Targus International LLC v. Group III International, Inc.

United States District Court

for the

Southern District of Florida

Targus International LLC, Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

Civil Action No. 20-21435-Civ-Scola

)

Group III International, Inc., )

Defendant. )

Order on Claim Construction

Plaintiff Targus International LLC complains Defendant Group III

International, Inc., has infringed its patent—U.S. Patent No. 8,567,578 (the

“’578 Patent” or “Patent”)—which protects innovations related to its line of

“checkpoint-friendly” laptop bags and cases. (Compl., ECF No. 1.) Before the

Court is the parties’ claim-construction briefing. (Pl.’s Mot., ECF No. 107; Def.’s

Resp., ECF No. 119; Pl.’s Reply, ECF No. 131.) The Court held a hearing on

December 19, 2022, where the parties presented argument, and the Court has

carefully reviewed the briefing, the record, and the relevant legal authorities.

After full consideration, the Court finds none of the contested terms require

construction and agrees with the parties’ proposed construction of a term the

parties say is now undisputed. Accordingly, the Court grants, in large part,

the relief Targus requests in its opening claim-construction brief (ECF No.

107).

1. Background

Both parties agree that the claimed bag design is “straightforward.” (Pl.’s

Mot. at 5; Def.’s Resp. at 5.) The ’578 Patent describes and claims a computer

case designed to pass through screening at security checkpoints without

removing the computer from the case. In broad terms, the Patent teaches a

bifold case for holding objects in a first storage section and a laptop computer

in a separate, second storage section. When the case unfolds, objects in the

first storage section do not overlap with the computer in the second storage

section.

The parties agree claim 1 of the patent is representative of the patent

claims and is reprinted below, with emphasis added to highlight the disputed

language:

1. A bi-fold case to allow for convenient security screening of a

computer, comprising:

a first storage section comprising a first outer side, a first inner side,

a first proximal end, and a first distal end opposite the first proximal

end, the first outer side, first inner side, first proximal end, and first

distal end defining a first pouch with a first pouch opening and a first

pouch fastener coupled to the first pouch opening and configured to

only secure the first pouch opening, wherein the first outer and inner

sides are configured to enable a scanning device to scan through1 the

first outer and inner sides and scan an interior of the first pouch,

wherein the first storage section further comprises a third pouch

including a third pouch opening, independent of the first pouch

opening, and a third fastener to only secure the third pouch opening;

and

a second storage section comprising a second outer side, a second

inner side having a surface area approximately equal to a surface area

of the first inner side, a second proximal end, and a second distal end

opposite the second proximal end, the second storage section

comprising,

a second pouch and the second storage section configured without

an additional pouch, the second pouch configured to receive a

computer, wherein the second storage section and the second

outer

and inner sides are configured to enable a scanning device to scan

through the second outer and inner sides and scan an interior of

the

second pouch and a computer disposed therein, and

a second pouch fastener configured to substantially enclose only

the second pouch and thereby retain a computer therein,

the second storage section foldably joined at the second proximal end

to the first proximal end of the first storage section such that the

second proximal end and the first proximal end are coupled adjacent

one another to form a hinge configured to enable a scanning device to

scan through the hinge,

wherein the first and second inner sides are disposed adjacent one

another in the folded configuration and separated in an unfolded

configuration,

wherein the first and second distal ends are disposed adjacent one

another in the folded configuration and separated from one another

in the unfolded configuration,

wherein in the unfolded configuration with the outer sides of both the

first and second storage sections laid flat upon a same planar

1 The term “configured to enable a scanning device to scan through” was initially disputed but

the parties have since stipulated to Targus’s construction—“made of materials that do not

interfere with a scanning device.” The Court adopts the parties’ agreed to construction.

surface, an object in the first storage section is removed from

interfering with a scanner positioned above and below the second

storage section to enable uninhibited scanning of a computer in the

second pouch of the second storage section.

(Ex. 1, ’578 Patent, ECF No. 106-1 at 20:5-57 (formatting approximates

original; emphasis added).)

