Fletcher v. United Ground Express, Inc.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 23-cv-10005-ALTMAN/Reid

GERALD FLETCHER,

Plaintiff,

v.

UNITED GROUND EXPRESS, INC.,

Defendant.

__________________________________/

ORDER

The Plaintiff has filed a Motion to Remand (the “Motion”) [ECF No. 10]—which, after careful

review, we now GRANT.1

THE FACTS

On December 14, 2022, the Plaintiff, Gerald Fletcher, filed a Complaint in state court, alleging

that his employer, United Ground, had (1) discriminated against him on the basis of his age and

disability, in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, FLA. STAT. § 760.01, et seq. (“FCRA”),

and (2) retaliated against him, in violation of the Florida Workers’ Compensation Law, FLA. STAT. §

440.205 (“FWCA”). See generally Complaint [ECF No. 1-3].

Fletcher, who was seventy-five years old when he filed his Complaint, was employed by the

Defendant as a “customer service and ramp associate” at the “Key West airport location.” Id. ¶ 13,

16. Fletcher alleges that Christine Long, his manager, made discriminatory and harassing comments

to him about his age. Id. ¶¶ 18–20. Fletcher adds that, on January 4, 2021, while performing his normal

1 That Motion is now ripe for resolution. See United Ground Express, LLC’s Response in Opposition

(the “Response”) [ECF No. 15]; Plaintiff’s Reply in Support of its Motion to Remand (the “Reply”)

[ECF No. 20].

work duties, he was caught on a piece of luggage as he was placing the bag onto a conveyer belt,

“causing him to fall and be dragged and injuring his head, legs, right knee, right arm, and right

shoulder.” Id. ¶ 21. According to the Complaint, this work-related injury left Fletcher disabled and

substantially limited his ability to do his job. Id. ¶ 22. As a result, he asked Long for medical assistance

in the form of workers’-compensation benefits. Id. ¶ 23. On January 8, 2021, shortly after Fletcher

brought the injury to Long’s attention, he was terminated. Id. ¶ 24. Fletcher claims that he was fired

by the Defendant “on account of discrimination due to his age and disability and in retaliation for

making claims for or requesting access to workers’ compensation benefits regarding his work-related

injury[.]” Id. ¶ 27.

Fletcher seeks back wages from the date of the adverse employment action to the date of the

filing of his Complaint, “an equal amount of back wages as liquidated damages,” “front wages,” and

“injunctive relief prohibiting Defendant from wrongfully subjecting its employees to adverse

employment actions[.]” Id. at 18. In the Civil Cover Sheet that’s attached to his Complaint, Fletcher

indicated that his damages totaled $30,001–$50,000. Id. at 4.

The Defendant, United Ground, removed this case here on January 20, 2023. See Notice of

Removal [ECF No. 1]. In its filings in our Court, United Ground says that it removed the case under

the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 and 1446, see Removal Status Report [ECF No. 5] at 2, and it

maintains that we may exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over the case because (1) the parties are

completely diverse and (2) the amount in controversy is “likely to exceed the $75,000 threshold,” see

Notice of Removal at 4. Because we disagree with this last proposition, we now remand the case back

to state court.

THE LAW

A federal court should remand to state court any case that has been improperly removed. See

8 U.S.C. § 1447(c). The party attempting to invoke the federal court’s jurisdiction bears the burden of

establishing that jurisdiction. See McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. of Ind., Inc., 298 U.S. 178, 189

(1936). “Not only does the language of the Act of 1887 evidence the Congressional purpose to restrict

the jurisdiction of the federal courts on removal, but the policy of the successive acts of Congress

regulating the jurisdiction of federal courts is one calling for the strict construction of such legislation.”

Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 109 (1941). Indeed, “[d]ue regard for the rightful

independence of state governments, which should actuate federal courts, requires that they

scrupulously confine their own jurisdiction to the precise limits which the statute has defined.” Healy

v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 270 (1934).

