The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Case No. 20-cv-23270-DAMIAN
VICTOR MANUEL CORONEL RAMIREZ,
Plaintiff,
vs.
ROSALIA’S INC., KOSMAS A. KALAS,
and MANUEL PAUCAR,
Defendants.
______________________________________/
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S VERIFIED MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES
AND COSTS AGAINST DEFENDANTS AND REQUEST FOR A FEE MUTLIPLIER
AND PLAINTIFF’S VERIFIED MOTION FOR SUPPLEMENTAL ATTORNEY
FEES AND COSTS [ECF NOS. 126, 143]
THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Plaintiff, Victor Manuel Coronel Ramirez’s,
(“Plaintiff” or “Mr. Ramirez”), Verified Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs Against
Defendants and Request for a Fee Multiplier [ECF No. 126], filed December 1, 2022, and
Verified Motion for Supplemental Attorney Fees and Costs [ECF No. 143], filed January 6,
2022. This matter is before the undersigned pursuant to the parties’ Consent to Proceed Before
a United States Magistrate Judge, in which the parties jointly and voluntarily elected to have
the undersigned conduct all further proceedings in this case. [ECF No. 80]. See 28 U.S.C. §
636(c).
The undersigned has reviewed the Motions and their supporting documents,
Defendants’ Responses [ECF Nos. 141, 146], Plaintiff’s Replies [ECF Nos. 142, 147], the
pertinent portions of the record, and the relevant legal authorities and is otherwise fully
advised in the premises. For the reasons set forth below, the Motions are GRANTED IN
PART AND DENIED IN PART.
I. BACKGROUND
On May 7, 2020, Mr. Ramirez filed the Complaint against Defendants in state court
[ECF No. 1-2], and Defendants removed the case to this Court on August 6, 2020 [ECF No.
1]. In the Complaint, Mr. Ramirez alleges he was employed as a cook for Defendants from
July 2005 to January 2020 and that between May 2017 and January 2020, Defendants
willfully and intentionally refused to pay him overtime wages in violation of the Fair Labor
Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. [ECF No.1-2 at ¶¶ 16, 22-23].
In October 2022, the parties proceeded to a jury trial, and on October 28, 2022, the
jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff. [ECF No. 115]. The Court entered Final Judgment
in favor of Plaintiff on November 1, 2022. [ECF No. 118].
On December 1, 2022, Plaintiff filed the Verified Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs
pursuant to Title 29, United States Code, Section 216(b), and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
54(d)(3). [ECF No. 126]. In the Motion, Plaintiff seeks to recover $187,193.75 in attorney’s
fees, with a fee multiplier of 2 in light of the exceptional result counsel achieved for Plaintiff,
and $14,954.35 in costs 1. Id.
In their Response, Defendants argue that the Motion should be denied in part because
numerous time entries are either duplicative, redundant, excessive, clerical in nature, contain
1 Separately, Plaintiff filed an Application for Bill of Costs [ECF No. 124] and Motion to Tax
Costs [ECF No. 126], which sought the same costs as the Motion for Attorneys’ Fees. Those
costs were addressed by separate order. [ECF No. 148]. As such, the arguments regarding the
$14,954.35 sought in costs are moot and will not be addressed by the Court.
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insufficient descriptions, or are based on unrecoverable time. [ECF No. 141]. Defendants also
argue that the Motion should be denied to the extent it seeks hourly rates higher than are
reasonable. Id. Lastly, Defendants argue that the request for a fee multiplier should be denied
because Plaintiff did not achieve an exceptional result. Id.
In Reply, Plaintiff argues that Defendants waived their right to contest the requested
hourly rates because they did not timely submit their objections as required by Local Rule
7.3(a). [ECF No. 142]. Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ objections to the hours expended by
counsel should be denied for the same reason. Lastly, Plaintiff reasserts that a fee multiplier
is warranted.