2. Legal Standard

It is the exclusive province of the Court to determine the meaning and

scope of a patent claim. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370,

372 (1996); Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 574 U.S. 318, 321 (2015).

But claim construction is required only when “the meaning or scope of

technical terms and words of art is unclear and in dispute and requires

resolution” by the Court. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Aradigm Corp., 376 F.3d 1352, 1360

(Fed. Cir. 2004). That is, absent “a fundamental dispute regarding the scope of

a claim term,” construction is not required. O2 Micro Intern. Ltd. v. Beyond

Innovation Tech. Co., Ltd., 521 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The goal

of claim construction is to give disputed terms their “ordinary and customary

meaning” as the term would mean to “a person of ordinary skill in the art in

question . . . as of the effective filing date of the patent application.” Vitronics

Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996). A person of

ordinary skill in the relevant art is the standard used because patents are

addressed to others skilled in the pertinent art. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d

1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005).

When a term requires construction, the Court’s task is a limited one. The

Court must construe only those terms that are in controversy, and “only to the

extent necessary to resolve the controversy.” Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sc. &

Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Claim construction involves

defining a term in its appropriate context. “[T]here is no magic formula . . . for

conducting claim construction. Nor is the court barred from considering any

particular sources or required to analyze the sources in any specific

sequence[.]” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1324. “To ascertain the meaning of claims, we

consider three sources: The claims, the specification, and the prosecution

history.” Markman, 52 F.3d at 979 (cleaned up).

The claim itself often provides substantial guidance as to the meaning of

particular claim terms. See Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582. Because claim terms are

normally used in a consistent manner throughout a patent, usage of a term in

one claim can illuminate the meaning of the same term in another

claim. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1324.

The claims must also “be read in view of the specification, of which they

are a part.” Markman, 52 F.3d at 979 (cleaned up). “The specification contains

a written description of the invention that must enable one of ordinary skill in

the art to make and use the invention.” Id. Furthermore, a patent's

specification is “always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis.

Usually it is dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed

term.” Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582. For this reason, the specification is “the

primary basis for construing the claims.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315. “The

construction that stays true to the claim language and most naturally aligns

with the patent’s description of the invention will be, in the end, the correct

construction.” Id., at 1316.

Courts also consider a patent’s prosecution history, if it is in evidence, to

illuminate a disputed term. Markman, 52 F.3d at 980. A patent’s prosecution

history can consist of the complete record of the proceedings before the United

States Patent Trademark Office (“USPTO”) and can include the prior art cited

during the examination of the patent, which, like the specification, can shed

light on how the inventor and USPTO understood the patent. Phillips, 415 F.3d

at 1317. However, courts are wary of placing too much emphasis on the

prosecution history because it reflects an ongoing negotiation between the

USPTO and the inventor, and thus can lack the clarity needed to be a helpful

resource. See Athletic Alternatives, Inc. v. Prince Mfg., Inc., 73 F.3d 1573, 1580

(Fed. Cir. 1996) (concluding that the evidence in the patent’s prosecution

history produced contradictory interpretations). Nonetheless, when the

prosecution history in evidence clearly disclaims an interpretation, the

disclaimed interpretation should be excluded from the claim construction. ZMI

Corp. v. Cardiac Resuscitator Corp., 844 F.2d 1576, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1988).

Finally, the Court may also rely upon extrinsic evidence, such as

treatises and dictionaries, to illuminate the meaning of claim terms. Because

extrinsic evidence is external to the patent, sometimes authored by persons not

skilled in the art in question, and does not have the benefit of being created at

the time of, or in view of, the asserted patents, it is considered less reliable,

and thus, holds less weight in claim construction. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318

(explaining reasons why extrinsic evidence is generally less reliable than

intrinsic evidence in determining how to read claims).

In sum, the Court construes only those claim terms which require

construction, and only then to the extent necessary to resolve the dispute. The

Court looks first to the claim itself and the specification. The Court may also

consider the patent’s prosecution history and various extrinsic sources, though

extrinsic evidence is weighted less than intrinsic evidence in claim

construction.