The Constitution provides that the “judicial power shall extend to . . . controversies . . .

between citizens of different states.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. “This language, however, does not

automatically confer diversity jurisdiction upon the federal courts. Rather, it authorizes Congress to

do so and, in doing so, to determine the scope of the federal courts’ jurisdiction within constitutional

limits.” Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 84 (2010).

Congress has authorized the federal district courts to exercise original jurisdiction over “all

civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest

and costs, and is between . . . citizens of different States[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). This type of

jurisdiction (what we call diversity jurisdiction) requires complete diversity: Every plaintiff must be

diverse from every defendant. See Triggs v. John Crump Toyota, Inc., 154 F.3d 1284, 1287 (11th Cir. 1998)

(citing Tapscott v. MS Dealer Serv. Corp., 77 F.3d 1353, 1355 (11th Cir. 1996)). For purposes of diversity

jurisdiction, a corporation is “deemed to be a citizen of any State by which it has been incorporated

and of the State where it has its principal place of business.” § 1332(c)(1). The party invoking federal

jurisdiction must establish that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See § 1332(a).

Congress may expand or restrict the district courts’ diversity jurisdiction within the limits

prescribed by the Constitution. See Hertz Corp., 559 U.S. at 84 (noting that Congress “determine[s] the

scope of the federal courts’ jurisdiction within constitutional limits”). For example, before 1948, the

diversity statute limited jurisdiction to “suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity.” Ankenbrandt

v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 700 (1992). In 1948, however, Congress “amended the diversity statute . . .

to replace the law/equity distinction with the phrase ‘all civil actions[.]’” Ibid. Congress has also steadily

raised the amount-in-controversy requirement. See Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 339–40 (1969) (“[T]he

congressional purpose in steadily increasing through the years the jurisdictional amount requirement

. . . was to check, to some degree, the rising caseload of the federal courts, especially with regard to

the federal courts’ diversity of citizenship jurisdiction.”).

In evaluating whether the “particular factual circumstances of a case give rise to removal

jurisdiction, we strictly construe the right to remove and apply a general presumption against the

exercise of federal jurisdiction, such that all uncertainties as to removal jurisdiction are to be resolved

in favor of remand.” Scimone v. Carnival Corp., 720 F.3d 876, 882 (11th Cir. 2013) (cleaned up); see also

Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1095 (11th Cir. 1994) (“[W]here plaintiff and defendant clash

about jurisdiction, uncertainties are resolved in favor of remand.”).

ANALYSIS

This case involves two claims of discrimination under the FCRA and one claim of retaliation

under the FWCA. We’ll start with the easy one: The parties agree that the FWCA claim should be

severed and remanded back to state court. See Response at 3–4 (“[United Ground] specifically

request[s] that the Court sever and remand [the FWCA] claim to state court.”); Reply at 2 (“Defendant

has conceded this point and Plaintiff rests on his argument and Defendant’s concession.”). Nor could

they have argued otherwise. Under § 440.205 of the FWCA, “[n]o employer shall threaten to discharge,

intimidate or coerce any employee by reason of such employee’s valid claim for compensation or an

attempt to claim compensation under the Worker’s Compensation Law.” And federal law provides

that “[a] civil action in any State court arising under the workmen’s compensation laws of such State

may not be removed to any district court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1445(c). The Eleventh

Circuit “has not explicitly ruled” on whether a worker’s-compensation-retaliation claim under §

440.205 “arises under” Florida’s Worker’s Compensation Law. Berry v. Tampa Sportservice, Inc., 2009 WL

1922240, at *3 (M.D. Fla. July 2, 2009) (Kovachevich, J.). But it has held that, for purposes of Alabama

law, a retaliatory-discharge claim arises under that state’s worker’s-compensation laws. See Reed v. Heil

Co., 206 F.3d 1055, 1059–60 (11th Cir. 2000) (“Under the plain meaning of section 1445(c), claims

raised under [the Alabama retaliatory-discharge cause of action] arise under Alabama’s workers’

compensation laws.”).

