order Denying Postconviction Motion [ECF No. 9-1] at 137–39. The Court will analyze each of

Petitioner’s grounds for relief in turn.

A. Ground One

In Ground One, Petitioner argues that his trial counsel “misadvised the defendant about his

need to testify in this case.” Attach. at 2. According to Petitioner, his attorney (incorrectly)

informed Petitioner that “because [Petitioner] had ‘prior felonies’ on his record, him testifying

would reveal those prior felonies to the jury,” and that Petitioner’s testimony “was not needed

because the State did not fulfill their burden of proving each and every element of the charged

offenses[.]” Postconviction Motion [ECF No. 9-1] at 114. Petitioner explains that, if defense

counsel had not given this “erroneous” advice, he would have testified at trial that “he did not have

any planned connection [sic] with the [codefendant],” “that he never attempted to forcibly remove

any property from the possession of the victim and picked up the laptop off the ground,” and that

he never did “any act to incite, cause, advise, encourage, or assist [the codefendant] to commit the

crime[.]” Id. at 114–15. The Respondent contends that counsel’s advice was accurate and proper,

and that, in any event, the record shows that Petitioner’s decision not to testify was knowing and

voluntary since the trial court held a lengthy colloquy with Petitioner about his right to testify. See

Resp. at 16–18.

Every criminal defendant has “the right to ultimately choose whether or not to testify” but

his or her defense counsel also “bears the primary responsibility for advising the defendant of his

right to testify or not to testify, the strategic implications of each choice, and that it is ultimately

for the defendant himself to decide.” United States v. Teague, 953 F.2d 1525, 1532–33 (11th Cir.

1992) (en banc). Counsel can be ineffective for violating a defendant’s right to testify if they

“refuse[ ] to accept the defendant’s decision to testify,” “never inform[ ] the defendant of his right

to testify,” or “fail[ ] to discuss the strategic implications of testifying or not testifying[.]” Gallego

v. United States, 174 F.3d 1196, 1197 (11th Cir. 1999). However, under Strickland, relief cannot

be granted unless the habeas petitioner also shows that, had counsel provided accurate advice, the

petitioner would have testified at trial and that “there was a reasonable probability . . . his testimony

would have led to a different outcome in the case.” Topete v. United States, 628 F. App’x 1028,

1029 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697); see also Morris v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr.,

677 F.3d 1117, 1130 (11th Cir. 2012) (“In short, Morris has not demonstrated a reasonable

probability that his sentence would have been different had he testified during the penalty phase

of the trial.”).

Ground One is easily refuted by the record since Petitioner, his lawyer, and the trial court

extensively discussed Petitioner’s right to testify and the risks and benefits of testifying at trial. At

the close of the State’s case-in-chief, the trial court asked defense counsel whether Petitioner

intended to testify:

[Defense Counsel]: Judge, I—Judge, I have spoken to Mr. Silas.

Explained to him his options. And consequences—potential

consequences of his options to testify or not to testify. I explained

to him that he has a right not to testify. Of course that if he does

choose to testify, it’s his right, I cannot stop him. It will be subject

to cross examination of course and among other things he may be

impeached with prior felony convictions[.]

[. . . .]

[The Court]: Has Mr. Silas made a decision whether he is testifying?

[Defense Counsel]: Yes, Judge. After discussing with him, and I

advised him, I want to put on the record that he should not take the

witness stand, and [Petitioner] does not wish to take the witness

stand.

Trial Tr. [ECF No. 10-3] at 74–75. The record here confirms Petitioner’s claim that his defense

counsel advised him not to testify because he would be “impeached with prior felony convictions.”

Id. at 74.3 The problem for Petitioner is that counsel’s advice was accurate: if Petitioner had

chosen to testify, the State would have been able to attack his credibility by asking him about “the

existence of prior [felony] convictions and the number of convictions.” Fotopoulos v. State, 608

So. 2d 784, 791 (Fla. 1992) (citing Fla. Stat. § 90.610(1)). And this would have been a big problem

for Petitioner because he had ten prior felony convictions at the time of his trial. See Trial Tr.

[ECF No. 10-3] at 76–77. Counsel’s advice, then, was not only accurate, but also very reasonable

3 In his Postconviction Motion, Petitioner alleges counsel actually said that, if he testified, the State would

be able to “go into” the details of his prior convictions—which might have been inaccurate advice. See

Postconviction Motion [ECF No. 9-1] at 114; see, e.g., Rodriguez v. State, 761 So. 2d 381, 383 (Fla. 2d

DCA 2000) (“When the witness admits his or her convictions, a trial court errs by allowing the State to

question the witness about the specific convictions.”). But the trial transcript conclusively refutes

Petitioner’s interpretation of counsel’s advice, and, in any event, the trial court correctly informed Petitioner

that the State only “gets to ask you how many felony convictions you have” (and not the details of each

conviction). Trial Tr. [ECF No. 10-3] at 76.

since Petitioner’s status as a ten-time convicted felon would have eviscerated his credibility in

front of the jury. See Teague, 953 F.2d at 1533 n.9 (“There are good tactical reasons why it may

not be best for the defendant to testify in some circumstances. Some examples might be if . . . the

defendant might be prejudiced by revelation of prior convictions[.]” (emphasis added)); Stepp v.