3. Analysis

The parties’ competing constructions of the claim language are

summarized as follows:

Claim Term Targus’s Proposed Group III’s Proposed Construction

Construction

“a hinge” (claims 1, no construction “a structure made only of rigid, non-

17, 21, 22, 28, 42, necessary metallic components, which cannot

50, 57) be defined as (a) ‘foldable material,’

(b) ‘deformable material or fabric,’ or

(c) ‘straps,’ the structure allowing two

sections of a case to fold or pivotally

joined [sic] onto each other.”

“substantially “substantially “not enclose”

enclose” (claim 1) contain”

“a first pouch” “Parts of a case that retain an object

(claims 1, 17, 21, on at least the bottom and the sides

either: no

22, 28, 42, 48, 50, of the object”

construction

57)

necessary or construe

“a second pouch” “Parts of a case that retain an object

“pouch” as “a pocket

(claims 1, 4, 6, 17, on at least the bottom and the sides

or partially enclosed

21, 22, 27, 28, 32, of the object and that are not the

receptacle”

42, 47, 48, 50, 57) same parts as those that make up the

‘first pouch.’”

“a first inner side” either: no “Any surface located within a case,

(claims 1, 17, 21, construction including a surface opposite the ‘first

22, 28, 42, 50, 57) necessary or construe outer side’ on the same panel as the

as “first interior side” ‘first outer side.’”

“a second inner Either: no “Any side located within a case that is

side” (claims 1, 17, construction not the ‘first inner side,’ including a

19, 21, 22, 28, 31, necessary or construe surface opposite the ‘second outer

32, 33, 42, 50, 57) as “second interior side’ on the same panel as the

side” ‘second outer side.’”

A. “hinge”

Targus maintains the word “hinge” needs no construction because the

jury will have no difficulty understanding its plain meaning. As Targus explains

it, the ’578 Patent claims use “hinge” to describe a “foldable joint.” (Pl.’s Mot. at

9 (quoting, as an example, claim 1 of the ’578 Patent: “the second storage

section [is] foldably joined at the second proximal end to the first proximal end

of the first storage section . . . to form a hinge . . . .”).)

In opposition, although Group III does not dispute Targus’s position that

a jury would have no difficulty understanding the plain meaning of the word

“hinge,” it nonetheless urges the Court to construe “hinge” such that it

excludes any joining components made with “foldable material,” “deformable

material,” “fabric,” or “straps.” (E.g., Def.’s Resp. at 10, 12.) Additionally, says

Group III, the claimed “hinge” should be construed as limited to being made

only of “rigid, non-metallic components.” (Id.)

Group III’s argument relies on its theory that the ’578 Patent’s

specifications list four (or five) distinct mechanisms for connecting the first

storage section to the second storage section, only one of which is called a

“hinge.” (Def.’s Resp. at 10 (“The ’578 Patent describes four specific

mechanisms for connecting the first storage section to the second . . . .”); id. at

12 (“the ’578 Patent described at least five alternative choices for connecting

the two storage sections together”). These different mechanisms, as Group III

characterizes them, are connections between the two sections using (1)

deformable material; (2) foldable material; (3) fabric; (4); a strap; or (5) a hinge.

(Id. at 12.) As Group III sees it, these five different mechanisms are all mutually

exclusive. Accordingly, because Targus has only claimed a “hinge,” as the

component or structure that joins the two sections, Group III reasons Targus

has necessarily disclaimed the other four mechanisms. The Court disagrees.

In pushing its theory, Group III insists that “hinge” should not receive its

ordinary and customary meaning and should, instead, be limited as described

above. As a starting point, “a claim term will not receive its ordinary and

customary meaning only in limited situations.” W.E. Hall Co., Inc. v. Atlanta

Corrugating, LLC, 370 F.3d 1343, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Among those

situations are:

where the patentee has acted as his own lexicographer and clearly

provided an alternate definition for the term; where the intrinsic

evidence shows that the patentee distinguished his invention from

a prior art reference, expressly disclaimed subject matter, or

highlighted a particular feature as important to the invention; or,

where the term chosen makes the scope of the claim so unclear as

to require resort to the intrinsic evidence for meaning.”