On January 6, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Verified Motion for Supplemental Attorney Fees
and Costs. [ECF No. 143]. In that Motion, Plaintiff seeks to recover supplemental fees and
costs spent litigating the Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and attempting to collect on the Final
Judgment. Id. In their Response, Defendants argue that the Motion should be denied in part
to the extent it seeks non-recoverable attorney fees and costs and requests hourly rates higher
than are reasonable. [ECF No. 146]. Additionally, Defendants reassert that Plaintiff’s request
for a fee multiplier should be denied. Id.
II. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS
Section 206 of the FLSA establishes the federally mandated minimum hourly wage,
and Section 207 prescribes overtime compensation of “one and one-half times the regular
rate” for each hour worked in excess of forty hours during a given workweek. 29 U.S.C. §§
206, 207. An employer who violates the FLSA is liable to its employee for any unpaid
minimum and/or overtime wages and, in enumerated circumstances, for an equal amount in
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liquidated damages. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). When a plaintiff prevails in a FLSA action, the
district court “shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a
reasonable attorney's fee to be paid by the defendant, and costs of the action.” Rodriguez v.
Molina Healthcare Inc., 806 F. App'x 797, 802 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting U.S.C. § 216(b)).
In determining reasonable attorney’s fees, the Court looks to the lodestar method as
developed by federal case law. Under the lodestar method, as applied by courts in the
Eleventh Circuit, attorney’s fees are calculated by multiplying the reasonable hours expended
times a reasonable hourly rate. See Norman v. Housing Auth. of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292,
1299 (11th Cir. 1988).
Courts review the hourly rate and attorney time for reasonableness based on the twelve
so-called “Johnson factors,” including: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and
difficulty of the questions; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (4) the
preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to the acceptance of the case; (5) the
customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the
client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the
experience, reputation and ability of the attorneys; (10) the “undesirability” of the case; (11)
the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in
similar cases. See Farley v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 197 F.3d 1322, 1340–41 (11th Cir. 1999)
(citing Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717–19 (5th Cir. 1974)). The
Court may also rely on its own knowledge and experience in determining the reasonableness
of fees. See Norman, 836 F.2d at 1303 (11th Cir. 1988) (“The court, either trial or appellate, is
itself an expert on the question [of reasonable hourly rates and hours expended] and may
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consider its own knowledge and experience concerning reasonable and proper fees and may
form an independent judgment either with or without the aid of witnesses as to value.”
(quoting Campbell v. Green, 112 F.2d 143, 144 (5th Cir. 1940))).
A reasonable hourly rate is the prevailing market rate in the relevant legal community
for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skills, experience, and reputation.
Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 n.11 (1984). The applicant bears the burden of producing
satisfactory evidence that the requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the
community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and
reputation, as well as the burden of showing that an enhancement of the basic fee award is
necessary. N.A.A.C.P. v. City of Evergreen, Ala., 812 F.2d 1332, 1338 (11th Cir. 1987).
In assessing the number of hours reasonably expended, the Court should exclude
excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary hours from the amount claimed. Norman, 836
F.2d at 1301. As the Court must be reasonably precise in excluding hours thought to be
unreasonable or unnecessary, so should be the objections and proof from fee opponents. Id.
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff seeks attorney’s fees for the work of J.H. Zidell, Esq., Natalie Starochak, Esq.,
and Samuel Gold, Esq., as well as fees for the work of Lisa Novick, a paralegal. Plaintiff also
seeks supplemental costs associated with the issuance of writs of garnishment onto
Defendants.
A. Reasonable Hourly Rates
As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff argues, in the Reply, that Defendants waived their
right to contest the requested hourly rates by failing to submit an affidavit opposing the hourly
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rates within fourteen days of receiving the Motion for Attorney’s Fees, as required by Local
Rule 7.3(a)(8). [ECF No. 142 at 1-2].
Local Rule 7.3(a) governs motions for attorney’s fees and states in relevant part:
Within fourteen (14) days after service of the motion [for attorney’s fees], the
respondent shall describe with reasonable particularity each time entry or
nontaxable expense to which it objects, both as to issues of entitlement and as to
amount, and shall provide supporting legal authority. If a party objects to an
hourly rate, its counsel must submit an affidavit giving its firm’s hourly rates for
the matter and include any contingency, partial contingency, or other
arrangements that could change the effective hourly rate.