And, applying Reed, district courts in our Circuit have uniformly held that a Florida retaliatory-

discharge claim under § 440.205 likewise arises under Florida’s Worker’s Compensation Law. See Rex

v. Fla. Leg., 2013 WL 6891787, at *1 (N.D. Fla. Dec. 20, 2013) (Hinkle, J.) (“Florida district courts,

including this one, have applied Reed to retaliation claims under the Florida workers’ compensation

statute.”); Pascuales v. Bentley Roofing, L.L.C., 2020 WL 13389835, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 6, 2020)

(Dimitrouleas, J.) (“[A] claim under Florida Statute § 440.205 for retaliation for use of the Florida

Workers’ Compensation Law is a claim ‘arising under the workmen’s compensation laws’ of

Florida[.]”); Johnston v. Morton Plant Mease Healthcare, Inc., 2007 WL 570078, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 20,

2007) (Lazzara, J.) (“Even though [a] modicum of a distinction exists between the case law of [Florida

and Alabama], it is not enough to tip the scales in favor of a finding that retaliatory discharge claims

do not ‘arise under’ the workers’ compensation laws of Florida.”). Given Reed’s holding, we agree with

our colleagues that an FWCA retaliation claim “aris[es] under the workmen’s compensation laws” of

Florida. Fletcher’s retaliation claim is, therefore, nonremovable and must be remanded.

But that doesn’t resolve the more complicated question of what to do with Fletcher’s FCRA

claims. Although the federal circuit courts haven’t entered this fray, most federal judges around the

country have held that §§ 1441(c) and 1445(c), when read together, require a remand of the whole case in

situations like ours—viz., where one claim is nonremovable and the other arises solely under our

diversity jurisdiction. See, e.g., Jackson v. Wal-Mart Stores Tex., LLC, 925 F. Supp. 2d 810, 813–15 (N.D.

Tex. 2013) (“[E]ven if the Court were inclined to consider that only the workers’ compensation claim,

and not the entire case, was improperly removed, the Court does not have the power to sever and

remand only the section 451.001 claim. Section 1445(c), like section 1441(a), provides no such

authority . . . . [I]f a court has federal question jurisdiction over one claim in a case and Congress has

made another independent claim in the same case nonremovable, the court may sever and remand

only the nonremovable claim. Nowhere, however, does [section 1441(a)] grant a court authority to

sever and remove a single claim made nonremovable by statute if the remaining claims arise under

state law only and the defendant removed the case on diversity grounds . . . . Because the Court has no

authority under federal law to sever nonremovable claims in a diversity action, the Court must remand

the entire action in this case.” (emphasis in original)); Burris v. Zale Del., Inc., 2009 WL 3762987, at *3

(W.D. Mo. Nov. 10, 2009) (“Defendant requests that plaintiff’s retaliatory discharge claim brought

under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 287.780 be severed from the remaining claims and remanded to state court.

However, severance of a non-removable state claim is permissible only if the district court is exercising

federal question jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (2009). There is no statutory provision that would

allow a district court having jurisdiction based solely on diversity to sever a non-removable claim and

adjudicate the remaining state claims.”); Mayfield v. Shelley’s Elec. Serv. Inc., 582 F. Supp. 3d 1103, 1109

(N.D. Ala. 2022) (Danella, Mag. J.) (“Stated simply, along with § 1441(c), Reed supports severance-

and-remand where the case includes a federal claim and a nonremovable state law claim. But, in the

absence of a federal claim, the plain language of § 1441(c) does not apply. Here, because the Mayfields’

complaint does not include any federal claim for relief, there is no basis for federal question

jurisdiction, and no basis for severance-and-remand pursuant to § 1441(c). Importantly, Congress has

not enacted an analogous severance-and-remand provision for those situations—like this case—in

which a defendant has removed a case that invokes diversity jurisdiction and that includes a statutorily

nonremovable claim. To be clear, nothing in § 1441(c) prohibits severance-and-remand in those

situations, but nothing in the plain language allows it either.” (cleaned up)); Formosa v. Lowe’s Home

