Byrd v. Valles

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE No. 23-cv-61362-BLOOM

JERRY LEE BYRD,

Plaintiff,

v.

DANIEL B. VALLES, et. al.,

Defendants.

_______________________________________/

ORDER REQUIRING AMENDED COMPLAINT

THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon pro se Plaintiff, Jerry Lee Byrd’s Complaint Under

28 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Complaint”), ECF No. [1], entered on the docket on July 18, 2023. Plaintiff is

ordered to amend his Complaint in accordance with this Order.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a pretrial state prisoner who files suit against the Broward County Sheriff, seven

Broward County Sheriff’s Office (“BSO”) officers, a storage facility, and an insurance company

alleging that his arrest — and the resulting search of his storage unit — was in violation of his

constitutional rights. See generally id. All Defendants are sued in their individual and official

capacities. See id. at 2.

Plaintiff alleges that he “was arrested and detained by several BSO officers in [an] illegal

traffic stop at the entrance of Extra Space Storage . . . that turned into a fishing expedition[.]” ECF

No. [1] at 4. Following the stop, Plaintiff alleges that both he and his vehicle were unlawfully

searched and “Defendant Detective Daniel B. Valles . . . knowingly and willfully stole the

Plaintiff[’s] “Extra Space Storage” business card that [displayed] the gate code, storage unit

number, and the [PIN] to enter the side door, but did not display the code of the combination lock

affixed to the storage unit[.]” Id. at 6. Plaintiff alleges that the resulting search warrant of his

storage unit was unlawfully obtained and executed. See id. at 7–9. Plaintiff seeks $100,000.00 in

compensatory damages, $150,000.00 in punitive damages as well as declaratory and injunctive

relief. See id. at 13–14.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Plaintiff has been granted permission to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) and is therefore

subject to the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). See Farese v. Scherer, 342 F.3d

1223, 1228 (11th Cir. 2003). Under § 1915(e)(2), a case is subject to dismissal if the action is: (1)

“frivolous or malicious,” (2) “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or (3) “seeks

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-

(iii).

To state a claim for relief under § 1983, Plaintiff must show that he was deprived of a

federal right by a person acting under color of state law. See Griffin v. City of Opa-Locka, 261 F.3d

1295, 1303 (11th Cir. 2001). In order to “avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint

must contain factual allegations that, when accepted as true, allow the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct.” Wright v. Miranda, 740 F. App’x

692, 694 (11th Cir. 2018) (citing Waldman v. Conway, 871 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2017) (per

curiam). Although a pro se pleading is liberally construed, it must still “suggest that there is some

factual support for a claim.” Id. (citations omitted). Thus, the allegations in a complaint require

more than mere labels and legal conclusions. See Quality Auto Painting Ctr. of Roselle, Inc. v.

State Farm Indem. Co., 917 F.3d 1249, 1262 (11th Cir. 2019). However, a district court is not

required to “rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.” Rodriguez v.

Scott, 775 F. App’x 599, 603 (11th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (quoting Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd.,

760 F.3d 1165, 1169 (11th Cir. 2014).

In addition, shotgun pleadings are not allowed — even from pro se plaintiffs. There are

four types of shotgun pleadings that violate Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a), 10(b), or both:

The most common type — by a long shot — is a complaint containing multiple

counts where each count adopts the allegations of all preceding counts, causing

each successive count to carry all that came before and the last count to be a

combination of the entire complaint. The next most common type . . . is a complaint

that does not commit the mortal sin of re-alleging all preceding counts but is guilty

of the venial sin of being replete with conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not

obviously connected to any particular cause of action. The third type of shotgun

pleading is one that commits the sin of not separating into a different count each

cause of action or claim for relief. Fourth, and finally, there is the relatively rare sin

of asserting multiple claims against multiple defendants without specifying which

of the defendants are responsible for which acts or omissions, or which of the

defendants the claim is brought against.

Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1321–23 (11th Cir. 2015). The

“unifying characteristic” of shotgun pleadings is they “fail . . . to give the defendants adequate

notice of the claims against them and the grounds upon which each claim rests.” Id. at 1323.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Shotgun Pleading

The Complaint falls under the third category of shotgun pleadings because it contains a

rambling, nine-page “statement of the claim” that fails to identify any claim or claims for relief.

See ECF No. [1] at 4–12. It is altogether unclear what claim or claims are being alleged, nor which

of the named Defendants is liable and for what each Defendant is responsible. In other words, the

Complaint is a shotgun pleading that “fail[s] . . . to give the [D]efendants adequate notice of the

claims against them and the grounds upon which each claim rests.” Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1323.

Moreover, Defendant Valles and Defendant Tony are the only law enforcement defendants

mentioned in the “statement of the claim.” See ECF No. [1] at 4–12. Defendants Diaz, Miller,

Gomez, Okun, Thompson, and Russell are not mentioned and so no “factual allegations” exist that

would “allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant[s] [are] liable for the

alleged misconduct.” Griffin, 261 F.3d at 1303. In fact, for all Defendants, Plaintiff fails to plead

sufficient “factual allegations that, when accepted as true, allow the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant[s] [are] liable for the alleged misconduct.” Id. Plaintiff shall have one

opportunity to amend.