Id. Group III fails to show that any of these circumstances are present in this

case. Instead, Group III’s argument is that, because the patent specifications

set forth “a list of choices for connecting the storage sections”—(1) deformable

material; (2) foldable material; (3) fabric; (4); a strap; or (5) a hinge—and the

claim identifies only one of them—a hinge—the other four options are, by

implication, necessarily disclaimed. To limit the term “hinge” in this way,

though, would be to ignore the context of both (1) how the term is used in the

claim and (2) the nature of the list in the specifications on which Group III

focuses.

The ’578 Patent claims use the term “hinge” to describe the part of the

case where the “second storage section [is] foldably joined at the second

proximal end to the first proximal end of the first storage section such that the

second proximal end and the first proximal end are coupled adjacent [to] one

another.” (E.g. Claim 1, 20:42–44 (describing the formation of a “hinge” where

“the second storage section [is] foldably joined at the second proximal end to

the first proximal end of the first storage section”); Claim 17, 22:3–5 (describing

the folding connection of “the first and second proximal ends” of the first and

second storage sections as “forming a hinge”); Claim 18, 24:50–53 (“foldably

joining the first storage section to the second storage section at the first and

second proximal ends to for a hinge”).) Read in isolation, the Court finds no

difficulty in applying the ordinary and customary meaning of the term “hinge”

here as a description of the mechanics of how the sections foldably separate

from one another while remaining attached along their proximal ends. The use

of the term “hinge” here implies no obvious limitation on or specification of the

materials that make up that hinge, as Group III urges.

Nor do the lists set forth in the specifications. Group III makes the

mistake of assuming that, because items are presented in a list, connected by

“or,” each item represents a mutually exclusive option. That is, says Group III,

“‘[H]inge’ must be interpreted as something other than ‘deformable material,’

‘foldable material,’ ‘fabric,’ or a ‘strap.’” (Def.’s Resp. at 15 (emphasis in

original).) This concept, sometimes embodied by the interpretative cannon

expression unius est exclusion alterius—or “expressing one item of an

associated group or series excludes another left unmentioned,” is highly

dependent on context or circumstances. N.L.R.B. v. SW Gen., Inc., 580 U.S. 288

(2017); Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 568 U.S. 371, 381 (2013) (“The force of any

negative implication, however, depends on context.”). Importantly, drawing the

inference of exclusion is appropriate “only when the items expressed are

members of an associated group or series, justifying the inference that items

not mentioned were excluded by deliberate choice, not inadvertence.”

Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Air Capital Grp., LLC, 614 F. App’x 460, 469

(11th Cir. 2015). The Court does not find the application of the doctrine here

justified. The lists here, describing the way the first and second sections are

joined, are not associated in such a way that the mention of one necessarily

excludes the others. The lists, instead, identify different possible aspects of the

foldable connection area: characteristics of the material at that connection

(foldable or deformable); a type of material (fabric); the general mechanism or

form of the connection (hinge or strap or other structure). (E.g., ’578 Patent,

4:58, 9:16–19, 17:1–2.) The items in the list are not all stand-alone

descriptions of discrete concepts, describing distinct mechanisms for making

that connection.

For the same reason, Group III’s reliance on the disclosure-dedication

rule, to the extent it is even applicable to a claim-construction analysis, is

similarly misplaced. Under this rule, “When a patent drafter discloses but

declines to claim subject matter, this action dedicates that unclaimed subject

matter to the public.” SanDisk Corp. v. Kingston Tech. Co., Inc., 695 F.3d 1348,

1363 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (cleaned up). Unsurprisingly, the rule “is not without

restriction.” Id. Of note, “before unclaimed subject matter is deemed to have

been dedicated to the public, that unclaimed subject matter must have been

identified by the patentee as an alternative to a claim limitation.” Pfizer, Inc. v.