Ctrs., Inc., 806 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1189 (N.D. Ala. 2011) (Blackburn, C.J.) (“When faced with removed

cases containing worker’s compensation claims, several district courts in Alabama have chosen to

remand the entire case rather than sever and remand the nonremovable worker’s compensation claim,

particularly where the only basis for federal jurisdiction was diversity jurisdiction, as here.”); Bryant v.

Wausau Underwriters, Ins. Co., 2008 WL 1808325, at *2 (M.D. Ala. Apr. 21, 2008) (“Reed cannot be

interpreted as authority for severing and remanding worker’s compensation claims in cases that are

removed under § 1332 (diversity) because Reed involved a case removed under § 1331 (federal

question).”); Williams v. CNH Am., LLC, 542 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1266–67 (M.D. Ala. 2008) (Fuller,

J.) (“Because fraudulent joinder is only relevant to claims that are removed based on diversity

jurisdiction, even if Reed stood for the proposition that CNH suggests, it would not be controlling

here.”).

Although the Eleventh Circuit hasn’t opined on this question, we agree with what appears to

be the majority view. As these other district courts have recognized, neither § 1445(c) nor § 1441(c)

authorizes a district court, when left with nothing but diversity claims, to sever and remand only the

nonremovable state-law claim. See § 1441(c) (not mentioning diversity claims at all); § 1445(c) (“A civil

action in any State court arising under the workmen’s compensation laws of such State may not be

removed to any district court of the United States.”). And “[t]his silence” in § 1441(c) is significant

because the statute unambiguously authorizes district courts to sever and remand nonremovable

claims from federal-question causes of action. It says:

(1) If a civil action includes—

(A) a claim arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States

(within the meaning of section 1331 of this title), and

(B) a claim not within the original or supplemental jurisdiction of the district

court or a claim that has been made nonremovable by statute,

the entire action may be removed if the action would be removable without

the inclusion of the claim described in subparagraph (B).

(2) Upon removal of an action described in paragraph (1), the district court shall sever

from the action all claims described in paragraph (1)(B) and shall remand the severed

claims to the State court from which the action was removed.

§ 1441(c). Given that § 1441(c) thus explicitly describes the circumstances in which a district court may

sever and remand a nonremovable claim—and because that description excludes the situation we have

here—we think this “silence” in § 1441(c) “is dispositive[.]” GE Energy Power Conversion France SAS,

Corp. v. Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC, 140 S. Ct. 1637, 1645 (2020); Pinares v. United Techs. Corp., 973

F.3d 1254, 1262 (11th Cir. 2020) (“Where Congress knows how to say something but chooses not to,

its silence is controlling.” (quoting Animal Legal Def. Fund v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 789 F.3d 1206, 1217

(11th Cir. 2015))); Jama v. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 543 U.S. 335, 341 (2005) (“We do not lightly assume

that Congress has omitted from its adopted text requirements that it nonetheless intends to apply, and

our reluctance is even greater when Congress has shown elsewhere in the same statute that it knows

how to make such a requirement manifest.”); Savage Servs. Corp. v. United States, 25 F.4th 925, 935 (11th

Cir. 2022) (refusing to read into the Oil Pollution Act a waiver of sovereign immunity because

“Congress . . . knows how to waive sovereign immunity when it wants to”). As one federal court in

Alabama has said, we “will not read out of § 1441(c) the distinction between claims rooted in federal

question and diversity jurisdiction.” Steel v. Viscofan USA, Inc., 2017 WL 253960, at *3 (M.D. Ala. Jan.