Local Rule 7.3(a) (alteration added).
Plaintiff argues that Defendants did not submit an affidavit in opposition within
fourteen days after service of the Motion for Attorneys’ Fees. See ECF No. 142 at 1-2. A
review of the docket reflects that the parties filed an agreed motion to extend the deadline for
Defendants to respond to the Motion for Attorneys’ Fees [ECF No. 139] and that the Court
granted the agreed motion and extended the deadline for Defendants to respond to December
22, 2022. [ECF No. 140]. The docket further reflects that Defendants filed their Response on
December 22, 2022, within the extended deadline, and that Defendants included with their
Response an affidavit by attorney Adi Admit regarding defense counsel’s hourly rates charged
in this case See ECF Nos. 141, 141-6. Under these circumstances, the Court finds that
Defendants did not waive their right to object to the requested hourly rates.2
2 Even if Defendants had waived their right to object to the requested hourly rates, such a
waiver would not discharge the Court of its duty to determine the reasonableness of the
requested rates.
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Next, Plaintiff avers that his counsel learned, during the course of this litigation, that
Defendants’ insurer agreed to cover the costs of Defendants’ attorney’s fees. [ECF No. 142 at
2]. Plaintiff thus argues that Defendants failed to disclose whether their attorneys’ rates
charged in this case are discounted in light of this alleged agreement. Id. Plaintiff offers no
support for the argument that Defendants’ attorneys’ hourly rates were reduced. On the other
hand, in defense counsel’s affidavit submitted in support of Defendants’ opposition, attorney
Adi Amit declared, under oath, that there is no arrangement that may change the effective
hourly rate of Defendants’ counsel in this matter. [ECF No. 141-6 at ¶ 9]. Defense counsel’s
sworn statement is unrebutted. Accordingly, the Court will consider Defendants’ counsel’s
hourly rates in determining the reasonableness of Plaintiff’s counsel’s hourly rates.
The Court now considers whether Plaintiff’s counsel’s hourly rates are reasonable. A
reasonable hourly rate is defined as the “prevailing market rate in the relevant legal
community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skills, experience, and
reputation.” ACLU v. Barnes, 168 F.3d 423, 439 (11th Cir. 1999). With regard to hourly rates,
this Court “is itself an expert on the question and may consider its own knowledge and
experience concerning reasonable and proper fees and may form an independent judgment
either with or without the aid of witnesses as to value.” Norman, 836 F.2d at 1303 (quoting
Campbell, 112 F.2d at 144).
Here, Plaintiff requests an hourly rate of $425 for Mr. Zidell, $350 for Mr. Gold, $300
for Ms. Staroschak, and $150 for Ms. Novick. [ECF No. 126 at 11]. In support, Plaintiff
provides legal authority from the Southern District of Florida where courts found similar rates
reasonable. Id. at 8-10.
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Defendants argue that Plaintiff unjustifiably relies on decisions in which the
defendants did not object to the reasonableness of the requested rates. [ECF No. 141 at 5-6].
Defendants assert that based on the information provided by Plaintiff, the Court should
reduce the hourly rates for Mr. Zidell from $425 to $375, for Mr. Gold from $350 to $250, for
Ms. Staroschak from $300 to $200, and for Ms. Novick, the paralegal, from $150 to $125.
[ECF No. 141 at 5-8]. In support, Defendants rely on the affidavit of lead defense counsel,
Adi Amit, in which Mr. Amit states that his hourly rate for this matter was $300, that the
hourly rate for his associates was $200, and the hourly rate for his paralegal was $125. [ECF
No. 141-6 at ¶ 8].
Although most of the decisions relied on by Plaintiff to support the reasonableness of
his counsel’s hourly rates were based on unopposed fee applications, the applicants in those
decisions nevertheless bore the burden of establishing that the requested hourly rates were
reasonable. The lack of opposition to requested rates does not invalidate the courts’ findings
that the rates in those cases were reasonable.