Teva Pharm., USA, Inc., 429 F.3d 1364, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Here, Group III

fails to establish that the items identified in the specification list represent

distinct alternatives to the claim limitation. The context here is readily

distinguishable from the disclosure-doctrine cases Group III relies on where,

for example, the specifications provided for using aluminum, stainless steel, or

nickel alloys but the patent only claimed the use of aluminum. Johnson &

Johnston Associates Inc. v. R.E. Serv. Co., Inc., 285 F.3d 1046, 1055 (Fed. Cir.

2002); see also, e.g., PSC Computer Products, Inc. v. Foxconn Intern., Inc., 355

F.3d 1353, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (finding that alternative use of plastic clip

parts was dedicated to the public where written description explained that

plastic clip parts could be substituted for metal clip parts but only metal clip

parts were claimed).

In sum, the Court finds “hinge” does not require construction and that

Group III has failed to show that the circumstances here would warrant

narrowing the word’s plain meaning as it suggests. In other words, there are no

“clear indications in the intrinsic evidence communicating an intent to depart

from an ordinary customary meaning.” W.E. Hall, 370 F.3d at 1353 (noting that

any ambiguities as to whether a patentee used a claim term inconsistent with

its ordinary and customary meaning must be disregarded). The Court finds

“hinge” here to be readily understood as encompassing whatever components

make up the connection point or juncture between the two sections, that keeps

them joined to one another while also allowing them to fold away from one

another to facilitate scanning.

B. “substantially enclose”

The parties offer competing constructions for the term “substantially

enclose,” neither of which the Court adopts.

First, Group III proposes construing “substantially enclose” as “not

enclose.” (Def.’s Resp. at 17–19.) In support, Group III explains that

“‘substantially’ communicates that the claim does not require a full enclosure,”

and then, from this, apparently concludes that this equates to a computer

being stored in the second pouch as being not actually enclosed. (Id. at 18

(emphasis in original).) The Court is unable to find the logic in Group III’s

proposal and otherwise finds no support for it. Without any apparent

justification for doing so, Group III proposes a construction of “substantially

enclose” that approaches the exact opposite of the meaning of the term rather

than clarifying any potential ambiguities.

Targus, conversely, proposes that the Court construe “substantially

enclose” as “substantially contain.” (E.g., Pl.’s Mot. at 12–14.) Targus justifies

the construction by pointing out that “‘enclose’ can mean ‘to hold or contain.’”

(Id. at 12.) Continuing, Targus explains that, without the context of the ’578

Patent, “‘substantially enclose’ refers to preventing the computer from falling

out of the pouch, i.e., containing it.” (Id. at 13.) While Targus may be right that

“substantially contain” could be a viable synonym for “substantially enclose,” it

fails to explain why such a construction, for a term that both parties seem to

agree is straightforward and understandable, is necessary. Indeed, without

more, merely replacing one understandable word with an equally-digestible

synonym does nothing to enhance comprehension. See Luminara Worldwide,

LLC v. Liown Elecs. Co. Ltd., 14-CV-3103 (SRN/FLN), 2016 WL 706190, at *12

(D. Minn. Feb. 22, 2016) (“Replacing ‘chaotic’ with ‘unpredictable’ or ‘without a

specific pattern’ simply substitutes equally-understandable words for the

inventor's already-understandable claim language and is unnecessary.”)

To conclude, the Court finds no construction of “substantially enclose”

necessary.

C. “a first pouch” and “a second pouch”2

Group III urges the Court to construe “a first pouch” as “Parts of a case

that retain an object on at least the bottom and the sides of the object” and “a

second pouch” as “Parts of a case that retain an object on at least the bottom

and the sides of the object and that are not the same parts as those that make

of the ‘first pouch.’” (Def.’s Resp. at 19.) In lobbying for its construction, Group

2 Targus urges the Court to apply collateral estoppel to prevent Group III from relitigating its

proffered construction. In support of its position—that collateral estoppel would apply in this

way—Targus cites to Pleming v. Universal-Rundle Corp., 142 F.3d 1354, 1359 (11th Cir. 1998)

and SynQor, Inc. v. Vicor Corp., 2:14-CV-287-RWS-JBB, 2022 WL 6217132, at *12 (E.D. Tex.