19, 2017) (Borden, Mag. J.).

Fletcher’s two FCRA claims arise solely under our diversity jurisdiction. Given our plain-

language reading of §§ 1441(c) and 1445(c)—and our straightforward application of the contextual

canon (expressio unius est exclusio alterius)2—we would remand Fletcher’s entire case on this basis alone.3

But there are two additional reasons for our view that Fletcher’s FCRA claims should be remanded.

First, we reiterate the well-settled proposition that “the burden is on the party who sought

removal to demonstrate that federal jurisdiction exists.” Friedman v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 410 F.3d 1350,

1353 (11th Cir. 2005). And, in its effort to establish the amount in controversy, our Defendant has

2 A. SCALIA & B. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 107 (2012)

(describing the canon of expressio unius to mean that the “expression of one thing implies the exclusion

of others”); STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47:23 (7th ed. updated Nov. 2021) (“Expressio unius

instructs that, where a statute designates a form of conduct, the manner of its performance and

operation, and the persons and things to which it refers, courts should infer that all omissions were

intentional exclusions.”).

3 We acknowledge that some federal judges have taken a different approach. For judges following

this minority view, whether § 1445(c) requires remand of the entire action depends on whether the

claim that’s otherwise removable arises under a state’s workers’-compensation laws—even if the

otherwise-removable claim is based on diversity jurisdiction alone. See, e.g., Stassi v. Dollar Tree Stores,

Inc., 2023 WL 3956168, at *4 (N.D. Ala. June 12, 2023) (severing workers’-compensation claim from

state-law tort claims because “the two causes of action for negligence and wantonness do not arise

under the workers’ compensation laws of Alabama”); Yates v. Eastdale Apartments Ltd. P’ship, 2022 WL

3230428, at *2 (M.D. Ala. Aug. 10, 2022) (severing and remanding a worker’s-compensation claim,

while retaining jurisdiction over tort claims, because “the workers’ compensation claim is not

inextricably linked to [the plaintiff’s] tort claims”). These judges seem to view § 1441(c) as

“inapplicable” to our question. See, e.g., Perdue v. Westpoint Home, Inc., 2007 WL 320245, at *4 (N.D. Fla.

Oct. 27, 2007) (Smoak, J.) (“Section 1441(c) is inapplicable because it only applies, according to its

plain language, when one claim or cause of action involves a federal question under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Jurisdiction for the claims arising under Florida law in Counts I and II, however, is based solely on

diversity of citizenship, not federal question. I therefore find it improper to remand Count I based on

§ 1441(c) . . . . I lack discretionary authority to remand to state court a claim for which jurisdiction in

this Court is proper.”); Climer v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 2004 WL 1531796, at *5 (N.D. Tex. July 8,

2004) (“Climer’s remaining causes of action—for violations of [Texas statutes], and for breach of

contract, negligence, tortious interference, and intentional infliction of emotional distress—are only

incidentally related to the Texas workers’ compensation statutes. The Texas workers’ compensation

statutes did not create these causes of action and, therefore, they do not come within the ambit of the

non-removability provision of § 1445(c).”).

But “[i]t is a ‘fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be

read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.’” Food and Drug

Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000) (quoting Davis v. Mich. Dep’t. of

Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989)); cf. Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 426 (2009) (“[S]tatutory

interpretation turns on ‘the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the

broader context of the statute as a whole’” (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997))).

And, when read together, §§ 1441(c) and 1445(c) don’t allow us to sever and remand a nonremovable

claim while retaining jurisdiction over a claim that arises solely under our diversity jurisdiction.

failed to show that Fletcher’s discrimination claims belong in federal court. Fletcher has made clear,

in a sworn filing in state court, that he’s seeking at most $50,000 in total damages.4 See Complaint at 4.

The Defendant tries to supplement this amount with its own estimates of what Fletcher’s compensatory

and punitive damages—plus attorneys’ fees—might one day look like. See Response at 6–10.