Mr. Zidell’s requested hourly rate is $425. A review of the relevant authority in this
District reflects that attorneys of similar experience are typically awarded between $300 to
$400 per hour in similar cases. However, courts in this District have found hourly rates of up
to $450 reasonable for similar services by legal professionals of reasonably comparable skills,
experience, and reputation as Mr. Zidell. See Gonzalez v. Radiation Shield Techs., No. 20-23262-
CIV-GOODMAN, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58291, at *2-3 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 25, 2021) (finding
hourly rate of $425, which was later increased to $450, reasonable) (Goodman, J.); Toledo v.
Vioss Vision, Inc., No. 18-20309-CIV, 2019 WL 5689246, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 31, 2019)
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(Goodman, J.) (finding hourly rate of $425 reasonable), report and recommendation adopted,
No. 18-20309-CIV, 2019 WL 13144562 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 17, 2019); Mila v. Big Steve's Deli, LLC,
No. 20-60367-CIV, 2020 WL 9460230, at *2 (S.D. Fla. July 15, 2020) (Snow, J.) (same), report
and recommendation adopted, No. 0:20-CV-60367, 2020 WL 9460219 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 3, 2020).
Based on this Court’s own knowledge and experience, and taking the Johnson factors into
consideration, including consideration of the quality of the representation, counsel’s years of
experience, and all other pertinent factors, this Court finds that Mr. Zidell’s hourly rate of
$425 is reasonable and appropriate given the circumstances of this case.
Plaintiff provides less support for the requested rates for Mr. Gold and Ms. Staroschak.
Plaintiff asserts that Mr. Gold “was licensed in Florida in 2002 and had several years of
employment law experience” and that Ms. Staroschak “is licensed to practice law in the State
of Florida since 2015 and has been handling FLSA cases of this nature for approximately
three years at the time she left this Firm.” [ECF No. 126 at 7]. In support of these requested
rates, Plaintiff relies on the decision in Acosta v. Pajeoly Corp., in which the court found that a
reduced rate of $325 “is more appropriate for a senior associate working on an FLSA case”
and reduced Ms. Staroschak’s hourly rate for from $285 to $250. No. 18-23399-CIV, 2020
WL 764127, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 10, 2020) (Torres, J.), report and recommendation adopted, No.
18-CV-23399-CIV, 2020 WL 764035 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2020). This Court finds that a
reduction in Mr. Gold’s hourly rate from $350 to $300 and a reduction in Ms. Staroschak’s
hourly rate from $300 to $275 is appropriate under the circumstances presented in this case.
With regards to the requested hourly rate for Ms. Novick, a paralegal, a review of
relevant authority in this District indicates a reasonable hourly rate range of $100 to $150 for
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paralegals of comparable experience. Mila, 2020 WL 9460230, at *2 (finding hourly rate of
$150 reasonable); Garica, 23399-CIV, 2020 WL 764127 (finding hourly rate of $100
appropriate). Although the requested hourly rate is on the higher side for paralegals in South
Florida, the Court observed Ms. Novick’s participation in the trial, and Ms. Novick was
actively involved and, undoubtably, an instrumental part of Plaintiff’s trial team. Therefore,
the Court finds that an hourly rate of $150 is appropriate under the circumstances presented
in this case.
B. Reasonable Hours Expended
The Court next considers whether the number of hours spent on the matter by
Plaintiff’s counsel is reasonable. Counsel must use “billing judgment” when requesting
attorney’s fees and must exclude “excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary” hours
from any fee petition, irrespective of their skill, reputation, or experience. Hensley v. Eckerhart,
461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983); Barnes, 168 F.3d at 427. The party requesting attorney’s fees must
submit evidence sufficient to allow the court to determine that the requested fees are
reasonable. “When a district court finds the number of hours claimed is unreasonably high,
the court may conduct an hour-by-hour analysis or it may reduce the requested hours with an
across-the-board cut.” Bivins v. Wrap it Up, Inc., 548 F.3d 1348, 1350 (11th Cir. 2008).