Jones, No. 16-CV-25170, 2018 WL 9439863, at *8 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 29, 2018) (“In any event, it is

not unreasonable to advise a defendant against testifying to keep prior convictions away from the

jury.”).4

Not satisfied with counsel’s representations, the trial court also held a sworn colloquy with

Petitioner to ensure that Petitioner understood the extent of his right to testify and that Petitioner

was knowingly and voluntarily waiving his right to do so:

The Court: And I understand that your attorney has advised you not

to testify. While certainly I would expect you to give great weight

to his recommendation, you do understand that the decision is yours

and yours alone, he can only advise you on that; do you understand

that?

Mr. Silas: Yes, sir.

The Court: And have you had sufficient time to discuss that decision

with your attorney?

Mr. Silas: Yes, sir.

The Court: And it is your wish not to be a witness in the case?

Mr. Silas: Yes, sir.

4 Petitioner also claims that counsel incorrectly stated that Petitioner’s testimony was “not needed” because

“the State did not fulfill their burden of proving each and every element of the charged offenses[.]”

Postconviction Motion [ECF No. 9-1] at 114. The Court agrees with Respondent that this argument is

meritless since Petitioner chose not to testify after the trial court denied Petitioner’s motion for judgment

of acquittal and concluded that the State had produced sufficient evidence that Petitioner “participat[ed] as

a principal.” Trial Tr. [ECF No. 10-3] at 72.

Trial Tr. [ECF No. 10-3] at 77. The Eleventh Circuit has repeatedly held that “on-the-record

waiver[s]” of a defendant’s right to testify are meant to “nip these post-conviction issues in the

bud,” since a waiver will refute a defendant’s post hoc claim that he was misinformed about his or

her right to testify. United States v. Anderson, 1 F.4th 1244, 1258 (11th Cir. 2021); see also, e.g.,

Marquez v. United States, 684 F. App’x 843, 866 (11th Cir. 2017) (“[T]he record conclusively

refutes Marquez’s allegation that counsel deprived him of his right to testify, . . . Marquez told the

district court during trial that he had, in fact, decided not to testify after he had discussed his rights

and options with counsel[.]”).

The record here is conclusive. Defense counsel properly advised Petitioner about his right

to testify and accurately appraised the risks of doing so. Petitioner then knowingly and voluntarily

waived his right to counsel after being fully informed by both defense counsel and the trial court.

See Trial Tr. [ECF No. 10-3] at 74–77. The Court finds that the state postconviction court’s

decision was reasonable and DENIES Ground One.

B. Ground Two

Petitioner alleges in Ground Two that defense counsel rendered “incompetent advice”

during the plea bargaining stage, which led to Petitioner rejecting a favorable plea offer from the

State. See Attach. at 3. Petitioner explains in his Postconviction Motion that the State had offered

him a 16-year sentence followed by 5-year term of probation if Petitioner agreed to testify against

his codefendant. See Postconviction Motion [ECF No. 9-1] at 116. When asked about the plea

offer, counsel purportedly told Petitioner that “the State’s case against him was weak” and that the

offer was “extremely harsh especially in light of the fact that it requires the defendant to snitch.”

Id. at 116–17. Petitioner insists that this unreasonable advice is what caused him to reject the plea.

See id. at 118. In response, Respondent insists that there is no evidence that Petitioner would have

accepted the State’s 16-year offer since Petitioner “presented a counteroffer.” Resp. at 22.

A defense attorney has the duty “to communicate formal offers from the prosecution to

accept a plea on terms and conditions that may be favorable to the accused.” United States v.

Smith, 983 F.3d 1213, 1220 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 145 (2012)).

If a habeas petitioner alleges that counsel has performed deficiently during the plea-bargaining

stage, he or she must “show a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s ineffectiveness: (1) ‘the

plea offer would have been presented to the court (i.e., that the defendant would have accepted the

plea and the prosecution would not have withdrawn it in light of intervening circumstances)’; (2)

‘the court would have accepted its terms’; and (3) ‘the conviction or sentence, or both, . . . would

have been less severe than under the judgment and sentence that in fact were imposed.’” Osley v.

United States, 751 F.3d 1214, 1222 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 164

(2012)).