Beginning with attorneys’ fees, the Defendant contends that “the potential amount of

attorney’s fees in this case is likely to be between $40,000 and $50,000, which is a conservative

estimate.” Id. at 8. And (United Ground adds) “the FCRA authorizes the recovery of attorney’s fees

to a prevailing Plaintiff.” Ibid. But, as we’ve said many times, “[w]hen attorneys’ fees are recoverable—

either by contract or by statute—only fees incurred at the time of removal should be included in the

amount-in-controversy computation.” Torreyes v. Godiva Chocolatier, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 3d 1276, 1282

(S.D. Fla. 2019) (Altman, J.) (emphasis added). As a result, in determining whether the removing

defendant has satisfied the amount-in-controversy requirement “at the time of removal,” we cannot

consider any future attorneys’ fees the parties might incur after removal. Ibid. And the Defendant—

whose burden it was—simply hasn’t told us whether, as of the date of removal, the attorneys’ fees in

this case pushed the amount in controversy over the jurisdictional threshold.

The Defendant also proffers $75,000 as a “conservative estimate of the punitive damages at

issue in this case.” Response at 10. But, as some of our colleagues have said, that punitive-damage

computation is just far too “speculative” to include “as part of the amount in controversy.” Haley v.

Envision Physician Servs., LLC, 2019 WL 13256251, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 13, 2019) (Moreno, J.); see also

Connally v. Fla. HMA Reg’l Serv. Ctr., LLC, 2022 WL 92829, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 10, 2022) (Covington,

J.) (“[I]t would be rank speculation for the Court to add an amount of punitive damages to the amount

in controversy calculation as no evidence of the actual punitive damages at issue in this case has been

4 See also Reply at 3 (“In the action at bar, Plaintiff has suggested in his Civil Cover Sheet damages not

exceeding $50,000.”).

provided.”).

Next, the Defendant “estimates Plaintiff’s compensatory damages [for emotional distress] at

an amount of $40,000.” Response at 7. In support, the Defendant cites other cases in which juries have

awarded $40,000 (or more) in emotional damages. See, e.g., ibid. (“The plaintiff’s lost wages do not have

to be significant to command a high jury award for emotional damages. For example, in Bernstein v.

Sephora, 182 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1216 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (Goldberg, J.), the jury found for the plaintiff on

her claims of unlawful employment discrimination and awarded her $130,500 in emotional pain and

mental anguish, despite awarding only $2,000 for lost wages.”). Again, however, the party seeking to

remove a case based on diversity jurisdiction “bears the burden of establishing the existence of federal

jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.” Walcott v. Ferrelgas, Inc., 2021 WL 3518204, at *1

(M.D. Fla. Mar. 8, 2021) (Presnell, J.). And, while a defendant can “submit[ ] evidence of damages from

decisions in comparable cases” to help satisfy its burden, id. at *2 (cleaned up), it must still “explain

why that amount would be awarded in this case,” Bragg v. Suntrust Bank, 2016 WL 836692, at *2 (M.D.

Fla. Mar. 4, 2016) (Covington, J.) (emphasis in original). United Ground doesn’t explain why it believes

our case is similar to Bernstein, nor does it give us any other yardstick by which we can reasonably

conclude that the emotional-damages awards from those other cases are at all relevant on our facts.

We thus agree with one of our Middle District colleagues who, in a similar context, had this to say

about a defendant’s efforts to speculate about what a jury might one day award in mental-anguish

damages:

[B]eyond stating that [some cases] [are] analogous to [ours], [the defendant] provides

no factual comparison of the emotional state of the plaintiffs. Indeed, [it] provides no

evidence at all of [the plaintiff’s] emotional distress or suffering. With no background

of factual similarity, [d]efendant’s contention that damages for emotional distress in

FCRA actions routinely exceed $75,000 adds little to the AIC calculus. Thus, [b]ecause

[the defendant] can only speculate as to potential compensatory damages, the Court

need not consider those damages in its analysis of whether the jurisdictional

requirement has been met.