In the Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, Plaintiff requests fees for a total of 542.85 hours
worked by counsel and a paralegal. The breakdown of the requested fees is as follows:
• 340.15 hours by J.H. Zidell;
• 62.9 hours by Sam Gold;
• 5.8 hours by Natalie Staroschak; and
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• 134 hours by paralegal Lisa Novick.
[ECF No. 126 at 11]. In the Supplemental Motion and Reply thereto, Plaintiff requests fees
for an additional 35.1 hours worked, broken down as follows:
• 30.4 hours by J.H. Zidell; and
• 4.7 hours by Lisa Novick.
[ECF No. 143-1]. Taken together, Plaintiff requests fees for a total of 577.95 hours worked,
broken down as follows:
• 370.55 hours by J.H. Zidell;
• 62.9 hours by Sam Gold;
• 5.8 hours by Natalie Staroschak; and
• 138.7 hours by Lisa Novick.
Defendants argue that the number of hours should be reduced to account for time
entries that are clerical in nature, duplicative, redundant, excessive, contain insufficient
descriptions, or are based on unrecoverable time. Defendants also argue that Plaintiff should
not be compensated for fees spent litigating fees in light of the valid arguments raised in the
Response. [ECF No. 146 at 7].
1. Hours Expended on Clerical Work and Paralegal Work
Defendants argue that they should not be forced to reimburse Plaintiff for time spent
performing work that is not traditionally done by an attorney and that does not require a
lawyer’s skill or training nor for time spent by Ms. Novick attending trial. [ECF No. 146 at 8-
10]. Plaintiff argues that time spent filing, attending trial, uploading/saving documents, and
preparing trial binders is compensable because no other employee was available to perform
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those tasks due to the size of Plaintiff’s counsel’s firm. [ECF No. 142 at 4]. Plaintiff also argues
that tasks such as calendaring and inputting filing deadlines should be compensated because
of their utmost importance in this District. Id.
Fees for paralegal work are recoverable “to the extent that the paralegal performs work
traditionally done by an attorney.” Jean v. Nelson, 863 F.2d 759, 778 (11th Cir. 1988). “Tasks
of a clerical nature are not compensable as attorney's fees." Martin v. Italian Cabinetry, Inc.,
No. 18-CV-24958, 2019 WL 3429919, at *4 (S.D. Fla. June 6, 2019) (O’Sullivan, J.) (quoting
Gates v. Barnhart, 325 F. Supp. 2d 1342, 1348 (M.D. Fla. 2002)), report and recommendation
adopted, No. 18-CV-24958-UU, 2019 WL 3425942 (S.D. Fla. June 24, 2019). Examples of
clerical work include scheduling, filing, and preparing trial binders. Ramos v. Arba Constr. Inc.,
No. 20-25192-CIV, 2021 WL 4482659, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 25, 2021) (McAliley, J.), report
and recommendation adopted, No. 20-25192-CV, 2021 WL 4480169 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 30, 2021);
Kahn v. Cleveland Clinic Fla. Hosp., No. 16-61994-CIV, 2020 WL 10502419, at *6 (S.D. Fla.
Apr. 20, 2020) (O’Sullivan, J.).
The Court finds Plaintiff has not satisfied his burden of demonstrating that time spent
on clerical work, such as filing, uploading/saving documents, and preparing trial binders is
compensable. However, the Court does find that Ms. Novick’s time spent in trial is
compensable based on her level of involvement in assisting with trial, which, as discussed
above, the Court observed first-hand. Accordingly, the Court has conducted an hour-by-hour
analysis of Plaintiff’s counsel’s bills and has removed those hours based on performance of
only clerical work.
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2. Hours Expended Litigating Fees
With regards to the supplemental fees requested in Plaintiff’s Motion for Supplemental
Attorney Fees [ECF No. 143], Defendants argue that Plaintiff should not be reimbursed for
16.9 hours spent reviewing Defendants’ Response to the Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and
drafting his Reply in light of the valid arguments raised by Defendants in their Response.