Sept. 26, 2022), rep. & rec. adopted, 214CV00287RWSJBB, 2022 WL 5318061 (E.D. Tex. Oct.

6, 2022) for the proposition that collateral estoppel applies to an inter partes review decision

that construes claims. The Court can find no support for that proposition in either of those

cases. Indeed, there appears to be authority to the contrary. See SkyHawke Techs., LLC v. Deca

Int’l Corp., 828 F.3d 1373, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[W]e cannot foresee how the claim

construction reached by the Board in this case could satisfy [the] ordinary elements [of issue

preclusion].”). Without more, Targus has failed to persuade, on this thin showing, that

collateral estoppel applies in this way.

III points out that, in the context of the 578 Patent, a “pouch” is clearly

something that “is used to retain an object within the bifold case.” (Def.’s Resp.

at 21.) Continuing, says Group III, any such pouch must “include[] the parts of

a case that retain an object on at least the bottom and the sides of the object—

so that the object would not fall out.” (Jd.)

The Court finds Group III’s proposed construction inadequate. Although

it lists some attributes of what a “pouch” may be, it falls short of shedding any

light on the full contours of what a “pouch,” in the context of the Patent,

actually is. For example, certainly there is no denying Group III’s unremarkable

point that “a ‘pouch’ is used to retain an object within the bifold case.” ([d.) The

second part of Group III’s proposed construction, that the parts of a case that

comprise the pouch retain the object “on at least the bottom and the sides of

the object” is no less unhelpful in clarifying the contours of the pouch. What

does Group III consider the “bottom” of the object? Presumably, if that object is

a laptop computer, being contained in the “second pouch,” the “bottom” of the

laptop is the side of the computer that would ordinarily fact down while it is in

use, for example. But, then, what to make of the part of the “pouch” that

retains the object on its “sides”? Does Group III’s “pouch” require containment

on all sides of the object? What if one or more of the object’s sides, or portions

thereof, protrude, uncovered from the “pouch”? Such a receptacle would not

retain an object on all its sides or all parts of its sides—at least one side would

be wholly exposed and parts of two other sides would be partially exposed.

Such a container would seem to be improperly excluded using Group III’s

construction. Group III also fails to supply any probative evidence to the Court,

in its briefing, to support its proposed construction.

Instead, within the parties’ joint claim construction and prehearing

statement, Group III points to the embodiment in Figure 13B of the Patent,

reproduced below, as “evidence” supporting its construction. (Jt. Stmt., Ex. A.,

4, ECF No. 58-1.)

1312

aS)

1322 “6 ONS

\ 2?

1308 1306 □□□ / = 1332

AL

1305

“1330 7304

NN Fig.13B

~ 1309

Group III’s position seems to be that what the figure identifies as “1306”

qualifies as a “pouch.” But the specification itself describes that aspect of the

figure, marked as “1306,” as a “recess,” not a “pouch”: “[t]he inner side 1309 of

the second, computer storage section 1308 may comprise a recess 1306.” (578

Patent at 16:31-34 (emphasis added).) The specification further teaches that a

computer could then be “secured within the recess 1306 using retention

member 1330,” which it explains could be “a cover (not shown), a strap, or

other selective means (e.g., a friction fit, a lip on the recess 1306, webbing, one

or more cords, or the like).” (Id. at 16:34-38.) The Court agrees with Targus

that although covering the “recess” with a “cover” would form a “pouch,” the

recess by itself or even with the strap (or a friction fit, a lip, webbing, or one or

more cords) is differentiated from the claimed “pouch.” Accordingly, Figure 13B

does not support Group III’s definition of a “pouch.”

For its part, Targus maintains “pouch” requires no construction or, if the

Court finds that it does, should be construed as “a pocket or partially enclosed

receptacle.” (Pl.’s Mot. at 14.) In support of its position that no construction is

necessary, Targus points to Figure 3B in the specification:

320

312

é?