Quintano v. Fogo De Chao Churrascaria (Orlando) LLC, 2017 WL 3263101, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 1, 2017)

(Dalton, J.) (quoting Bragg, 2016 WL 836692, at *2). As in Quintano, our Defendant has offered no

evidence about the emotional state of our Plaintiff—nor (it goes without saying) has it compared

Fletcher’s emotional state to the mental anguish the jury found so compelling in cases like Bernstein.

Having decided not to include in our amount-in-controversy calculation the Defendant’s

speculation about the amounts of any future attorneys’ fees, emotional damages, or punitive awards,

we’re left only with the Defendant’s estimate of the Plaintiff’s potential backpay. Here, though, the

Defendant comes up with a number that, for the most part, mirrors much of what the Plaintiff has

said. By its own admission, United Ground has “submitted evidence that Plaintiff’s back pay from

termination to the present totals approximately $40,145.” Response at 5. With only this amount

leftover, the Defendant hasn’t carried its burden of proving that our amount in controversy, more

likely than not, exceeds $75,000.

Recall that, in deciding whether the “particular factual circumstances of a case give rise to

removal jurisdiction, we strictly construe the right to remove and apply a general presumption against

the exercise of federal jurisdiction, such that all uncertainties as to removal jurisdiction are to be

resolved in favor of remand.” Scimone, 720 F.3d at 882 (cleaned up); see also Burns, 31 F.3d at 1095

(“[W]here plaintiff and defendant clash about jurisdiction, uncertainties are resolved in favor of

remand.”); Fowler v. Hertz Vehicles, LLC, 2007 WL 106563, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 9, 2007) (Covington,

J.) (“Given the fact that removal statutes are strictly construed and any doubts or ambiguities are to

be resolved in favor of remand, the Court is bound to resolve any uncertainties in favor of remanding

this case to [state court].”). In short, the Defendant, as “the removing party,” has “failed to carry its

burden of demonstrating that removal was proper.” Fowler, 2007 WL 106563, at *3.

Second, other district courts in our Circuit have remanded similar cases for reasons of judicial

economy. In Hernandez v. Neo Pet Spa, Inc., for example (which involved a nonremovable workers’-

compensation claim and a variety of other state- and federal-law claims), the plaintiff argued that she

“should not be subjected to the risk of inconsistent adjudication if the motive for discharge 1s

simultaneously litigated in federal and state court.” 2023 WL 3642085, at *2 (S.D. Fla. May 25, 2023)

(Bloom, J.). Judge Bloom agreed, noting that, “although [the Court] has original jurisdiction over the

FLSA claims, 1t is in the interest of both judicial economy and consistent adjudication of the issues to

remand all claims to [state court].” Ibid. To preserve judicial resources and to avoid any possible

inconsistency in the treatment of these related claims, we agree that a remand of the entire action—

especially in a case that involves vo federal questions—is the wisest course here. See Wingard v. Guillot

Textilmaschinen GmbH, 2008 WL 4368884, at *3 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 23, 2008) (remanding entire case

because “severing the workers’ compensation claim against [the defendant] would not promote

judicial economy’’).

1k

Accordingly, we hereby ORDER and ADJUDGE that the Plaintiff's Motion to Remand

[ECF No. 10] is GRANTED. ‘The case is REMANDED to the 16th Judicial Circuit in and for

Monroe County, Florida. The Clerk of Court is directed to CLOSE this case. All pending deadlines

and hearings are TERMINATED, and any pending motions, including the Defendant’s Motion to

Dismiss [ECF No. 14], ace DENIED AS MOOT.

DONE AND ORDERED in the Southern District of Florida on July 10, 2023.

“a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

cc: counsel of record

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