[ECF No. 146 at 7]. Defendants similarly argue that Plaintiff is not entitled to fees for the 5.1
hours spent researching and drafting the Motion for Supplemental Attorney Fees. Id. And
Defendants argue that Plaintiff should not be reimbursed for fees incurred collecting on the
Final Judgment because Plaintiff failed to indicate what efforts were made to collect on the
Final Judgment and whether the work was necessary. Id.
Plaintiff argues that the authority in the Eleventh Circuit establishes entitlement to an
award of “fees on fees.” [ECF No. 147 at 2]. Plaintiff also attaches emails sent to defense
counsel requesting that Defendants voluntarily pay the Final Judgment to demonstrate that
fees incurred in attempting to collect on the Final Judgment were necessary. [ECF No. 147-
1].
The Court agrees that under the precedent in the Eleventh Circuit, Plaintiff is entitled
to recover fees incurred litigating the amount of attorney’s fees. See Norelus v. Denny's, Inc.,
628 F.3d 1270, 1301 (11th Cir. 2010). Whether Defendants’ arguments in opposition to the
requested fees are valid or substantially justified does not affect Plaintiff’s entitlement to the
fees. See Jean, 863 F.2d at 780. As the court pointed out in Jean, not allowing fees-on-fees
would undermine the congressional policies behind awarding attorney's fees. See id. However,
the Court agrees with Defendants that several time entries are excessive and, therefore, will
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reduce the hours recoverable accordingly. Moreover, under the FLSA, Plaintiff is entitled to
recover his reasonable attorney’s fees incurred in collecting the Final Judgment. DiFrancesco
v. Home Furniture Liquidators, Inc., No. 06-21709-CIV, 2009 WL 36550, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Jan.
6, 2009) (O’Sullivan, J.). Here, Plaintiff has established that reasonable efforts were made to
collect on the Final Judgment, including applying for and obtaining three writs of
garnishment [ECF No. 134-136]. Plaintiff may recover fees for these efforts.
Based on the foregoing and a review of the record activity regarding Plaintiff’s fee
applications, the Court finds that Plaintiff may recover fees incurred litigating the amount of
attorney’s fees and attempting to collect on the Final Judgment, albeit in the reduced amounts
indicated.
3. Defendants’ Other Objections
Defendants argue that the amount of hours recoverable should also be reduced to
account for time entries that are duplicative, redundant, excessive, contain insufficient
descriptions, or are based on unrecoverable time. In support, Defendants provide a
spreadsheet identifying the contested time entries and the bases for each objection. [ECF No.
141-7]. In reply, Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ chart of objections lacks specificity and
supporting legal authority, as required by Local Rule 7.3(a). [ECF No.142 at 6]. Plaintiff also
insists that his counsel’s billing entries are not vague nor otherwise insufficient. Id.
Local Rule 7.3(a) states, in relevant part, “[T]he respondent shall describe with
reasonable particularity each time entry or nontaxable expense to which it objects, both as to
issues of entitlement and as to amount, and shall provide supporting legal
authority.”(emphasis added). Other than the objections regarding clerical work discussed
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above, Defendants did not provide legal authority supporting its objections to specific time
entries. Regardless, the Court has carefully reviewed the billing records to determine whether
the amounts sought are reasonable. Based upon an hour-by-hour review of the records, the
Court finds that Plaintiff’s requested hours warrant reduction based on time entries for clerical
work; that are duplicative, redundant, or excessive; contain insufficient descriptions; or are
based on unrecoverable time. After these reductions, the Court finds the following amounts
reasonable:
• 307.3 hours by J.H. Zidell;
• 56.8 hours by Sam Gold;
• 4.1 hours by Natalie Staroschak; and
• 111.6 hours by Lisa Novick.