Ss 300

310

AS

<O

Fig. 3B

302

The specification explains, “The case 300 includes a pouch 302 that receives,

supports, protects, and at least partially covers a portable computer 304.” In

the context of the patent, the Court agrees with Targus that “pouch” needs no

construction as it would be readily understood by a jury.

Finally, the Court does not find Targus’s alternate construction, defining

“pouch” as either a “pocket” or “partially enclosed receptacle” helpful. It would

seem “pocket,” alone, would reach too broadly, encompassing receptacles

beyond a pouch. And Targus fails to explain why a “partially enclosed

receptacle” is not already encompassed by the plain meaning of “pouch.”

D. “a first inner side” and “a second inner side”

Finally, Group III takes issue with the Patent’s terms “a first inner side”

and “a second inner side.” (Def.’s Resp. 22-24.) Group III complains that

“Targus is looking for a flexible scope these terms,” protesting that Targus has

shifted its definition of what part of the case comprises an “inner side” when

mapping the terms to Group III’s products. (Jd. at 8, 22-24.) At the heart of

Group III’s argument are the following figures, reproduced from Group III’s

response:

eS

□□ ccexertes ums

AD Dron mately Equal

'g at lnsisreadienamey Gan

aes End = og

~ ra Second

Second Storage ™— Distal End

Section

Targus’ Position Before IPR Targus’ Position After IPR

(Def.’s Resp. at 8, 23.) Group III’s complaint is that Targus’s dashed green line

encircling the “inner side” of the second storage section of an accused bag, on

the left, is at odds with the dashed green line encircling a more circumscribed

area of the inner side of what appears to be a second storage section from a

different accused bag, on the right. Group III describes the image on the left as

Targus’s “initial,” “previous,” or “original position”’—“before” the inter partes

review—and the image on the right as Targus’s “newfound current position”’—

“after” the inter partes review. (Id. at 8, 23-24.) Based on this discrepancy,

posits Group III, the “inner side” could be either the inner side of the inner

panel of a section or the inner side of an outer panel of that section. In other

words, Group III’s position is that the “inner side” can be the inner surface of

the same piece of fabric that makes up the outer side of a storage section.

Accordingly, Group III proposes construing “a first inner side” as “Any surface

located within a case, including a surface opposite the ‘first outer side’ on the

same panel as the ‘first outer side.” Similarly, Group III proposes construing “a

second inner side” as “Any side located within a case that is not the ‘first inner

side,’ including a surface opposite the ‘second outer side’ on the same panel as

the ‘second outer side.” The Court is not convinced.

Considering the patent as a whole, the Court concludes a jury would

have no difficulty understanding what an “inner side” of one storage section is

in relation to another storage section. The Patent describes each storage

section, the first and the second, as having inner sides that “are disposed

adjacent one another in the folded configuration and separated in an unfolded

configuration.” (°578 Patent at 20:45-47.) The Patent also explains that the

first storage section, for example, is comprised of “a first outer side, a first

inner side, a first proximal end, and a first distal end opposite the first

proximal end, the first outer side, first inner side, first proximal end, and first

distal end defining a first pouch.” (Jd. at 20:7-12.) Similarly, the second storage

section is comprised of “a second outer side, a second inner side having a

surface area approximately equal to a surface area of the first inner side, a

second proximal end, and a second distal end opposite the second proximal

end, the second storage section comprising, a second pouch.” (/d. at 20:22-28.)

It is readily apparent to the Court from the claim, that the described “inner

sides” cannot be the inner surface of the same piece of material that makes up

the outer side of a storage section. Such an interpretation would make it

impossible, for example, for “the first outer side, first inner side, first proximal

end, and first distal end” to “defin[e] a first pouch.” (Id. at 20:9-12.) Instead,

under Group III’s construction, “the first outer side, first inner side, first

proximal end, and first distal end” would simply define one side or part of a

pouch.