Even assuming that counsel told Petitioner that (1) the State’s case was “weak,” and (2)

the State’s offer was “extremely harsh,” the state court could reasonably conclude that this was

not deficient performance under Strickland. Counsel’s estimation that the State’s case was

“weak”—along with the attendant implication that Petitioner’s chances of success at trial were

strong—was not unreasonable advice. See Lafler, 566 U.S. at 174 (“[A]n erroneous strategic

prediction about the outcome of the trial is not necessarily deficient performance.”); Teers v.

United States, 739 F. App’x 960, 966–67 (11th Cir. 2018) (“[T]here is a difference between

expressing optimism about a defendant’s chances at trial and guaranteeing that the defendant will

win.”). Petitioner’s claim that counsel called the plea offer “extremely harsh” also rings hollow to

the Court, considering that counsel himself informed Petitioner (on the record) that—if he was

found guilty at trial—he would be classified as a “habitual offender” and face “a mandatory life

sentence.” Trial Tr. [ECF No. 10-1] at 182. Suffice to say, Petitioner was aware that the State’s

16-year offer was not “extremely harsh” in comparison to the possibility of a mandatory life

sentence.

In addition, the record confirms that Petitioner was unwilling to accept the State’s 16-year

offer. During calendar call, defense counsel confirmed that he “ran by [Petitioner] the State’s plea

offer” and, when presented with this offer, Petitioner instead proposed a counteroffer of “seven

years [in] Florida state prison, followed by five years of probation.” Calendar Call Tr. [ECF No.

10-6] at 4. The State rejected this counteroffer. See id. The state court reasonably concluded that

Petitioner’s decision to reject the State’s 16-year offer and respond with a (much) lower

counteroffer was proof that Petitioner had no desire or intention of ever accepting the 16-year plea

offer, no matter what counsel’s advice was. See Gissendaner v. Seaboldt, 735 F.3d 1311, 1319

(11th Cir. 2013) (“A willingness to accept [a counteroffer] more favorable than what is offered

does not indicate a willingness to accept what is offered.”); Permenter v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr.,

No. 3:17-CV-813, 2019 WL 5268802, at *9 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 17, 2019) (“Counsel’s performance

did not affect the outcome of the plea process as evidenced by Petitioner’s decision to make the

counter offer.”). The record, in short, suggests that Petitioner could not have been prejudiced by

counsel’s advice since he would not have accepted the State’s plea offer. See Osley, 751 F.3d at

1222. For these reasons, Ground Two is DENIED.

C. Ground Three

Finally, in Ground Three, Petitioner claims that the “cumulative effect of such errors denied

the defendant a fair and impartial trial[.]” Attach. at 4. However, since Petitioner has failed to

establish in Grounds One and Two that any error occurred, his cumulative error claim necessarily

fails. See Morris, 677 F.3d at 1132 (“This Court has made clear that where there is no error in any

of the trial court’s rulings, the argument that cumulative trial error requires that this Court reverse

the defendant’s convictions is without merit.” (cleaned up)). Ground Three is thus DENIED.

EVIDENTIARY HEARING

No evidentiary hearing is warranted in this matter. See Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S.

465, 474 (2007) (“[I]f the [state court] record refutes the applicant’s factual allegations or

otherwise precludes habeas relief, a district court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing.”).

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

After careful consideration of the record in this case, the Court declines to issue a certificate

of appealability (“COA”). A habeas petitioner has no absolute entitlement to appeal a district

court’s final order denying his habeas petition. Rather, to pursue an appeal, a petitioner must

obtain a COA. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1); Harbison v. Bell, 556 U.S. 180, 183 (2009).

Issuance of a COA is appropriate only if a litigant makes “a substantial showing of the

denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To do so, litigants must show that

reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable

or wrong. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). And “[w]here a district court has

disposed of claims . . . on procedural grounds, a COA will be granted only if the court concludes

that ‘jurists of reason’ would find it debatable both ‘whether the petition states a valid claim of the

denial of a constitutional right’ and ‘whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.’”

Eagle v. Linahan, 279 F.3d 926, 935 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting Franklin v. Hightower, 215 F.3d

1196, 1199 (11th Cir. 2000)).

Here, reasonable jurists would not debate the Court’s decision to deny the Petition on its

merits. Accordingly, a COA will NOT ISSUE.

CONCLUSION

Having carefully reviewed the record and governing law, it 1s hereby

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Petition [ECF No. 1] is DENIED. Any request

for a certificate of appealability is DENIED, and an evidentiary hearing is DENIED. All deadlines

are TERMINATED, and any pending motions are DENIED as moot. The Clerk is directed to

CLOSE the case.

DONE AND ORDERED in Miami, Florida, this 10th day of August, 2023.

ls A. RUIZ I

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

ce: Counsel of record

Rudolph Silas

DC # 654456

Everglades Correctional Institution

Inmate Mail/Parcels

1599 SW 187th Avenue

Miami, FL 33194

PRO SE

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