C. Loadstar Amount
After taking into consideration the above findings, including reductions to hourly rates
and the reasonable number of hours billed, and applying the lodestar method pursuant to
Norman and Johnson, the Court finds that a reasonable amount of attorney’s fees in this case
is $165,510 (307.3 x $425+ 56.8 x $300 + 4.1 x 275 + 111.6 x $150).
D. Fee Multiplier
The Court next considers whether the lodestar amount should be adjusted up or down
based on the results obtained. Plaintiff requests the Court assess an attorney fee multiplier of
2 to the reasonable amount of fees because of the exceptional result Plaintiff’s counsel
achieved for their client. [ECF No. 126 at 4].
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Normally, when a plaintiff has obtained an excellent result, his attorney should recover
all hours reasonably expended on the litigation. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435. There may be some
cases of “exceptional success” where an enhanced award may be justified. Id. However, even
a complete victory for a plaintiff does not require an enhanced award because “winning on
all claims” is not “so unusual that it must be deemed ‘exceptional.’” Jones v. Cent. Soya Co.,
748 F.2d 586, 591 (11th Cir. 1984).
Here, although Plaintiff prevailed on his claims, the Court finds that the result was not
“exceptional” and therefore an enhancement is not warranted. Accordingly, the Court denies
Plaintiff’s request for a fee multiplier.
E. Supplemental Costs Requested
The following costs are taxable against a losing party:
(1) Fees of the clerk and marshal;
(2) Fees for printed or electronically recorded transcripts necessarily obtained for
use in the case;
(3) Fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses;
(4) Fees for exemplification and the costs of making copies of any materials
where the copies are necessarily obtained for use in the case;
(5) Docket fees under section 1923 of this title;
(6) Compensation of court appointed experts, compensation of interpreters, and
salaries, fees, expenses, and costs of special interpretation services under section
1828 of this title.
28 U.S.C. § 1920.
Although a prevailing party is entitled to taxable costs, the Court may still exercise
discretion in awarding the costs that Section 1920 enumerates. Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T.
Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 441-42 (1987). The Court is limited to taxing the costs specifically
authorized by statute. E.E.O.C. v. W & O, Inc., 213 F.3d 600, 620 (11th Cir. 2000) (citing
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Crawford Fitting Co., 482 U.S. at 445). Moreover, the Court must independently review the
costs sought to determine whether they are recoverable under Section 1920. See Monelus v.
Tocodrian, Inc, 609 F. Supp. 2d 1328, 1333 (Dimitrouleas, J.) (“Although [the] [p]laintiff has
failed to object to the costs set forth in [the] [d]efendant's [m]otion, the Court nonetheless
reviews each category of the items sought in the [d]efendant's [m]otion, and whether [the]
[d]efendant can properly receive monies for these categories of costs under the statute.”).
Here, Plaintiff seeks to recover $440 in costs related to efforts to collect on the Final
Judgment. [ECF No. 143]. However, as Defendants correctly point out, such costs are not
taxable under Section 1920. In reply, Plaintiff argues that even though costs related to the
collection of a final judgment do not fit into the enumerated categories in Section 1920, such
costs are compensable under the FLSA. [ECF No. 147 at 3]. Plaintiff provides legal authority
to support his position that fees incurred in relation to collecting a final judgment are
recoverable under the FLSA. The authority citied by Plaintiff does not, however, support an
award of costs incurred in collecting on a final judgment. On the other hand, it is clear that
these costs are not taxable under Section 1920.
Accordingly, the Court denies Plaintiff’s request for $440 in supplemental costs.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, it is hereby
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiff’s Verified Motion for Attorneys’ Fees
and Costs Against Defendants and Request for a Fee Multiplier [ECF No. 126] and Plaintiff’s
Verified Motion for Supplemental Attorney Fees and Costs [ECF No. 143] are GRANTED
IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. It is further
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ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiff is entitled to an award of $165,510 in
attorney’s fees to be paid by Defendants, jointly and severally.
The Court will issue a judgment as to fees and costs by separate order.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida this 9" day of June, 2023.
MELISSA DAMIAN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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