Further, the parties both easily identify the same part of the case as the

“inner sides” of the storage sections using Figure 10D:

on 1004

il i ih portman a 1008

“second inner side” ™ ae distal end” — vate =

a oy

Tanne Ao.10 ~<—O F.0D gh

second inner side has a surface area

approximately equal to a surface area

of the first inner side

Group III’s Depiction Targus’s Depiction

(Def.’s Resp. at 22; Pl.’s Mot. at 19 (yellow highlights added by the Court in

both images).) In light of these figures, Group III simply provides no support for

its proposed construction, that the inner side could additionally be the inside

surface or face of an outer panel. Indeed, the Court can discern no support for

construing “inner side” as only one surface, or face, of a particular panel of a

storage section rather than the panel itself. In other words, the “inner side,” as

described in the Patent, is the “inner side” of a section as a whole; not the

“inner side” of only a given panel of the section. The Court finds a jury would

readily discern that the “inner side” refers to the part of the storage section that

is on the inside of the bag as a whole (when closed) as opposed to the outer

side which is the part of the storage section that is on the outside of the bag.

Nor does the Court find Targus’s divergent mapping of the green dashed

lines onto the inner sides of two different accused products (as depicted on

page 12, above) supportive of Group III’s construction. First, the cited to figures

are contemporaneous, both found in exhibits attached to Targus’s second

amended infringement contentions which was served on Group III on October

25, 2022. (See Def.’s Resp., Ex. B to Pl.’s 2d Am. Infr. Cont., ECF No 119-2, 17;

Def.’s Resp., Ex. C. to Pl.’s 2d Am. Infr. Cont., ECF No. 119-3, 16.) Accordingly,

Group III’s contention that the two figures show a change or evolution in

Targus’s position, over time, is without merit. Second, Targus’s presentation of

the two figures is focused on mapping an entirely separate claim requirement,

that the inner sides “hav[e] a surface area approximately equal,” onto two

different accused bags. (Ex. B (“SwissGear 2700 USB Scansmart Laptop

Backpack”); Ex C (“SwissGear 3670 Scansmart Laptop Backpack”).) And,

finally, Targus maintains that the green dashed line, encircling the “inner side”

of the “second storage section,” in the image on the left, was, in any event, in

error. (Pl.’s Reply at n. 3 (citing Ex. B at 17).) Instead, says Targus, the green

dashes should encircle only the corresponding part of the pouch as shown in

the figure on the right, consistent with Targus’s other depictions of the same

accused product with respect to the mapping of other claim requirements—for

example, the purple-shaded area and the area pointed to as the “[s]econd inner

side” in the following two depictions:

uae End

4 First Inner Side

First Storage |

Section First

Second Pouch id Proximal End

4 = Second

Computer bail Si Inner Side

—S

Second Storage

Section

(Ex. B at 15, 18.) In sum, Group III’s description of the discrepancy between

the two green, dashed lines in the two figures is inaccurate, irrelevant, and

apparently based on a typographical error and, accordingly, does not persuade

the Court that the term requires construction or, even if it did, that Group III’s

construction should be adopted.

4. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the Court concludes the following terms,

found within the claims designated, require no construction:

e “a hinge” (claims 1, 17, 21, 22, 28, 42, 50, 57);

e “substantially enclose” (claim 1);

e “a first pouch” (claims 1, 17, 21, 22, 28, 42, 48, 50, 57);

e “a second pouch” (claims 1, 4, 6, 17, 21, 22, 27, 28, 32, 42, 47, 48, 50,

57);

e “a first inner side” (claims 1, 17, 21, 22, 28, 42, 50, 57); and

e “a second inner side” (claims 1, 17, 19, 21, 22, 28, 31, 32, 33, 42, 50,

97).

On the other hand, the Court adopts the parties’ now-undisputed proposed

construction of “configured to enable a scanning device to scan through” (in

claims 1, 17, 21, 22, 28, 42, 47, 50, 57) as “made of materials that do not

interfere with a scanning device.”

As such, the Court mostly grants Targus’s opening claim construction

brief (ECF No. 107), as fully set forth above.

Done and ordered, at Miami, Florida, on January 5, 2022.

t= N. Scola, Jr.

United States District Judge