B. Official Capacity Claims

As discussed, Plaintiff seeks to sue all Defendants in their individual and official capacities.

Regarding the official capacity claims, a suit against a state officer, employee, or agent in his or

her official capacity is in actuality “an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.”

Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985) (quoting Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social

Servs., 436 U.S 658, 690 n.55 (1978) (“Official-capacity suits ... ‘generally represent only another

way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.’ ”); see also Faulkner

v. Monroe Cnty Sheriff's Dept., 523 F. App'x 696, 701 (11th Cir. 2013) (“A suit against a person

in their official capacity is treated as a suit against the entity.”). Because these Defendants are

employed by the BSO, the official capacity claims are the equivalent of claims against Broward

County.1

“To impose § 1983 liability on [Broward County], a plaintiff must show: (1) that his

constitutional rights were violated; (2) that [Broward County] had a custom or policy that

constituted deliberate indifference to that constitutional right; and (3) that the policy or custom

caused the violation.” Garcia v. Leavins, 2021 WL 3476623, at *4 (N.D. Fla. June 25, 2021),

1 The claims are against Broward County because under Florida law, “sheriff’s offices lack the legal

capacity to be sued.” Wilk v. St. Lucie Cnty. Fla. Sheriff Off., 740 F. App’x 658, 662 (11th Cir. 2018)

(citation omitted).

report and recommendation adopted, No. 2021 WL 3472797 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 5, 2021) (alterations

adopted; citing McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004). A government entity,

such as Broward County, may be liable in a section 1983 action “only where the [government

entity] itself causes the constitutional violation at issue.” Cook ex. rel. Estate of Tessier v. Sheriff

of Monroe Cty., Fla., 402 F.3d 1092, 1116 (11th Cir. 2005). Thus, in an official capacity suit,

plaintiff must establish that an official policy or custom of the government entity was the “moving

force” behind the alleged constitutional deprivation. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S.

658, 693–94 (1978); Graham, 473 U.S. at 166 (“[I]n an official capacity suit the entity’s ‘policy

or custom’ must have played a part in the violation of federal law.”). Plaintiff shall have one

opportunity to amend.

C. Individual Capacity Claims: Defendant Warden Tony

For a supervisor to be liable for the misconduct of his subordinates, he must be causally

connected to the constitutional violation, such as by implementing an unlawful policy or

disregarding multiple prior reports of misconduct. See, e.g., Alston v. Swarbrick, 954 F.3d 1312,

1321 (11th Cir. 2020); Piazza v. Jefferson Cty., Ala., 923 F.3d 947, 957 (11th Cir. 2019); Fulwood

v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 568 F. App’x 753, 756 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam). Plaintiff fails to

allege any causal connection between Defendant Warden Tony and the alleged constitutional

violations. His status as a supervisor is not enough. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009)

(noting that “supervisory liability” is a misnomer). In other words, Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient

facts to establish that Defendant Warden Tony was personally involved in the alleged

constitutional violations. See id. Plaintiff shall have one opportunity to amend.

D. Conspiracy: Private Party Defendants

Defendant Extra Space Management and Defendant Beecher Carlson Insurance Services

are private parties. To sue a private party under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that the private

party conspired with state actors to violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Bendiburg v.

Dempsey, 909 F.2d 463, 468 (11th Cir. 1990). “To establish a prima facie case of section 1983

conspiracy, a plaintiff must show, among other things, that the defendants reached an

understanding to violate [his] rights. Rowe v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 279 F.3d 1271, 1283 (11th

Cir. 2002). Plaintiff shall have one opportunity to amend.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED as follows:

1. On or before August 24, 2023, Plaintiff shall file an Amended Complaint that cures the

abovementioned deficiencies. The Amended Complaint must be signed under the penalty of

perjury and must provide a short and plain statement of all claims for relief, a basis for federal

jurisdiction, and a demand for judgment.

2. Plaintiff shall file the Amended Complaint on this District’s form for section 1983

actions, which he must fill out completely. The Clerk is DIRECTED to provide Plaintiff with this

District’s form for section 1983 actions alongside this Order.

3. The Amended Complaint shall be the sole operative pleading considered in this case;

only the claims alleged therein will be addressed by the Court. Therefore, the Amended Complaint

must not refer to the original complaint or incorporate by reference claims raised or arguments

made therein. Similarly, the Amended Complaint must not incorporate by reference arguments or

text from any other documents, including any exhibits.

Case No. 23-cv-61362-BLOOM

4. The Amended Complaint must contain a separate paragraph as to each defendant

explaining what the defendant did and the supporting facts to show why that person is being sued.

5. The Amended Complaint must be labeled “Amended Complaint” and must show 23-

cv-61362-BLOOM so that it will be filed in this case.

6. Plaintiff must not expand the scope of the case by alleging new unrelated claims, or

adding new unrelated defendants, in the Amended Complaint. See George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605,

607 (7th Cir. 2007).

7. The Plaintiff is warned that failure to file the Amended Complaint on time and in

compliance with this Order will result in dismissal of this case. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, on July 24, 2023.

BETH BLOOM

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies to:

Jerry Lee Byrd

Paul Rein Detention Facility

Inmate Mail/Parcels

2421 NW 16 Street

Pompano Beach, FL 33069

PRO SE